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ABSTRACT 
Companies are legal persons and as much part of commercial traffic as the 
natural persons owning and controlling them. Compared to one another, 
companies and natural persons nevertheless have very different legal abilities 
and characteristics. It is therefore not unexpected that they are treated differently 
for purposes of the law of taxation. As a result it may often be more beneficial to 
have the profits generated by a business enterprise taxed in a company rather 
than in the hands of a natural person, especially in instances where a shareholder 
would be commercially indifferent to whether those profits are generated in a 
company or not. 
By using the separate legal personality of a company shareholders may often 
perpetrate an abuse of that separate legal personality. Such abuse of legal 
personality can also take place when legal personality is employed primarily for 
tax reasons. 
While a limited form of abuse of the corporate veil is tolerated, whether the use 
of separate legal personality for tax reasons amounts to an abuse thereof beyond 
what is permitted in South Africa can be determined in terms of three tests. These 
tests are the traditional “piercing of the corporate veil” judgments forming part of 
the common law, section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the General 
Anti-Avoidance Rules (“GAARs”) (and other specific provisions) in the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962. This dissertation considers when any of these various tests 
will dictate that the separate personality of a company be ignored (or “pierced”) 
for purposes of taxes levied in terms of the Income Tax Act. 
Through critical analysis of both the South African rules on piercing as applied 
for tax purposes as well as the circumstances under which selected other 
jurisdictions provide for piercing for tax reasons the dissertation formulates what 
best practice and desired policy for piercing for tax reasons are. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Background 
In South African law, as in most jurisdictions, both natural persons and juristic 
persons take part in everyday commercial life. 
Natural and legal persons share various characteristics. Both can own assets 
in their own name and earn income for their own account from those assets. 
Similarly, both natural and legal persons have the responsibility to answer for 
their own liabilities.1 Yet natural and legal persons also have very different 
commercial abilities as well as different constraints imposed upon them by law 
because of their nature. For example, natural persons are unable to pay 
dividends, while juristic persons only exist in an abstract sense by virtue of law. 
Similarly, no one can nowadays legally own natural persons, whereas juristic 
persons exist typically to fulfil some legitimate purpose. So too in relation to the 
law of taxation very different rules apply to natural persons and legal persons 
respectively. This is not only true for the different tax rates at which legal and 
natural persons are taxed at but applies also broadly to the various tax regimes 
available to each.  
The legal person’s separate legal personality defines its existence. Since the 
company form is arguably the most common manifestation of legal personality 
today, this dissertation deals exclusively with the separate legal personality of 
companies. The company form may at times have access to beneficial tax 
regimes that natural persons do not have access to and it may therefore 
sometimes be more beneficial from a tax perspective for natural persons to be 
economically active by employing a company as vehicle to operate through 
indirectly.2 Apart from the potentially beneficial tax rates applicable to a company, 
other tax advantages linked to involving a company in transactions include the 
                                            
1 See the text to ch 2 part 2 3 below. 
2 AS Silke Tax Avoidance and Tax Reduction PhD dissertation, University of Cape Town 
(1958) 49. 
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often more beneficial income tax regimes in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
(“Income Tax Act”) that apply to them. These include being able to register as a 
“public benefit organisation” or a “small business corporation” and to have access 
to the group relief provisions contained in the Income Tax Act3 (which essentially 
involve moving assets to and from other group companies without incurring any 
tax consequences). Moreover, South African companies are generally not subject 
to dividends tax.4  
In 1984 Gower had already identified that the tax benefits associated with the 
company form are such that many may purposefully pursue economic interaction 
through a company for this reason alone: 
 
“[I]t is a trite observation that today taxation is one of the main factors for consideration 
in any legal transaction and this is especially true of company law. Indeed, it is 
probably fair to say that in the last 60 years more companies have been formed 
because of the real or imagined taxation advantages than for any other single reason. 
Tax considerations influence the choice of business medium, the financing of 
companies and their capital structures and, not infrequently, their management 
structures.”5 
 
This statement is even more relevant today, more than 30 years later.  
One should acknowledge that different tax consequences are not always the 
only commercial driver when deciding whether to hold assets or run a business 
through a company. Considerations such as the limited liability of shareholders 
and the perpetual existence of a company6 are some of the other influencing 
factors when deciding whether to conduct a business by using a company with 
separate legal personality. However, even where these commercial factors do 
not have a material bearing on a person’s decision to consider in which form to 
cache a business or hold assets, such person may opt to do so through the most 
tax beneficial structure available.  
                                            
3 Ch II, part III of the Income Tax Act. 
4 S 64F(1)(a). 
5 LCB Gower Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (1984) 239. 
6 See the text to ch 2 part 2 3 below. 
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By utilising the company form primarily to achieve a tax advantage the line 
between prudent tax planning and impermissible tax avoidance becomes blurred. 
Even more so considering that the use of the company form would then extend 
beyond the goal that it purports to serve in commercial traffic.7 While it is possible 
in certain instances for legal personality to be created outside of the legislative 
framework, statute law creates the company form specifically.8 It is therefore a 
potentially uncomfortable contradiction where a statutory creation, the company, 
is used to frustrate the levying of taxes by another statutory instrument, the 
Income Tax Act. 
 
2 Research question and scope  
2 1 Research question 
About three decades ago the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) expressed concern that a person, acting through a legal 
entity created in a state with the sole purpose of obtaining treaty benefits, may 
obtain those treaty benefits which would not otherwise have been available to 
such person directly.9 
This succinctly sets out the concern that this dissertation seeks to address, 
namely that companies can achieve tax benefits solely by virtue of their 
recognition as separate legal persons. The problem extends wider than the 
context of double taxation agreements (“DTAs”) to include also situations where 
persons can access tax relief provided for in domestic tax legislation.10 To date, 
only specific anti-avoidance legislation could address this problem. In instances 
not covered by these anti-avoidance provisions, the concern could not be 
                                            
7 See the text to ch 2 part 2 2 below. 
8 S 19 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
9 OECD Double taxation conventions and the use of conduit companies R(6) (adopted 
by the OECD Council on 27 November 1986) (1986) para 1.  
10 See the examples in part 3 of this chapter below. Whereas Example 3 serves as 
example in the treaty shopping context and in relation to which the OECD has expressed 
concern, Examples 1, 2 and 4 are examples of how the same anti-avoidance problem 
manifests in a domestic tax context.  
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addressed in an adequate fashion. Examples of such inadequacies are set out 
below.11 
The common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil (“piercing doctrine”) 
has historically presented a remedy whereby it is possible for a court to ignore 
the separate legal personality of the company in certain instances, most notably 
when used to engage in “improper conduct”.12 
The overarching research question that this dissertation will consider is 
whether it is possible to apply the piercing doctrine as a remedy in the South 
African income tax context where the separate legal personality of a company is 
used mainly for tax purposes. It will do so by considering whether the potential 
piercing remedies as exist in the developed common law doctrine, section 20(9) 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”) or in the General Anti-
Avoidance Rules (“GAARs”) contained in the Income Tax Act apply.13  
 
2 2 Scope limitation 
It is necessary to limit the field of study to focus the research. Therefore this 
dissertation focuses on a consideration of the piercing doctrine as it pertains to 
“companies” as defined in section 1 of the Companies Act only, or companies 
formed in other countries in terms of comparable legislation that may exist in 
those other countries. The position of “non-profit companies” as defined in section 
1 of the Companies Act is excluded. 
The dissertation’s focus will further be limited to a consideration of piercing for 
tax purposes only. Piercing in this work is moreover only concerned with piercing 
as it may be applied at an income statement level. In other words, the dissertation 
does not consider whether existing tax debts may be recovered through the 
application of piercing, but rather whether piercing may be applied to affect the 
                                            
11 See the text to part 3 of this chapter below.  
12 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
13 Ch III, Part IIA of the Income Tax Act. 
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calculation of a tax expense or for purposes of determining for which person the 
tax debt arises.14 
Although the investigation’s scope is limited to taxes levied in terms of the 
Income Tax Act, it is conceivable that a wider application of the study is possible. 
The above limitations of scope do not suggest that the conclusions reached 
are exclusively applicable to companies as such or even to matters of taxation. 
Indeed, the conclusions reached may frequently be equally applicable to other 
corporate forms (close corporations being a case in point)15 or even to piercing 
as applied outside the context of the law of taxation.  
 
3 Examples of tax avoidance achieved by using the corporate veil 
Taxpayers attempt to avoid the incidence of tax in a variety of manners. Many of 
these involve complex structures and transactions which this dissertation will not 
attempt to investigate. In certain instances, it is also possible to mitigate tax in an 
uncomplicated manner. This dissertation considers four such simple examples 
whereby it is possible to use the separate legal personality of the company to 
obtain a tax advantage for those behind the company and for which specific anti-
avoidance provisions in the Income Tax Act do not exist. 
 
Example 1: 
An individual holding a portfolio of South African listed shares would be liable for 
dividends tax levied at 20% on any dividends declared on those shares. In 
contrast, South African tax resident companies are exempt from dividends tax.16 
By transferring those shares solely to avoid dividends tax to a company of 
which the individual holds all the shares, the individual would delay the incidence 
                                            
14 Ch III, Part IIA, for example and if applicable, has specific provisions dealing with the 
allocation of tax consequences.  
15 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 4 below for a comprehensive discussion on the position 
of close corporations. 
16 S 64F(1)(a). 
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of dividends tax until such time (if ever) when the dividends received by the 
company are declared as dividends to the individual.17 
 
Example 2: 
An individual operating a business is subject to income tax at a rate of up to 45%. 
However, a company would be subject to income tax at 28%.  
An individual, earning taxable income at the maximum marginal rate, will 
benefit if he transfers his business operation to a company which he wholly owns 
due to the difference in tax rates between the individual and the company. This 
is the case even after one considers the effect that any subsequent dividends tax 
may have, should the company’s profits eventually be distributed to the individual 
by way of a dividend. 
 
Example 3: 
The individual in Example 1 considers it likely that the company holding his share 
portfolio will in future years distribute to him all the dividend receipts which it is 
likely to receive. The individual understands that at that stage dividends tax will 
become payable. To mitigate the 20% dividends tax due at declaration of that 
ultimate dividend the individual designs a corporate structure with a Mauritian tax 
resident company interposed between the individual and the wholly owned 
company resident in South Africa for tax purposes.  
Mauritius does not have a dividends tax regime in place. Therefore, the 
interposition of the Mauritian company reduces the dividends tax that the South 
African company pays to the Mauritian company from 20% to 5% in terms of the 
South Africa/Mauritius double taxation agreement (DTA).18 The South African tax 
                                            
17 See National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Bill (2008) 38 et seq where the National Treasury identified taxpayer behaviour of this 
nature as a risk. 
18 At article 10(2)(a) of Article 10 (Dividends) of the agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Mauritius for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income (effective 28 May 2015). 
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Three different trusts each own a valuable asset. Due to concerns relating to the 
imminent depreciation of the value of these assets, the trustees of each of the 
trusts decide to dispose of their respective assets with a view to reinvesting the 
proceeds in a different asset class. None of the capital beneficiaries of any of the 
trusts qualifies at this stage to receive any of the capital profits to be realised. 
However, the trustees are concerned about the high effective capital gains tax 
rate that would apply to such an asset disposal. 
Utilising the “roll-over” provisions of section 42 of the Income Tax Act the 
trustees transfer the assets held to a single company in which these trusts 
collectively hold shares. The company now owns the assets previously held by 
the three trusts. These trusts now instruct the company to dispose of the assets. 
Consequently, the company is now able to dispose of the assets and to be taxed 
at a more beneficial tax rate than would have applied to the trusts. 
 
These examples not only illustrate how the corporate veil may be used to 
achieve a tax advantage, but also how tax avoidance may be achieved in different 
contexts. I intend to measure each of the four examples above against the 
conclusions that are reached in this dissertation. The aim is to consider whether 
it is possible to apply the remedies identified in this research successfully, be it in 
terms of common law, the Companies Act or the Income Tax Act, to address the 
tax benefit otherwise achieved regardless of the context. I apply and refer to these 




The use and employment of assets generate income and income tax arises from 
income being earned. It follows that the owner of an asset will usually be the 
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recipient of the income generated therefrom. Income tax is therefore, most of the 
time, inherently linked to the ownership of assets.19 It is thus possible to 
manipulate income tax consequences by transferring ownership of an asset to a 
company. A result of such a transfer would be that the tax consequences 
attendant on the income subsequently earned by that company will be more 
beneficial than would have been the case had the income not accrued to and not 
been taxed in the hands of the company. In this manner it is possible to avoid or 
delay the incidence of income tax for the ultimate commercial beneficiary, even 
though ownership and attribution of value from underlying assets still lie in the 
control of the transferor shareholder, albeit indirectly through the shareholder’s 
legal ownership of the shares in the company.  
This dissertation considers the scope of the legally permissible use of legal 
personality mainly for tax purposes. It does not focus on specific transactions, but 
rather on the doctrinal legal question namely whether the law permits the use of 
ownership through a company structure to achieve a tax benefit, ultimately for its 
shareholder. If not permissible, the appropriate remedy would be to ignore the 
separate legal personality of the company in those instances or to pierce the 
corporate veil, whether in terms of statute or the common law. 
The analysis of the piercing doctrine in this dissertation strives not to be a 
repetition or summary of the many works published on the piercing doctrine, 
although it is necessary to a limited extent to revisit these briefly to lay the 
foundation for the remainder of the discussion. This is particularly the case with 
the analysis in chapter 2, which starts with an overview of the doctrine of separate 
juristic personality and the potential limitations thereof brought about by the 
piercing doctrine. That chapter further considers the reason for devising separate 
juristic personality as a now entrenched legal concept. The piercing doctrine 
serves as an exception to the doctrine of legal personality and chapter 2 seeks 
to define the scope of the latter doctrine. In focusing the research it further 
considers what piercing amounts to in practice and what it does not, by identifying 
the common law doctrines or remedies that differ from piercing.  
                                            
19 CIR v King 1947 14 SATC 184 199. 
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In her contribution to the IFA Rome Congress in 201020 Olivier states that there 
are generally three measures to address impermissible tax avoidance in South 
Africa: (1) the application of common law principles; (2) specific fiscal legislative 
measures; and (3) the legislated GAARs in the Income Tax Act. 
This dissertation states the law as at December 2018. It considers each of the 
above three measures as applied to the use of corporate personality for tax 
purposes specifically. I consider this a timely and relevant analysis, considering 
the recent developments in all three contexts identified above. In particular, the 
enactment of the Companies Act has brought with it a new potential remedy in 
section 20(9), which possibly also affects how the common law piercing doctrine 
will be applied in future. In recent years there have also been two significant 
judgments in the United Kingdom (“UK”) dealing with the piercing remedy as 
applied in that jurisdiction.21 These statutory and common law remedies (to the 
extent that they may be applied) stand in contrast to the Income Tax Act’s 
relatively new GAARs22 that no court of law has applied to date. 
Chapter 3 considers whether it is possible for the South African Revenue 
Service (“SARS”) to apply the common law piercing doctrine as a remedy in the 
event of the abuse of legal personality for tax purposes. As part of this analysis 
the South African context is considered, as well as that of the UK, the United 
States of America (“USA”), Australia and Canada. I identified these jurisdictions 
specifically as representing those legal systems that have had a historically 
significant influence on the development of the South African common law system 
generally.23 Although chapter 3 commences with an analysis of the piercing 
                                            
20 International Fiscal Association Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2010 Rome 
Congress) Vol 95a: Tax treaties and tax avoidance: application of anti-avoidance 
provisions 719. 
21 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp 2013 UKSC 5 and Prest v Petrodel 
Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 (discussed in the text to ch 3 part 4 1 below). 
22 Introduced in 2006. 
23 The importance of such a comparative legal study, specifically in the piercing context, 
is particularly relevant. See Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 161:  
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doctrine as applied generally, it ultimately focuses on the application of the 
analysed doctrine for tax purposes only. The traditional common law doctrine 
prohibits the use of juristic persons when the use of separate legal personality 
would amount to an abuse of legal personality in order to perpetrate fraud, 
dishonesty or other improper conduct, and then only if policy considerations in 
favour of piercing outweigh those considerations opposed thereto.24 The evasion 
of legal obligations appears to amount to improper conduct.25 Chapter 3 therefore 
ultimately considers whether the avoidance of tax may amount to such an evasion 
of a legal obligation. If it does, the corporate veil may be susceptible to piercing 
under South African common law as a remedy against impermissible tax 
avoidance, providing that piercing would also be justifiable in terms of the relevant 
policy considerations identified in that chapter. 
The commencement of the Companies Act of 2008 on 1 May 2011 brought 
with it a statutory piercing provision contained in its section 20(9). In terms of this 
provision it is possible to disregard the separate legal personality of a company 
where it has been the subject of “unconscionable abuse”. It is not immediately 
clear what actions could amount to “unconscionable abuse”. Chapter 4 attempts 
to give content to the phrase that contains various striking similarities, and 
dissimilarities, when compared to the statutory piercing provision contained in 
section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (“Close Corporations Act”). 
It is also not immediately apparent to what extent one should consider the 
statutory piercing provision as a replacement of or enhancement to the common 
law piercing doctrine. Only once these questions have been thoroughly 
considered can a conclusion be drawn whether section 20(9) may potentially 
serve as a remedy against the use of the corporate veil for tax purposes.  
If there is impermissible tax avoidance the obvious remedies should be those 
contained in the Income Tax Act. While this Act does contain various remedies 
                                            
“Vir beter perspektief omtrent die mate van ontwikkeling wat hier plaasgevind het of 
moontlik nodig geag mag word, is 'n verwysing na oorsese regstelseld (sic) nie 
onvanpas nie.” 
24 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
25 554. 
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against the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes, such as the “controlled 
foreign company” or “personal service company” regimes, other forms of tax 
avoidance may also occur outside the scope of these specific anti-avoidance 
provisions. Some examples have been provided in part 3 of this chapter above. 
In the absence of any specific anti-avoidance provisions in the Income Tax Act, 
the sole remaining remedy in the Income Tax Act to potentially address abuse of 
the corporate veil for tax purposes is that contained in its GAARs.26 Chapter 5 
considers the efficacy of these rules in addressing the abuse of the corporate veil 
for tax purposes, particularly with a view to investigate the best practice in 
choosing to apply the common law doctrine, section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
or the GAARs in the Income Tax Act as remedy in the income tax context. 
Such a comparison of the predicted effectiveness of the remedies is set out in 
chapter 6 and is based on the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters. 
The purpose of that comparison and this dissertation generally is to suggest the 
most effective remedy available in South Africa to address shareholders’ actions 
primarily aimed at achieving tax avoidance by using the corporate veil. 
 
5 Methodology 
5 1 Holistically 
The research methodology followed in this dissertation is of a non-empirical and 
doctrinal nature. The research comprises primarily of case law, legislation 
(notably the South African Income Tax Act and Companies Act) as well as a 
selection of academic journal articles, theses and books. Although the 
dissertation considers the research question in the context of the South African 
legal framework, it also refers to various international reference works to inform 
the South African position where applicable. 
 
5 2 Chapter by chapter 
Chapter 2 considers the piercing doctrine generally, particularly in the context of 
the common law where the doctrine originated. Chapter 3 proceeds to apply the 
                                            
26 Ss 80 to 80L of the Income Tax Act. 
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developed common law doctrine to the income tax context specifically and as a 
means to address the problem statement identified in part 2 1 of this chapter 
above. Because these chapters focus mainly on the common law position as it 
exists today, both in South Africa and in other selected jurisdictions, those 
chapters comprise mostly of an analysis of case law. 
The focus of chapter 4 is to consider the content of the piercing remedy 
contained in section 20(9) of the Companies Act. The research methodology 
followed in that chapter is one of detailed statutory interpretation. 
The final potential remedy considered in this dissertation is whether SARS may 
apply the GAARs in the Income Tax Act as a statutory piercing remedy. Therefore 
this chapter also follows a statutory interpretative approach, but with significant 
reference to those judgments that have considered the scope and content of the 
GAARs as these existed in terms of previous legislative instruments. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The analysis in chapters 2 and 3 portrays an academic controversy that has 
always surrounded the piercing doctrine, which sentiment Blackman echoes: 
 
“It is an area of the law that has resisted clarity and coherence.” 27 
 
For the reasons advanced in chapter 4, I regard the introduction of section 
20(9) of the Companies Act as bringing significant clarity to the doctrine, both 
when applied in terms of section 20(9) and in terms of the common law. 
This research departs from the premise that separate corporate personality 
may have the effect of avoiding or delaying the levying of taxes in terms of the 
Income Tax Act. I identified examples of such instances above.28 In particular this 
dissertation considers whether the avoidance of tax in these manners are 
addressed by any one of the common law piercing remedy, section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act or the GAARs of the Income Tax Act. To the extent that it does, 
                                            
27 MS Blackman, RD Jooste, GK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R de la Harpe 
Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) 4-133. 
28 See the text to part 3 of this chapter above. 
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this study concludes by highlighting which of these remedies is the most effective 
mechanism through which to address tax avoidance achieved in this manner. 








In both South Africa and elsewhere a company is regarded as a distinct and 
separate legal person.29 Metaphorically speaking, the respective separate 
existences of the company and the shareholder is said to be divided by the 
“corporate veil”. 
This chapter first considers the concept of separate corporate personality, 
including how it arises and what the disregarding thereof entails. It further 
considers why and on what basis the separate existence of a company is 
recognised.30 Thereafter the nature and consequences of the corporate veil are 
considered against the backdrop of the historical development of separate legal 
existence, as well as the commercial requirements that this separateness 
purportedly serves. The circumstances under which the corporate veil may be 
                                            
29 See the text to part 2 of this chapter below. 
30 As explained by Benade in ML Benade “Selfstandigheid van die maatskappy-
regspersoon” (1967) 30 THRHR 213, one cannot determine when the separate legal 
persona of a company should be disregarded without considering why the 
“separateness” itself should even be recognised:  
“Die doel wat die reël dien, bepaal die mate waarin dit aangehang moet word; in die 
woorde van regter Frankfurter: ‘Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract 
categories … They have a specific juridical origin and etiology. They derive meaning 
and content from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the purposes 
they were designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a live tree to its roots.’” 
[own emphasis]  
Benade further cautions that companies serve a certain purpose in society – they are a 
means to an end (also see MP Larkin “Regarding judicial disregarding of the company’s 
separate identity” (1989) 1 SA Merc LJ 277 295). Therefore, he continues, one should 
be cautious to treat a company’s separate legal persona as an absolute rule; this would 
have the effect of making the rule (ie the means) into the end itself. Fairness 
considerations, according to Benade, should be the primary scale in considering the rule. 
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pierced in South Africa for income tax purposes are considered in later 
chapters.31 
Only once the above matters have been discussed will it be appropriate to 
consider when the disregarding of that separate legal existence will be justified. 
 
2 Defining the company 
The definition of a company in section 1 of the Companies Act does not offer any 
profound revelation as to the nature, abilities, and responsibilities of a company: 
 
“‘company’ means a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act, a 
domesticated company, or a juristic person that, immediately before the effective 
date- 
(a) was registered in terms of the- 
(i)  Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973), other than as an external 
company as defined in that Act; or 
(ii)  Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act 69 of 1984), if it has 
subsequently been converted in terms of Schedule 2; 
(b)  was in existence and recognised as an ‘existing company’ in terms of the 
Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973); or 
(c)  was deregistered in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act 61 of 1973), 
and has subsequently been re-registered in terms of this Act …” 
 
The definition describes a company as a juristic person incorporated either in 
terms of the Companies Act, or alternatively in terms of either the repealed 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“Repealed Companies Act”) or the Close 
Corporations Act (coupled with a conversion from a close corporation to a 
company). Clearly, this definition does not sufficiently address the question of 
what a company is. 
The most significant aspect to take from this definition of a company may be 
that the company is stated to be a juristic person. This phrase lends the most 
essential criterion of a company’s existence to it, which is its separate legal 
                                            
31 See chs 3 to 5 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
 
personality and existence.32 Although the common law itself also recognises 
separate legal personality, the Companies Act creates that separate legal 
existence for the company form specifically.33 
 
2 1 The historical development and basis upon which separate corporate 
personality is recognised 
The advent of the new and current company law era in South Africa was marked 
by the enactment of the Companies Act of 2008 that came into effect on 1 May 
2011.34 However, to what extent a different corporate law regime has been 
introduced as a result (particularly regarding the law involving the piercing 
doctrine) is still rather uncertain. Nevertheless, one can predict with relative 
certainty that the position prior to May 2011 will continue to form the basis of 
many aspects of current South African company law.35  
The present Companies Act36 continues to endorse one key position long 
entrenched in South African corporate law and previously recognised by the 
Repealed Companies Act.37 This is that a company is a separate juristic person, 
capable of performing its own actions (through representatives), with perpetual 
succession and with members who have, generally, no liability for the obligations 
                                            
32 FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats, Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) 31; RC Williams “Companies: Part I” in WA Joubert (ed) Law 
of South Africa IV 2 ed (2012) para 65; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies 
Act 4-107 – 4-111. 
33 See the text to n 45 below. 
34 Proc R32 in GG 34239 of 26-04-2011. 
35 Specifically at issue is whether those cases dealing with piercing under the Repealed 
Companies Act (although admittedly piercing was not applied in terms of that Act, but 
rather in terms of the common law framework influenced by that Act) are still good law 
under the new Companies Act. The submission is that these cases still apply and that 
as far as piercing is concerned, the Companies Act did not bring about any changes 
which render these old cases useless. This can also be inferred from a reading of Ex 
Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC). See generally the text to ch 4 part 
2 below on the interpretation and application of s 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
36 S 19(1) and (2) of the Companies Act.  
37 S 65(1) of the Repealed Companies Act.  
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of the juristic person. A company is also considered a separate person for the 
purposes of the Income Tax Act.38 
The company’s separateness recognised in law is, however, not sacrosanct.39 
The law also provides for the “piercing”40 of the corporate veil when the separate 
juristic personality of the company may be disregarded, referring to those 
circumstances where the fiction of separate legal personality41 created by law 
may be disregarded.42 Piercing, as developed in South Africa, stems from the 
English common law43 and is applied internationally in Commonwealth states and 
beyond.44 
The separate legal existence of the company form for legal purposes is 
traditionally created ex lege.45 This is also the case for South Africa: 
                                            
38 Refer to the discussion in ch 2 part 2 3. 
39 Benade (1967) THRHR 213. 
40 Or “lifting” – see ch 2 part 3 2 2 below. Some would distinguish between “lifting” and 
“piercing” the corporate veil. See Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd: The Coral 
Rose (No 1) 1991 4 All ER 769 (“Atlas Maritime Co SA”) where “lifting” is said to be 
applied to determine some quality of the company with reference to its shareholders (eg 
intent). To the extent that this distinction is accepted, this research will be limited to a 
discussion of “piercing” in its conventional sense only. 
41 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-108 and Williams “Companies: 
Part I” in LAWSA 64; cf Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 31. 
42 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 85. 
43 The historic English common law has made more than a significant contribution to 
South African Company law (Benade (1967) THRHR 213). The South African Company 
law legislation and the judgments by South African courts developing it (as recently as 
the example in Ex Parte Gore) were predominantly based on the prevailing English law 
for a number of decades. Refer also Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 3. 
44 See the text to n 48 and ch 3 part 4 below.  
45 Lord Halsbury LC in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 29. Also refer to the 
discussion below regarding the historical development of corporate legislation to this 
effect in South Africa. This does not detract from the fact that legal personality can also 
be afforded to an organisation in common law (Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 4-112). The Companies Act is not the sole provider of legal personality 
in our law. The common law legal person, the universitas personarum, is also endowed 
with legal personality (cf Ex-TRTC United Workers Front v Premier, Eastern Cape 
Province 2010 2 SA 114 (ECB) 122F-123A; Blackman et al Commentary on the 
 




“(1) From the date and time that the incorporation of a company is registered, as 
stated in its registration certificate, the company- 
(a) is a juristic person, which exists continuously until its name is 
removed from the companies register in accordance with this Act; 
[and] 
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of an individual … 
(2)  A person is not, solely by reason of being an incorporator, shareholder or 
director of a company, liable for any liabilities or obligations of the company 
…”.46 
 
The separate existence of a company is of course no new revolutionary 
concept brought about by the Companies Act. Rather, the notion of companies’ 
independent existence can be traced as far back as Roman law.47 This concept 
was further developed as part of Roman-Dutch law48 to find application in 
                                            
Companies Act 4-112). For the purposes of this dissertation though, only the position of 
companies as distinct legal persons is analysed.  
46 S 19 of the Companies Act. Cf s 65(1) of the Repealed Companies Act. 
47 PJ Badenhorst, M Pienaar, H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s: The Law of Property 
5 ed (2006) ch 3.3. 
48 Voet 1 8 28 and the text to ch 3 part 4 1 (see also the reference and discussion thereof 
in Webb & Co Ltd v Northern Rifles 1908 TS 462). The Dutch East India Company was 
one of the first modern companies – see the useful discussion in this regard in Frans v 
Paschke 2010 JOL 26212 (NmH). Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 4 refers to the 
alleged first stock company, being a Russian company formed as far back as 1553. 
Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 62 also refers to Webb & Co Ltd v Northern 
Rifles 1908 TS 462, where it is concluded that the definition of a “corporation” for Roman-
Dutch law purposes was (at 464-465): 
“an aggregation of individuals forming a persona or entity, having the capacity of 
acquiring rights and incurring obligations to a great extent as a human being, (to be) 
distinguished from a mere association of individuals by the fact that it is an entity 
distinct from the individuals forming it, its capacity to acquire rights or incur obligations 
is distinct from that of its members, which are acquired or incurred for the body as a 
whole, and not for the individual members”.  
See also Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 24. 
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modern-day South African company law whilst incorporating a strong English 
influence.49 
This strong English influence in South African company law is to be expected, 
given the historical development involved and the political context when the 
enabling legislation came into being. In South Africa companies were first 
formalised under legislation by the Cape Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability 
Act 23 of 1861. This Act was based almost entirely on English legislation, the by 
then repealed Joint Stock Companies Act of 184450 as well as its successor in 
the form of the Limited Liability Act of 185551 which first introduced the concept 
of limited liability for the shareholders of a company in English law.52 
Subsequent Acts in the Union of South Africa and later the Republic, all 
recognising the separate existence of a company, were first the South African 
Companies Act 46 of 1926 (“1926 Companies Act”), followed by the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 the present Companies Act of 2008 and (to some extent) the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”).53 
The first English judgment fully recognising the separate legal identity of a 
company, later followed both in South Africa and elsewhere, was Salomon v A 
Salomon & Co Ltd (“Salomon”): 
 
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to its 
memorandum; and though it may be that, after incorporation, the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee 
for them.”54 
 
                                            
49 Benade (1967) THRHR 214. 
50 7 and 8 Vict c 110. 
51 18 and 19 Vict c 133. 
52 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 4-5; JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & 
M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the cases (1999) 1-2.  
53 S 8(4) of the Constitution.  
54 1897 AC 22 51. 
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Some years later the Salomon principle that a company constitutes a separate 
legal person was endorsed as forming part of South African law in Dadoo Ltd v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council (“Dadoo”).55  
The Dadoo and Salomon cases have been accepted as laying the foundation 
for the recognition of the separateness of a company’s personality in South 
African company law.56 This was reconfirmed as recently as 2013.57 
While the separate legal personality of the company therefore remains 
embedded in the Companies Act it is important to recognise that the company is 
still a statutory creature, unlike for example the trust which is merely regulated by 
statute as opposed to being created by it. Although legal personality has its roots 
in common law the legislature, in creating the company form, utilises this concept 
in creating its own instrument in the form of the company. The modern company 
is a statutory creation of the Companies Act with its very existence bound to the 
provisions and purpose of that Act. 
 
2 2 The need for separate corporate personality 
The company as legal entity, precisely because of its separate juristic existence, 
continues to play a vital role in the modern commercial environment. One would 
struggle to imagine economic activity without having the use of a vehicle like a 
company to separate the legal and commercial existence of an enterprise from 
the individuals involved therein. The early development of this concept and the 
survival thereof over time58 provide evidence of the necessity for mercantile law 
to recognise the existence of such a being.  
                                            
55 1920 AD 530. Innes CJ at 551 held that “(a) registered company is a legal persona 
distinct from the members who compose it.” See also Banco de Mocambique v Inter-
Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 330 (T) 345:  
“In Dadoo Ltd & Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 the Appellate 
Division enshrined the inviolability of corporate personality.” 
56 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 160.  
57 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC). 
58 Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 24. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21 
 
Gower59 identifies three broad functions that the modern company may fulfil, 
namely: 
 
1 for purposes other than the profit of their members, that is so-called non-
profit companies; 
2 to enable a sole merchant or limited number of partners to carry on a 
business; and 
3 to enable the investing public to share in the profits of an enterprise without 
having to be involved in the active management of the business carried on. 
 
This dissertation does not consider or discuss non-profit companies. However, 
the second and third functions of a company formulated by Gower speak to the 
very essence of the development of the doctrine of separate judicial existence. 
This is that commercially active natural persons want to trade and invest indirectly 
through the use of corporate entities rather than transacting in their own capacity.  
This preference is a result of the onerous realities that would otherwise arise, 
for example greater exposure to the risk of liability to creditors or incurring 
unlimited losses in spite of the full-time investment of time and skill.60 The use of 
corporate entities comes at a cost for society, for example in the form of credit 
risk for potential creditors, but that is tolerated due to the benefits created through 
increased economic activity.61 It can therefore be argued that limited liability 
achieved through incorporation is acceptable to society.62 In a sense, it comprises 
a social contract between shareholders and society based on the expectation that 
this limited liability will generate increased benefits for society in future, society 
being a stakeholder in companies in general.63 
                                            
59 11. 
60 PL Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) 177 et 
seq. 
61 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 35; South African Company Law for the 
21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-
2004. 
62 S 19 of the Companies Act is a manifestation thereof. 
63 South African Company Law for the 21st Century GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-2004. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 22 
 
To this end the law has developed to provide a pragmatic approach to these 
realities and requirements: the recognition of the concept of the modern-day 
company. With this recognition also comes the recognition of the existence of the 
company distinct from its shareholders so as to allow these functions to be 
served, effectively allowing for the interposing of the corporate veil between the 
shareholders of the company and the underlying assets thereof. This allows the 
corporate form to engage in activities on a scale and over a period which 
individuals acting in their own capacity are unable to achieve.64 
However, this separateness is limited and the law will refuse to recognise the 
legal fiction that it itself creates if the circumstances so necessitate. The 
circumstances under which the disregard of the separate corporate personality 
of a company will be allowed are discussed in chapters 3 and further. Suffice it to 
say at this stage that some form of abuse of corporate personality is required.65 
The company embodies the commercial requirement for separateness that 
has underpinned the historical development of the doctrine of separate 
personality to serve exactly that commercial purpose: to enable and encourage 
natural persons to pool resources for the benefit of a joint enterprise. In other 
words, the act of separation of assets from natural persons’ own estates and the 
transfer thereof into a common pool, similar in many ways to a partnership, gave 
rise to the recognition of this separateness. Initially, this was arguably not for 
protection against creditors as much as it was for protecting the various 
stockholders from one another. This protection prevented stockholders from 
taking more from the common pool than that to which they were entitled.66 
Certain commercial needs and realities exist in the community which the law 
serves. These include the three functions listed by Gower above, but also the 
specific consequences of incorporation discussed in part 2 3 below, for example 
limitation of liabilities or fault and the ability to transact separately. These are all 
                                            
64 S Deakin “The Corporation as Commons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance 
and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise” (2012) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 339 352-
353. 
65 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) para 20. 
66 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 4 and 62. 
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legitimate reasons for incorporating a company and by implication to make use 
of the separate legal personality thereof. It is where corporate personality is 
sought for purposes other than the afore-mentioned, that the law should consider 
disregarding the legal existence put in place by it. 
It remains to be considered whether the use of corporate personality for tax 
purposes should be regarded as such a legitimate commercial purpose. Chapter 
3 concludes that it is not.67 Not only would such a use amount to an abuse of 
corporate personality, being a use for which it was not intended, but indeed abuse 
to such an extent that the law should not recognise the corporate veil for these 
purposes. The corporate veil was not introduced with tax purposes in mind nor 
was it developed as such. There is no authority to support the notion that one of 
the legitimate uses of the corporate form would be the avoidance of tax.  
It is not disputed that the corporate veil can bring about certain tax benefits or 
that some of these benefits have been purposefully introduced to allow and 
encourage certain commercial behaviour. This dissertation agues though that the 
corporate veil was not designed to achieve beneficial tax results as one of its 
foremost legitimate goals and that the law should not recognise the corporate veil 
to the extent that it is primarily so applied. 
 
2 3 The consequences of separate corporate personality 
The fact that a company exists as a juristic person by virtue of incorporation68 
means that it is endowed with various attributes, most of which flow from its legal 
personality. This gives rise to various abilities and consequences for the company 
itself as well as its shareholders. 
Different legal consequences are linked to the concept of separate legal 
personality attributed to a company.69 Crucially, these include the recognition of 
                                            
67 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 4 below specifically. 
68 S 19(1)(a) of the Companies Act. 
69 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 35 et seq; Blackman et al Commentary on 
the Companies Act 4-111 et seq; PM Meskin, P Delport & Q Vorster Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2012): Notes on “Juristic Person”; Pretorius et al Hahlo’s 
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a company as a separate legal entity existing as a legal persona distinct from its 
members (that is perpetual existence), the limited liability which the 
shareholder(s) of a company have towards the obligations of the company, and 
limited ownership of the assets of the company. 
These consequences are set out in section 19 of the Companies Act. From 
section 19(1) it follows that a company can exist perpetually and perform its own 
actions, with the resultant consequences, separately from its shareholders. 
Section 19(2) explicitly provides that shareholders are not liable for the debts of 
the companies in which they hold shares.70  
The consequences arising from incorporation extend to more than merely 
perpetual existence, the ability to contract and the limited liability of shareholders 
to company creditors.71 Of great importance, especially where the law of taxation 
is concerned, is that the profits, and by implication the taxable income, of a 
company belong only to that company. It follows that a further consequence of 
incorporation is that a company is also subject to taxation of its income if such a 
tax exists in a particular jurisdiction.72 This arises primarily from the ability of a 
                                            
South African Company Law 11; HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis, PA 
Delport, L de Koker & JT Pretorius Cilliers & Benade – Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) 10. 
Also see Voet 1 8 28 et 3 4 1 as well as Lord MacNaghten’s judgment in Salomon v A 
Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 52. 
70 Although admittedly the subsection is phrased in a peculiar manner (presumably to 
mirror the wording in the Close Corporations Act – cf s 2(3)), it is arguable that the 
provisions of subsection (2) do not add anything not already put in place by s 19(1) of 
the Companies Act. It is submitted that the separate juristic personality afforded to a 
company in terms of subsection (1) would suffice to argue that the debts of companies 
are in any event removed from their shareholders. 
71 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-114 list 21 consequences of 
separate juristic, or corporate, personality. Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 35 
et seq consider eight consequences, while Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade – Corporate 
Law 10 identify five consequences of separateness. Williams “Companies: Part I” in 
LAWSA 65 et seq considers twenty. 
72 S 5(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act. 
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company itself to enter into contracts or to transact.73 For purposes of this 
dissertation this capacity to transact, as well as the separate liability of the 
shareholders vis-à-vis a company, is of particular importance. As is discussed 
below, for income tax purposes the corporate veil allows transactions to have tax 
consequences separately in the company and not in the hands of the 
shareholders themselves. Secondly, it means that any tax debts arising as a 
result are that of the company alone and that they cannot be recovered from the 
shareholders.74  
In terms of the South African Income Tax Act, and most other fiscal acts, a 
company is regarded as a fully-fledged separate taxpayer. According to section 
1 of that Act a “‘taxpayer’ means any person chargeable with any tax leviable 
under this Act” [own emphasis]. 
Because a company is considered a “person” for tax purposes,75 the 
conclusion is obvious – a company is liable for income tax and is subject to the 
administrative duties that accompany this. 
                                            
73 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-119; cf s 33 of the Repealed 
Companies Act and s 19(1)(b) of the Companies Act. 
74 The exception in s 181 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (“Tax Administration 
Act”), is discussed in ch 5 below. This will, however, no longer be the case where piercing 
is applied, whether on a transactional or income statement level (the so-called income 
statement piercing, where tax consequences arise for the shareholder and not the 
company) or on a creditor’s balance or balance sheet level (the so-called balance sheet 
piercing, where the veil is pierced to hold the shareholders of the company liable for its 
tax debts). 
75 The definition of “person” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act does not specifically mention a 
company as a person, although the word “includes” precedes the list of “persons” listed 
there. There is no doubt that a company is considered a person for purposes of the 
Income Tax Act. An argument similar to that raised in CIR v Friedman and Others NNO 
1993 1 SA 353 (AD) in the context of trusts would undoubtedly fail if it were to be 
employed by a taxpayer where a company is involved. See Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service v Professional Contract Administration CC 2002 1 SA 179 (T) 185:  
“It is trite that a body corporate, be it a company or a close corporation, having one 
member, has legal personality and as such is an individual taxpayer.”  
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Being a taxpayer in terms of the Income Tax Act is, however, not only to the 
disadvantage of the company. Various beneficial tax regimes exist which 
companies, sometimes exclusively, are able to access.76 These beneficial 
treatments available to companies often give rise to the formation or utilisation of 
companies with the purpose of reaping these tax benefits; not so much for the 
benefit of the company itself, but for the benefit of the shareholders behind it. 
Very often it will be more beneficial to have income taxed in the hands of the 
company as opposed to the hands of natural person shareholders. The focus of 
chapter 3 and further in this dissertation will be the extent to which it is acceptable 
for shareholders to seek out these tax benefits linked to the use of a company 
purposefully and primarily.  
 
3 Defining piercing 
As stated above, there are circumstances in which the law will disregard the 
separate legal existence of a company brought about by section 19 of the 
Companies Act. Although these circumstances will only be discussed in chapters 
3 to 5, the notion of piercing the corporate veil itself and what it entails will be 
discussed in greater detail here first. 
 
3 1 Introduction 
Piercing is essentially a manifestation of the “substance over form” doctrine.77 
This becomes particularly relevant when legal personality is easily obtained 
through the registration of companies: legal personality is created through the 
relatively simple submission of certain documents to the Companies and 
                                            
See also ITC 1670 [1998] 62 SATC 34 38 and ITC 1618 [1996] 59 SATC 290. The 
definition of “person” in section 1 of the Interpretation Act, 33 of 1957, supports the above 
conclusion. 
76 See Silke Tax Avoidance and Tax Reduction 49. Examples include the exemption from 
dividends tax levied on receipt of dividends, exemption from PAYE generally, potentially 
beneficial income tax rates compared to high-earning natural persons, beneficial regimes 
for companies qualifying as “small business corporations” (s 12E), etc.  
77 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 1 below. 
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Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”). As stated above,78 although there is 
a practical need in modern society to have such a thing as separate corporate 
personality, this ease of access to legal personality together with the favourable 
consequences associated therewith, makes the act of incorporation open to 
abuse.79 It is interesting to note that the increased ease linked to registering a 
company – and creating legal personality – is a stated policy objective for which 
the Companies Act was drafted and introduced.80 
It is certainly arguable that the greater ease of incorporating companies will 
lead to an increase in companies being incorporated, for both legitimate and 
illegitimate purposes. Therefore it is inevitable that more instances of abuse of 
corporate personality will occur.81 It is a necessary consequence that the 
application and use of remedies to counter that should receive more attention. 
Remedies previously described as “exceptional”82 should be applied in a less 
exceptional fashion to keep track with the changing legal framework in which they 
are to function. 
 Piercing is the legal remedy against such abuse of the benefits attached to 
legal personality. 
                                            
78 See the text to ch 2 part 2 2 above. 
79 According to CIPC, a company can be registered for as little as R400 by filing three 
forms: Reservation of a name, Notice of Incorporation, and Memorandum of 
Incorporation. See CIPC “Company Registration” (2017) CIPC <http://www.cipc.co.za/ 
Companies_files/CompanyReg.pdf> (accessed 23-08-2017). Silke Tax Avoidance and 
Tax Reduction 42 identified the ease of incorporating companies in as early as 1958 
already as being a concern and a clear cause for increasing incidences of the avoidance 
of tax. 
80 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform 
GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-2004 3.3 (27). 
81 “Abuse” is not a rigid concept. What constitutes “abuse” is subject to judicial judgment 
and consideration which are bound to change over time. Changes in judicial opinion are 
for example apparent when comparing the later judgments of Salomon in the House of 
Lords and Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 
(A) to the earlier judgments of lower courts. 
82 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA); Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 
2 SA 558 (C). 
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 “Piercing of the corporate veil” is understood to refer to an act by either the 
legislature or the courts83 in terms of which the separate legal personality of a 
company is disregarded. One frequently associates piercing with the attribution 
of the liabilities of a company to that company’s shareholders,84 but it is certainly 
not limited to this. 
Various definitions are available to describe piercing. Blackman et al offer the 
following brief effort: “In certain instances the separateness of a company from 
its shareholders is disregarded by the court.”85 
In Ex Parte Gore NO and Others (“Ex Parte Gore”),86 the most recent South 
African case to consider piercing in detail87 and the first to do so in terms of the 
legislated remedy now in section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the concept was 
considered to entail “a facts-based determination by the courts in certain cases 
to disregard some or all of the characteristics of separate legal personality that 
statute law ordinarily attributes to a duly incorporated company …”.88 
Finally, the explanation in the widely accepted leading South African case 
dealing with piercing, Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 
                                            
83 Although there is an obiter dictum in Lategan and another NNO v Boyes 1980 4 All SA 
638 (T) 647 (“Lategan”) that direct statutory authority for disregarding corporate 
personality does not amount to a “true example of ‘piercing the veil’”, piercing by way of 
statute is confirmed in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 164. 
84 See for example Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd: The Coral Rose (No 1) 
1991 4 All ER 779:  
“To pierce the corporate veil is … treating the rights or liabilities or activities of a 
company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders.” 
85 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-133. Williams “Companies: Part 
I” in LAWSA 85; Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 112 and Cilliers et al Cilliers 
& Benade – Corporate Law 13 also regard the primary element of piercing as one 
whereby the separate existence of the legal person is being disregarded. Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 41 agree with this but add that it is essentially a remedy 
examining the substance of the company, rather than its form.  
86 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC). 
87 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 below.  
88 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 4. 
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(“Cape Pacific”),89 states that piercing is applied where “a court would be justified 
in certain circumstances in disregarding a company’s separate personality in 
order to fix liability elsewhere for what are ostensibly acts of the company …”.90 
 
3 2  Misapplications 
It is trite that the piercing doctrine is often the source of much confusion, mostly 
because of the inaccurate and loose application of facts and law and labelling 
these as examples of piercing, where in fact it is not accurate to do so.91 It is 
therefore necessary to use the phrase sparingly. 
Two examples of such wrong labelling are often encountered, one of which is 
included, in my view incorrectly, under the banner of “piercing”, and the other 
incorrectly excluded therefrom.92 The first mistake involves that “piercing” can 
also refer to directors, as opposed to shareholders, being ascribed the liabilities 
of a company, predominantly because of some wrongdoing on their side. The 
second one involves that “lifting” the veil is something different from piercing and 
                                            
89 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
90 553. 
91 This is an inevitable and unhappy consequence of the use of metaphors, identified 
specifically concerning the corporate veil as early as in 1926 in Berkey v Third Avenue 
Railway 244 NY 84, 94, 155 NE 58, 61:  
“The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one 
that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly 
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. We 
say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation 
operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as an ‘alias’ or a 
‘dummy’...”.  
See too Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-133: “It is an area of the 
law that has resisted clarity and coherence”; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
48 and Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 85; also the UK case of VTB Capital plc 
v Nutritek International Corp 2013 UKSC 5 124:  
“However, such pejorative expressions are often dangerous … and, while they may 
enable the court to arrive at a result which seems fair in the case in question, they 
can also risk causing confusion and uncertainty in the law.” 
92 Cf Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 85. 
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involves looking to the shareholders, directors or broader management of a 
company to determine certain attributes of a company, for example residence for 
tax purposes93 or intention. 
The reasons why these are considered to be mistaken are briefly discussed 
below. 
 
3 2 1 Piercing to ascribe liabilities to directors 
Numerous examples exist of how piercing has been considered in the past as 
also including the ascribing of liabilities of a company to its directors, as opposed 
to its shareholders.94 It is submitted that this is not piercing in its true sense and 
that the doctrine should be limited purely to the realms of the company-
shareholder relationship. The historical development of the doctrine of separate 
corporate personality discussed above,95 as well as that of the piercing doctrine 
itself, dictate that this be the case. This is, however, by no means to suggest that 
the directors of a company can never be held accountable for the obligations of 
                                            
93 Estate Kootcher v CIR 1941 AD 256 at 260; T Gutuza “Has recent United Kingdom 
case law affected the interplay between ‘place of effective management’ and ‘controlled 
foreign companies’?” (2012) 24 SA Merc LJ 424 434. 
94 The Lategan case is arguably the best illustration where piercing has been applied as 
such. See Lategan and another NNO v Boyes 1980 4 All SA 638 (T) 645 and 647, which 
also refers to Orkin Bros. Ltd v Bell 1921 TPD 92 (“Orkin Bros”) as representing a case 
of “piercing” on a similar basis (yet, not called “piercing” as such in that judgment); the 
FAIS case of Siegrist v Botha – The Office of the Ombud for Financial Service Providers 
case no: FAIS 00039/11 – 12/GP1. Also see the UK case of Ad Valorem Factors Ltd v 
Ricketts 2004 1 All ER 894. The difference between piercing and holding directors liable 
for the debts or actions of a company is well illustrated by a comparison of ss 180 and 
181 of the Tax Administration Act, the latter representing true piercing, whilst the former 
does not. (The fact that s 180 does not amount to “piercing” as such, of course does not 
detract from the validity of that section.)  
95 See the text to ch 2 part 2 1 above. 
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a company, be it on a statutory,96 contractual, or delictual basis.97 The submission 
is merely that this is not piercing in the true sense. 
Blackman et al argue,98 in my view correctly, that directors of a company are 
not held liable personally by virtue of the separate corporate existence of a 
company being disregarded, but rather based on misrepresentation of the in-
substance agency agreement which exists between company and director. In 
such instances, the director is held personally liable in the same manner as an 
agent would have been had it misrepresented its principal.99 The agency 
relationship existing between director and company as opposed to the legal 
relationship existing between shareholder and company should not be 
confused.100 
Blackman et al further argue that directors of a company being held personally 
liable in terms of the Companies Act does not amount to piercing since it amounts 
to “rules to be applied by the court”, in other words piercing by the legislature.101 
Although the conclusion itself is to be agreed with, one is left unsatisfied with the 
argument used to come to that conclusion, being that piercing is a common law 
instrument alone. If “statutory piercing” does not constitute “piercing” as such, 
                                            
96 An example is the provisions of s 19(3) of the Companies Act (comparable to s 53(b) 
of the Repealed Companies Act). 
97 Many regard the director-company relationship as one akin to an agency agreement 
in terms of which the director may (as the controlling mind or alter ego) act as agent of 
the company. This may be true even though no formal agency agreement exists between 
the company and its director (Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 52; Blackman 
et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-110; Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 
64). 
98 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-146. 
99 Refer also Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 63; Williams “Companies: Part 
I” in LAWSA 85. For an Australian perspective, see H Anderson “Piercing the Veil on 
Corporate Groups in Australia: The Case of Reform” (2009) 33 Melb UL Rev 342. 
100 See the text to part 4 2 4 of this chapter below for a discussion of agency in the context 
of piercing. 
101 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-146; Cf Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 63. 
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then neither section 65 of the Close Corporations Act nor section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act would amount to piercing.102 
The corporate veil is set in place to create a person separate from its 
shareholders, not separate from the directors. Although directors and 
shareholders may both benefit from the existence of a company, the shareholders 
alone benefit from the corporate veil as such.103 
The fact that directors quite often represent the face of the company easily 
leads to misunderstanding, but the abuse of a corporate relationship should not 
be confused with an abuse of the separateness which the corporate veil creates. 
A company requires natural persons to act on its behalf as it is itself physically 
unable to do so, for example to sign contracts. However, this is no different from 
the duty imposed on a person acting on behalf of or representing a person legally 
unable to act for themselves, for example minors and the mentally ill. In much the 
same way the director of a company performs certain actions on the company’s 
behalf. When this duty is betrayed, it does not amount to an abuse of the 
corporate personality of the legal persona, but rather to the misuse of the 
association and of the position of the director with the company. To liken directors’ 
personal liability for the liabilities of a company to piercing is to argue that a 
breach of duty also amounts to the misuse of the existence of the natural or legal 
person being misrepresented in a conventional agency context.104 
It must be remembered that piercing is a legal remedy to guard against the 
misuse of corporate personality.105 The question therefore should be: when 
                                            
102 Cf Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 4. 
103 Al-Kharafi & Sons for General Trading, General Contracting and Industrial Structures 
Wll v Pema NO & others 2010 JOL 25851 (GSJ) 39 directs that a company-shareholder 
relationship is foundational to the application of the piercing doctrine. 
104 Directors, as the agents of companies, have a fiduciary duty towards the companies 
which they manage (Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 
180), the breach of which will lead to personal liability. See Part F of Ch 2 of the 
Companies Act generally. 
105 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 
553. Also see Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 16 where ownership 
is identified as a necessary prerequisite before a court could consider piercing. 
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directors are held accountable for the liabilities of a company, does that attribution 
of liability arise as a result of the directors’ misuse of the corporate personality of 
that company or from the misuse of their association with that company? In my 
view the latter: the separateness of the company vis-à-vis the shareholder is 
simply not the separateness available to the directors. Had the notion of separate 
corporate personality not existed, with the result that businesspeople had to 
conduct business in partnership, the managers or directors of the business would 
still have been separate from the business owners.106 The separateness brought 
about by the corporate veil does not create a separateness for the directors that 
would otherwise not have existed. 
That is not to say that directors never misuse or misrepresent companies and 
that other remedies to correct such misuse or misrepresentation do not exist. The 
argument is rather is that the existing remedies in such instances remain valid, 
but are not related to the piercing doctrine. The difference between cases where 
directors misuse a company as opposed to the shareholders doing so is that the 
company does not belong to the directors; the owners thereof (the shareholders) 
merely entrust its management to their care. It is therefore necessary to bear in 
mind that separate legal personality has been developed as a legal solution to a 
commercial requirement. Where the attribution of the obligations of a company is 
concerned, this is best left to situations where the shareholders are held 
personally liable and not the directors.107 
                                            
106 See M Dendy “Agency and Representation: Preliminary Note” in Forms and 
Precedents (2014) 5.2. Legal separateness is attributed to the agency relationship that 
exists between managers / directors and the persons who they represent. Irrespective 
of whether the principals in question are partners of a partnership or a legal person such 
as a company, that legal separateness exists in both instances between principal and 
agent irrespective whether the conglomore of principals have legal personality or not. 
107 This also explains the piercing of close corporations (see the text to part ch 4 par 2 3 
4 below). The uniqueness of close corporations lies therein that their members effectively 
occupy the position of both director and shareholder. Suffice it to say at this stage that 
close corporations can be pierced because members have a vested ownership interest 
in the close corporation and not because they manage that legal persona as the directors 
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In conclusion, Cassim et al108 and Lategan v Boyes (“Lategan”)109 appear to be 
the only authorities to consider the incurrence of personal liability by a company’s 
directors for the liabilities of that company to have anything to do with the 
corporate veil. The submission here is that the corporate veil is an entirely 
separate matter from the directors of a company being held personally liable.  
On the strength of the above arguments it is my view that section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act cannot be applied to hold directors of a company liable, 
irrespective of the reference to “another person” in that subsection, as this would 
not result in the “unconscionable abuse” of the juristic personality of a company, 
but at the most the abuse of the company itself.  
Although the issue may only involve secondary matters such as using the 
correct legal label,110 director liability is excluded from the scope of this 
dissertation. The incorrect use of the phrase confuses and overcomplicates the 
application of the legal doctrine. 
 
                                            
of a company would. See also Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd: The Coral 
Rose (No 1) 1991 4 All ER 779:  
“To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating the 
rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or activities of 
its shareholders.” [emphasis by Stocker LJ] 
108 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 63 refer to piercing of the corporate veil 
when applied to directors as “lifting the veil” (which is somewhat confusing considering 
the discussion in the text to ch 2 part 3 2 2 below where this phrase is ordinarily reserved 
for attributing certain characteristics to a company). See the text to n 125 below. See too 
at n 210 of Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act which seems to support 
the notion that directors being held personally liable is linked to the corporate veil, which 
is not the case. “Veil limitation” as discussed at the references made there is linked to 
shareholder liability and not that of directors. 
109 See the text to n 93 above. In this case piercing was (incorrectly) found to apply and 
that purely on the strength of the decision in Orkin Bros, which did not conclude that 
holding directors liable amounted to piercing. Also refer to Lategan and another NNO v 
Boyes 1980 4 All SA 638 (T) 647 for the lack of authority acknowledged by Le Roux J. It 
appears from this too that the authority referred to does not support the notion of drawing 
in the liability of directors under the banner of piercing. 
110 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 4. 
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3 2 2 Lifting distinguished from piercing 
It is a settled principle in South African law that courts are justified in attributing 
certain characteristics of natural persons who stand in a particular relationship 
with a company to that company itself, such as a shareholder,111 director112 or 
even a senior employee.113 In the income tax milieu in particular the attribution of 
such characteristics would include for example determining what the subjective 
intent of a company is.114 All depends on the facts and circumstances at hand. 
The rationale behind such attribution is that the law generally requires legal 
persons to be subject to the same principles that govern natural persons, for 
example that a legal person is able to commit a crime or delict, enter into 
contracts, or be subject to tax. To this end it is required that legal personae also 
be awarded certain attributes, even if only fictionally, to allow the appropriate legal 
consequences to flow. Quite often, these attributes will be afforded to a company 
based on how these are attached to the individuals who act on behalf of or as the 
“directing mind” of that company.115 A company has “no soul to damn and no 
body to kick”116 and “acts through its directors”.117 
The decision whereby a court attributes these characteristics of individuals to 
legal personae has been drawn by some into the realm of the piercing of the 
                                            
111 Refer to the examples in John Bell and Company (Pty) Limited v Secretary for Inland 
Revenue [1976] 38 SATC 87; Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van 
Binnelandse Inkomste [1978] 39 SATC 163 and Yates Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1956] 20 SATC 238. 
112 Refer to the example in CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd [1956] 20 SATC 355. 
113 SARS’ Interpretation Note 6 3; OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital 2014: Commentary on Article 4 (2014) para 24.1.  
114 See e g Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 
[1978] 39 SATC 163. 
115 Benade (1967) THRHR 217; John Bell and Company (Pty) Limited v Secretary for 
Inland Revenue 1976 38 SATC 87 100. Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 80 and 
81 gives examples of some of these attributes. 
116 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 31 referring to this statement by Lord 
Chancellor Thurlow. 
117 Barkett v SA Mutual Trust & Assurance Co Ltd 1951 2 All SA 462 (A). 
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corporate veil.118 Confusion abounds as far the inconsistent use of the phrase 
“lifting the corporate veil” is involved.119 On the one hand one has the dictum in 
Cape Pacific which does not seem to distinguish between lifting and piercing:120 
 
“Equally trite is the fact that a court would be justified in certain circumstances in 
disregarding a company’s separate personality in order to fix liability elsewhere for 
what are ostensibly acts of the company. This is generally referred to as lifting or 
piercing the corporate veil.” [own emphasis]121 
 
On the other hand sources such as Cassim et al122 and the Dictionary of Legal 
Words and Phrases123 would have “lifting” refer not to piercing as such, but rather 
to some quality or human characteristic being fictionally attributed to the 
                                            
118 The Taxpayer “Case Law: CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Limited” (1990) 39 The 
Taxpayer 147-149. 
119 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 4. 
120 552. 
121 Also refer to Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act in the text to n 69 above 
for a discussion of s 19 in their work. See also The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v 
Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 24 for another example of where the AD 
seemingly drew no distinction between “lifting” and “piercing”, as well as Banco de 
Mocambique v Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 
330 (T). Cf Al-Kharafi & Sons for General Trading, General Contracting and Industrial 
Structures Wll v Pema NO & others 2010 JOL 25851 (GSJ) and Airport Cold Storage 
(Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 2008 2 SA 303 (C) where piercing is also referred to as “lifting” the 
veil. See also FP Strydom & JJ du Plessis “Ontsluiering by maatskappye en beslote 
korporasies: ‘n vergelyking tussen piercing the corporate veil en artikel 65 van die Wet 
op Beslote Korporasies 69 van 1984” (1997) 3 TSAR 400. 
122 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 46. Confusingly, at 63 (as has been 
discussed in the text to ch 2 part 3 2 1 above), Cassim et al also promote the idea that 
imposing “liability on the directors and prescribed officers of the company … are more 
accurately described as instances of lifting the veil”. 
123 “Corporate Veil” is defined in RD Claassen (ed) Dictionary of Legal Words and 
Phrases (2015) as:  
“In order to determine who is responsible for the activities, decisions and control of a 
company it may be necessary to lift the corporate veil.” 
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company.124 “Lifting” as distinguished from piercing therefore does not have the 
effect to ignore the separate legal existence of a company and to impose liability 
on shareholders. Staughton LJ’s dictum in Atlas Maritime Co SA, which sets out 
the position in English law, aptly describes this:  
 
“To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating the 
rights or liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or activities of 
its shareholders. To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should 
mean to have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.” 
(emphasis supplied by Staughton LJ)125 
 
It would appear as if the distinction is based exclusively on non-South African 
authorities.126 While it must be acknowledged that piercing, or lifting for that 
matter, is an internationally recognised concept, it would seem that the South 
African courts, right up to the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”), have not 
subscribed to the idea of differentiating between lifting and piercing. In fact, no 
South African case law could be found to suggest that South African courts have 
ever defined lifting as being anything else than piercing.127 It is submitted that the 
                                            
124 See also FHI Cassim (ed), MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats The 
Law of Business Structures (2012) 67 and Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade – Corporate 
Law 13 et seq. The authorities listed by the latter all include cases where courts have 
not distinctly referred to piercing as such. 
125 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd: The Coral Rose (No 1) 1991 4 All ER 
779, referring to Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 as justification for the 
said distinction. See also Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 150. 
126 This is not to advance the notion that foreign cases do not play an important role in 
South African law. This would be contrary to ss 232 and 233 of the Constitution. 
However, it is curious to note that all the cases put forward by Cassim et al to justify 
some difference between “lifting” and “piercing” of the corporate veil are from outside 
South Africa and all predate the AD’s muted refusal to accept said distinction in its 1994 
and 1995 judgments in The Shipping Corporation of India and Cape Pacific cases 
respectively. See also Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 113 in respect of the 
position in English law. 
127 Ex Parte Gore has gone as far as to acknowledge that confusion does exist, but again 
with references to non-South African case law. It also goes no further in deciding on the 
accuracy of such a distinction.  
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correct approach would be not to distinguish between “piercing” and “lifting” as 
different concepts.128 
The approach whereby the attribution of characteristics is excluded from 
“piercing” or “lifting” of the corporate veil does no harm to the principle that 
characteristics of natural persons can be attributed to a company. As is the case 
in part 3 2 1 above the agency doctrine adequately explains such attribution. 
Therefore, the human attributes attached to a company are not so attached as a 
result of the company being a legal persona, but rather because of the role which 
natural persons may play on behalf of the company. It need not involve the 
corporate veil and thus no distinction should be drawn between “piercing” and 
“lifting” of the corporate veil. 
 
3 2 3 Conclusion 
When considering the above variations on the piercing doctrine,129 one cannot 
but agree with the sentiment expressed by Van den Heever JA in Cape Pacific: 
 
“I am wary in this matter of the metaphor that companies wear veils that sometimes 
require to be pierced, or partially pierced, or lifted. A metaphor – to use another – may 
prove to be an unnecessarily confining corset.”130 
 
The solution would be to limit piercing or lifting of the corporate veil to those 
circumstances involving the disregarding of the separate legal personality of a 
company from that of its shareholders, irrespective of what label it was given in 
the past. Ascribing attributes of its shareholders or directors to the company 
should not be referred to as lifting or piercing. If one were to insist on the use of 
a metaphor to describe such instances, reference to “veil transparency” would be 
more appropriate. 
                                            
128 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-111 and 4-144. 
129 Described in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 162 as the varying degrees 
of “versluiering” (“veiling”). 
130 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 558 and 559. 
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The use of terminology involving the “veil” should be restricted to instances of 
piercing only. The correct context and content for “piercing” are important in order 
to ensure that the doctrine itself is not misapplied or developed under the 
influence of rules that have no real legal bearing on the piercing doctrine.131 
For the purposes of this research piercing or lifting of the corporate veil will 
therefore be defined as in Ex Parte Gore, namely that piercing or lifting involves 
“a facts-based determination by the courts in certain cases to disregard some or 
all of the characteristics of separate legal personality that statute law ordinarily 
attributes to a duly incorporated company”.132 
What Cassim et al describe as “lifting”, that is ascribing certain attributes to a 
company, is therefore excluded from the scope of this research, as well as the 
attribution of the liabilities of a company to its directors. Disregarding of the 
corporate veil, whether in terms of general or specific enabling legislation or in 
terms of the common law, will be included. As was so aptly stated in the plaintiff’s 
heads of argument in the Cape Pacific a quo case: 
 
“As a general principle companies are recognized as legal entities separate from their 
shareholders, officers and directors. Corporate obligations remain the liability of the 
entity and not of the shareholders, directors or officers who own and/or act for the 
entity. ‘Piercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially imposed exception to this 
principle by which Courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a 
shareholder or controller133 responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the 
shareholder's own.”134 
                                            
131 See also Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-148 et seq. 
132 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4; cf Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 16:  
“But when we speak of piercing the corporate veil, we are not (or should not be) 
speaking of any of these situations, but only of those cases which are true exceptions 
to the rule in Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, i.e. where a person 
who owns and controls a company is said in certain circumstances to be identified 
with it in law by virtue of that ownership and control.” [own emphasis] 
133 This should be understood in the context of the case: the controller referred to here 
is not in the capacity as a director, but rather a person who is in substance the 
shareholder and owner of a company, as Lubner was in this case. 
134 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd [1993] 3 All SA 685 (C). 
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4 Piercing distinguished from other common law doctrines 
4 1 Introduction 
Piercing, a unique remedy,135 should be regarded as a doctrine on its own. 
Admittedly though, the doctrine has elements of many other common law 
doctrines and even share certain similarities.136 These include, inter alia, the 
sham and the substance over form and the alter ego doctrines. Nevertheless, the 
doctrine remains identifiable by its legal effect: it results in the disregarding by a 
court of the separate legal personality of a company in relation to its shareholders. 
What should be cautioned against, however, is labelling doctrines as a sub-part 
of piercing only because the practical effect of these other doctrines may 
correspond to the practical effect of piercing. Confusing the practical effect of 
other legal doctrines with that of piercing will inevitably lead to a wrong 
understanding of the requirements and effect linked to piercing in the proper 
sense.137 Piercing is but one remedy which in certain circumstances can afford 
an aggrieved party relief.138  
                                            
135 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 paras 27 and 80. 
136 Contra ITC 1611 [1995] 59 SATC 126 (see also the judgment of Lord Walker in Prest); 
Cf Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 
552. It has been confirmed in other jurisdictions, such as the UK, that piercing is a self-
standing remedy: see specifically the judgments of Lords Neuberger and Sumption in 
Prest, and again by Lord Neuberger in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp 2013 
UKSC 5 127. The position is also confirmed in South Africa in the cases of The Shipping 
Corporation of India, Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter where the SCA has confirmed, 
expressly and impliedly, that the doctrine is very much a self-standing remedy and part 
of South African law. The High Court in Ex Parte Gore has recently reconfirmed this. 
137 Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 296:  
“Furthermore, [the company] has features which both resemble other institutions, 
such as agency, and differ from them, and careful regard should always be paid to its 
relationship with any other such institution which is relevant to the issue at hand.” 
The dangers linked to confusing legal doctrines are illustrated in the context of the abuse 
of trust doctrine by MJ de Waal “The abuse of the trust (or: ‘going behind the trust form’)” 
(2012) RabelsZ 1078 1080. 
138 Cf the text to ch 3 part 2 below on whether piercing is a remedy of final resort only, 
which illustrates this point. 
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The lines between piercing and non-piercing remedies often become blurred, 
particularly when non-piercing remedies are applied but mislabelled as 
piercing.139 It is necessary to consider the most often used common law remedies 
which in my view do not constitute piercing and should accordingly not be labelled 
as such. 
 
4 2  Other common law remedies  
4 2 1 Substance over form 
The substance over form doctrine involves an enquiry into the substance of a 
transaction. It involves a comparison of the substance of a transaction with the 
form in which it is presented. Where that substance differs from the form in which 
it is presented, the law will recognise the substance of the transaction rather than 
the form thereof.140 
The piercing remedy is rooted in the substance over form doctrine,141 but with 
the emphasis placed on the form of the transaction.142 The court in Cape Pacific 
held that:143 
 
“a court would (only) then be entitled to look to substance rather than form in order to 
arrive at the true facts, and if there has been a misuse of corporate personality, to 
disregard it and attribute liability where it should rightly lie. Each case would obviously 
have to be considered on its own merits.”144 
 
                                            
139 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 16. 
140 Although most commonly manifesting in a context that involves some dishonesty (see 
the text to ch 2 part 4 2 2 below for a discussion on the sham and simulation doctrines), 
it may also occur through honest error in a transaction inaccurately portrayed in a manner 
which is different from the substance of the transaction.  
141 Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 290 et seq: “[T]he issue transcends the problem of the 
corporate veil, as it does company law itself.” 
142 This is also particularly relevant in the income tax context: see Ochberg v CIR 1931 
AD 215 for the minority judgments of Wessels and Stratford JJA. 
143 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
144 See also 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552 for an application of the principle set out in Dadoo. 
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Nevertheless, the piercing and substance over form doctrines, although 
related, must not be considered as one and the same. Piercing is a remedy with 
unique requirements that must be met before it can be applied. “Substance over 
form” by itself is however not an unlimited concept. The law will recognise the 
legal form that is the company,145 yet will revert to a substance-based approach 
as opposed to a formalistic one when it is justified.146 The corporate veil exists as 
a result of statute creating the fiction of corporate personality, requiring the form 
to be recognised rather than the economic substance. Only where the form is 
being used beyond what is allowed will the substance prevail where the corporate 
veil is concerned. 
The case of Melomed Hospital Holdings Ltd v Wilson NO147 serves as an 
example of such confusion between substance over form and piercing. There the 
substance over form doctrine was applied, rather than piercing.148 In fact, the 
court chose to consider the shareholder not to be the true owner of the company. 
Although not all cases on the substance over form doctrine will also involve 
piercing, it is inevitable that any enquiry involving piercing will to some degree 
amount to a substance-based approach, but with due respect for the form created 
by statute.149  
 
 
                                            
145 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-146 et seq. 
146 Discussed in ch 3 below. 
147 2012 JDR 1489 (LC). The case dealt with the question whether an individual was 
employed by the company of which he was the sole shareholder, or by the hospital 
owning company receiving all his services. The court found the latter to be the case. 
148 Had the court explicitly found that Melomed was in substance the shareholder (as 
was the case in Cape Pacific in respect of the relationship between Lubner and LCI, or 
for Ebrahim Snr in Airport Cold Storage in his capacity as in-substance member), then 
piercing would theoretically have been possible, although the court did not go that far in 
this case. 
149 Also see VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International [2012] EWCA Civ 808 87, as quoted 
in Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC): “Veil piercing … is about 
substance, not form …”. 
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4 2 2 Sham and simulation 
The sham and simulation doctrines150 share a common feature with piercing in 
that they all contain elements of the substance over form doctrine.151 However, 
for piercing the question of substance is with reference to the substance of a 
company’s legal personality; for simulated transactions the doctrine involves the 
substance of a specific transaction. This is an important distinction. Whereas 
simulated transactions are wholly disregarded,152 piercing disregards only the 
corporate veil and only for a limited purpose. Piercing does not disregard any 
transaction: it continues to recognise the form of a transaction in its entirety, but 
attributes consequences thereto as if the corporate veil did not exist. Simulation 
disregards transactions; piercing disregards certain effects of a structure while 
maintaining that structure for all other purposes.153 This is an extremely important 
distinction, and this limited effect of piercing also plays a major distinguishing role 
as applied to the other doctrines discussed in parts 4 2 3 and further below. 
The facts of Cape Pacific serve as an example of this difference. In this case 
piercing was applied by the court with the result that performance could be 
claimed from the sister company (GLI) of the respondent (LCI) since for the 
purposes of the ownership of the assets to be delivered the two companies could 
be regarded as the same legal entity. If, hypothetically, in this scenario, the court 
had found a simulation to be present, the subsequent transfer of assets by LCI to 
its sister company GLI would have been disregarded with the claim for 
                                            
150 AP de Koker & E Brincker Silke on International Tax (2010) 46.5. Also see the text to 
n 140 above: sham/simulated transactions necessarily involve a degree of dishonesty 
(Commissioner of Customs & Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd [1941] 33 SATC 
48 67). 
151 See the text to part ch 2 part 4 2 1 above. 
152 Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley [1992] 1 All SA 398 (A) 405. 
153 See the English position in Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 
157 which, in my view correctly, confirmed that the use of the word “sham” in a piercing 
context should not be afforded a strict, legalistic meaning. See too the English case of 
Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 and in the South African context The Shipping 
Corporation of India v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 25. See ch 2 part 6 1 
below for a discussion on the limited effect that piercing practically has. 
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performance only being against LCI as the transferring company. The order was 
ultimately made against GLI, showing the limited effect that piercing has. The 
court acknowledged that in form GLI remains the owner of the shares.154 
Save for the above distinction between the two doctrines, they are of course 
also both independently developed doctrines, each with its own respective criteria 
which must be satisfied in order to apply.  
 They should therefore not be confused.155 There may, however, be one area 
where they may overlap, and that would be the case for a “sham” company, which 
also involves the alter ego doctrine. 
 
4 2 3 Alter ego doctrine 
Piercing is generally applicable with reference to a particular transaction only,156 
although theoretically nothing prohibits a court to pierce on the basis that the very 
existence of a company is a sham.157 This would result in the corporate veil being 
pierced for purposes of all assets and obligations belonging to the company, in 
other words all transactions that the company has ever entered into. Such a 
finding would be a rather drastic one if supported by the facts. However, there is 
support that this is possible, although it is questionable whether such total 
disregard of a company would amount to piercing in a strict sense.158 
When used in the context of companies the phrase “alter ego” embodies two 
different concepts.159 The first is where it is used as means to determine the 
actions and subjective mind of the company in order to mirror such actions and 
                                            
154 The background facts of the case are set out in more detail in ch 3 part 3 3 2 below. 
155 The Taxpayer – Editorial “Employees’ tax” (1989) 38 163-164. 
156 See the text to ch 2 part 6 1 below. 
157 Cf Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 284; see also the judgment of Denning MR in Littlewoods 
Mail Order Store Ltd v McGregor [1969] 1 WLR 1241 (CA). 
158 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 87; Gilford Motor Co v Horne 1933 Ch 935 
(CA) 961. 
159 See also Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-137 and in particular 
n 3. 
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intention from the controllers of the company onto the company itself.160 
Secondly, the alter ego doctrine is often used in relation to the application of the 
piercing doctrine. This means that, as a result of the abusive behaviour by the 
shareholders of a company, the company is in fact nothing but the shareholder 
dressed up to appear to be a separate person. Its separate personality should 
therefore not be recognised.161 This dissertation is concerned only with the 
latter.162 
Clearly the two doctrines are not the same.163 It is incorrect to state that 
piercing may be applied based on the alter ego doctrine exclusively.164 The alter 
ego doctrine, although playing a useful role in considering whether piercing 
should be applied, is not enough on its own. This is also the position under UK 
law.165  
                                            
160 Also known as the “directing mind doctrine”: Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 4-123 et seq; cf the text to ch 2 part 3 2 2 above. 
161 Refer e g Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 
543 (A) 554. Also see the discussion of so-called “one-man companies” in ch 3 part 5 2 
2 below. 
162 Refer e g Banco de Mocambique v Inter-Science Research and Development 
Services (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 330 (T) 339 et seq where this was considered with 
reference to companies owned by governments specifically. The court however does not 
come to a clear conclusion on the matter, nor is it submitted was it necessary to. See 
also cases from other jurisdictions in O’Donnell v Weintraub 67 Cal Rptr 274; In re 
Elegant Custom Homes Inc., Debtor. Elegant Custom Homes, Inc., et al, Appellants, v 
Elaine M. Dusharm, Appellee as decided by the US District Court for the District of 
Arizona on May 14, 2007 (unreported) and Clarkson Co. v Zhelka [1967] 2 OR 565, 64 
DLR (2d) 57. 
163 See Cassim et al The Law of Business Structures 70; Cassim et al Contemporary 
Company Law 69; Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 125 et seq and 137. 
164 Cf D Bhana “Should the doctrines of the ‘undisclosed principal’ or ‘piercing of the 
corporate veil’ determine the locus standi of a party to sue in terms of a contract? The 
conundrum of Botha v Giyose t/a Pragon Fisheries” (2010) 127 SALJ 5-18, 16 et seq. 
Also see Cape Pacific where the AD in no uncertain terms listed fraud, dishonesty or 
improper conduct as necessary prerequisites before piercing can be applied – factors 
not necessary for the alter ego test to apply. 
165 Mubarak v Mubarak [2000] EWHC 466 (Fam) (23 October 2000) para 36, approved 
in Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 206. 
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Moreover, a subjective element is also required for piercing.166 The mere fact 
that a person, although a legal person, is treated by another as though it does 
not exist or is not recognised or acknowledged, is irrelevant as to whether that 
person does exist in law. Corporate personality is a thing of substance167 and 
mere failure by any person to recognise its existence or to observe certain 
prescribed formalities in a specific instance does not derogate from the existence 
of the thing itself.168 The law will only disregard the corporate veil for limited 
purposes under the piercing doctrine.169 Only those specific advantages which 
the shareholder seeks to exploit will be affected. 
                                            
166 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 and ch 4 part 2 3 5 below. Blackman et al Commentary 
on the Companies Act 4-137 seek to argue that the alter ego doctrine may apply in the 
company law context and seek to distinguish this from the piercing doctrine. Blackman 
et al acknowledge though that the use of “alter ego” as phrase in the company law 
context has in the past not been used in a technically correct manner. This dissertation 
argues that a distinction between the piercing doctrine and past references to the 
company as alter ego is artificial and that the term “alter ego”, when used in relation to 
companies, is not used in the strict technical sense. Where Blackman et al therefore 
seek to argue that the application of the company as alter ego of the shareholder is 
different to piercing, it does so on this non-technical distinction. This dissertation 
considers the non-technical application of the alter ego phrase as being nothing more 
than part of the broader piercing doctrine. When the term “alter ego” has in the past been 
used in the company law context, it has been used in a non-technical manner that is akin 
to describing the company as an “instrumentality” to commit fraud, dishonesty, or 
improper conduct. These circumstances all have in common that the company is 
subjectively used in a certain manner, whereas the strict alter ego doctrine finds 
application even in the absence of conscious misuse; in other words, based on objective 
bases. Where a company is referred to as being the “alter ego” of its shareholders, it is 
done with reference thereto that the company is being purposefully abused on a 
subjective level to achieve some impropriety. Whether the company is therefore used as 
“alter ego” or “instrumentality”, or to commit fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct 
(two bases on which Blackman et al would want to distinguish distinct separate criteria 
upon which to apply the piercing doctrine), these scenarios could very well be regarded 
as being the same. 
167 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 550. 
168 See s 8(4) read with s 9(2) of the Constitution. 
169 See O’Donnell v Weintraub 67 Cal Rptr 6 where the court concluded that a company, 
being the alter ego of its shareholders, could still have a separate existence for all other 
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It is considered below to what extent the alter ego doctrine plays a role as a 
requirement for piercing.170 It is, however, not enough for a company to be 
pierced in the absence of some form of intentional abuse at least.171 Thus, a 
subjective test also needs to be applied.172 
To what extent the alter ego test is a necessary requirement for piercing 
warrants further discussion. Williams173 regards it as a requirement. It is also 
notable that the court in Cape Pacific concluded that the companies there were 
the alter egos of Lubner.174  
In this regard the approach in the judgment of In re Elegant Custom Homes175 
is to be preferred. Without expressing an opinion on the correctness of the test 
applied there, I regard the case as a good illustration of how the alter ego principle 
                                            
purposes and benefit from the assignment of a lease (which approach does not accord 
with the strict interpretation of the alter ego doctrine). 
170 The application of the alter ego doctrine in the context of the law of trusts is not 
relevant here. See the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 2 SA 
77 (SCA). Refer also to the examples of Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 3 SA 228 (C) and 
Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 2 SA 225 (SCA) as discussed by SA Hyland & BS Smith 
“Abuse of the trust figure in South Africa: An analysis of a number of recent 
developments” (2006) 1 Journal for Estate Planning Law 4.1. 
171 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 
554. 
172 Also see the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 below, which accords with the UK approach 
discussed in ch 3 part 4 1 below, being that the corporate veil must be used to “avoid or 
conceal liability …”. (Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 162.) 
This is an important conclusion where piercing is being considered as remedy in 
instances of use for tax purposes. For piercing to potentially apply, it must be established 
that the avoidance of tax was at least one of the purposes for which the veil was 
employed. See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 1 and 5 1 1 below. 
173 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 87 and 90; cf Blackman et al Commentary on 
the Companies Act 4-140-2 et seq (as well as the reference there to the requirements 
listed by Cilliers & Benade Company Law 415); Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 52. 
174 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 554. 
175 In re Elegant Custom Homes Inc., Debtor. Elegant Custom Homes, Inc., et al, 
Appellants, v Elaine M. Dusharm, Appellee as decided by the US District Court for the 
District of Arizona on May 14, 2007 (unreported). 
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is incorporated into a test for piercing, while acknowledging that the principle on 
its own is not enough: 
 
“It was shown that it has long been the law in Arizona that the corporate form will be 
disregarded when the corporation is the alter ego of one or more individuals and ‘the 
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.’” [own 
emphasis] 
 
In this regard, Blackman et al176 argue on the strength of Die Dros (Pty) Ltd v 
Telefon Beverages CC177 that the alter ego doctrine presents a second distinct 
foundation on which piercing can be applied, independent from the requirements 
of fraud, dishonesty, or improper conduct. Put differently: it represents a different 
basis on which piercing can be applied without having regard to subjective 
criteria. This argument is on the strength of the court’s reference to the arguments 
raised by the applicants in that case.178 This argument cannot be supported: no 
finding of the court in that judgment supports the notion that piercing can be 
applied in the absence of one of the subjective179 criteria of fraud, dishonesty, or 
improper conduct.180 Not one of the cases put forward by Blackman et al181 
supports the notion that the alter ego test on its own is a sufficient basis on which 
to pierce. It is not disputed that the alter ego principle may be a relevant criterion 
in ascertaining whether there has been abuse of the corporate veil by 
shareholders. It is after all only the shareholders that can perpetrate abuse of the 
corporate veil.182 However, control on its own (and therefore the alter ego 
principle by implication) is not enough and it disregards the requirement of fraud, 
                                            
176 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-140-1. 
177 [2003] 1 All SA 164 (C). 
178 Para 26. 
179 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 below. 
180 See also the criteria on which the court pierced the veil in Le’Bergo Fashions CC v 
Lee 1998 2 SA 608 (C). 
181 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-140-2. 
182 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 below. 
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dishonesty or improper conduct set by the SCA in Cape Pacific.183 Even if the 
cases quoted by Blackman et al in some sense support the notion that the 
application of the alter ego principle is a sufficient basis on which to pierce, these 
cases all precede the judgment in Cape Pacific. The principles set out in Cape 
Pacific must now be followed.184 
While references to the use of the company as “‘sham’, ‘cloak’, ‘device’, 
‘stratagem’, ‘puppet’, ‘creature’, etc.”185 – or, one may add, as alter ego – may 
arguably be indicative of subjective abuse,186 it remains to consider what exactly 
is meant by the company as the alter ego of its shareholders. Blackman et al infer 
that this translates into more than ownership and control: what is needed is 
control and dominance to such an extent that the company cannot be said to 
have a separate mind, will, or existence of its own.187 This corresponds with the 
view that the veil can only be pierced where sole or majority shareholding through 
which abuse is perpetrated is present.188 While this may certainly be the case 
where piercing is to be applied with the usual set of facts (where company liability 
is attributed to shareholders, restraint of trade terms are extended to companies 
                                            
183 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 below. 
184 The SCA supported this view in The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon 
Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 25: “[T]hey would generally have to include an element 
of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use of the company or the 
conduct of its affairs.” As is shown in the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 below, our courts have, 
in developing the piercing doctrine, made a clear effort to incorporate a subjective 
element into the doctrine, first from a (perceived) requirement of fraud in Lategan and 
then to fraud or impropriety in The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd, to fraud, dishonesty 
or improper conduct in Cape Pacific. Taking cognisance of this development as well as 
using an ejusdem generis approach to the criteria set out, one can only arrive at the 
conclusion that a subjective requirement must be present for the piercing doctrine to be 
applied. It is further significant that the SCA in both Cape Pacific and Ebrahim v Airport 
Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) applied piercing on different bases than the 
objective criteria used in both the cases a quo. 
185 Gower Principles of Modern Company Law as quoted in Banco de Mocambique. 
186 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 below. 
187 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 85. 
188 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 5 2 below. 
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owned by the restrained shareholders, etc), this cannot be a blanket rule. As is 
illustrated below,189 minority shareholders lacking dominance of a company are 
also able to abuse the corporate veil for improper purposes. From a policy 
perspective,190 courts will be less inclined to pierce the corporate veil where 
minority shareholders would be prejudiced. This, however, does not apply to 
piercing applied for tax purposes. In this regard, a minority shareholder may use 
the corporate veil for different purposes from that of a majority shareholder. The 
majority shareholder is also not necessarily affected where piercing is applied for 
tax purposes: only the shareholder with the disallowed intent is. 
To give an example: two individuals incorporate their share portfolios into a 
single company. The one, which holds 25% of the shares in the company, does 
so only to avoid the levying of dividends tax on dividends declared on the share 
portfolio. The other, majority, shareholder does so only to protect the investment 
against his potential future creditors. If the intention of the minority shareholder is 
a legitimate basis upon which to pierce, piercing for tax purposes will only be 
applied as regards the tax consequences linked to that shareholder on dividends 
received. For example, if the company were to receive R100 dividends, it is 
plausible that R75 will be treated as being exempt from dividends tax and 
received by the company, whilst the remaining R25 will be subject to dividends 
tax and deemed to have been received by the individual shareholder directly.191 
It is therefore suggested that the alter ego doctrine should not be applied as 
part of the test for piercing.192 A strict, purely objective approach would be 
contrary to one of the fundamental principles of piercing, being that piercing has 
                                            
189 See the text to ch 3 parts 5 2 and 3 3 2 3 below. 
190 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
191 The controlled foreign company rules in the Income Tax Act are examples of 
legislated piercing provisions and have exactly the same effect as illustrated here. 
192 See Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 125 et seq and 137: the author at 
124 considers that the application of agency as a form of piercing amounts to the 
inappropriate use of a legal sledgehammer (at 124). The conclusion in this dissertation 
is that the same would be true where the alter ego doctrine is applied under the guise of 
piercing.  
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a limited effect on the existence of a company and does not regard an entire 
company as having ceased to exist.  
In the context of piercing it is rather suggested that the alter ego test should 
be interpreted to mean that a shareholder is capable of using the corporate veil 
to achieve an improper goal which the shareholder subjectively intends to.193 This 
would provide for both the instance where majority shareholding194 and 
dominance are necessary for piercing in the conventional sense where liabilities 
are concerned. It would, however, also allow for piercing to be applied to minority 
shareholders who, without dominance, seek to obtain tax consequences and who 
are therefore also capable of abuse even in the absence of dominance.195 
 
4 2 4 Agency 
 Agency appears to be widely accepted as forming part of the piercing doctrine.196 
However, if one accepts that the effect of piercing is only to disregard the 
corporate veil for limited purposes for a specific transaction197 and that the 
shareholder is not held liable for all aspects of that transaction, then agency 
cannot form part of piercing.198  
                                            
193 See Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 
(A) 554. 
194 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 5 2 below. 
195 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 5 2 below. 
196 A Domanski “Piercing the corporate veil – a new direction?” (1986) SALJ224 225 and 
226. Also refer to Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 2 SA 558 (C) 23, and the 
references there at 13 to Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd v Corporation of the City of 
Toronto (1944) 3 DLR 609 and The Corporation of the City of Toronto v Famous Players’ 
Canadian Corporation Ltd (1936) SCR 141. 
197 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-143; Faiza Ben Hashem v 
Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 164. See the text to ch 2 part 6 1 below. 
198 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-127 and 4-140-2. See too the 
comments by Pennington and Gower quoted in Banco de Mocambique below, which 
also reflects English law. Cf Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1022 and 
1026 where the agency and piercing doctrines are dealt with separately and as distinct 
remedies. This accords with the approach adopted by the court in the English case of 
DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1976) 3 All ER 462, as 
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The facts in Ex Parte Gore serve as an example to illustrate the point. The 
liquidators of a group of companies, held essentially by three shareholders (family 
trusts of the three King brothers) through a holding company, successfully applied 
to the court to pierce the corporate veil of the various subsidiary companies to 
rule that these fellow group companies were also accountable for the debts of the 
company under consideration. In other words, the shareholders were not to be 
held solely liable for these debts, as would have been the case with a finding of 
agency. The substance of this was that for all other purposes outside the piercing 
enquiry at hand the assets of the group companies remain their own. Only for the 
purpose of the piercing order is the corporate veil momentarily disregarded.  
Had the court found that the company in Ex Parte Gore acted as agent for the 
rest of the group, the order would have had much more far-reaching implications. 
A finding of agency would have meant that the debts of the company were in law 
only that of the fellow group companies or shareholders and not that of the 
company. All the assets of the company would then have to be considered to 
belong to the various group companies and not to the agent company. This result 
will be a finding regarding ownership and will extend beyond the matter before 
the court. In this regard Kerr199 confirms that an agent is not party to an agreement 
between the principal and creditor. Conversely piercing requires that both the 
company and its shareholder be involved.  
It is therefore important to distinguish between the company acting as agent, 
not being part of the agreement in question, and it being a party thereto together 
with its shareholder in the case of piercing.  
It is not surprising that agency can so easily be regarded as part of the piercing 
doctrine. The practical legal effect of agency may frequently correspond with the 
                                            
well as that proposed by Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 55. In both of these 
sources agency and piercing are mentioned as alternative and different remedies. Also 
see the UK judgment of Burman v Hedges & Butler [1979] STC136; Larkin (1989) SA 
Merc LJ 290 and the discussion there of Salomon’s case. In the case of CIR v Sanson 
[1921] 2 KB 492 Lord Sterndale MR, whilst in principle willing to pierce for tax purposes, 
makes it quite clear at 505 that this would not be as a result of a finding of agency. 
199 AJ Kerr The Law of Agency (2006) 129. 
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practical relief sought in terms of a piercing action, but the legal mechanics behind 
each mechanism are very different. 
A finding of agency, even in the absence of a formal agency agreement,200 can 
only be made with reference to a transaction in its entirety; it cannot be entered 
into and regarded as being part-agency and part not. Further, the very nature of 
agency requires the recognition that an agent is not bound to the person with 
whom the agent is contracting on behalf of the principal. Piercing by contrast 
means that the company will be jointly implicated at least.201 
In this regard the judgment in Banco de Mocambique v Inter-Science Research 
and Development Services (Pty) Ltd (“Banco de Mocambique”)202 illustrates the 
correct approach taken by Goldstone J, where the court was unwilling to pierce, 
even though it found that an agency agreement had been in place in that case.203 
This interpretation is largely founded on the views of Pennington and Gower as 
quoted: 
 
“Of this and other cases where the corporate veil was apparently lifted by the English 
Courts, the following is stated in Pennington Company Law 4th ed at 54: 
‘The tenuous evidence from which the Court has implied an agency or trusteeship in 
some of the foregoing cases naturally leads one to question whether the agency or 
trusteeship is not merely a convenient legal fiction used by the Court to enable it to 
give decisions which it thinks just. The description of the subsidiary as the holding 
company’s agent or trustee often appears to be merely an epithet used to indicate the 
subsidiary’s complete subjection to the holding company, and not a statement of their 
legal relationship at all. For example, in Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham 
Corporation Atkinson J described the subsidiary company as ‘the agent or employee, 
                                            
200 Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd v Corporation of the City of Toronto (1944) 3 DLR 
16. 
201 Piercing involves as basic principle a limited application to a specific transaction only, 
as pertains only to the question at hand. The doctrine also has the effect of ascribing the 
assets, liabilities, or profits of the company and shareholder to one another to a certain 
extent. On both these counts, agency differs from piercing. See also Cassim et al The 
Law of Business Structures 69 and 70; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 42.  
202 Banco de Mocambique v Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) 
Ltd 1982 3 SA 330 (T). 
203 343. 
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or tool or simulacrum’ of the holding company, words which are obviously intended to 
be read in a metaphorical rather than a legal sense…’ 
And Professor Gower in his Principles of Modern Company Law 4th ed says the 
following at 124: 
‘When, however, they have been asked to treat the company as an agent of its 
individual controlling shareholder and to make the shareholder liable on that basis 
they have not been willing to do so except where that is necessary to frustrate some 
grave impropriety, and in such circumstances they have coupled the description of 
the company as an agent with more pejorative descriptions, such as “sham”, “cloak”, 
“device”, “stratagem”, “puppet”, “creature”, etc. In truth they themselves seem to have 
been using a cloak, that of agency principles, to give legal respectability to the use of 
a sledgehammer.’” [own emphasis] 
 
 
And more pertinently in Salomon, as quoted with approval in Dadoo: 
 
“[T]he company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to its 
memorandum; and though it may be that, after incorporation, the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee 
for them.”204 [own emphasis] 
 
The “sledgehammer approach” mentioned above by Gower,205 referring to the 
company or shareholder relationship as one of agency in the context of piercing, 
should thus be avoided.206 Not only does it cause confusion when used in a 
metaphorical sense, but it is also technically incorrect. 
 
4 2 5 Nominees 
Piercing, for the reasons advanced in the discussion on agency above, does not 
amount to a situation where the company acts only as a nominee. Although it is 
quite possible for a company to act in the capacity of a nominee on behalf of its 
shareholders, a nominee relationship between a company and a shareholder 
would not amount to piercing. 
                                            
204 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 51. 
205 Gower Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 124. 
206 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 90. 
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A nomination agreement would affect the entire transaction entered into and 
would also result in the nominee company not being a party to the transaction.  
 
4 2 6 Actio Pauliana 
A detailed consideration of the actio pauliana is not required for the purposes of 
this dissertation as the actio only arises where the collection of debts is involved, 
that is on a balance sheet level.207 Piercing in this dissertation is only concerned 
with piercing as it may be applied at an income statement level, that is affecting 
the calculation of a tax liability or determining for which person a tax debt 
arises.208 As the actio can never be applied for this purpose, it is not strictly 
relevant here. 
Nevertheless, as the actio pauliana was mentioned in the recent case of 
CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd (“Metlika”)209 which involved piercing, the 
relationship between the two remedies is briefly discussed.210  
It is interesting to note again how easily piercing can be confused with other 
remedies. The Metlika case serves as example of how the actio pauliana differs 
from piercing. This again highlights the basis upon which piercing is to be 
distinguished from nominee or agent relationships as discussed above.211 
 In Metlika the applicant (SARS) sought to pierce the corporate veil of the 
respondent, claiming that assets owned by Metlika Ltd, which had been 
transferred by Ben Nevis to its fellow group company, were available for 
attachment in order to settle a tax debt owing by Ben Nevis. Alternatively, SARS 
relied on the actio pauliana to claim that the transfer of assets by Ben Nevis to 
Metlika was invalid. 
The court, originally found that “… the facts of this justify the piercing of the 
corporate veil” and ordered that: 
 
                                            
207 See the text to ch 1 part 2 2 above. 
208 See the text to ch 1 part 2 2 above. 
209 CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd [2010] 72 SATC 241. The judgment was not appealed. 
210 See also ITC 1611 [1995] 59 SATC 126. 
211 See the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 4 and 4 2 5 above. 
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“i) The transfer of assets referred to in paragraph 5 from Ben Nevis to Metlika is 
set aside. 
ii) It is declared that the assets in paragraph 5 are owned by Ben Nevis. 
iii) It is declared that the assets referred to in paragraph 5 above, in so far, as the 
liability of Ben Nevis for income tax is recoverable or as it becomes recoverable, 
may be attached and be sold in execution to satisfy in whole, or in part, the 
liability of Ben Nevis to SARS …” 
 
However, some two months later Ledwaba J corrected this and issued an 
amended order212 which reads: 
“1.1 The separate corporate personalities of the second defendant (Ben Nevis) 
and the first defendant (Metlika) should be disregarded to the extent of the 
transfers referred to in paragraph 5 of the particulars of claim; and 
1.2 That in so far as the liability of the second defendant for income tax 
recoverable, or as it becomes recoverable, the assets referred to in 
paragraph 5 of the particulars of claim are to be regarded as assets owned 
by the second defendant and that they may be attached and sold in execution 
to satisfy in whole, or in part, the liability of the second defendant to the 
plaintiff.”213 
 
From the above it can be deduced that in terms of the original judgment the 
transfer of assets was disregarded, as would be the case with the actio pauliana, 
but not with piercing. According to the amended order the assets were to be 
regarded as those of the transferor company,214 but only to the extent necessary 
for discharging the tax debts of the transferor. 
 
                                            
212 The amended order itself is not part of the reported judgment, but is quoted in the 
applicant’s heads of argument para 18 in the matter between Metlika Trading Ltd and 
Ben Nevis Holdings Ltd v CSARS: In re CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd and Ben Nevis 
Holdings Ltd case no 20827/2002 (reported judgment at CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd 
[2010] JOL 26102 (GNP)). 
213 Applicant’s heads of argument para18 in the matter between Metlika Trading Ltd and 
Ben Nevis Holdings Ltd v CSARS: In re CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd and Ben Nevis 
Holdings Ltd case no 20827/2002 (reported judgment at CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd & 
others [2010] JOL 26102 (GNP)). 
214 See the comparable order in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442. 
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4 2 7 Partnerships 
In the English case of DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets (“DHN Food Distributors”)215 Lord Denning found that the group of 
companies in question was “virtually the same as a partnership”. This was a 
statement of fact rather than one of principle and therefore limited to that matter. 
In the Australian case of Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd 
(“Pioneer”)216 Young J advanced the notion that “if the court can see that there is 
in fact or in law a partnership between companies in a group …” it can then pierce 
the corporate veil. No example has been found in South African case law to 
support that piercing would per se be justified where companies are involved in 
a partnership agreement.217 
In the South African legal framework and other jurisdictions too the dicta in 
Pioneer and DHN Food Distributors would not be accurate218 if they seek to 
convey that companies in the same group are always part of an implied 
partnership. It is possible that the two judgments above did not intend to go this 
far. However, what is implied in both cases is that piercing in a group of 
companies may be applied if a tacit partnership agreement can be factually 
shown to exist between the companies involved. This too is incorrect. Although 
piercing and the application of partnership principles may have the same effect, 
the two principles have vastly different requirements to be satisfied before either 
can apply. Piercing is possible due to the existence of a statutory relationship 
between the company as legal person and its shareholders. In contrast, partners’ 
relationship inter se is contractually regulated. To enforce the partnership 
principles one must determine the terms of the agreement between the partners. 
                                            
215 1976 3 All ER 462. 
216 1986 11 ACLR 108. 
217 Also see Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 42 and 50 et seq. 
218 It is possible that the term “partnership” is not used here in the strict legal sense, 
although it appears unlikely. If what is intended is that companies within a group can be 
pierced on the basis that they form part of the same economic unit, the statement would 
be less contentious. However, this in itself also does not constitute a sufficient basis for 
the application of piercing. See the discussion in the text to ch 3 part 5 2 1 below for 
piercing within groups of companies. 
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Piercing the corporate veil on the other hand involves a court disregarding a 
statutory relationship established by Parliament. 
Piercing in the South African context means that the separate legal personality 
of a company is disregarded for example to make the fellow group companies or 
shareholders thereof jointly liable to the creditors of the company. If it were a 
partnership agreement, the company(ies) or shareholders party thereto would be 
jointly and individually liable for each other’s debts and entitled to the partnership 
assets by virtue of such an agreement. The existence of a partnership agreement 
therefore does not amount to piercing. In fact, it negates the motivation for 
piercing the veil in the first place as the parties would already be jointly liable in 
terms of the law of contract, and not for the limited purposes to which the piercing 
doctrine may be applied.219 
One can see that the confusion arises due to the similar relief that is available 
to a claimant. If for example such a claimant were to attempt to recover debts 
from another group company, it may be able to do so either through proving the 
existence of a partnership agreement or by applying for piercing to be applied. 
However, the requirements for proving such remedies are very different.220 The 
existence of a partnership agreement would be one of fact, the requirement to 
pierce a question of law.  
 
4 2 8 Beneficial ownership 
“Beneficial ownership” is sometimes referred to in cases involving piercing.221 In 
this regard Botha J in Metlika said that “the words ‘beneficial owner’ do not 
constitute a clearly defined juristic concept …, but they are appropriate in the 
context of a situation where it is alleged that someone who is the ostensible owner 
of property is in fact not its real owner.” 
                                            
219 See the discussion in the text to ch 2 part 6 1 below to this effect. 
220 See also Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-145. 
221 See for example CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd [2003] 66 SATC 345; Banco de 
Mocambique v Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 
330 (T). 
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In contrast Hyland and Smith,222 referring to Yarram,223 seek to define the term 
with reference to trust law, dividing ownership into two categories, viz the “bare” 
or “legal” owner vis-à-vis the “beneficial” owner; a distinction not dissimilar to that 
present in the bewind trust or for a bare dominium holder and a usufructuary in 
Roman Dutch law. 
Since there is no distinct and settled domestic law on “beneficial ownership” in 
South Africa, it would not be appropriate to speculate on a possible link with 
piercing.224 In any case, if the doctrine only relates to who the “real owner” of an 
asset is, then it is also not relevant for the purposes of this dissertation, which 
concerns itself only with piercing on an income statement level. 
 It is, however, necessary to refer briefly to piercing as applied in DTAs 
containing “beneficial owner” clauses.225 In such agreements the term is used on 
an income statement level to determine to which entity income from cross-border 
activities should be attributed. The “beneficial ownership” doctrine as applied by 
                                            
222 Hyland & Smith (2006) Journal for Estate Planning Law 3. 
223 Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank Ltd [2006] JOL 18830 (SCA)10 
(“Yarram”):  
“His title is usually described as ‘bare ownership’ (‘nudum dominium’) – sometimes 
also called ‘legal ownership’ – while ‘beneficial ownership’ (‘utile dominium’) is said to 
vest in the beneficiaries of the trust (see for example The Master v Edgecombe’s 
Executors & Administrators 1910 TS 263 at 274–275; Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 
1984 (2) SA 850 (A) at 859–860; Honoré para [170] 288). In short, the provisions of 
the Act and the Deed are, in my view, quite clear: upon registration in its name, qua 
trustee, the respondent became the ‘legal owner’ of the property and holds it in trust 
for the investors as ‘beneficial owners’.” 
224 This accords with the UK position – see Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 
34 para 43 et seq where “beneficial ownership” is considered on a distinctly different 
basis from piercing. See also the text to ch 3 part 4 4 below. 
225 For the reasons set out in ch 5 below, this is not considered in detail as part of this 
dissertation. 
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the OECD226 is not known in either South African legislation or common law.227 
Instead, in the South African context beneficial ownership refers to the ownership 
of assets as a descriptive label only,228 rather than to the ownership of an income 
stream, if such a notion can be said to exist in South African domestic law at all.229 
The term, as used in the DTAs concluded by South Africa and indeed as used by 
the rest of the world, should therefore be seen and interpreted within a context of 
its own and not within the context of South African domestic law.230 It should also 
not be utilised as a tool to interpret South African domestic non-tax law, including 
the piercing doctrine. 
 
4 3 Conclusion 
The above analyses confirm how narrow the piercing doctrine in the South African 
common law context actually is. It follows that piercing is an independent doctrine 
which has unfortunately often been subjected to very wide, loose and inaccurate 
application. 
The doctrine should not be confused with the other doctrines discussed above. 
Although it may incorporate other doctrines,231 itself form part of others,232 or have 
                                            
226 See M Lang Source versus Residence. Problems Arising from the Allocation of Taxing 
Rights in Tax Treaty Law and Possible Alternatives (2008) 69, specifically ch 5: S van 
Weeghel “Dividends (Article 10) OECD Model Convention”. 
227 See Olivier’s report in IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2010 Rome Congress) 
Volume 95a. Tax treaties and tax avoidance: application of anti-avoidance provisions 
(2010) 726; L Olivier & M Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective (2011) 
542-544. 
228 Cf De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 9.10; and the definition of “beneficial 
interest” in s 1 of the Companies Act (see also De Koker & Brincker Silke on International 
Tax 9.12). 
229 Cf De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 9.9. 
230 Cf para 12.1 of the OECD Commentary on Article 10; De Koker & Brincker Silke on 
International Tax 9.3. 
231 Predominantly the alter ego doctrine. See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above. 
232 Such as the principles of substance over form and sham or simulation. See the text 
to ch 2 parts 4 2 1 and 4 2 2 above. 
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a similar effect as other legal principles,233 the doctrine must be recognised and 
treated as a distinct, separate legal doctrine and remedy. Failing to do so will 
ultimately reinforce the confusion that unfortunately already exists and which is 
evident in the many examples of the loose and confused manner in which the 
doctrine was applied in the past. Much of this can be ascribed directly to courts 
effectively piercing, yet labelling it as something else, or applying a different legal 
principle yet mistakenly referring thereto as an instance of piercing. The doctrine 
should be narrowly construed and applied with reference to its own developed 
criteria only.234 
 
5 Piercing as applied for tax purposes 
In the law of taxation piercing can conceivably be applied to counter two instances 
of abuse of corporate personality.235 The first is the avoidance of paying an 
existing tax liability, in other words frustrating the collection of tax debts, on a 
balance sheet level. The second is to avoid, minimise or postpone the coming 
into existence of a tax liability in the first place, that is on an income statement 
level. This involves the use of companies to benefit from the beneficial tax 
regimes that may be afforded to them vis-à-vis other non-company taxpayers. It 
is therefore necessary to distinguish between piercing as applied to recover tax 
debts and piercing as applied to calculate tax debts.236 
 
5 1 Balance sheet piercing: Piercing tax debts 
It is not difficult to contemplate how piercing can be applied on a balance sheet 
level to counter the intentional self-impoverishment of a taxpayer to frustrate the 
                                            
233 Such as that of agency and nominee relationships. See the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 4 
and 4 2 5 above. 
234 These criteria are discussed and analysed in chs 3 and 4 below. 
235 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 86 similarly refers to two kinds of veil piercing 
which are not entirely dissimilar, but which are not defined with reference directly to the 
law of taxation. 
236 For the purposes of this dissertation the beneficial tax regimes often abused through 
use of corporate personality will be those created specifically by the Income Tax Act. 
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collection of tax debts. This perhaps presents the most common set of facts in 
which piercing is applied, both in and beyond the realms of the law of taxation. In 
its crudest form this occurs when a tax-owing company is stripped of its assets, 
for example through disposal at less than market value prices, in order to frustrate 
attempts by revenue authorities to recover that tax debt.237 An example of this is 
to be found in the Metlika case238 where a subsidiary company transferred most 
of its assets to a fellow subsidiary when learning of an impending tax assessment 
to be issued against it. In that case common law piercing was applied as the court 
found that the corporate veils through which the assets had passed were not of 
sufficient substance and that the tax debt in question could therefore be 
recovered from the fellow subsidiary of the taxpaying company.  
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim (“Airport Cold Storage”)239 serves as 
example where balance sheet piercing was applied to assign a liability240 to a 
different person than the company and not to determine the ownership of assets, 
as was the case in Ex Parte Gore and Metlika. If the facts in the Airport Cold 
Storage case241 were different with the SARS being the creditor claiming the 
sought-after relief, it is conceivable that piercing in those circumstances may have 
been applied to attribute the tax liability of the taxpayer-company to its 
shareholder. 
This dissertation, however, does not consider piercing on a balance sheet 
level. It limits itself to the application of piercing as remedy against abuse of 
corporate personality for tax purposes, in other words to piercing as applied on 
an income statement level.242  
 
                                            
237 Specific piercing provisions to counter this are present in s 181 of the Tax 
Administration Act. 
238 CSARS v Metlika Trading Ltd [2010] 72 SATC 241 – refer to the amended order 
issued on 1 October 2012. 
239 2008 2 SA 303 (C). 
240 Which conceivably may also be a tax liability. 
241 Set out briefly in n 710 below. 
242 See the text to ch 1 part 2 2 above. 
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5 2 Income statement piercing: Piercing to calculate tax debts 
Some of the various beneficial income tax regimes linked to companies were 
already mentioned above.243 Income statement piercing for tax purposes involves 
the disregarding by a court of the corporate veil to such an extent that the 
beneficial tax results gained from misuse are refused and the company treated 
as a see-through entity for the purposes of calculating and assigning tax 
consequences. Through various provisions in the Income Tax Act corporate 
personality can be used to obtain beneficial tax consequences and to the abuse 
of which the legislature responded in a targeted fashion.244  
It is argued below that not only the legislature is entitled to disregard the 
corporate veil as a remedy in case of the abuse thereof for tax purposes, but that 
the SARS too can avail itself of this remedy by applying to court, either in terms 
of the common law, the GAARs in the Income Tax Act or section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act. The remedy has always been available to SARS in terms of the 
common law and is now also specifically provided for in section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act. It is further argued below that piercing is also available in 
appropriate circumstances through the application of the GAARs in the Income 
Tax Act. 
Typical scenarios where the corporate veil may potentially be misused by 
taxpayers to reduce tax include: 
 
 when so-called conduit companies are employed to repatriate dividends 
from abroad through the use of reduced withholding tax rates in applicable 
DTAs; 
                                            
243 See the text to n 76 above. 
244 See for example the provisions of ss 9D(2), 57 and paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act on the tax consequences linked to a “personal service 
company”, as well as the abuse identified for which the “Passive Investment Company” 
regime in s 9E was introduced. An excellent example is also to be found in s 50A of the 
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. 
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 the avoidance of dividends tax by non-exempt entities by typically 
interposing a dividends tax exempt entity such as a South African 
company between itself and its investments; 
 incorporating a business to circumvent the provisions of section 20A;245 
 utilising a company to escape dividends tax on deemed dividends;246 and 
 instead of an individual receiving a salary directly from an employer and 
therefore subject to income tax at potentially maximum marginal rates, this 
may be manipulated by interposing a company to render these services to 
the employer as a personal service company of which the individual is the 
sole shareholder to ensure that the same amount is taxed at the lesser 
corporate tax rate. 
 
If piercing were to be applied to these examples, it would mean that for tax 
purposes the income in question is treated as though the shareholder received it 
directly. The tax consequences that would arise would then be determined as if 
the company had not existed. The resultant tax consequences would therefore 
not arise for the company, but for the shareholder in question directly and as 
though the company’s tax beneficial attributes had not existed.247 
                                            
245 S 20A, which applies to natural persons only, seeks to limit the availability of assessed 
losses in certain instances in which such losses would otherwise have been available for 
set-off against taxable income. 
246 A deemed dividend arises for example when a company extends an interest free loan 
to a natural person shareholder (s 64E(4) of the Income Tax Act). If the facts were the 
same, but the individual holds his shares through an intermediate company, no dividends 
tax arises, as the deemed dividend is declared to a dividends tax exempt entity. 
247 As discussed above in the text to n 244 above the controlled foreign company rules 
contained in s 9D of the Income Tax Act are examples of piercing applied for tax 
purposes, albeit by authority of statute. So too are s 57 and paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act. Also see the “thinking-away” approach adopted in 
Furniss v Dawson [1984] STC 153 (HL) as discussed by Derksen (AG Derksen “Should 
the South African courts adopt the English anti-tax-avoidance rule in Furniss v Dawson?” 
(1990) 107 SALJ 416-433. In Furniss the court “thought away” a certain step in a 
transaction. What can be done through a piercing for tax purposes is to “think away” the 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 65 
 
Few judgments can be found where piercing was applied by the South African 
courts to counter the misuse of legal personality of a company in an attempt to 
gain a more beneficial income tax treatment for a transaction.248 The absence of 
                                            
company itself for the purposes of calculating the tax consequences that would otherwise 
have arisen.  
248 In ITC 1611 the court, although finding in favour of the Commissioner, refused to apply 
piercing. In ITC 1606 [1995] 58 SATC 328 the court did not apply piercing as such, 
although the reference there to the judgment of Zulman J in Income Tax Special Court 
cases 9592 and 9593 [1993] (unreported; the a quo judgment of Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith 
(Pty) Ltd v CIR [1996] 58 SATC 229) suggests that the court in ITC 1606 may have been 
inclined to rule that piercing ought to have been applied, although it appears from the 
judgment that this was not considered in detail (nor that it was required given the facts 
at hand). In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith, although the court a quo ostensibly sought to apply 
piercing (considering the quoted dictum from that judgment in ITC 1606), the SCA did 
not follow this approach (it is submitted correctly, in the absence of a company-
shareholder relationship with the pension fund), although it still dismissed the taxpayer’s 
appeal. Also see CIR v Berold 1962 3 SA 748 (AD) 755; CIR v Meyerowitz 1963 3 SA 
863 (AD) 875 and Smith v Commissioner for Inland Revenue [1964] 2 All SA 83 (A) 
where piercing was applied in terms of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act. In 
Commissioner for Customs & Excise v Tayob [2002] JOL 9944 (T) 56 et seq the court 
considered whether it would be appropriate to pierce for tax purposes, but left the 
question open. See also M Glaser Piercing the corporate veil: a review of the concept; 
and consideration of its relevance in South African tax law, LLM thesis, University of 
Cape Town (1994), as well as the dictum referred to by NF van Zyl The Corporate Veil 
in Tax Law LLM (Tax Law) thesis, University of the Witwatersrand (1986) 42 et seq in 
Apthorpe (Surveyor of Taxes) v Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co Ltd 4 TC 111 where 
piercing was applied for tax purposes in the UK and upheld on appeal. Various other 
examples are also cited there where piercing was applied for tax purposes in the UK and 
Canada. See too Littlewoods Mail Order Store Ltd v McGregor [1969] 1 WLR 1241 (CA) 
for piercing for tax purposes and Furniss v Dawson [1984] STC 153 (HL). In CIR v 
Sanson [1921] 2 KB 492, Lord Sterndale MR unambiguously stated at 502 et seq:  
“An appeal was made to us … not to lay down the principle that when once you have 
what I may call a Salomon v. Salomon case, no further inquiry can be made, and that 
it never can be possible to make any person liable to taxation in respect of the 
business of the company. Now I never had the slightest intention of laying down any 
such principle …”.  
In the USA, piercing for tax purposes has been expressly envisaged in Gregory v 
Helvering 293 US 465 (1935) and Nelson v CIR 281 F2d (5th Cir 1960). 
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a great body of case law to serve as an example of income statement piercing 
for tax purposes249 does not advance the idea that piercing on this level cannot 
be done. The Transvaal Income Tax Special Court has indeed expressly held 
that tax purposes can serve as an appropriate basis for the courts to apply 
piercing, even in the absence of dishonesty and fraud.250 That same court, and 
the Transvaal Provincial Division as well, has subsequently also been willing to 
disregard the interposition of a company when used for tax purposes.251 
The lack of many examples of piercing in cases of tax avoidance is indicative 
of the unwillingness with which South African courts have in the past approached 
veil piercing in terms of the common law. In addition, SARS has also not sought 
to use the remedy before (arguably due to other, less controversial, remedies 
also being at its disposal). As will be discussed in chapters 3 to 6 below, the 
approach in future is bound to be different. This will not so much be a question of 
developing the law but rather due to a more informed application of the existing 
legal principles.252 
 
5 3 Conclusion 
There is nothing to suggest that piercing should be approached any differently 
where the law of taxation is involved as opposed to the law of obligations.253 The 
                                            
249 ITC 1611 is an example of how piercing on an income statement level would be 
applied for income tax purposes if piercing were to be done. 
250 Income Tax Special Court cases 9592 and 9593 [1993] (unreported) 31. 
251 See Bailey v CIR [1933] 6 SATC 69. 
252 Income statement piercing (in other words outside the context of the law of taxation) 
has already been acknowledged to apply in instances involving the circumvention of a 
restraint of trade agreement. See the examples in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne 1933 Ch 
935 (CA) and Le’Bergo Fashions CC v Lee 1998 2 SA 608 (C). 
253 It must be noted that, apart from s 20(9), there are various other provisions in the 
Companies Act in terms of which piercing can potentially be applied or in terms of which 
similar relief can be achieved. These provisions are not considered in this dissertation 
as the general piercing clause in s 20(9) is considered the only remedy in the Companies 
Act potentially available to prevent the abuse of corporate personality for tax purposes 
in particular. 
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only difference is that the debt will always be due to the state and that such debts 
arise from statute. This is not enough for piercing to be applied in a stricter 
manner than would be the case with “ordinary” debts. If anything, both factors 
justify a more permissive approach to the application of the doctrine if one has 
regard to the policy considerations at play in the context of tax avoidance.254  
This dissertation will therefore not consider the abuse of corporate personality 
to frustrate the recovery of already existing tax debts. It only deals with cases 
where the abuse of legal personality for tax purposes is aimed at reducing or 
postponing a future potential liability, in other words income statement piercing. 
This will be discussed under the headings: anti-avoidance measures forming part 
of the common law,255 section 20(9) of the Companies Act,256 and the GAARs in 
the Income Tax Act.257 
 
6 Ancillary matters 
6 1 The limited effect of piercing 
The above analysis of balance sheet and income statement piercing for income 
tax purposes raises the issue of the extent of the legal effect when piercing is 
applied: Is the entire legal personality of the company tainted, so to speak, or is 
piercing only applied to the extent that it provides the sought-after relief? For 
example, if the corporate veil is pierced to collect assets to recover a company’s 
debt from a shareholder, does that company cease to exist as such, even retro-
actively, or is the separate corporate personality being ignored simply for the 
purpose of the collection of that specific debt? 
In the absence of a court declaring the company a total sham, which is almost 
inconceivable,258 the corporate veil is disregarded only to the extent necessary to 
                                            
254 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 below. 
255 See ch 3 below. 
256 See ch 4 below. 
257 See ch 5 below. 
258 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 2 above. 
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provide the requisite relief.259 This is also the case with the piercing provisions 
contained in respectively section 65 of the Close Corporations Act and section 
20(9) of the Companies Act, both of which give a discretion260 to a court to 
disregard the corporate veil “in respect of” the purpose for which the veil is being 
unconscionably abused. 
Since piercing for tax purposes will be applied on an income statement level, 
manifesting in the refusal of tax benefits for the specific shareholder involved, 
other shareholders or creditors are not prejudiced by such piercing and the 
balance sheet position of the company is also left unaffected. In other words, a 
tax liability arises for the shareholder in question as though the company did not 
exist and piercing for tax purposes is limited to that liability. It does not affect for 
                                            
259 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 85, especially n 2; Blackman et al 
Commentary on the Companies Act 4-136-1; BS Smith “Statutory discretion or common 
law power? Some reflections on ‘veil piercing’ and the considerations of (the value of) 
trust assets in dividing matrimonial property at divorce – Part One” (2016) 41 JJS 68 73; 
Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 554:  
“Thus if a company, otherwise legitimately established and operated, is misused in a 
particular instance to perpetrate a fraud, or for a dishonest or improper purpose, there 
is no reason in principle or logic why its separate personality cannot be disregarded 
in relation to the transaction in question (in order to fix the individual or individuals 
responsible with personal liability) while giving full effect to it in other respects.”  
See however Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 89 where it is envisaged that the 
company itself may be a sham. Although the exception, such a scenario would amount 
to a court finding that for the purpose of all contracts ever entered into by that company, 
and not just for the purpose of examining the true nature of a single debt or transaction 
entered into by the company, the company had been a sham or the alter ego of the 
shareholders. With piercing already considered a “drastic remedy” (see Amlin and also 
Banco de Mozambique) and the corporate veil as something which courts should not be 
“lightly disregard” (Cape Pacific), it is not surprising that no examples could be found 
where a South African court declared the very existence of a company a sham. This 
accords with the position in the UK: see the text to ch 3 part 4 1 below.  
260 See Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 (C) 1070; Ebrahim v 
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) 26; Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552 and Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 
2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA)20; N Schoeman “Piercing the corporate veil under the new 
Companies Act” (2012) De Rebus 26-28. 
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example the ownership of assets for all other purposes. For income tax purposes 
only will the income of the company be deemed to be that of its South African 
shareholder(s).261 
 
6 2  Piercing for own benefit 
Can piercing also be applied as relief for the company itself or for its 
shareholders?262 In South Africa the 1979 case of Gien v Gien263 is the only 
example where “reverse piercing”264 was applied, in casu as part of a procedural 
matter. Although the Gien decision was not approved of in the judgment a quo in 
Cape Pacific, the reason for this appears not to have been the application of 
“reverse piercing” as such. It was rather that the veil should not have been pierced 
so easily. On appeal the AD remained silent on the matter. 
Since it cannot be seen how reverse piercing can be applied in the context of 
abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes, it is not considered in further detail 
in this dissertation. 
 
7 Conclusion 
The company is a separate legal person. The separate corporate and legal 
personality of a company clearly serves an important commercial purpose. 
However, certain circumstances may arise which require the separate existence 
                                            
261 This is well illustrated by the legislated piercing provisions in the Income Tax Act, such 
as the “controlled foreign company” regime contained in s 9D thereof. 
262 Referred to by Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 86 as “reverse veil piercing”. 
See also the article in PwC “Piercing the corporate veil: s 20(9) of the Companies Act 
2008” (2013 PwC South Africa Synopsis Tax Today 2-3) where this is considered in the 
context of s 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
263 1979 2 SA 1113 (T). 
264 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 86, as well as the examples mentioned from 
other jurisdictions listed in n 6 thereof. Cf Al-Kharafi & Sons for General Trading, General 
Contracting and Industrial Structures Wll v Pema NO & others 2010 JOL 25851 (GSJ) 
where “reverse veil piercing” was requested by the applicants, but denied by the court 
based on the facts at hand. See also Ochberg v CIR 1931 AD 215 where the taxpayer 
effectively sought to have piercing applied to absolve him from an income tax liability. 
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of the company vis-à-vis its shareholders to be disregarded for certain limited 
purposes. This disregarding can be applied by force of either general or specific 
enabling legislation or the common law. Where piercing is applied in terms of the 
common law it should be treated as a distinct and separate remedy; not to be 
confused with other legal constructions, particularly the agency and alter ego 
doctrines which may have the same practical outcomes. Similarly, it should not 
be extended to the company-director relationship,265 or to the attribution of certain 
characteristics to the company. 
For tax purposes piercing could conceptually be applied both where a 
company’s tax debt is enforced against a shareholder or a fellow group 
company266 and where the tax debt is regarded as having arisen directly in the 
hands of the shareholders or of a fellow group company. This dissertation will 
only consider the latter.  
Piercing therefore involves the attribution to the owners of a company of the 
legal consequences of a transaction to which the company, in form, was a party. 
It acknowledges that the legislature creates a form through a legal fiction. 
However, where that form is stretched too far or is abused, the law will for that 
limited situation ignore the fiction and recognise the substance of the matter.  
The circumstances in which the law will go behind the veil for tax purposes will 
be discussed in the following chapters of this dissertation.
                                            
265 As to the potential liability of company directors (as opposed to shareholders), it is the 
writer’s opinion that this should be excluded from piercing. Therefore, it is not dealt with 
in this dissertation. However, it is a fact that, due to the very loose use of the term 
“piercing” in recent times, it would be an exercise in legal semantics to insist that piercing 
excludes the possibility to hold the directors of a company liable for the company’s debts. 
For example, Lategan’s case, which refers to director liability as a result of piercing, 
provides a very useful analysis of the principles involved in “actual” piercing (indeed an 
analysis which has often been referred to as authority in subsequent cases). One would 
therefore be unwise to exclude this case from a study of the piercing doctrine.  
266 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 1 below for piercing discussed in the context of groups 
of companies. 








It was established in chapter 2 that a company at incorporation acquires a statutory 
legal personality separate from that of its shareholders. This is a fundamental principle 
of law and is observed by the courts unless exceptional circumstances exist to 
disregard it.267 The reluctance on the part of the courts to apply piercing in terms of 
the common law effectively amounts to the common law overriding a statutory 
provision. This can only be justified in exceptional circumstances if one has regard to 
the basic principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. In principle the 
judiciary should not usurp the role of the legislature,268 unless it is satisfied that the 
statutory provisions have been abused to such an extent that it cannot but intervene. 
This makes the provisions of section 20(9) of the Companies Act even more relevant. 
For the first time now the courts are expressly authorised by the legislature to disregard 
the separate legal personality of a company. 
Where the courts in the past did act in such circumstances, they acted in terms of 
the common law. The common law was in this regard not replaced by the new statutory 
possibilities in for example the Companies Act of 2008.269 
The piercing doctrine remains an accepted part of the common law and the courts 
should not shy away from applying and developing it. As was recently confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court in Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd,270 the 
common law is the law of the courts271 and the courts have a duty to develop it in 
                                            
267 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 23. 
268 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) and Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa  
2009 2 BCLR 136 (CC) 29. 
269 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 below. 
270 [2015] ZACC 5. 
271 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 67. 
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accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.272 The two are intertwined “and do not 
constitute separate concepts”.273 However, if Parliament wishes to override an 
acknowledged common law principle by legislation, then it is entitled and able to do 
so.274  
If one accepts that separate legal personality was developed to satisfy a certain 
commercial need, its consequences are also justified by that need. However, when 
the purpose for which legal personality is used in a particular case is not in line with 
the purpose for which statute created it,275 the question whether the law should still 
accommodate the existence of the legal personality becomes problematic. 
This chapter will consider whether the law as applied in South Africa should address 
the use of legal personality for unintended purposes, such as for instance to facilitate 
tax avoidance. However, a subsidiary matter needs to be considered first, namely 
when it would be appropriate for a court to consider whether common law piercing 
may be applied or not. There has over the past two decades been a significant debate 
about whether piercing can only be used as a remedy of last resort. Only thereafter 
will it be appropriate to consider the contents of the common law piercing doctrine 
itself. 
 
2 A remedy of last resort? 
The legislated piercing remedy available in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act contains no restriction on it being invoked as a remedy of first instance.276 Yet, for 
the reasons set out in chapter 4 part 3 below, the section 20(9) remedy should be 
developed and interpreted in line with the common law.  
                                            
272 S 173. See the majority judgment of Moseneke DCJ in Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 
(Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 113 et seq, supported by the minority judgment of Cameron J 
at para 120.  
273 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte Application of the 
President of RSA 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC). 
274 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 115. 
275 In other words, where legal personality is “misused” or “abused. 
276 See the text to ch 4 part 3 3 below. 
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This creates a potential debate on whether section 20(9) may also, like some would 
suggest is the case for the common law remedy, only be applied as a remedy of last 
resort.277  
The common law position is uncertain.278 Although not relevant in deciding on the 
substantive criteria, it remains an important preliminary matter. There would be little 
use in ascertaining whether the requirements for applying piercing are present in a 
particular case when a court would not be willing to venture into such an exercise to 
begin with. 
When comparing the seemingly contradictory AD judgment in Cape Pacific in 1995 
and the SCA’s judgment in Hülse-Reutter v Gödde (“Hülse-Reutter”)279 in 2001, it is 
clear why this confusion exists. The AD in Cape Pacific was quick to distance itself 
explicitly from the notion advanced by the court a quo280 that piercing is to be used 
only in the absence of any other remedy. Smalberger JA ruled: 
 
“In principle I see no reason why piercing of the corporate veil should necessarily be 
precluded if another remedy exists. As a general rule, if a person has more than one legal 
remedy at his disposal he can select any one of them; he is not obliged to pursue one rather 
than another (although there may be instances where once he has made an election he 
will be bound by it). If the facts of a particular case otherwise justify the piercing of the 
corporate veil, the existence of another remedy, or the failure to pursue what would have 
been an available remedy, should not in principle serve as an absolute bar to a court 
                                            
277 In light of the judgment in Hülse-Reutter. 
278 See Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 49 et seq where the seemingly conflicting 
judgments of the AD in Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter are discussed, as well as the 
application of this principle in Amlin. In the latter judgment, Dlodlo J (at 23) held:  
“I accept that ‘opening the curtains’ or piercing the veil is rather a drastic remedy. For that 
reason alone it must be resorted to rather sparingly and indeed as the very last resort in 
circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done between two litigants. It cannot, for 
example, be resorted to as an alternative remedy if another remedy on the same facts can 
successfully be employed in order to administer justice between the parties.”  
It is unclear whether the court set down this principle of its own accord, or with the judgment 
of Hülse-Reutter, not explicitly referenced to, in mind as authority. Cf Williams “Companies: 
Part I” in LAWSA 87: n 2 who supports veil piercing not being applied merely as a “matter of 
convenience”, although he distances himself from the application of veil piercing as a remedy 
of last resort only. 
279 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA). 
280 Cape Pacific judgment a quo. 
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granting consequential relief. The existence of another remedy, or the failure to pursue one 
that was available, may be a relevant factor when policy considerations come into play, but 
it cannot be of overriding importance.”281 
 
The apparent contrary position adopted in Hülse-Reutter is: 
 
“The very exceptional nature of the relief which the respondent seeks against the appellants 
requires, in the circumstances of the present case, that he should have no other remedy”.282 
[own emphasis] 
 
The fact that our then highest court handed down both these judgments 
necessitates a consideration of the stare decisis doctrine.  
In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Camps Bay Ratepayers’ 
and Residents’ Association v Harrison283 the approach used in the earlier case should 
be followed unless the SCA finds the later judgment to be “clearly wrong”.284 It follows 
then that only if the SCA in Hülse-Reutter found that the judgment in Cape Pacific was 
“clearly wrong” (which it did not) can there be a departure from the principle that 
piercing may be applied even if the doctrine does not present the only remedy 
available. Indeed, Hülse-Reutter appears to acknowledge the correctness of the Cape 
Pacific judgment,285 thereby avoiding a clear conflict. One should therefore apply the 
judgment in Hülse-Reutter in the context of Cape Pacific.  
                                            
281 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 555. 
282 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) para 23. 
283 2011 2 BCLR 121 (CC)28:  
“What [the doctrine of stare decisis] boils down to ... is: ‘certainty, predictability, reliability, 
equality, uniformity, convenience: these are the principal advantages to be gained by a 
legal system from the principle of stare decisis.’ Observance of the doctrine has been 
insisted upon, both by this Court and by the Supreme Court of Appeal. And, I believe rightly 
so. The doctrine of precedent not only binds lower courts but also binds courts of final 
jurisdiction to their own decisions. These courts can depart from a previous decision of their 
own only when satisfied that that decision is clearly wrong. Stare decisis is therefore not 
simply a matter of respect for courts of higher authority. It is a manifestation of the rule of 
law itself, which in turn is a founding value of our Constitution. To deviate from this rule is 
to invite legal chaos.” [own emphasis] 
284 Also see the various cases cited in S Ryan “The balance between certainty and flexibility 
in horizontal and vertical stare decises: Bosch v CSARS” (2015) 132 SALJ 237. 
285 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 23:  
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The principle established in Cape Pacific is that piercing need not be a remedy of 
last resort, but that the availability of alternative remedies is not unimportant when a 
court is requested to apply piercing.286 Hülse-Reutter focused this principle to a certain 
extent. 
Scott JA in Hülse-Reutter drew a distinction.287 Where rights exist against the 
company, those rights must be exercised before the corporate veil may be pierced. 
Where the rights enforceable against the company are however commercially 
worthless, for example where the company would be unable to pay if sued or there is 
no remedy against the company, then piercing may be applied.288  
The finding is one that establishes a clear principle. Where alternative remedies are 
available to a claimant against the company, it is not entitled to ask for piercing of the 
corporate veil. Piercing may, however, be granted if the alternative remedies are not 
exercisable against the company, but against its shareholders or fellow group 
companies. This is an important development and entails that piercing is only available 
where no other remedy exists against the company to afford the necessary relief. In 
other words, only where other remedies are available against the company will 
piercing be a remedy of last resort. 
Scott JA concluded in this regard that there can be no “unfair advantage”289 against 
a company’s shareholders if another remedy is available against the applicable 
company for which piercing is considered in the first instance. His dictum below 
supports this: 
                                            
“I do not understand the learned judge as having suggested that the existence of another 
remedy is an irrelevant consideration nor, I think, should the dictum be read out of context. 
The facts of the case were very different from the present one.” 
Cf Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) n 38 where Binns-Ward J also 
sought, in my view correctly so, to reconcile the approaches taken by the SCA in Cape Pacific 
and Hülse-Reutter. 
286 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 555 and 556. 
287 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 21: “There is no evidence that the 
corporation would be unable to pay if sued …”. 
288 See e g Cape Pacific where the question regarding the doctrine of notice rather was at 
issue and applicable, not against LCI (being the contracting company sought to be pierced), 
but against its sister company (GLI). See also the similar arguments of the UK Supreme Court 
in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International [2012] EWCA Civ 808 para 139 specifically. 
289 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 20; see the text to ch 3 part 3 3 3 below. 
 




“There is no evidence that the corporation would be unable to pay if sued; there is nothing 
to suggest that the respondent was unfairly prejudiced by the distinction which exists 
between the company and those who control it.”290 
 
The test goes further than to establish whether a remedy exists against the 
company. Hülse-Reutter not only considers the availability of a remedy, but also if the 
company would be able “to pay if sued”. This test brings another more practical 
element to the fore. The presence of an alternative remedy against the company is 
only relevant if it results in practical relief for the claimant. An insistence that a claimant 
exercise a remedy available against a company who cannot pay if sued will prejudice 
that claimant. It will be precluded from applying for piercing, even though no real relief 
is available in terms of alternative remedies against the company.291 It is for this reason 
that both Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter provide for an exception to the rule: piercing 
may be applied where no other real relief is available to a claimant when exercising 
alternative remedies against the company. Piercing may then be applied in the first 
instance, regardless of the fact that an alternative yet hollow remedy exists.292 If such 
an alternative remedy does exist, courts should not even consider applying piercing. 
However, where piercing is one of the remedies available against the shareholder 
rather than the company, a court would not be prohibited from piercing.293  
                                            
290 Para 21. 
291 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 21. 
292 Although preceding Hülse-Reutter, the court a quo in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 719 came to the same conclusion in its 
disapproval of the judgment in Gering v Gering [1974] 1 All SA 65 (W). The SCA did not 
address the matter. 
293 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 28. Cf Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 555 and 556 for authority that the 
existence of an alternative remedy could be a consideration opposed to piercing. See the text 
to part 3 3 2 2 of this chapter below. The position in the UK appears to be somewhat different. 
Four of the seven judges (the remaining three preferring not to take a view on the matter) in 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 expressed their clear preference that piercing 
may be applied as a last and final remedy only. The majority in that case therefore agreed 
with the approach in Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 as opposed to that of 
Antonio Gramsci Shipping v Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333 (Comm). 
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The conclusion therefore is that the Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter cases should 
not be regarded as conflicting with each other. Hülse-Reutter should rather be seen 
as only limiting the potential circumstances under which piercing may be applied.294  
It is in any case doubtful whether this will have any impact if piercing is sought to 
counter tax avoidance, that is on an income statement level. The reason for this is that 
tax avoidance through the misuse of corporate personality necessarily implies that no 
action exists against the taxpaying company. By its nature, to address the abuse of 
the corporate veil, SARS would require a remedy against the shareholder. The 
principle is therefore only relevant where piercing is sought to be applied on a balance 
sheet level.295 
The principle remains therefore that common law piercing in the tax avoidance 
context may be applied even if not all other remedies to counter the perceived 
impermissible tax avoidance by shareholders have been exhausted. Where a 
corporate structure is abused nothing precludes such piercing from being applied, 
even where the GAARs or the provision in section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
potentially come into play to counter abuse by a company’s shareholders. 
 
3 The common law requirements for piercing of the corporate veil 
3 1 Introduction 
In the many judgments that have ostensibly dealt with the piercing doctrine in the past, 
                                            
294 The subsequent judgment and conclusion in 2008 by the Cape High Court in Amlin (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 2 SA 558 (C) (where the conclusion was drawn obiter that piercing 
can only be applied as a final remedy) is therefore, with respect, in conflict with the principle 
laid down by the SCA. So too the judgment in Knoop NO and Others v Birkenstock Properties 
(Pty) Ltd FSHC case no 7095/2008 of 4 June 2009. See also Olivier & Honiball. 2010. The 
Taxation of Trusts in South Africa. Siberink, Cape Town at 74. 
295 Even on a balance sheet level it is questionable whether piercing as a remedy will 
nowadays only be available as a remedy of last resort. This is based on the conclusion in ch 
4 (specifically part 3) that s 20(9) of the Companies Act has practically usurped the common 
law remedy; this section makes no provision for piercing to be applied only after all other 
remedies have been exhausted. See also Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 
(WCC) 34. 
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a lot of controversy is apparent.296 
The following analysis will consider the piercing doctrine as developed in South 
African common law within the confines set out in the previous chapter.297 These 
principles will thereafter be applied to the law of taxation to determine how piercing 
may be applied in the context of tax avoidance structures. 
 
3 2 Development of the doctrine – history 
In Dadoo’s case298 a South African court for the first time confirmed that a company 
is a person separate in law from its owners.299 That case can be regarded as the South 
African equivalent of the English Salomon case. The two questions before the court in 
Dadoo were whether the corporate veil existed in the first place and whether a transfer 
of properties to said company was in fraudem legis, which doctrine does not fall within 
the ambit of the piercing doctrine.300  
In confirming the principle of the separate legal existence of a company, Innes CJ 
simply stated that “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members 
who compose it.”301 
Bark and Another NNO v Boesch302 is arguably the earliest example where a South 
African court was confronted with the question of piercing. Although the court did not 
use the words “piercing” as such, it effectively applied the doctrine. It is interesting that 
the court then already acknowledged that piercing could be applied between two 
                                            
296 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552: 
“The law is far from settled with regard to the circumstances in which it would be permissible 
to pierce the corporate veil ...”. 
297 See the text to ch 2 part 4 above. 
298 Dadoo Ltd & Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530. 
299 See Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W); Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v 
Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 24; Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A). 
300 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 2 above for the discussion on simulated/sham transactions. 
301 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 550. 
302 1959 2 SA 377 (T). 
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companies with common shareholders, that is not between a company and its 
shareholder as would be the usual situation.303  
Others may consider Orkin Bros. Ltd304 or Robinson305 to be the first South African 
cases to have involved piercing, though neither of these judgments explicitly refer to 
“piercing” as such. Orkin’s case revolved around whether piercing would be justified 
in the event of fraud on the part of a director (which the court answered in the 
affirmative). In Robinson the fiduciary duty of directors towards a company was 
considered. Since both these cases involved the director/company relationship they 
are not, for purposes of this dissertation, regarded as relating to piercing in the proper 
sense.306 
The first South African case to consider piercing (the disregarding of this separate 
existence) in any significant detail and labelling it as such, was that of Lategan in 
1979.307 
 
3 2 1 Lategan v Boyes – the requirement for fraud 
Although Lategan’s case did not concern piercing in the strict sense,308 a proper 
analysis of the concept cannot be done without considering this judgment. Le Roux J 
sought to address the piercing doctrine directly and did so in considerable detail. In 
addition his judgment was also the subject of further consideration in subsequent 
piercing cases.309 Crucially, Lategan introduced a theme which would feature in the 
                                            
303 See the discussion in the text to ch 3 part 5 2 1 on piercing within company groups, or 
“horizontal” piercing. 
304 Orkin Bros. Ltd v Bell 1921 TPD 92. 
305 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168. 
306 See the text to ch 2 part 3 2 1 above. 
307 Since Bark’s case the judgments in Gering, Gien and RP Crees (Pvt) Ltd v Woodpecker 
Industries (Pvt) Ltd [1975] 2 All SA 665 (R) were handed down. However, these did little to 
develop the doctrine and it is doubted whether they are appropriate examples of piercing to 
begin with. It is therefore not necessary to deal with them in any detail as part of this 
dissertation. 
308 The company/director relationship was under scrutiny here rather than the 
company/shareholder relationship. 
309 Refer e g Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) and The Shipping Corporation of 
India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A). 
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South African common law piercing context for more than a decade, viz whether fraud 
is a requirement for piercing to be applied. 
Lategan is often regarded as the original source for fraud as a requirement.310 This 
view is based on the following dictum of Le Roux J:  
 
“I have no doubt that our Courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and 
again where fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality.”311 
 
Fraud should, however, not be regarded as an absolute requirement for piercing to 
apply. Such an approach relies on reading the above dictum out of context.312 The 
mention of fraud in the dictum is based on the case of Orkin Bros. The dictum should 
be understood as a comment by Le Roux J that piercing was in that case based on 
the presence of fraud. Instead of requiring fraud in all cases, Le Roux J was merely 
expressing his agreement with the court’s finding in the Orkin Bros case that fraud is 
an appropriate basis upon which to justify piercing.313 
This corresponds with subsequent judgments by the SCA,314 holding that although 
the presence of fraud may be an appropriate basis on which to apply piercing, it is by 
no means the only basis upon which to do so. 
After Lategan the first significant case in which piercing was again considered was 
Banco de Mocambique. However, the doctrine was not developed further in that case 
where it was found that piercing was inappropriate on the facts, even though an 
agency relationship existed.315 
                                            
310 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-139; Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 
2008 2 SA 558 (C) 20; Domanski (1986) SALJ 225. 
311 648. 
312 See Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 160 in support.  
313 The reference in Lategan and another NNO v Boyes 1980 4 All SA 638 (T) 648 to Canadian 
case law may arguably be regarded as confirmation that fraud is the only basis on which to 
pierce, but this amounts to an obiter statement at most. It is also notable that the court in the 
quoted Canadian case of Clarkson Co. v Zhelka [1967] 2 OR 565, 64 DLR (2d) did not 
conclude that piercing may only be applied in instances of fraud. 
314 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) and The 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 25. 
315 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 4 above. 
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The next significant judgment was Botha v Van Niekerk (“Botha”), which introduced 
the first common law test316 for piercing in the appropriate context and labelled it as 
such.317 
 
3 2 2 Botha v Van Niekerk 
At issue in Botha was whether the seller of a property (Botha), having sold it to Van 
Niekerk “or his nominee”, was able to enforce the sale agreement against Van Niekerk. 
Van Niekerk, after concluding the agreement, exercised the nomination right provided 
for in the agreement by nominating a dormant company of which he was the sole 
shareholder. The court refused to apply piercing. 
The court made the following important comments,318 which are relevant also for 
the purposes of interpreting section 20(9) of the Companies Act:319 
“Die werklike debat gaan egter daaroor of daar gronde is om verby daardie afsonderlikheid 
te kyk in hierdie bepaalde geval in die lig daarvan dat die regspraak onmiskenbare tekens 
toon dat hy nie sonder voorbehoud by die afsonderlikheid sal volstaan nie en die 
ontwyfelbaarheid van die billikheid daarvan dat die Hof soms by die afsonderlikheid moet 
verbykyk.”320 [own emphasis] 
 
“Dit sou ten minste besondere gronde verg; iets wat 'n redelik dwingende noodsaak skep 
in die belang van geregtigheid om die elementêre van maatskappystigting uit te skryf sodat 
'n aandeelhouer of direkteur persoonlik aanspreeklik is op 'n maatskappy se kontrakte. 
Blote billikheid, op sy beste 'n redelik onhanteerbare perd, is nie voldoende nie.”321 [own 
emphasis] 
 
                                            
316 It has been argued that the test set out in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) was 
merely obiter (cf Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 2 SA 558 (C)). The correctness of such 
a claim is doubtful, especially in the light thereof that the court in Cape Pacific commented on 
the test laid down in Botha’s case, a clear indication of its relevance. 
317 Although the court considered whether piercing should be applied in the Banco de 
Mozambique case, it did not address the criteria necessary to pierce to any extent. 
318 Refer particularly to the discussion of the judgment of the SCA in Cape Pacific in ch 3 part 
3 3 2 below. 
319 The reference in the judgment to “onduldbare onreg” is of particular relevance: See ch 4 
part 2 3 5 below. 
320 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 161. 
321 165. 
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“Ek meen dat daar in hierdie geval ook net tot 'n konklusie van persoonlike 
aanspreeklikheid sou kon kom as daar ten minste 'n oortuiging was dat applikante 'n 
onduldbare onreg aangedoen word en wel ten gevolg van iets wat vir die regdenkende 
duidelik onbehoorlike optrede aan die kant van eerste respondent is.”322 [own emphasis] 
 
There are a number of aspects to these dicta. 
The first is that piercing can be justified in certain circumstances for reasons of 
fairness and/or equity.323 However, such consideration of fairness or equity, although 
a prerequisite, is not enough. The remedy should only be resorted to in cases where 
exceptional grounds exist. Piercing should therefore only be applied where an 
“unconscionable injustice” is being done to the aggrieved party, coupled with improper 
conduct on the part of the shareholder through his or her use of the corporate veil. 
This comprehensive statement requires further analysis, particularly since the SCA 
later thought this to be “perhaps too rigid a test”.324 
Of particular interest in Flemming J’s judgment are two key requirements: an 
unconscionable injustice to the claimant or applicant and improper conduct 
perpetrated by the shareholder through use of the company form. 
It is unnecessary at this point to consider the phrase “onduldbare onreg” (or 
“unconscionable injustice”) in the common law context as it was not applied in any 
subsequent piercing cases.325 The important principle to note from Botha is that 
piercing requires a two-pronged approach. It is insufficient to have regard only to the 
manner in which corporate personality is misused; one must also have regard to the 
effect that this misuse has on the aggrieved party.  
                                            
322 167. 
323 It is interesting to note that the sentiments portrayed in the judgment regarding that equity 
and fairness considerations not being enough is implied in the phrase “onduldbare onreg”: an 
injustice or “onreg” in itself is ostensibly not enough to pierce. See also the text to ch 4 part 2 
3 5 below for a similar position in terms of s 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
324 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 555. 
325 The requirement of an “unconscionable” injustice (or abuse) in s 20(9) of the Companies 
Act will be discussed below in ch 4. The possible influence of Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All 
SA 157 (W) on the formulation of the test in that section is also considered in detail there. 
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“Improper conduct” or “onbehoorlike optrede”, the second requirement from the 
judgment, did not appear for the first time in Botha. Gower326 also referred to this as a 
factor which would justify piercing as an alternative to fraud only. The obvious question 
is: what would constitute “improper conduct”? Because the SCA subsequently applied 
this test in Cape Pacific,327 the scope thereof will be considered in the discussion of 
that case below.328 Suffice it to say for the moment that improper conduct must involve 
the company / shareholder relationship. In this regard, it is important to distinguish 
between improper conduct perpetrated by the company and improper conduct using 
the legal personality separating the company and its shareholder. In the first situation 
piercing would not be justified. In the latter piercing does become relevant. The dictum 
of Scott JA in Hülse-Reutter that “there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the 
distinction between the corporate entity and those who control it …”329 [own emphasis] 
supports this distinction.  
Following this survey of the initial important cases on piercing330 the further 
development of the doctrine by the SCA is considered next. These judgments must 
necessarily be regarded as the final authority on the matter. 
 
3 3 The developed doctrine 
The SCA had three opportunities to consider piercing. These three judgments are 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation (“Shipping Corporation of 
India Ltd”),331 Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter. 
It should be noted from the outset that the principles decided in these cases should 
be read together. None of them contradicts any of the other judgments by the same 
court.332 
                                            
326 LCB Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 3 ed (1969) 216 as referred to in Lategan 
and another NNO v Boyes 1980 4 All SA 638 (T) 646. 
327 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
328 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 below. 
329 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) para 20. 
330 See also Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v Erconovaal Ltd 1985 4 SA 615 (T) which did not add 
much to the contents of the doctrine. 
331 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A). 
332 Refer the discussion on stare decisis as applied by the Constitutional Court in n 283 above. 
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3 3 1 The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd 
This case shares two commonalities with Banco de Mocambique. The facts in both 
cases concerned the possible piercing of the veil of wholly owned state-owned 
companies.333  
A further shared feature is that the court did not give significant guidance in either 
of them as to when piercing would be considered appropriate. The facts in both cases 
made such a discussion unnecessary.334 Perhaps the most relevant dictum to come 
out of The Shipping Corporation of India case is that of Corbett CJ: 
 
“Suffice it to say that they would generally have to include an element of fraud or other 
improper conduct in the establishment or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs.”335 
[own emphasis] 
 
The judgment by itself is thus not very helpful, but it was referred to in the important 
Cape Pacific decision. 
 
3 3 2 The important Cape Pacific case  
Though the separate legal identity of a company was recognised in Salomon and 
Dadoo, the leading South African case on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is 
undoubtedly Cape Pacific.336 Not only was the piercing doctrine significantly 
developed and refined, which refinements have gone untested since then,337 but the 
doctrine as a whole was considered in some detail.338 
                                            
333 The fact that the companies were state-owned was irrelevant but interesting (The Shipping 
Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 24). 
334 In Shipping Corporation of India the court rather abruptly concluded that “no ground has 
been shown for piercing the corporate veil in the present case”, while in Banco de Mozambique 
the court in similar fashion held “that in the present case I can conceive of no principle of law 
whereby such a radical step would be justified”. 
335 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 25. 
336 See also Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 20. 
337 Cape Pacific was not considered in detail in Hülse-Reutter, nor is it submitted was it 
necessary to do so. 
338 Significant matters dealt with in the judgment include that piercing need not be a remedy 
of final resort (see the text to ch 3 part 2 above) and further that even though the incorporation 
of a company may have been legitimate, the particular use thereof may nonetheless warrant 
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As in Bark v Boesch (“Bark”) Cape Pacific involved piercing within a group of 
companies. At stake was therefore not the corporate veil between a company and its 
shareholder, but the corporate veils between companies forming part of the same 
group inter se.339 
The individual behind the companies, Lubner, transferred certain assets from one 
company which he controlled (“LCI”), to another company (“GLI”) which was wholly 
owned by him. This was done in order to frustrate the delivery of assets that LCI had 
originally agreed to sell.340 
The current principles underlying common law piercing are arguably best set out in 
the following dictum in Cape Pacific: 
 
“It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our courts should not lightly disregard a 
company’s separate personality, but should strive to give effect to and uphold it. To do 
otherwise would negate or undermine the policy and principles that underpin the concept 
of separate corporate personality and the legal consequences that attach to it. But where 
fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct (and I confine myself to such situations) are 
                                            
piercing irrespective of the purpose or intent exhibited at incorporation of the company (see 
the text to n 342 below). It also directs that piercing does not amount to the disregarding of 
the company’s separate legal personality for all intents and purposes, but only to the extent 
necessary to counter the abuse perpetrated – refer ch 2 part 6 1 above. 
339 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 1 below. 
340 The court regarded Lubner as being the effective shareholder of LCI even though he was 
not the registered owner or even ultimate owner of any of the company’s shares. The court 
found at 548 that LCI “was essentially none other than Lubner personally, albeit in a different 
guise.” This is worth noting for two reasons: the first is that a court can pierce where a 
shareholding relationship is in place in substance (even if not in form), which relationship 
needs to be in place if the separate corporate existence of LCI and GLI are to be disregarded. 
The second matter of note is that, as is the case with piercing, such shareholding relationship 
can be inferred only for limited purposes: Smalberger JA at 546:  
“[I]t is not in my view necessary to determine whether Lubner had complete control of LCI. 
The real issue is rather whether he exercised absolute control over LCI in relation to its 
dealings with the Findon shares.”  
Control as referred to here is not control exercisable by a director of a company. Rather, it is 
control as would exist over an asset and which can be exercised by the owner thereof, with a 
company being controlled by its shareholders. Provision for piercing persons who are 
shareholders in substance is also found in s 20(9) of the Companies Act, which foresees 
piercing where a shareholder or “another person” is abusing the juristic personality of a 
company. (Also see s 65 of the Close Corporations Act.) 
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found to be present, other considerations come into play. The need to preserve the 
separate corporate indentify (sic) would in such circumstances have to be balanced against 
policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil (cf Domanski: 
‘Piercing The Corporate Veil - A New Direction’: 1986 SALJ 224). And a court would then 
be entitled to look to substance rather than form in order to arrive at the true facts, and if 
there has been a misuse of corporate personality, to disregard it and attribute liability where 
it should rightly lie.”341 [own emphasis – refer below discussion] 
 
The above raises several issues regarding the current state of the doctrine, as well 
as its future development.  
 
3 3 2 1 Fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct: the threshold requirement for 
piercing 
To summarise the conclusions reached in Cape Pacific: if fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct, defined within the context of reigning policy considerations, is 
present, a court would be justified to pierce if this is coupled with a misuse of the 
corporate veil.342 The sentiment is consistent with that expressed in The Shipping 
Corporation of India Ltd.343 
This dissertation considers piercing and where it can be applied to otherwise legally 
sound corporate structures used primarily for impermissible tax avoidance purposes. 
As a result a focus on improper conduct” and what it entails is appropriate. In the tax 
milieu one would typically expect to find “fraud” or “dishonesty” to be present where 
                                            
341 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553. 
342 Such impropriety (or dishonesty or fraud) need not be the purpose with which the company 
was incorporated – see the dictum of Hoffman AJ in Le’Bergo Fashions CC v Lee 1998 2 SA 
615 (C) and reference there to Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne 1933 Ch 935 (CA), Cape Pacific 
as well as Gower as quoted and referred to in that judgment. See too Pioneer Concrete 
Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd & Ors 1986 11 ACLR 108 (Australian case Reference) and J 
Louw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 2 SA 237 (N)). Also see Cape Pacific Ltd 553 et seq, in 
particular Gower as quoted there. The impropriety should, however, be the reason why the 
company’s separate corporate personality was utilised in that instance. 
343 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 2 All SA 11 (A) 25. Although 
“dishonesty” (listed specifically in Cape Pacific as a potential criterion to justify piercing) is not 
mentioned here by name, one can assume that it formed part of the “other improper conduct” 
required in Shipping Corporation of India. 
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illegal acts are perpetrated, such as tax evasion.344 This dissertation therefore does 
not consider these alternative bases upon which to apply piercing. Suffice it to say that 
it has already been established in the discussion of Lategan’s case in the text to 
chapter 3 part 3 2 1 above that fraud is not a requirement for piercing to be applied. 
As shown by Cape Pacific, it is but one of the possible criteria to justify piercing.345 
                                            
344 See text to n 482 below. 
345 Notwithstanding the above it is interesting to note that under the judgment in Cape Pacific, 
even if fraud or dishonesty is present, one must still revert to the question whether in terms of 
policy considerations such fraudulent or dishonest activities are fraudulent or dishonest 
enough to warrant piercing. It is therefore curious is that the Court appears to diverge from the 
statement in Lategan that “our Courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and 
again where fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality” without any further 
considerations being taken into account. It is submitted that the interpretation of “fraud” as 
used in Cape Pacific differs from the interpretation in Lategan and that the requirement of 
“fraud” in Cape Pacific should not be interpreted too strictly. It would seem that the content of 
the word according to Cape Pacific is similar to that of “dolus” in Bark and another NNO v 
Boesch 1959 2 SA 377 (T) 384-385:  
“[I]f from the nature of a contract it can be implied that a moral or legal duty rests on a 
debtor not to effect the fulfilment of a resolutive condition which can relieve him of his 
obligation, deliberately to act in breach of that duty with the intention of ridding himself of 
his obligation constitutes dolus …”  
(Also see TK Cheng “The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of the 
English and the U.S. Corporate Veil Doctrines” (2011) 34 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 328-412, 
357.) Although “dolus” was considered in Bark v Boesch as a requirement for the application 
of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment, the court did in effect pierce the corporate veil. I cannot 
see how a deliberate and intentional action by a taxpayer in breach of his/her obligation to pay 
tax cannot be considered “fraudulent” or “improper” as contemplated in Cape Pacific. This is 
not to say that the breach of the duty to pay tax is sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. But a 
wide interpretation of “fraud” would increase the need for a court to undertake a detailed 
consideration of whether such breach is significant enough in terms of policy considerations 
to warrant piercing. For tax purposes, having regard to the considerations against piercing, a 
moral obligation to pay tax (if such an obligation exists) should in my view not be sufficient to 
warrant piercing. The question becomes even more pertinent where the actions involve the 
intentional and deliberate misuse of corporate personality primarily to rid that taxpayer of what 
would otherwise have been a legal duty to pay tax. Whether this is the case will to a large 
extent depend on the specific facts to be determined on a case by case basis (Cape Pacific 
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 
 
Gower, clearly the source of the phrase “improper conduct” in Cape Pacific,346 does 
not explain what this potentially loaded term means. Notwithstanding this, it is clear 
that the SCA’s intention was to include an element of mala fides therein.347 This 
suggests that improper conduct should be determined subjectively, as is the case with 
fraud or dishonesty. The SCA confirmed as much in WT v KT,348 preferring to refer to 
“improper purpose” rather than “improper conduct”.349 The application of a subjective 
test for piercing also accords with the English approach, as will be seen later.350 
A further argument in favour thereof that piercing necessarily involves a subjective 
requirement can be found in the SCA and the AD’s approach to the judgments in 
Ebrahim351 and Cape Pacific. In Ebrahim, the SCA, based on the same objective 
criteria cited by the court a quo, sought to apply section 64 rather than the piercing 
provision in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act applied by the court a quo,352 in 
                                            
346 Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 3 ed 216. 
347 If an ejusdem generis interpretation is followed (LM du Plessis “Statute law and 
interpretation” in WA Joubert (ed) Law of South Africa XXV 2 ed (2011) 359). In the context of 
the piercing provision in s 20(9) of the Companies Act, see E Nel “Two sides of a coin: piercing 
the veil and unconscionability in trust law” (2014) Obiter 570 575. 
348 2015 3 SA 574 (SCA). 
349 Although WT v KT is a case dealing with trusts, that case is relevant. See the text to ch 4 
part 2 3 5 below. 
350 See the text to part 4 1 below where the UK Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources 
Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 agreed with the approach suggested in Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 
EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 162 that the company must be used with the purpose to “avoid or 
conceal liability”. Further at para 163 the court concluded that motive would be extremely 
relevant and at paragraph 164 impropriety was likened to “deceptive intent”. See also Prest 
para 21 the UK Supreme Court concluded that Adams is authority that the corporate veil can 
only be pierced where it “was being used for a deliberately dishonest purpose”. [own 
emphasis] 
351 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA). 
352 S 64 of the Close Corporations Act is not strictly a piercing provision given the absence of 
member-company relationship. That section allows a court to apply that provision potentially 
based on objective criteria alone to hold others liable for the debt of the close corporation in 
question. S 65 is an example of a statutory piercing provision and which in my view would 
require a court to take account of the subjective purpose of a member in order to apply that 
provision. It is in my view arguable that the SCA in Ebrahim therefore decided to apply s 64 in 
arriving at its conclusion rather than s 65 due to the absence of an enquiry haven taken place 
into the subjective purpose of the members in that case. See also n 710 below. 
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my view due to the absence of subjective criteria being present. In Cape Pacific, the 
a quo judgment was emphatic in its finding that the companies in question were on a 
strictly objective basis determined to be alter egos of the defendant (Lubner). 
Conversely, on appeal this was not the criteria on which the court based its application 
of the piercing doctrine. In the AD a subjective element clearly also had a bearing on 
the court’s conclusion. It is submitted that in both instances, the courts of appeal – 
correctly and in line with the UK’s approach353 – considered a subjective element 
necessary to apply piercing. As much is clear due thereto that the appeals in both 
Ebrahim and Cape Pacific were dismissed, yet on different bases than were the case 
in the courts a quo. Based on the objective approach taken by the a quo court in 
Ebrahim the SCA preferred not to apply section 65 of the Close Corporations Act, but 
rather section 64. In Cape Pacific, the subjective purpose of the defendant inclined the 
AD to apply the piercing doctrine, rather than the strictly objective alter ego doctrine.354 
An analysis of the historical development of the test further supports the presence 
of a subjective enquiry in the piercing doctrine.355 As discussed in part 3 3 2 1 above, 
Lategan has long been regarded as authority that piercing may only be applied where 
fraud is present. The court clarified in Shipping Corporation of India that fraud is not 
the only test, but that “other improper conduct” may also suffice. In Cape Pacific the 
court further extended the potential for piercing by adding “dishonesty” as a further 
criterion to the existing bases of “fraud”’ and “improper conduct”. Whilst “dishonesty” 
would, in the view of the court, be a justifiable ground for piercing, an even less 
restrictive test should be applied. From this it is clear that courts may pierce, even 
absent fraud or dishonesty, where improper conduct is present to such an extent that 
policy considerations would regard the circumstances as severe enough to pierce. 
The development of the doctrine shows a further significant pattern. From Lategan’s 
often misinterpreted “fraud test” and through Shipping Corporation of India to Cape 
Pacific, one sees a gradual relaxation of the rule in Salomon: from “fraud”, to “fraud or 
other improper conduct” and then to “fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct”. 
                                            
353 See the text to ch 3 part 4 1 below. 
354 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above. 
355 In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 554 
the court suggested that motive would be a “highly relevant consideration”. 
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The test for improper conduct is, as with fraud and dishonesty, necessarily a 
subjective one. In a tax context it this means that the veil may only be pierced for tax 
purposes where a taxpayer intentionally used the corporate veil to achieve a tax 
benefit.356 Where the corporate veil is used as a “device”, “stratagem” “cloak” or 
“sham”, this may be indicative of such impropriety, but the motive of the shareholder 
for deploying the corporate veil is decisive.357 Whether, as a question of law, the veil 
should be pierced when used primarily for tax purposes is considered in more detail 
in part 5 1 of this chapter below. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the “improper conduct” must not be that of the 
company, but rather that of the shareholders behind the company using the veil for 
their own benefit with an improper subjective purpose.358 As will be discussed 
below,359 it is precisely when shareholders who control the corporate veil are able to 
exert control to such an extent that the corporate veil is used for “fraud, dishonesty or 
other improper conduct”, that such use amounts to “misuse”. 
It is important to understand what is meant by “policy considerations” in Smalberger 
JA’s dictum as quoted above. Even where impropriety is perpetrated through a misuse 
of the corporate veil, policy considerations should be taken into account first to 
determine whether piercing should be applied. 
                                            
356 In RP v DP 2014 6 SA 243 (ECP) the assertion is made at 20 that “improper conduct” 
involves instances where the corporate veil is used as alter ego, agent, puppet or mask. While 
such situations may very well include elements of impropriety, these would involve only 
objective elements. For piercing to be applied, the correct question to be asked is rather why 
the corporate veil has been used as such, rather than whether if it has been employed in a 
manner which can be described as alter ego, agent, puppet or mask. Also see J Louw and Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 2 SA 237 (N) where the court distinguished Gilford Motor Co Ltd v 
Horne 1933 Ch 935 (CA) and refused to pierce the corporate veil where it was found that the 
company had been used “innocently, honestly and for purposes that were quite above board”. 
Also see Le’Bergo Fashions CC v Lee 1998 2 SA 608 (C). 
357 The Shipping Corporation of India as quoted in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553; cf Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 
89. 
358 Which appears to have been the reason why the court was unwilling to pierce in Hülse-
Reutter: no evidence was presented to show impropriety on the part of the shareholders. See 
the text to ch 3 part 3 3 3 below.  
359 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 below. 
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3 3 2 2 Policy considerations 
It is important to recognise at the outset that policy considerations cannot determine 
the legality or illegality of an act. It cannot trump legal principle. To quote Lord 
Neuberger in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International (“VTB”):360 
 
“However, such pejorative expressions are often dangerous, as they risk assisting moral 
indignation to triumph over legal principle, and, while they may enable the court to arrive at 
a result which seems fair in the case in question, they can also risk causing confusion and 
uncertainty in the law.” [own emphasis] 
 
Policy considerations can only assist with piercing to determine when the use of a 
company has gone too far. In circumstances where such use involves an already 
legally “improper” purpose, such considerations can only help to determine whether it 
is improper enough and not whether it is improper per se.361  
Smalberger JA’s mention of policy considerations in Cape Pacific obviously refers 
to the “balancing test” proposed by Domanski, quoted with approval by the court.362 
Domanski’s balancing test relies on Glazer v Commission on Ethics for Public 
Employees, a judgment of the USA Court of Appeal of Louisiana363 where “(t)he court 
ruled that the test for piercing the corporate veil is a balancing of ‘the policies behind 
recognition of a separate corporate existence’ against the ‘policies justifying 
piercing’”.364 
Domanski does not set out what all the policies in favour of piercing365 would be vis-
à-vis those considerations opposed thereto. It is also not intended to try and do so 
here. Suffice it to say that considerations against the veil being pierced would include 
                                            
360 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp 2013 UKSC 5 124. 
361 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553 and 
561. 
362 See the text to ch 3 part 4 1 below where the distinction between the “evasion” and 
“concealment” principles made by the UK Supreme Court is considered. 
363 (1983) 431 So.2d 752. 
364 Domanski (1986) SALJ 232. Cf Benade (1967) THRHR 227 arguing that piercing should 
be applied based on “billikheidsoorwegings” (“considerations of fairness”). 
365 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 88 identifies the interests of justice, fairness and 
right dealing.  
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the interests of minorities and of other third parties potentially adversely affected366 as 
well as the maintenance of legal certainty.367 
Ryan,368 considering the role of stare decisis and to what extent it is limited to allow 
for changing societal needs, writes that “[t]he inherent flexibility of a common law 
system is perhaps one of its greatest strengths, and a particular system must find the 
appropriate balance to allow for the incremental development of the law while retaining 
a sufficient degree of certainty”. This approach is as much applicable to the piercing 
doctrine as it is to the common law in general. The common law should be developed 
to serve the needs of society if these needs outweigh the demand for legal certainty. 
In my view, our common law already allows piercing for tax purposes.369 Even if this 
is not the case, it is argued below that development of the common law is now 
necessary, if not overdue. 
The considerations against piercing are not at all as flexible as those in favour 
thereof. Especially those policy considerations in favour of piercing are therefore very 
relevant when interpreting a vague criterion for piercing such as “improper conduct”. 
The test for impropriety can easily become a moving target:370 What is considered a 
                                            
366 See e g Al-Kharafi & Sons for General Trading, General Contracting and Industrial 
Structures Wll v Pema NO & others 2010 JOL 25851 (GSJ). See the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 3 
and 6 1 and ch 3 part 5 2 below for why piercing for tax purposes can never be to the detriment 
of any third parties or other shareholders. See also Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 
2380 (Fam) para 146 where an English court confirmed that the presence of minority 
shareholders does not per se render a company immune from piercing. 
367 Domanski goes as far as to state that “abuse of juristic personality” should in itself provide 
sufficient grounds for policy considerations in favour of piercing to outweigh the considerations 
listed above opposed thereto. Although this may be correct, it is submitted that such abuse 
can only be determined with reference to whether the abuse is coupled with “fraud, dishonesty 
or improper conduct” in other words the question of abuse should be addressed separately 
from policy considerations (as supported by the Cape Pacific judgment which was delivered 
subsequent to the Domanski article). 
368 Ryan (2015) SALJ 234. 
369 See the text to n 248 above. 
370 Refer to Brand JA’s comments on policy considerations in Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd 
v SA National Roads Agency Ltd [2008] JOL 22803 (SCA) 7 which, although in a different 
context, would also be applicable to of the law of taxation: 
“[W]hat are the considerations of policy that should be taken into account for purposes of 
the enquiry? By what criteria should the relevant considerations of policy be identified? 
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minor impropriety today may very well be regarded as severely improper tomorrow 
because of a shift in policy considerations.371 This will undoubtedly influence the 
contents that a court will give to the phrase “fraud, dishonesty and (in particular) 
improper conduct”.372  
The Constitutional Court recently decided that policy considerations when 
developing the common law should include cognisance of “reasonableness”, the “boni 
mores” and “public policy”.373  
An illustration of this principle can be found when one applies the Cape Pacific test 
to the facts of Dadoo. Had “policy considerations” applied in 1920 and had the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation been applicable,374 it is very likely that a different 
judgment would have been handed down.  
                                            
Must we accept that policy considerations are by their very nature incapable of pre-
determination and that the identification of the policy considerations that should find 
application in a particular case are to be left to the discretion of the individual judge? … I 
believe the answer … must be ‘no’. Liability cannot depend on the idiosyncratic views of an 
individual judge. That would cloud the outcome of every case in uncertainty. In matters of 
contract, for example, this Court has turned its face against the notion that judges can 
refuse to enforce a contractual provision purely on the basis that it offends their personal 
sense of fairness and equity. Because, so it was said, that notion will give rise to legal and 
commercial uncertainty ... A legal system in which the outcome of litigation cannot be 
predicted with some measure of certainty would fail in its purpose … We therefore strive 
for certainty. The question is, how can that be achieved in an area directed by 
considerations of public or legal policy? I believe we must accept at the outset that absolute 
certainty is unattainable.” 
371 See Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 399. Cf De Koker & Brincker Silke on International 
Tax 46.9. 
372 See Nugent JA in AB Ventures Ltd v Siemens Ltd [2011] ZASCA 58 (31 March 2011) (as 
quoted in Hyde Construction CC v Blue Cloud Investments 40 (Pty) Ltd [2012] JOL 28470 
(WCC)) on the extension of the realms of the common law based on policy considerations. 
373 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 117. 
374 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 550 where a literal interpretative 
approach was preferred, contrary to what has now been prescribed by the SCA in Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund (see the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 below). 
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It is therefore not surprising that the doctrine has been described as one that is “far 
from settled”.375 Any doctrine that is linked to the ever-changing criteria of “policy 
considerations” is likely to remain unsettled.376 This does not mean that the doctrine 
must be discarded as useless due to its variability. Evolution to address changing 
circumstances is part of the nature of the law itself. Our courts strive continuously to 
develop the law, but along a path leading in a consistent direction. This is arguably 
what the courts in South Africa have done where the piercing doctrine is concerned.377 
 
3 3 2 3 Misuse of corporate personality 
It is important to appreciate that fraud, dishonesty or some other improper conduct is 
not enough on its own to pierce the corporate veil. It should be determined whether 
the presence of these subjective elements, whilst also considering the applicable 
policy considerations at play, is sufficient to then proceed to the objective test to decide 
whether said fraud, dishonesty or impropriety has been perpetrated by way of “misuse” 
of the corporate personality of the company.  
The terms “misuse” or “abuse”, which are used interchangeably in the Cape Pacific 
judgment,378 imply that the corporate personality is being used or exploited for 
purposes which it was not intended for or to depart from the legal use thereof.379 
Larkin,380 as quoted with approval in Cape Pacific, “reminds us that ‘the company is 
something which has a clear purpose, the facilitation and encouragement of business 
                                            
375 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552; 
Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 20; Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 4-133. 
376 See n 370 above. 
377 See the discussion in the text to part 3 3 2 1 below on the relaxation of the test necessary 
to apply piercing as developed by Lategan, then The Shipping Corporation and finally by Cape 
Pacific. 
378 Also refer Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 20. Cf De Koker & Brincker Silke 
on International Tax 46.20 where the authors note that no real distinction can be said to exist 
between the words “misuse” and “abuse”. Also refer Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 
(SCA) 20. 
379 S Hawker & M Waite (eds) Concise Oxford Thesaurus (2007); BA Garner (ed) Black’s Law 
Dictionary (2004).  
380 Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 295 and 296. 
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enterprise by large and small numbers of people’ and that: ‘The entity concept is not 
an absolute but was designed to serve certain purposes.381 To utilise the concept 
outside the framework of those purposes would turn a mere means to an end into an 
end on itself. If the entity concept is allowed to frustrate the law it would go against 
everything which it was intended to achieve.’”382 
To use the company to limit exposure to tax was clearly not one of the purposes 
envisaged by the legislature when it conceived the concept of separate legal 
personality. That is still the case. There is in principle nothing objectionable about tax 
benefits becoming an ancillary benefit to trading through a company. However, when 
the legal personality of the company is employed primarily to seek that tax benefit, this 
amounts to a misapplication, or a misuse or abuse, of corporate personality.383 The 
conclusion drawn in part 3 3 2 1 of this chapter above is that such misuse would at a 
minimum be improper and necessitate piercing if such impropriety was the dominant 
factor in seeking to utilise the corporate veil.384 
The only person who can potentially misuse the corporate personality of a company 
and directly benefit from this, is the shareholder. It is the owner of the company with 
its separate personality.385 There should be a clear distinction between a company 
perpetrating fraud, dishonesty or other impropriety for its own benefit and the 
shareholders of a company using the corporate personality of that company to 
perpetrate that fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct for their benefit.386 Misuse 
or abuse requires the ability to use, which in turn requires ownership-control. Majority 
control of the company is not required to achieve a tax advantage by using the 
corporate veil.387 All that is required is ownership-control which is achieved through 
                                            
381 Cf the text to ch 2 part 2 2 above. 
382 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 560. 
383 See the text to ch 3 part 5 below. 
384 See also the text to ch 3 part 5 1 below. 
385 Which explains why it was necessary for the court in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A)546 to consider whether Lubner controlled LCI. 
The question the court had to answer was whether Lubner could in fact exercise control over 
the company as a shareholder rather than whether Lubner was in a position to exercise 
“complete control”. 
386 Refer to the discussion of Hülse-Reutter in the text to ch 3 part 3 3 3 below. 
387 See also the text to ch 3 part 5 2 below. 
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the shareholding relationship between the company and its shareholders that 
establishes ownership, not of the company, but of a portion of the shares in the 
company.388 While it true that majority shareholder control has in the past been taken 
into account by courts when considering the application of the piercing doctrine,389 it 
should be remembered that even a minority shareholder is afforded the protection of 
the corporate veil. It is entirely possible that a majority shareholder’s main purpose 
when using the company’s separate legal personality may be legitimate. However, if 
tax reasons primarily drive the main purpose of a minority shareholder, there is no 
reason why a court should not be able to pierce the corporate veil only for the minority 
shareholder and not for the majority shareholder.390 Both the minority and majority 
shareholders share the advantages of employing the corporate veil and both are able 
in law to exert ownership-control over that portion of the veil that they are “entitled to” 
by virtue of their shareholding. For both sets of shareholders the corporate veil’s 
protection is absolute and equal and the percentage shareholding of each does not 
reduce this. Therefore, although misuse requires control, it should not require control 
of the company as a whole.391 It rather requires control over at least a portion of the 
corporate veil, which only a shareholding relationship can establish. This means that 
                                            
388 Which again shows why it is inappropriate to refer thereto as piercing in those instances 
where the directors are held liable personally for the company’s obligations. See the text to ch 
2 part 3 2 1 above. 
389 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 87; see also Blackman et al Commentary on the 
Companies Act 4-134 where curiously no South African authority is quoted for the assertion. 
It is important to note though that the requirement of “control” here would have existed had 
minority shareholders been financially prejudiced due to the improper actions of the majority 
shareholders. Policy considerations therefore require control in those instances where 
attribution of liability or assets is involved – see e g Al-Kharafi. As said in the text to ch 3 part 
5 2 though, this is not the case where piercing for tax purposes is concerned, because no 
persons other than the shareholder involved are prejudiced where piercing is applied for tax 
purposes. See the text to n 366 above. 
390 See the example in the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above; also see the text to ch 2 part 6 1 
above. 
391 Refer to the text to ch 3 part 5 2 below for the discussion on the principle that piercing, 
although it may impact the position of unrelated, third-party creditors or minority shareholders, 
should not impact them where piercing is applied for tax purposes (as opposed to where it is 
applied for the collection of debts due by a shareholder). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
 
the purpose with which the corporate veil is used by minority and majority shareholders 
may differ. 
Improper conduct is a subjective question, but misuse involves an enquiry into 
whether objectively de facto control through “ownership of the corporate veil” exists. 
In addition such control must indeed have been exercised in order to use the corporate 
veil to perpetrate fraud, dishonesty or an impropriety. The requirement of de facto 
control, as opposed to de jure control, is necessary, given the scenario where 
shareholder control is exercised not by the registered shareholder,392 but by the 
shareholder in substance. Examples hereof can be found in the facts of both Cape 
Pacific and Airport Cold Storage,393 or in groups of companies where there is indirect 
shareholding.394  
Regardless, “misuse” as contemplated in Cape Pacific should merely amount to the 
use of a company’s separate corporate personality by its shareholders for purposes 
of fraud, dishonesty, or other improper conduct.395 In other words, use of the corporate 
veil for prohibited purposes. It should be acknowledged that the corporate veil is not 
only at the disposal of a majority shareholder, but provides the same benefits, 
including tax advantages, for all its shareholders. 
 
                                            
392 That is, the shareholder on a company’s share register. 
393 See the text to n 340 above for a discussion on the position of shareholder in substance. 
394 Refer to the text to ch 3 part 5 2 1 below. Cf Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 
929 1023 where a similar challenge was launched in England (unsuccessfully, on the facts) 
based on shareholding held in that case by an individual, one Morgan. Also refer the English 
case of UBS AG v HMRC; DB Group Services (UK) Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKSC 13 para 38 
where the court had to decide whether the individuals there were the real shareholders of the 
companies involved. Although it is argued here that piercing necessarily involves control by 
way of a company-shareholder relationship, it is quite possible that the corporate veil can be 
misused outside this relationship and within, for example, a contractual relationship where 
shareholder control is effectively passed on to a non-shareholder by agreement. Refer the 
factual scenarios in the income tax “pension fund cases” in the text to n 248 above as 
examples were this may be applicable. Although not piercing as such, there is in principle no 
reason why the test for piercing cannot be applied in favour of the fiscus in such cases. 
395 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553 to 
554. 
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3 3 2 4 Conclusion 
To date Cape Pacific is the leading authority on the common law piercing doctrine in 
South Africa.396 Only once since has the doctrine been revisited by the SCA in Hülse-
Reutter. In that case the Cape Pacific judgment was impliedly accepted.397 
Not only did the court in Cape Pacific clearly seek to relax the requirements for 
piercing by endorsing the “balancing test” proposed by Domanski, but it also continued 
the trend of broadening the potential scope for the application of the remedy.  
 The test for piercing as formulated in Cape Pacific requires: 
 
1 fraud (interpreted widely), dishonesty or some other improper conduct that has 
been perpetrated subjectively;398  
2 by any of the shareholders of the company concerned using the corporate veil 
(objectively determined); and  
3 that the conduct involved is sufficiently objectionable for the policy considerations 
in favour of piercing to outweigh those considerations against it. 
 
It is surprising that very few piercing cases have since Cape Pacific been 
considered by the South African courts. The lack of cases on tax avoidance is 
particularly striking, though there is clear authority for tax avoidance as a ground on 
which to apply piercing.399 This could be due to three reasons. The first could be the 
uncertainty on the content of the piercing doctrine. A further reason could be SARS’s 
apparent ignorance of the potential implications of the Cape Pacific judgment. The 
third reason can perhaps be the fact that piercing as an impermissible tax avoidance 
remedy has not yet been substantively tested in a court of law. Given the international 
debate on tax avoidance and tax morality, it is probably only a matter of time before 
SARS will take a strong enough test case to court and request the court to pierce the 
corporate veil as remedy to counter the misuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes. 
                                            
396 See Le’Bergo Fashions CC 1998 2 SA 612 (C). 
397 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 3 below. 
398 It is submitted that this requirement has been met where the avoidance of tax is the principal 
purpose. 
399 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W)164; Gower Principles of Modern Company 
Law 112. 
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This, combined with SARS’s apparent preference to use common law remedies to 
address impermissible tax avoidance400 as opposed to the GAARs,401 will probably in 
future lead to more judgments on attempts at piercing in defence of the fiscus. 
The absence of provisions in the Income Tax Act to address the use of the corporate 
veil for tax reasons is not due to policy considerations,402 but an inability on the part of 
governments the world over to sufficiently address tax abuse through use of the 
corporate veil by introducing such legislative measures. The international tax context 
provides pertinent examples which include how the “beneficial ownership” and 
“limitation of benefits” clauses in tax treaties have failed to address the manifestation 
of treaty shopping and the use of conduit companies to avoid tax. The latest BEPS 
action plan, dealing in part with treaty shopping, acknowledges as much.403 The root 
cause of the problem is arguably that the law of taxation is largely subservient to other 
branches of law. It attaches tax consequences to rights and obligations which other 
branches of law create. The abuse of the company form for tax purposes is therefore 
likely to persevere until this root cause is addressed by the relevant branch of law, in 
this case company law. Just as there are no policy considerations against applying for 
example the common law simulation doctrine in the tax context,404 there is also no 
evidence to suggest that such considerations would exist against the application of 
other remedies in that context (such as piercing). The only policy consideration 
                                            
400 CSARS v NWK Ltd [2010] 73 SATC 55, Commissioner SARS v Bosch 2015 2 SA 174 
(SCA) and Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v CSARS (923/2017) [2018] ZASCA 153 (9 November 2018) 
(as yet unreported) are recent examples. 
401 PJ Hattingh & AJ Marais “Retroactive amendments: Value Shifting and Residence of 
Companies” (2014) 63(3) The Taxpayer 42. 
402 SARS’ draft guide on the GAARs (SARS. 13 December 2010. Draft Comprehensive Guide 
to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule) makes mention thereof that common law remedies may 
be used in addition or in the alternative to the GAARs to address impermissible tax avoidance. 
403 Refer to Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Action Plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) OECD Publishing. Available at: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892 64202719-en> (accessed July 2013) and Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in inappropriate circumstances (2014) OECD Publishing Available at: 
<https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/treaty-abuse-discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf>. 
404 As discussed in n 881 below, the UK only recently introduced a legislated anti-abuse rule 
after previously applying only a common law rule to address impermissible tax avoidance. 
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opposed to the application of the piercing remedy in a tax context is legal certainty.405 
The law of taxation does not operate as an exclusive regime, but forms part of a larger 
legal framework which includes that created by the common law and the Companies 
Act.406 
 
3 3 3 Hülse-Reutter 
Hülse-Reutter is the latest judgment in which the SCA dealt with piercing. The 
judgment did not further develop the piercing doctrine nor did it cast new light on the 
content thereof, probably because the court found on the facts that the applicability of 
the doctrine should not even be considered since there was an alternative remedy 
against the company itself.407 
For purposes of this dissertation Hülse-Reutter is only relevant as a confirmation of 
the principles established in Cape Pacific. There is one exception in this regard:408  
 
“Nonetheless what, I think, is clear is that as a matter of principle in a case such as the 
present there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the distinction between the 
corporate entity and those who control it which results in an unfair advantage being afforded 
to the latter.”409 [own emphasis] 
 
This dictum raises two questions: When will an “unfair advantage” be present and 
for whose benefit must that unfair advantage arise? 
Due to the lack of any explanation of what the court meant when referring to the need 
for an “unfair advantage”, it is submitted that these comments should be read in line 
with Cape Pacific. In the absence of any express or implied comment whereby the 
                                            
405 See the text to ch 4 part 4 1 below. 
406 See n 400 above for the examples where SARS has preferred to address instances of 
impermissible tax avoidance by applying common law doctrines as alternative to the GAARs. 
407 See the text to ch 3 part 3 2 above. 
408 See the text to ch 3 part 3 2 above on the application of the stare decisis doctrine. 
409 The remaining comments were primarily aimed at justifying piercing as a remedy of last 
resort – refer discussion in the text to ch 3 part 2 above. The court also confirmed at 20 the 
principle that “(a) court has no general discretion simply to disregard the existence of a 
separate corporate identity whenever it considers it just or convenient to do so.” 
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court distanced itself from Cape Pacific, the SCA surely followed the reasoning and 
approach of its own earlier judgment. 
The conclusion is therefore that “unfair advantage” should be interpreted as having 
the same meaning as “fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct” in Cape Pacific, 
subject of course to the condition that the conduct perpetrated was objectionable 
enough to warrant piercing despite possible policy considerations against piercing.410  
The second question in Hülse-Reutter is for whom the unfair advantage should 
arise. It is not a new one. As said in Cape Pacific, piercing is a remedy against the 
shareholders of the company and not against the company itself. There is a clear 
distinction between a company perpetrating a “wrong”,411 using a company to 
perpetrate such a “wrong” and using the distinction between the company and 
shareholder to commit the “wrong”. Only in the latter instance will piercing find 
application412 and only if no other real remedy is available for the claimant against the 
company itself.  
 
3 3 4 Conclusion 
The fiction of legal personality is not absolute.413 Van den Heever JA in his concurring 
minority judgment in Cape Pacific quotes with approval from PJJ Olivier’s doctoral 
thesis dealing with legal fictions: They “warp our thought ruthlessly if they become 
masters of our intellectual processes and are applied without rigorous scrutiny… Even 
more, in becoming a legal imperative and closed to constant scrutiny, the fiction 
perpetuates its falseness and harbours the real danger of being extended to socially 
and scientifically undesired consequences. It becomes a social and scientific lie.”414  
                                            
410 Ignoring the policy considerations contemplated in Cape Pacific would probably result in 
the “unfair advantage” test lowering the bar to unacceptably low levels applied. 
411 United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Company (1905) 142 Fed 247 (Fed SC) as 
quoted in Cape Pacific. 
412 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above; Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 295; see the discussion 
on Hülse-Reutter in the text to ch 3 part 2 above. 
413 Benade (1967) THRHR 215: “Die regsreël met betrekking tot die selfstandigheid van die 
regspersoon is per slot van sake ‘n doelmatigheidsreël en geen vooropgestelde absolute 
waarheid nie.” 
414 Which itself in the quoted extract is partly quoting from GW Paton A Textbook of 
Jurisprudence (1951). 
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Cameron JA in Ebrahim applied this approach to the fiction of corporate personality.415 
The cases analysed above form the basis of the current South African law on the 
piercing of the corporate veil at common law. The subsequent reported cases (none 
of them in the SCA) have not significantly developed or dealt with the piercing doctrine. 
It is therefore not necessary to discuss these in any detail.416 
What these cases do show is that fraud is not the only basis on which piercing can 
be applied. In fact fraud, even if interpreted widely, may in some instances not be 
enough. Piercing is a drastic remedy and a court does not have a general discretion 
to disregard a company’s separate corporate personality for the sake of convenience 
or justice.417  
 
4 International approach and recent developments 
Recent developments in other countries are briefly considered below. This includes 
two UK Supreme Court cases which deal with the piercing doctrine as applied in that 
country in detail. 
South African courts are obliged to consider international law.418 International policy 
considerations favouring piercing must by implication also be considered when local 
courts consider whether an improper purpose is improper enough to warrant piercing. 
In this context there has been a dramatic shift in specifically the tax area over the past 
few years.419  
                                            
415 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 15. 
416 These include the judgments in Metlika, Van Heerden v The State [2010] 73 SATC 7, Amlin 
and Al-Kharafi. The first judgment is discussed in greater detail in the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 6 
and 4 2 8 above. The relatively recent case of Al-Kharafi, although containing a detailed 
discussion of the development of the piercing doctrine, especially its application to groups, did 
not reach a conclusion on when appropriate circumstances to pierce would be present. Rather, 
a fact-based approach was taken (refer para 39), leading Malan J to conclude that piercing 
was inappropriate. This case is therefore not helpful in deciding on when it would be 
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil. 
417 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553 and 
confirmed in Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 20. JB Cilliers & SM Luiz “The 
Corporate Veil – An Unnecessarily Confining Corset?” (1996) 59 THRHR 523. See also the 
English case of Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1019. 
418 Ss 232 and 233 of the Constitution. And see too s 39 thereof. 
419 See the text to n 507, 508 and 511 below. 
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The Companies Act confirms that “[t]o the extent appropriate, a court interpreting 
or applying this Act may consider foreign company law”.420 Given the rich history of 
foreign precedent being applied in our courts in considering the piercing doctrine, one 
cannot contemplate a more appropriate context for considering foreign company 
law.421 
 
4 1 United Kingdom 
The UK’s position is particularly important given South Africa’s own close historical 
connection thereto. One need only reflect on the host of British case law that has come 
to serve as the basis for many of South Africa’s own company law principles.422 
The UK Supreme Court – previously the House of Lords – has only at three prior 
occasions considered the piercing doctrine in any significant detail. The first of these 
being Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council (“Woolfson”) where the court only 
briefly considered the doctrine and limited itself to obiter remarks.423 This makes the 
two 2013 judgments of VTB and Prest so much more valuable. The Court in these two 
cases considered both the remedy and all case law preceding these judgments in 
significant detail.  
Both these cases refer with approval to the judgment of Munby J in Faiza Ben 
Hashem v Shayif (“Ben Hashem”) and in particular to his six principles424 regarding 
the application of the piercing doctrine in the UK. All are in accord with the South 
African approach to the piercing doctrine in general. 
The principles identified in Ben Hashem are that: 
 
i) ownership and control425 of a company are not sufficient to warrant piercing; 
                                            
420 S 5(2) of the Companies Act.  
421 This is true of both the common law and its statutory equivalent in s 20(9) of the Companies 
Act. 
422 Salomon’s case being a case in point. Also see the text to ch 2 part 2 1 above. 
423 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 SLT 159. See VTB Capital plc v Nutritek 
International Corp 2013 UKSC 5 121 for a discussion of the relevance of that case. 
424 Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 paras 159 to 164 and the authorities cited 
there. 
425 It is unclear what the court would regard as “control”. Presumably this would refer to 
shareholder control, that is control over the company by virtue of majority shareholding (as 
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ii) piercing is not justified merely because it is in the interests of justice;426 
iii) “impropriety” is a necessary requirement to pierce;427 
iv) the impropriety must be linked to the use of the company structure to avoid 
or conceal liability;428 
v) both impropriety and control are necessary, with the motive for perpetrating 
the impropriety being highly relevant; and 
vi) whether or not the company was incorporated with the impropriety in mind is 
irrelevant and courts will only pierce to the extent necessary to provide 
appropriate relief. It will not apply piercing to declare a company non-existent 
for all extents and purposes. 
 
These six principles serve as an appropriate basis for a discussion of the current 
state of UK law concerning piercing. 
This list accords with the conclusions drawn thus far in this dissertation. As a 
starting point, for piercing to apply it requires consideration of both a question of fact429 
                                            
opposed to minorities). The court did not consider whether the piercing doctrine can also be 
applied against minority shareholders only. It is my view that Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 
EWHC 2380 (Fam) should not be interpreted as authority for the view that the piercing doctrine 
cannot be applied against minority shareholders. See the discussion in the text to ch 3 part 3 
3 2 3 above as to why minority shareholders should also be capable of having the piercing 
doctrine applied against them, even where the remedy is not applied against majority 
shareholders. Also see Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1026 in relation to 
piercing in the context of company groups. 
426 Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1019; N Grier UK Company Law (1998) 
28. 
427 This with reference to the court’s comments in Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 
447 457 and of Salomon’s judgment. See also Grier UK Company Law 28. The requirement 
of impropriety was thus expressly recognised as a piercing requirement in the UK too, as was 
the case in South Africa in Cape Pacific a few years earlier. See also the definition of 
“impropriety” in Davies & Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
222.  
428 Refer Lord Sumption’s distinction in Prest between the concealment and evasion principles. 
His views there are that only the latter presents a true example where piercing would be 
appropriate. 
429 See the proposed South African approach in the text to ch 3 part 5 2 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 105 
 
and a question of law.430 Furthermore, control of the company by the wrongdoer431 
and impropriety intentionally aimed at the misuse of the corporate veil must exist. Only 
where all elements are present can there be said to be misuse432 to the extent that the 
corporate veil should be pierced. 
These principles also confirm that the courts in the UK too will not be prepared to 
apply piercing merely when a company is found to be the alter ego of a shareholder 
on an objective basis. A further subjective enquiry is required.433 Where the alter ego 
doctrine can thus be invoked even in the absence of a deceptive motive or deceptive 
intent, a company used “to avoid or conceal liability” may not be pierced without these 
subjective factors also being present. Thus, the piercing doctrine in the UK, as is the 
case in South Africa, goes further than the alter ego doctrine. 
Lord Sumption aptly summarised in Prest that piercing may be applied “when a 
person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal 
restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately 
frustrates by interposing a company under his control”.434 
It is important to note that Prest, unlike the South African Cape Pacific, does not 
expressly require the consideration of public policy to decide if piercing will be 
appropriate.435 This does not mean that policy considerations are not a part of the 
piercing test under UK law as described by the Supreme Court in Prest. In the words 
of Lord Sumption: “The difficulty is to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing.”436 
                                            
430 See the proposed South African approach in the text to ch 3 part 5 1 below. 
431 In my view this means that a shareholder rather than a director of the company must 
exercise the impropriety. It also implies that this does not require majority shareholder control. 
432 VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp 2013 UKSC 5 128. 
433 Also see Mubarak v Mubarak [2000] EWHC 466 (Fam) (23 October 2000) 36, approved in 
Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 206. The latter judgment held that 
even where a company is the alter ego of its shareholder, all the requirements for piercing 
would still not have been met. 
434 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 35. 
435 Save to state at paragraph 35 that where it is not necessary to pierce, there is no public 
policy requirement that would justify such a course of action. Cheng (2011) BC Int’l & Comp 
L Rev 350 et seq notes the unwillingness of UK courts (pre-VTB and Prest) to take policy 
considerations into account in considering whether to pierce or not. 
436 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 28. 
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Policy considerations are incorporated in the UK piercing doctrine through Lord 
Sumption’s distinction between the “concealment principle” and the “evasion 
principle”, with only the latter justifying a court to pierce.437 In essence the evasion 
principle, although intertwined with the concealment principle, involves a person’s 
deliberate use of the company form to evade obligations or frustrate the exercise of 
rights against him. Conversely, the concealment principle involves using the corporate 
form to conceal the true facts pertinent to the position of the shareholder.438 The 
question therefore turns on whether, if the concealment achieved by using a company 
has been laid bare, the use of the company would still have the effect of frustrating or 
evading the exercise of rights by another, which would not have been possible had the 
company not been used.  
Returning for a moment to the South African context, it appears to have been this 
distinction that Scott JA tried to make in Hülse-Reutter. In that case the SCA refused 
to pierce the corporate veil, ostensibly as the company was not interposed to evade 
any obligations although it may have been used to conceal the identity of the 
                                            
437 Para 28:  
“The concealment principle is legally banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil 
at all. It is that the interposition of a company or perhaps several companies so as to 
conceal the identity of the real actors will not deter the courts from identifying them, 
assuming that their identity is legally relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding 
the “facade”, but only looking behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure 
is concealing. The evasion principle is different. It is that the court may disregard the 
corporate veil if there is a legal right against the person in control of it which exists 
independently of the company’s involvement, and a company is interposed so that the 
separate legal personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. 
Many cases will fall into both categories, but in some circumstances the difference between 
them may be critical.”  
See also the judgment of Lord Neuberger Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 
paras 61, 71 and 73 where he agrees with Lord Sumption on the distinction between the 
concealment principle and the evasion principle and that only the latter presents an 
appropriate basis on which to pierce. He goes on to mention that he does not consider the 
cases of Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 and Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne 1933 Ch 935 
(CA) to have involved the evasion principle and to have presented true examples of piercing. 
438 In the South African context Dadoo’s case is an excellent example of the concealment 
principle, and also one in which the AD did not find sufficient basis on which to pierce. 
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shareholders behind it.439 Yet, although the shareholders behind the company were 
unknown to the appellants in Hülse-Reutter, there was no misuse of the corporate veil 
to the detriment of the appellants. To put it differently: there was no evasion or 
frustration of a legitimate claim which the appellants would otherwise have had against 
the shareholders. As Lord Sumption put it in Prest: 
 
“It may be an abuse of the corporate legal personality of a company to use it to evade the 
law or to frustrate its enforcement. It is not an abuse to cause legal liability to be incurred 
by the company in the first place.”440 
 
Where the company is used to the disadvantage of another by evading or frustrating 
an otherwise legitimate exercise of a right rather than for purposes of concealment, 
such use of the company will be considered improper, regardless of policy 
considerations.  
It is suggested that by applying the evasion principle in Prest, UK law does make 
provision for policy considerations to be taken into account. It would seem that policy 
considerations in the UK are dealt with in a more indirect way. Where the evasion 
principle applies, considerations would be weighted sufficiently in favour of piercing. 
In the context of impermissible tax avoidance the evasion principle would clearly 
find application.441 It should also pass the test for improper conduct in Cape Pacific, 
even after taking policy considerations into account.442  
 
4 2 Australia 
Australian influence on the South African approach to piercing has been much less 
noticeable than the British impact. The High Court of Australia has not considered 
piercing in such detail as the UK Supreme Court has.443 The limited weight that recent 
                                            
439 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 21. 
440 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 para 34. 
441 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 below for an interpretation of what “evasion” would entail. 
Also see Van Zyl The Corporate Veil in Tax Law 57. 
442 See the text to ch 3 parts 5 1 2 and 5 3 below. 
443 See the discussion in ch 3 part 4 1 above.  
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piercing judgments, both in the UK Supreme Court in VTB and Prest, and in the South 
African High Court in Ex Parte Gore, attached to Australian case law supports this.444  
In Australia too various bases have been identified as appropriate to pierce the 
corporate veil.445 As has been suggested in part 2 4 of this chapter above, it would 
however be inaccurate to group all these bases under the piercing doctrine. 
What is significant is that, as in the UK, there is authority in Australia for the 
application of the “evasion principle” as justification for piercing to apply where the 
corporate veil has been used to evade legal obligations.446 Although no judgments 
were found where the piercing doctrine was considered in the context of tax 
avoidance, the minority judgment of Windeyer J in Gorton v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation447 should be noted. Here the court expressed its frustration on how formalism 
linked to separate corporate personality can be employed successfully to construct 
schemes aimed at reducing a person’s liability for tax. The court would no doubt, and 
in my view correctly so, have been willing to pierce the corporate veil under the 
common law in this instance had it been asked to do so. 
 
4 3 United States of America 
The courts in Ex Parte Gore, VTB and Prest took even less account of the American 
position on piercing.  
In Prest the UK Supreme Court noted that the piercing doctrine in the USA is far 
more developed than in the UK. This may also be a reference to the fact that the case 
law in the USA, due to its federal system, has led to an irreconcilable divergence of 
approaches to the doctrine.448 
                                            
444 Australian authority is also absent from the judgments in Cape Pacific and Hülse-Reutter. 
445 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd 1986 11 ACLR 108 264; Ramsay & Noakes 
(2001) Company and Securities Law Journal 8 et seq. 
446 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd & Ors 1986 11 ACLR 108 267. 
447 [1965] HCA 1 para 7 of Windeyer J’s judgment. 
448 See Anderson (2009) Melb UL Rev 360; also the comments of PI Blumberg “The 
Transformation of Modern Corporate Law: The Law of Corporate Groups” (2005) 37 
Connecticut Law Review 605 612, together with the dictum quoted from Secon Service 
System Inc v St Joseph Bank & Trust Co, 855 F 2d 406 414 (7th Cir, 1988); Cheng (2011) BC 
Int’l & Comp L Rev 353 et seq. 
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In the USA, more so than in other jurisdictions, it is impossible to identify a 
consistently applied approach. The piercing doctrine continues to be mired in 
controversy. Nevertheless, it can be said that most states in the USA have adopted a 
two-prong test to piercing.449 Firstly, a confusion of the distinction between shareholder 
and company, akin in more than one way to the alter ego doctrine, is required. This 
leads to a more conservative approach than the South African one, although it is by 
no means settled to what extent shareholder domination should be proven.450 
Secondly, the test involves conduct that results in fraud, wrong or an injustice being 
committed. In this sense the USA’s application of the doctrine is much more liberal 
than in South Africa.  
In respect of the second prong of the test Anderson refers to the “laundry list” 
approach used in the USA. Several grounds are identified whereupon a court would 
be justified to pierce the corporate veil. These include instances of fraud and 
misrepresentation, agency, an objective lack of separation between the company and 
its shareholders and an undercapitalisation of the company.451 The American courts 
have also been willing to pierce to remedy instances of impermissible tax 
avoidance.452 
The list suggests an approach not necessarily unique to the USA, but rather one 
that is consistent with that adopted previously in South Africa and in the UK.453 These 
instances do not all involve piercing per se. Rather, it very often amounts to separate 
doctrines which have the same effect as piercing, being applied, although with different 
prerequisites for each. As such, the USA provides very few examples of “pure” piercing 
which would be of any significant assistance.  
                                            
449 TK Cheng “Form and substance of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil” (2010) 80 
Mississippi Law Journal 497-585 503 et seq; NB Allen “Reverse piercing of the corporate veil: 
a straightforward path to justice” (2011) 85 St. John’s Law Review 1147 1150 et seq. 
450 Allen (2011) St. John’s Law Review 1151 et seq. 
451 See also Benade (1967) THRHR 228 et seq. 
452 K Vandekerckhove Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Transitional Approach, Doctor in de 
Rechten, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 438. 
453 Pre-VTB and Prest; see for example O’Donnell v Weintraub 67 Cal Rptr 274 277 et seq. 
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The USA’s approach to piercing is a far more liberal one than the South African 
one. Piercing will be applied more easily, because it may be invoked if justice454 or 
even equity455 so requires. This approach has been explicitly ruled out as basis for 
piercing in both South Africa456 and the UK.457 
 
4 4 Canada 
The position under Canadian law requires a brief mention due to the relatively recent 
cases of Prévost458 and Velcro,459 even though no other significant recent 
developments in the Canadian piercing doctrine could be found.460 
Prévost and Velcro both expressly refer to the piercing doctrine, but this is limited 
to the context of “beneficial ownership” as used in DTAs. This is not really relevant to 
this dissertation which is concerned only with the application of the piercing doctrine 
for tax purposes through legislative instruments of general application (being the 
GAARs in the Income Tax Act and section 20(9) of the Companies Act) and the 
                                            
454 Most notably confirmed in In re Elegant Homes. See also Benade (1967) THRHR 229; 
United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Company; Nassau County v Richard Dattner 
Architect PC (2011) NY Slip Op 31537 (U); O’Donnell v Weintraub 67 Cal Rptr 4; see also 
discussion by Cheng (2010) Mississippi Law Journal 508 et seq. 
455 Roepke et al v Western National Mutual Insurance Company 302 NW 2d 350 (1981). 
456 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552. 
457 Adams, Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 1177, Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 
2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) and Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34. 
458 The judgment a quo by Rip ACJ in Prévost Car Inc v The Queen, (2008) TCC 231 is of 
particular importance, although the judgment on appeal in Her Majesty the Queen v Prévost 
Car Inc. (2009) FCA 57 is also significant. 
459 Velcro Canada Inc v HM the Queen (2012) TCC 57. 
460 A further recent judgment is that of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in White v E.B.F. 
Manufacturing Ltd 2005 NSCA 167, but which does not introduce any new developments. It 
does however appear to confirm the attitude also taken in the USA that piercing may be 
applied in the interests of justice (a position first established in Kosmopoulos v Constitution 
Insurance Co. [1987] 1 SCR 2, although subject to later criticism – TG Heintzman & B Kain 
“Through the looking glass: Developments in Piercing the Corporate Veil” (2013) 28 Banking 
and Finance Law Review 541). 
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common law. It is in any case questionable whether these two cases involve true 
examples of piercing.461 
 
5 The developed doctrine as applied for income tax purposes 
For the reasons set out in part 3 3 2 1 of this chapter above,462 using the separate 
legal personality of a company to ensure a reduction of taxes payable463 will indeed 
amount to a misuse of legal personality by a shareholder if the purpose for which the 
corporate veil is used is mainly to achieve such a reduction in tax costs. It follows that 
the perceived right of taxpayers to arrange their affairs in the most tax beneficial 
manner possible is not always unlimited: 
 
“Within the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the relevant legislation, a taxpayer 
may minimise his tax liability by arranging his affairs in a suitable manner. If eg the same 
commercial result can be achieved in different ways, he may enter into the type of 
transaction which does not attract tax or attracts less tax. But, when it comes to considering 
whether by doing so he has succeeded in avoiding or reducing the tax, the court will give 
effect to the true nature and substance of the transaction and will not be deceived by its 
form.”464 
 
The same “choice principle” should apply where a taxpayer uses the corporate form 
predominantly to avoid tax.  
In such instances corporate personality is not used to advance commerce, the 
purpose which it was designed to achieve,465 but rather to frustrate the goals which 
the legislature seeks to promote through the levying of taxes.466 South African courts 
                                            
461 S Jain Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit Company Cases (2013) 
149. 
462 Expanded on in the text to ch 3 part 5 1 below. 
463 In other words, the amount of tax due by the shareholder had no company been part of the 
structure/transaction compared to the amount of tax due by the shareholder and his/her 
company had a company been used. 
464 CIR v Conhage (Proprietary) Limited [1999] 61 SATC 391 1. 
465 See the text to ch 2 part 2 above. 
466 See the text to ch 2 part 2 1 above for the development of the company form. Its existence 
as a statutorily created creature is bound to the purpose of the Companies Act being. Also 
see the text to ch 3 part 4 1 above for a discussion of the UK “concealment principle” and how 
this could find application in a South African tax context. 
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should under these circumstances have regard to the substance of the transaction 
and treat the company and shareholder as if they were one. The substance over form 
and sham doctrines467 cannot adequately address this. The piercing doctrine is best 
placed to deal with such a scenario against the background of the dictum that a person 
may arrange his affairs to his own advantage.  
A taxpayer may arrange his own affairs to minimise his tax liability.468 If a company 
is however used for fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct, the company’s separate 
legal personality is being abused. A court may then pierce the corporate veil of the 
company, taking policy considerations into account. It is argued below that where a 
person involves another party, specifically a company, and there is little or no 
commercial purpose in the company’s involvement but taxation is avoided, and it is 
the purpose of the person to avoid tax by involving the company, the corporate veil 
should be pierced. 
This is not to say that tax avoidance per se is improper.469 However, the use of 
corporate personality primarily for tax purposes is.470 This is the case not only because 
the separate corporate identity of a company was not conceived by Parliament to 
serve such a purpose,471 but also as this is obviously more than a mere conversion of 
a transaction into a tax efficient scheme. Where legal persons are involved 
predominantly for tax purposes, such transactions or structures are clearly engineered 
                                            
467 See the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 1 and 4 2 2 above. 
468 CIR v Conhage (Proprietary) Limited [1999] 61 SATC 391 1. A similar right exists for 
taxpayers in Australia, the USA and the UK (BT Kujinga “Factors that limit the efficacy of 
GAARs in income tax legislation: lessons from South Africa, Australia, and Canada” (2014) 
47 CILSA 429 440). See also J Cassidy “The holy grail: the search for the optimal GAAR” 
(2009) 128 SALJ 740 744 et seq. 
469 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Bosch 2015 2 SA 174 (SCA) para 
40. 
470 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 4 above. 
471 See the text to ch 2 part 2 1 above. No evidence could be found to suggest that the 
company form was ever conceived in either South Africa or elsewhere to be primarily used to 
accommodate taxpayers. 
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for purposes which should not be recognised in law.472 Cameron JA accurately 
summarised the position in Ebrahim:473 
 
“[T]heir separate existence remains a figment of law, liable to be curtailed or withdrawn 
when the objects of their creation are abused or thwarted.”474 [own emphasis] 
 
And Binns-Ward J in Ex Parte Gore: 
 
“Juristic personality is a legal fiction (or a ‘figment of law’ as it has on occasion been referred 
to) and thus, when the circumstances of a particular case make it appropriate to do so – 
inevitably in matters in which the concept has been used improperly, in a manner 
inconsistent with the rationale for the creation and maintenance of the legal fiction [by 
Parliament] – courts will disregard it.”475 [own emphasis] 
 
As will have appeared from the analysis of Cape Pacific,476 piercing for income tax 
purposes can be divided into a question of law and a question of fact. 
The legal question entails that a court should satisfy itself that the corporate veil is 
being used for improper purposes and that policy considerations in favour of piercing 
outweigh those opposed to piercing. Once this question of law has been answered, 
the court must decide, based on the facts, whether ownership-control existed through 
which the owner in a shareholder capacity is capable of using the corporate veil and 
did so predominantly for the stated improper purpose. 
                                            
472 See the text to n 248 above for the examples discussed in ITC 1606, ITC 1611 and Erf 
3183/1 Ladysmith, as well as the cases of Bailey and unreported cases 9592 and 9593. Of 
specific note is Gower’s comment quoted with approval in the a quo judgment of Cape Pacific 
Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 715, that “… they (the 
cases) reveal no consistent principle beyond a refusal by the Legislature and the judiciary to 
apply the logic of the principle laid down in Salomon's case where it is too flagrantly opposed 
to justice, convenience or the interests of the revenue.” [own emphasis]. Cf Van Heerden v 
The State [2010] 73 SATC 7 44. In Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 164 the court 
also acknowledged that the corporate veil could be misused for tax purposes. See also Briggs 
v James Hardie & Co (Pty) Ltd (1998) 15 NSWLR 549 579. 
473 Also see Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 295. 
474 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 16. 
475 Para 4. 
476 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 above. 
 




5 1 A question of law 
5 1 1 “Improper conduct” in a tax avoidance context 
Wessels JA said in Ochberg that the misuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes is 
by no means a new problem: 
 
“We know from our experience in the Law Courts that juggling with shares of a private 
company is a favourite method adopted by certain persons who control such companies in 
order to seek to evade the income tax laws, and therefore the Courts must be careful to … 
insist on the principle that the individual who controls the private company is not to be 
regarded as if he were the company.”477 
 
It remains to be considered whether “improper conduct” could include instances 
when tax is intentionally avoided. Although the question was not directly answered by 
Zulman J in the unreported 1993 Transvaal Income Tax Special Court cases, 9592 
and 9593, it is clear that he considered that piercing could be applied specifically in 
the tax context, even where fraud and dishonesty were absent: 
 
“… [I]n appropriate circumstances, namely circumstances which dictate the arriving at the 
reality of the transaction and despite what is stated in the well-known case of Dadoo v 
Krugersdorp Municipality 1920 AD 530 there may well be situations, even where fraud or 
dishonesty are absent, where it is proper and permissible to pierce the corporate veil.”478 
 
There are numerous other examples where our courts and academic writers have 
in the past concluded that piercing may be justifiable in principle where tax related 
purposes as primary motivation were present. And there seem to be no examples 
where the opposite was argued.479 
                                            
477 Ochberg v CIR 1931 AD 215 238. 
478 It is interesting to note that this judgment, concluding that fraud and dishonesty may not be 
the only appropriate criteria in terms of which piercing would be justified, predates the two 
SCA judgments where “improper conduct” was for the first time recognised as an alternative 
basis upon which the courts could pierce. 
479 See the text to n 248 above. 
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From the Cape Pacific judgment it is evident that “improper conduct” is linked to the 
evasion of legal obligations: 
 
“The transfer was … at the very least … carried out with an improper purpose – the evasion 
of legal obligations – in mind.”480 
 
In the tax context it is therefore necessary to consider when an evasion of legal 
obligations (or another action driven by an “improper purpose”) is taking place, as this 
would amount to “improper conduct” as envisaged by the court in Cape Pacific. 
When investigating whether an “evasion of legal obligations” is taking place for tax 
purposes, one should not confuse it with illegal tax evasion, as “evasion” as referred 
to in Cape Pacific is not within the tax context, but is rather used in a general sense. 
“Evasion” as used in Cape Pacific is within the context of a non-tax related sense. 
Therefore “evade” as per Smalberger JA should be understood within its ordinary 
meaning as synonymous with “avoid”481 and should not be associated with “tax 
evasion” as opposed to “tax avoidance”.482 
In this regard “evasion” in the context of Cape Pacific should be considered to 
include the act whereby one would “escape or avoid … something especially by guile 
or trickery”, including to “act contrary to the intention of a law …, especially while 
complying with its letter”;483 “to get away from or avoid, especially by deception”.484 
This accords with the judgment in Bark where the court found that it was “entitled to 
                                            
480 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 554. 
481 Hawker & Waite Concise Oxford Thesaurus. 
482 Cf Wessels JA in Ochberg v CIR 1931 AD 215 238. See also VTB Capital and Prest. The 
difference between “tax evasion” and “tax avoidance” is controversial. “Tax evasion” and “tax 
avoidance” both involve taxpayers attempting to limit their tax exposure. The former seeks to 
achieve such a lesser tax burden by way of unlawful means typically associated with 
fraudulent or dishonest behaviour, whereas “tax avoidance” involves an attempt to limit 
exposure to tax by way of honest means. See AP de Koker & RC Williams Silke on South 
African Income Tax (2011) ch 25.1C [e-book]; SARS. 13 December 2010. Draft 
Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule at 2 et seq. 
483 C Soanes & A Stevenson (eds) Oxford Dictionary of English (2005). 
484 W Allen (ed) The Penguin Reference Dictionary (1985). 
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peer behind the facade of a fictitious separate legal persona” where dolus485 (in this 
context not dissimilar to “improper conduct” as used in Cape Pacific) was present on 
the part of the defendant. A similar principle should apply to statutory obligations. 
Taxpayers may choose the most tax efficient method available to them by choosing to 
adopt the best alternative structure by which to achieve a desired commercial 
outcome. However, if a company is used to evade (within the meaning discussed 
above) a legitimate and statutorily imposed tax obligation that would otherwise have 
arisen, the conduct is, on the strength of Cape Pacific, clearly improper. For example, 
if a further party (a company) is unnecessarily involved in a transaction to serve mainly 
as a conduit and purely to escape or evade a legitimate tax liability, its use would be 
improper.486 In such a case the taxpayer goes beyond deciding on the most beneficial 
transactional structure to use. 
Where a company is used primarly for tax purposes rather than for other 
commercial purposes, the company is being utilised for something for which it was not 
intended.487 This would therefore amount to a misuse of corporate personality.488+489  
                                            
485 Dolus in a wide sense, being “a deliberate intention to defeat the fulfilment of the condition 
when having regard to the nature of the contract it was his duty moral or legal to assist or not 
to obstruct its fulfilment” (Koenig v Johnson and Co. Ltd. 1935 AD 262). 
486 See Furniss v Dawson [1984] STC 153 (HL) for a comparable approach adopted by the 
UK courts. Derksen (1990) SALJ 431 aptly describes the “problem of avoidance” as one that 
often involves tax planning through ensuring that facts exist and are manufactured so that the 
transaction may fall within the ambit of specific wording in the relevant statute, while 
“community opinion” would dictate that it should not. The relevance of using “community 
opinion” as a yardstick against which to measure “improper conduct” as contemplated in Cape 
Pacific, is at issue here. As Derksen (1990) SALJ 432 points out, “the law should satisfy the 
requirements of the community opinion”. The UK’s “concealment principle” should find 
application too: see the text to ch 3 part 4 1 above. 
487 See Lewis & Malcolm “Notion of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ extended” (31-03-2013) 
TaxManSA.co.za http://taxmansa.co.za/notion-piercing-corporate-veil-extended/ (accessed 
12-07-2013). One should be careful not to confuse the piercing doctrine with the simulation or 
sham doctrine (see the text to ch 2 part 4 2 2 above).  
488 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above. 
489 It is interesting to note that the argument advanced here appears to be contradicted by the 
judgment in Dadoo’s case. That case, however, not only did not consider the piercing doctrine 
but was also decided with significant reliance on a literal statutory interpretative approach (542 
et seq). Had the approach in that judgment corresponded with the approach which is 
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The SCA has in the past given clear guidance on the requirement that a transaction 
should have a clear commercial purpose for its tax consequences to be recognised.490 
Even though this guidance was given in the context of the simulation doctrine, it also 
holds true for the piercing doctrine. Conceptually there is very little difference between 
a transaction being entered into with no or little commercial purpose and a company 
being used in the same way. Even though the rights and obligations created by virtue 
of a company’s separate legal existence would ordinarily be considered of greater 
legal substance than those created by commercial agreements, any reason to 
continue to treat the company with greater circumspection in a particular case falls 
away once it has been ascertained that that company serves no commercial purpose 
other than to avoid tax being levied. 
Using a company for unintended purposes would not necessarily be enough to 
amount to a misuse of corporate personality, but where those unintended purposes 
take the form of fraud, dishonesty or improper conduct, a misuse of corporate 
personality as contemplated in Cape Pacific occurs. This dissertation argues that such 
a misuse will take place when the corporate veil is used primarily for tax related 
reasons. 
There is some force in the argument that piercing can only be applied to existing 
legal obligations, liabilities or restrictions and by implication not to future potential 
obligations or liabilities.491 This poses a challenge to the application of the piercing 
doctrine in a tax context where the existing structure through which a taxpayer 
conducts business has not yet given rise to an existing tax liability, but only to an 
expected future liability based on prevailing fiscal legislation. In other words, when it 
cannot be said that an existing legal liability is being avoided by incorporating a 
business today to avoid an anticipated future tax liability.  
Where courts have considered the issue,492 their remarks should not be considered 
out of context. Till now these involve only contractual obligations and liabilities that 
                                            
nowadays adopted in South African law (see the text to ch 4 part 2 1 below), it is doubtful 
whether the AD would have arrived at the same conclusion that it had in 1920. 
490 See Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 4 SA 319 (SCA) and the 
cases referred to at para 33 and 37. 
491 See Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 and 35; Adams v Cape Industries plc 
1991 1 All ER 929 1026. 
492 1026. 
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arise under private law as opposed to tax liabilities that arise under legislation. There 
is in my view though, no reason why the private law principle should not be extended 
to the law of taxation. 
The law of taxation imposes obligations arising out of statute (and not ex contractu) 
and within an enabling legislative framework, which regulates when and how these 
obligations arise. Therefore, anticipating such a statutory obligation and getting around 
it through use of the corporate veil amount to an evasion of the imposition of such a 
tax liability. Circumventing a future tax liability amounts to the avoidance of an existing 
statutorily imposed obligation in exactly the same manner as a party to an agreement 
may avoid certain obligations from arising. There is no reason in principle why a private 
law obligation being avoided should be treated any differently for the purposes of the 
piercing doctrine than a tax liability being avoided. 
It is true, both in South Africa and in the UK, that “[i]t may be an abuse of the 
corporate legal personality of a company to use it to evade the law or to frustrate its 
enforcement. It is not an abuse to cause legal liability to be incurred by the company 
in the first place.”493 Nevertheless, what may be unique when this dictum is applied to 
the law of taxation and not to the law of contract or delict, is that causing a tax liability 
to be incurred by the company in the first place may very well be a good example 
where legal personality is used intentionally to evade prevailing tax laws imposing an 
existing obligation. In the law of taxation separate personality is often used to escape 
an anticipated tax liability for a shareholder. This should not be countenanced. The 
law condones an escape from liabilities in the private law context as the company was 
designed for these purposes in order to encourage commercial activity, but on 
condition that the liability arise in the company. The law of taxation should be no 
different. There is no reason to suggest that the company may be used as tax 
mitigation tool and to escape existing taxing statutes.494  
Having established that piercing for tax purposes extends to the avoidance of 
anticipated tax liabilities, the dictum in CIR v Conhage (Proprietary) Limited 
(“Conhage”) cited above495 still allows for affairs to be arranged within the confines of 
                                            
493 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34. 
494 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 below; see also the text to n 471 above. 
495 See the text to n 464 and 474 above. 
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the law. It is submitted that the situation where the company form created by the 
legislature is used for no purpose other than to defeat the levying of tax that the very 
same legislature seeks to impose,496 falls outside the confines of what can reasonably 
be regarded as legitimately arranging one’s affairs. This is not only true on a 
“transaction-to-transaction” basis, but logically extends to where a company is 
artificially introduced into a structure to make the structure itself more tax efficient in 
future, for example to alter the tax consequences linked to the future flow of dividends 
through the structure.497 If the company from its shareholders’ perspective serves no 
“real world”498 purpose, its existence should not be recognised to serve the tax 
purposes which its owners primarily wanted to achieve. 
The conclusion is that a taxpayer engages in “improper conduct” as contemplated 
in Cape Pacific if he or she uses a company to enter into a transaction or set up or 
alter a structure in order to avoid or escape paying tax in a manner that is contrary to 
                                            
496 Digesta 1 3 29: “Contra legem facit qui id facit quod lex prohibet; in fraudem vero qui salvis 
legis verbis, sententiam ejus circumvenit.” (A person does something that is contrary to the 
law if he does that which the law prohibits. Nonetheless he does it fraudulently if he, within the 
wording of the law, circumvents the purpose of the law.) 
497 It appears that the UK would certainly see tax reasons as primary purpose for the use of 
the corporate veil as passing the threshold test for piercing and consider it improper at the 
very least. In the judgment in UBS AG the court referred with approval to the following 
judgments whilst commenting as follows:  
“First, ‘tax is generally imposed by reference to economic activities or transactions which 
exist, as Lord Wilberforce said, “in the real world”’. Secondly, tax avoidance schemes 
commonly include ‘elements which have been inserted without any business or commercial 
purpose but are intended to have the effect of removing the transaction from the scope of 
the charge’. In other words, as Carnwath LJ said in the Court of Appeal in Barclays 
Mercantile, [2002] EWCA Civ 1853; [2003] STC 66, para 66, taxing statutes generally ‘draw 
their life-blood from real world transactions with real world economic effects’. Where an 
enactment is of that character, and a transaction, or an element of a composite transaction, 
has no purpose other than tax avoidance, it can usually be said, as Carnwath LJ stated, 
that ‘to allow tax treatment to be governed by transactions which have no real world 
purpose of any kind is inconsistent with that fundamental characteristic.’”  
In this context, see also the comments by Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 403 that piercing 
should not be applied to bona fide business transactions. 
498 403. 
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the intention of the provisions of the Income Tax Act.499 Wide-spread tax planning 
should not obfuscate the rationale for corporate personality and detract from the 
principles of the piercing doctrine. 
It has already been said that a court’s power to pierce the corporate veil in a 
particular instance largely depends on the analysis of the specific facts at hand, 
considered on a case-by-case basis.500 The key question is: When will fraud, 
dishonesty or improper conduct be fraudulent, dishonest or improper enough, where 
other non-tax considerations are also present, to abuse the corporate veil? 
As will be discussed in chapter 5, the GAARs in the Income Tax Act require as one 
of their criteria that at least the main purpose of the transaction (or “arrangement”) in 
question must be to achieve the sought-after tax benefit in order for them to be 
applicable. Given the exceptionality of the piercing doctrine,501 our courts should adopt 
a similar approach, viz that piercing should only be applied where tax was the primary 
reason for employing the corporate veil.  
A company may of course be used simultaneously for more than one purpose. If it 
is accepted that the use of a company mainly for tax purposes is improper, the 
principle-based approach should logically apply as long as the tax purpose outweighs 
the other legitimate purposes for which the company may be used. In other words, 
                                            
499 In this regard one must distinguish between provisions of the Income Tax Act introduced 
to encourage certain taxpayer behaviour (e g the “small business corporation” provisions in s 
12E), and using the group relief rules in s 42 to interpose a company at no tax cost between 
an individual and his/her listed share portfolio solely to avoid the imposition of dividends tax. 
500 Cilliers & Luiz (1996) THRHR 523. 
501 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 163: “Dít bevestig op sy beurt dat daar geen 
vrye rigtinglose of willekeurige diskresie bestaan vir 'n Hof om inkorporasie te negeer nie.”; 
Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553: “It is 
undoubtedly a salutary principle that our courts should not lightly disregard a company’s 
separate personality, but should strive to give effect to and uphold it.”; Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 
2001 4 SA 1336 (SCA) 20: “A court has no general discretion simply to disregard the existence 
of a separate corporate identity whenever it considers it just or convenient to do so.” Cf Adams 
v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1020; Gower, as quoted in Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 714. Cilliers & Luiz (1996) THRHR 
527. 
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whether the company is used solely or mainly for tax purposes is unimportant: it 
remains improper in terms of the common law.502 
Although the doctrine admittedly presents a drastic remedy, it is suggested that it 
should only be applied when an equally drastic misuse has occurred. Once the hurdle 
has been crossed by proving an action improper enough to warrant piercing, there is 
no reason why a stricter or less strict test than the “main purpose” test should be 
applied to such an arrangement.503 
 
5 1 2 Policy considerations in the tax avoidance context 
The evolving nature of policy considerations504 (and by implication reasonableness, 
“boni mores” and “public policy”) means that this aspect becomes ever more 
complicated where income tax issues are concerned. This is valid in particular for 
South Africa, which has one of the highest Gini coefficients internationally and where 
the equal redistribution of wealth through a progressive tax system is used to address 
these socio-economic concerns.505 The collection of taxes is important to serve the 
public interest.506 It is within this context that a weighing up of competing policy 
considerations pertaining to piercing should occur. It is submitted that in South 
Africa,507 as in many other countries,508 there has been a definite shift in policy over 
                                            
502 This is recognised in the international tax context too: see the OECD report Double taxation 
conventions and the use of conduit companies R(6) where the use of companies mainly for 
tax purposes is labelled as being “improper”. I cannot see any reason why this description 
would be inappropriate in the domestic tax context. 
503 As is discussed in ch 5 below, the same statutory bar is prescribed by the legislature for 
the application of the GAARs in the Income Tax Act. 
504 Discussed in the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above.  
505 SAPA “World Bank: SA must fight inequality” (24-07-2012) iol Business Report 
<http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/world-bank-sa-must-fight-inequality1.13480 
58> (accessed 6-03-2013). 
506 Metcash Trading Ltd v CSARS 2001 1 SA 1109 (CC); Pienaar Bothers (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 
HC case no 87760/2014 of 29-05-2014 para 36; South African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth 
2015 5 SA 146 (CC) para 87. 
507 The public outcry over the tax avoidance structures of multi-national groups such as 
SABMiller and Lonmin is but one of a few examples. 
508 The examples in the text to n 511 below and the publications in Platform Making a killing: 
Oil companies, tax avoidance and subsidies (2013) and Actoinaid (also February 2013) Sweet 
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the past few years that could well see corporate structures being regarded with 
increasing suspicion, especially in the area of taxation. The effect of the shift to general 
voting rights should also not be disregarded as the majority of South Africans who now 
elect the government would probably prefer our courts to adopt a pro-fiscus approach. 
“Public policy considerations” must therefore necessarily form a big part of “policy 
considerations” as such.509 
Although the considerations opposed to piercing the veil are as relevant today as 
in the past, there is undoubtedly a growing realisation that the policy considerations 
favouring piercing where tax is concerned, have started to weigh significantly more in 
recent years.510 In the international tax context public policy has caused a shift in 
sympathy from the taxpayer to revenue services the world over.511 South Africa will no 
doubt follow this trend if one has regard to the economic inequalities and the role of 
tax collection in the redistribution of wealth. The gradual change in the interpretation 
of fiscal statutes demonstrates this. This allows the courts to adopt a more lenient 
                                            
nothings – the human cost of a British sugar giant avoiding taxes in southern Africa are 
illustrative of this. See also the findings of an Oxfam report: OXFAM “Tax on the “private” 
billions now stashed away in havens enough to end extreme world poverty twice over” (22-
05-203) OXFAM <http://www.oxfam.org/en/eu/pressroom/pressrelease/2013-05-22/tax-
havens-private-billions-could-end-extreme-poverty-twice-over> (accessed 05-06-2013). 
509 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 117. Also see J 
Maugham “The uses of morality in tax” (18-12-2014) Tax Journal <http://www.taxjournal.com/ 
tj/articles/uses-morality-tax-17122014> (accessed 18-12-2014). Also the Canadian Supreme 
Court judgment in Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd v M.N.R. [1977] 1 SCR 271 at 283: “… [I]n 
tax law it is imperative that legislation conform to changing social needs and government 
policy”. While it is noted that in the UK judgment in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International 
Corp 2013 UKSC 5 124 quoted above, it is cautioned that “moral indignation” should not be 
used to trump established legal principle, it is submitted, on the strength of Cape Pacific, that 
moral indignation could well come into play as an influence on policy considerations which 
may be used to interpret and apply a legal rule, yet stop short of trumping it. 
510 A balancing approach is also required to counter the increased instances of abuse that will 
naturally occur through the greater ease with which companies, and the corporate veil, can 
now be created– see the text to ch 2 part 3 1 above. 
511 The BEPS project undertaken by the OECD in reaction to the tax “scandals” by Google, 
Starbucks and the like at the behest of the G20 is a prominent indicator of this. Refer to 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (2013) OECD Publishing. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/97892 
64202719-en> (accessed July 2013). 
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interpretation of tax laws, resulting in taxpayers not being caught by the strict wording 
of a tax provision.512 Our courts’ interpretation and application of common law 
principles will probably follow suit:513 They are constitutionally obliged to develop the 
common law in the interests of justice514 and to do so in the spirit of the Constitution515 
and of the Bill of Rights.516 In the words of Moseneke J in S v Thebus: 
 
“Superior courts are protectors and expounders of the common law. The superior courts 
have always had an inherent power to refashion and develop the common law in order to 
reflect the changing social, moral and economic make-up of society. That power is now 
constitutionally authorised and must be exercised within the prescripts and ethos of the 
Constitution.”517 
 
On the basis of this increased frowning upon tax avoidance, and specifically the 
utilisation of corporate structures for this purpose, the question is when an action 
perpetrated by a taxpayer will be regarded as being fraudulent, dishonest or improper 
enough to warrant piercing in a case where abuse is also present.  
The submission is that the common law has since Cape Pacific been available to 
thwart abuse of corporate personality for tax reasons. Even if this is not the case, the 
Constitution requires the courts to develop the common law consonant with the policy 
considerations linked to public policy, the boni mores of society and 
reasonableness,518 as well as the interests of justice519 considered in an open and 
                                            
512 See also the similarly evolving approach of the UK courts, from the earlier literal approach 
adopted in IRC v Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1–19 and Partington v Attorney-General 
(1869) HL 100 to that in WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC (1982) AC 300 and Furniss v Dawson [1984] 
STC 153 (HL). 
513 As stated by De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 25.1C there has, 
in the interpretation of tax acts, been a “subtle shift over a long period by the judiciary from the 
strict rule of interpretation attempting to establish the intention of the legislature, even in cases 
where the words appeared clear and unambiguous.” [own emphasis]. 
514 S 173 of the Constitution. 
515 See the text to n 272 above.  
516 See the text to n 520 below.  
517 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) 31. 
518 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 117. 
519 S 173 of the Constitution. 
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democratic society.520 These factors should weigh heavily against the considerations 
opposed to piercing when corporate structures are used mainly for tax purposes.521 
In considering how piercing may be applied in the law of income tax, the question 
is whether this can be done within the dictum expressed in Botha: 
 
“Regsontwikkeling het begin toelaat dat bloot op grond van onderlinge afspraak te dien 
effekte (en met nakoming van sekere prosedures en formele vereistes) partye 'n onderlinge 
verhouding kan skep met betrekking tot bates en laste in die besonder, waarvolgens die 
posisie sal geld tussen hulle, maar ook teenoor derdepartye asof daar nog 'n persoon naas 
hulself bestaan. Ook ons regstelsel duld so 'n skepsel van individue en aanvaar dat daardie 
skepsel hanteer word op die basis dat hyself draer van regte en verpligtinge kan wees en 
as sulks in die handelsverkeer en regsverkeer kan deelneem. Oorsee, met die meerdere 
kompleksiteite en variasies van die Amerikaanse samelewing waarskynlik 'n faktor, het die 
oortuiging algaande meer aanvaarding gevind by Howe sowel as navorsers dat 
ontwikkeling van die erkenning van die maatskappy as 'n verdere persona in die reg 
plaasgevind het weens die behoefte daaraan in die verkeer, maar dat nadele kan ontstaan 
en onreg tot stand kan kom juis deur 'n aandrang op die erkenning van die afsonderlikheid 
van die regspersoon. Dit kom voor asof besef is dat om 'n volstrektheid te verleen aan die 
erkenning van die afsonderlikheid van die maatskappy soms inhou dat verder gegaan word 
as die doel en rede vir die erkenning van die bestaanbaarheid van 'n regspersoon; dat so 
'n benadering die heer kan word van onreg in plaas daarvan dat erkenning van 
regspersoonlikheid bloot die verkeersbehoeftes volgens billikheidsmaatstawwe dien; dat 
                                            
520 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 118 where the majority 
judgment directs that the common law should be developed in line with the objective normative 
value system which the Bill of Rights embodies – see s 7(1) of the Constitution. In S v Thebus 
2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 28 Moseneke J said:  
“It seems to me that the need to develop the common law under s 39(2) could arise ... even 
when a rule of the common law is not inconsistent with a specific constitutional provision 
but may fall short of its spirit, purport and objects. Then, the common law must be adapted 
so that it grows in harmony with the ‘objective normative value system’ found in the 
Constitution.”  
Cf Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 67 et seq. 
521 This is not to argue that the Constitution prescribes a more relaxed approach to piercing 
as such. One should heed the warning of the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 
(CC) that, “[w]hile we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, … 
it cannot be too strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we may wish 
it to mean … If the language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 
‘values’ the result is not interpretation but divination”. Undoubtedly, the same principle also 
applies to the development of the common law. 
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dit nie vir voldoening aan die behoeftes van die gemeenskap nodig is om 'n regspersoon 
so te benader dat totaal onaanvaarbare resultate ontstaan omdat partye toegelaat word 
om 'n fiktiewe persoon in die alledaagse verkeer te laat optree nie.”522 
 
This is a strong endorsement of Benade’s “doelmatigheidsreël”.523 When the 
achievement of certain tax results is no longer a consequence, but the raison d’etre 
for using the corporate veil, the case for piercing clearly outweigh the policy 
considerations opposed thereto.524 In such circumstances society pays too high a 
price for separate corporate personality and its concomitant advantages.525 Piercing 
is then not only warranted, but indeed necessary.526  
Benade is of the opinion that “[g]een dogmatiese konsep van die maatskappy word 
verkrag nie as dié geskeidenheid om geen gewigtiger rede nie as bloot ter wille van 
die billikheid buite rekening gelaat word.”527 Leaving aside whether fairness 
considerations are a sufficient basis upon which to pierce, the fact remains that the 
rule of separate corporate personality is not derogated from when piercing is applied 
in limited, predetermined circumstances. This is evident from a consideration of the 
actions of the legislature. Just as the legislature at times seeks to pierce the veil in 
specific instances,528 which has done nothing to detract from the rule of separate 
corporate personality in other respects, so too our courts should be empowered to do 
so in cases of abuse. These instances include the use of the corporate veil for reasons 
beyond those contemplated by its statutory creators. 
The overriding reason for the law’s recognition of the separate legal personality of 
a company is the fostering of economic activity. Taxation by its very nature is a product 
                                            
522 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 161. 
523 Benade (1967) THRHR 215. 
524 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above; Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 
SA 585 (SCA) para 15; Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 295. 
525 See Silke Tax Avoidance and Tax Reduction 73. 
526 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 1 below. A necessary exception would be those circumstances 
where a beneficial tax regime is introduced by the legislature to encourage certain taxpayer 
behaviour which would, inter alia, involve the taxpayer using the corporate veil to benefit from 
such a tax incentive (e g where a natural person incorporates a business to benefit from the 
small business corporation regime in s 12E of the Income Tax Act). 
527 Benade (1967) THRHR 227 (“No dogmatic concept of the company is lost if this 
separateness is ignored for no other reason than in the interest of fairness.”) 
528 The controlled foreign company rules in the Income Tax Act is a pertinent example. 
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of economic activity and the question may be asked whether in a modern commercial 
society it has not become a purpose for which the corporate veil may be legitimately 
used. There is no evidence to be found in South African law of such a development.  
Another developing issue is whether the shareholders of the company are still the 
only beneficiaries of the company. Or do other stakeholders also have a legitimate 
claim to benefit from the economic activity of the corporate entity? Deakin argues 
convincingly that the shareholder primacy model is no longer appropriate for modern 
corporate law, also due to its direct contribution to the global financial crises and it 
failing to address theoretical and practical problems underlying separate corporate 
existence. This became very apparent after the 2008 financial crisis for which the 
shareholder primacy model has been widely blamed, inter alia because a purely 
shareholder-centric approach discourages corporate longevity. It is therefore argued 
that a wider “stakeholder interest-based” approach should be adopted.529 The law 
should in future specify when the various contributors of inputs into a company are 
allowed, under pre-set conditions, to draw on such resources.530 According to Deakin 
society at large is necessarily one such stakeholder which contributes to the company. 
Society’s interests should therefore also be represented and be kept in mind in 
developing a model for the proper understanding of the corporate form.531 It remains 
an evolving policy debate on how legal personality should be approached,532 and one 
which applies also to issues such as how the company should be treated when being 
used for income tax purposes. 
Any discussion on how the company is to be used, logically includes a discussion 
on how the company is not meant to be used, in other words when its use is 
                                            
529 The stakeholder model was also used to a certain extent to inform the drafting of the 
Companies Act. It also describes both Government’s and the legislature’s approach to 
company law – see the text to n 766 below. See also the Institute of Directors Southern Africa 
King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016. 
530 Deakin (2012) Queen’s Law Journal 343 et seq and the other authors quoted there in 
support. 
531 See also C Stein & G Everingham The New Companies Act Unlocked (2011) 2 and 8 et 
seq in relation to the “enlightened shareholder value model” adopted by the Companies Act. 
Also see s 7(d) of the Companies Act. 
532 Deakin (2012) Queen’s Law Journal 343 et seq. See also the chapter by Deakin in The 
Critical Corporation under 2.2 (unpublished format used with permission of the author). 
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tantamount to abuse of the legal form.533 Society contributes in much the same sense 
to natural persons and the expectation that individuals should contribute back to 
society by for example paying taxes is similar. I agree with this, but would add that the 
corporate form is meant to benefit society at large by, amongst others, contributing to 
the fiscus. If the law were to condone the corporate form being used mainly for tax 
purposes and thus only for the benefit of those controlling it for themselves and at the 
cost of others, the law would indirectly give credence to the outdated shareholder 
primacy model. If we were to acknowledge rather that it is contrary to policy 
considerations when the corporate form is used for purposes directly contrary to its 
legitimate purpose under the stakeholder interest model,534 then our law could be 
developed to address this obvious social challenge. This is not to argue that 
shareholders should be treated on an equal footing with other stakeholders, but is 
merely a plea to recognise that other stakeholders also have a legitimate interest in 
the company and that it is, at least to a certain extent, a shared resource.535 
Once our courts have confirmed, as it is argued here that they should, that the use 
of the company for tax purposes should be disallowed as it amounts to an abuse of 
the doctrine of separate corporate personality, it is no longer a question of degree. 
Degree no longer plays a role: where the corporate veil is being used primarily for tax 
purposes, piercing should be applied, irrespective of the amounts or circumstances 
involved. This is, of course, subject thereto that a court is satisfied that control exists 
and that the corporate veil has indeed been misused primarily for tax reasons. Just as 
                                            
533 In this regard Deakin remarks in The Critical Corporation that “the question of how far the 
law should recognise the distinct identity of the corporation ought to be approached from a 
functional perspective, not a naturalistic one” and that such a functional approach lays bare 
the potential for abuse of the corporate form, amongst others, for tax purposes.  
534 Both Anderson (2009) Melb UL Rev 349-350 and Glazer v Commission on Ethics for Public 
Employees 758 refer correctly to the “privilege” of corporate personality. This correlates with 
the civil law “abuse of rights” doctrine and applies in the tax context too (Vandekerckhove 
Piercing the Corporate Veil 311). See too J Cassidy “Tainted elements or nugatory directive? 
The Role of the general anti-avoidance provisions (“GAAR”) in fiscal interpretation” (2012) 23 
Stell LR 319 338. 
535 Deakin in The Critical Corporation. Also see Directors Southern Africa King IV Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 23 et seq where responsible corporate citizenry 
is encouraged. 
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there are no degrees of piercing, there should be no degrees of impermissible tax 
avoidance. 
The courts have confirmed that the use of the corporate veil to circumvent restraint 
of trade agreements is an appropriate basis upon which to pierce the corporate veil.536 
In my view it should also be confirmed as a principle based in law that a tax benefit 
achieved by using the corporate veil is improper and contrary to policy considerations 
if that tax benefit was the main purpose of a transaction. The principle should be that 
in such circumstances the policy considerations in favour of piercing outweigh those 
considerations opposed thereto.537 This must be clearly confirmed as a legal principle 
to avoid the uncertainty that may arise should lower courts be tempted to deviate from 
it on a factual basis; exactly the scenario against which the SCA cautioned in Fourway 
Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd (“Fourway”).538 
 
5 2 A question of fact 
Two questions of fact also need to be answered before a court can apply piercing for 
income tax purposes. The first entails a subjective enquiry into whether the corporate 
veil has been used for tax purposes and the second whether control through which the 
shareholder concerned can use the corporate veil objectively exists. 
Both questions need to be interrogated on a case-by-case basis. The former 
involves a subjective enquiry. Therefore the test is largely dependent on the evidence 
put before a court to prove or disprove539 the purpose with which a shareholder sought 
to apply the corporate veil. In practice this is may present a significant evidentiary 
burden to bear, but a necessary one since it is a requirement for the taxpayer to have 
purposefully sought to achieve a tax benefit by using the corporate veil.540 This 
presents a practical problem. In many cases only the ipse dixit of a taxpayer may be 
                                            
536 See the text to n 252 above. 
537 An affirmatory conclusion was reached before in unreported cases 9593 & 9592. 
538 See the text to n 370 above. 
539 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 3 above for a discussion of the burden of proof where the 
common law doctrine is applied by SARS as a remedy against impermissible tax avoidance. 
540 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 above where the conclusion is reached that this tax purpose 
must also have been the main purpose of the taxpayer. 
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available as evidence. According to ITC 1185,541 where no other evidence is placed 
before a court the oral evidence of a taxpayer would carry significant evidentiary 
weight. Such an approach would appropriately balance the burden of proof in the tax 
court, addressing these practical difficulties. While SARS is ordinarily at an advantage 
in tax cases due to the burden of proof placed on taxpayers,542 it will in most cases 
require at least some objective evidence to counter a taxpayer’s ipse dixit.  
The second question involves an objective test of whether shareholder control 
actually exists. It is important to make some brief comments on deciding when control 
would be present. 
It has been said543 that where third party interests, such as minority shareholders, 
are negatively affected by piercing, that piercing should not be applied. Piercing in 
these circumstances would in effect lead to the minority shareholders’ economic 
                                            
541 ITC 1185 [1972] 35 SATC 122 at 123: “It is no difficult matter to say that an important factor 
is: what was the taxpayer’s intention when he bought the property? It is often very difficult, 
however, to discover what his true intention was. It is necessary to bear in mind in that regard 
that the ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and purpose should not lightly be regarded 
as decisive. It is the function of the court to determine on an objective review of all the relevant 
facts and circumstances what the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer were. Not the 
least important of the facts will be the course of conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the 
transactions in issue, the nature of his business or occupation and the frequency or otherwise 
of his past involvement or participation in similar transactions. The facts in regard to those 
matters will form an important part of the material from which the court will draw its own 
inferences against the background of the general human and business probabilities. This is 
not to say that the court will give little or no weight to what the taxpayer says his intention was, 
as is sometimes contended in argument on behalf of the Secretary in cases of this nature. The 
taxpayer’s evidence under oath and that of his witnesses must necessarily be given full 
consideration and the credibility of the witnesses must be assessed as in any other case which 
comes before the court. But direct evidence of intent and purpose must be weighed and tested 
against the probabilities and the inferences normally to be drawn from the established facts.” 
(own emphasis) The aforementioned dictum was subsequently approved in Malan v KBI 
[1983] 45 SATC 59. 
542 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 3 below. 
543 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 22 et seq. Also see RA Stevens The 
External Relations of Company Groups in South African Law: A Critical Comparative Analysis 
LLD thesis, University of Stellenbosch (2011) 72; cf Al-Kharafi & Sons for General Trading, 
General Contracting and Industrial Structures Wll v Pema NO & others 2010 JOL 25851 
(GSJ). 
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interest in the company also being diminished, even though their relationship with the 
company may be entirely legitimate. It is not necessary to comment on the validity of 
this argument here, since minority interests, or the interests of any other shareholder 
for that matter, will never be a relevant consideration in the case of piercing for tax 
purposes. It may, however, be a consideration where the veil is pierced, for example, 
in order to attribute the liability of a company to its shareholders. Where the calculation 
of the liability for tax is concerned though, the corporate veil is only disregarded to the 
extent that it is used, to unlawfully obtain some tax benefit. And it is then only pierced 
for that specific shareholder.544 One should therefore be careful to generalise by 
requiring control to be present in all instances of piercing.545 While this may be a 
necessary requirement where for example piercing is applied on a balance sheet level, 
this need not be the case where piercing is applied for tax purposes.546 It is conceded 
that abuse would be more difficult to conceal in instances where a majority 
shareholding is present but even on a theoretical level this should not ignore the fact 
that minority shareholders are also able to abuse the corporate veil for improper 
purposes. 
To illustrate this, consider the example where two shareholders own a South African 
company 50/50. Neither of the shareholders is exempt from dividends tax. Suppose 
shareholder A uses the company primarily to escape dividends tax. On application of 
piercing only 50% of the dividend received by the South African company should be 
treated as being exempt from dividends tax, with the remainder treated accruing 
directly to A. This portion should therefore be subject to the dividends tax for which A 
only would have been liable. Legally the entire dividend accrues to the company for 
all other purposes. For the purposes of calculating the dividends tax obligation the 
exemption afforded to the company should be limited to 50% of the dividend received 
                                            
544 Refer the discussion in the text to ch 2 parts 2 3 and 6 1 above. 
545 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 4-133 See Anderson (2009) Melb UL 
Rev 348 for support that control is not necessarily a prerequisite for piercing to apply. 
546 Even if it were to be suggested that majority shareholder control should be a requirement 
for piercing to apply on an income statement level as well, a distinction is justified to provide 
for a different approach where matters relating to taxation are concerned (Briggs v James 
Hardie & Co (Pty) Ltd (1998) 15 NSWLR 549 579 and 580). Minority shareholders benefit as 
much from the corporate veil as the majority shareholder.  
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in the above example. The remainder should be treated as non-exempt and that tax 
should be only for the account of the shareholder using the corporate veil for escaping 
the tax obligation.547 
The facts set out in Example 4 above lead to a similar conclusion.548 Had only one 
of the trusts involved in that example transferred its assets to the company in order to 
benefit from a more beneficial tax rate (with the remaining two trusts doing so for 
unrelated commercial reasons), the conclusion is that a 33% minority interest held by 
that trust may nonetheless be susceptible to piercing, irrespective thereof that it 
amounts to a minority interest only. 
 
5 2 1 Exercising control through groups 
The ability to use the corporate veil is linked to the ownership of a company’s issued 
shares. This was mentioned above549 as the determining factor in deciding whether a 
company is capable of being used for legitimate purposes or misused for illegitimate 
purposes. In the context of groups of companies the exercise of indirect control 
through other companies or direct control over companies with common control, such 
as fellow subsidiaries, becomes pertinent. 
De facto control by virtue of a shareholding relationship is not on its own sufficient 
for a court to pierce in the tax context.550 Such control needs to be exercised primarily 
for tax purposes. However, control of the corporate veil is still required, which control 
can only be established through a direct shareholding relationship, a substantial 
shareholder relationship551 or an indirect shareholder relationship, (such as is typically 
present in a layered company group structure).552 
                                            
547 See the text to n 197 above. 
548 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
549 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above. 
550 Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act, discussion of s 19. 
551 Refer to the facts in Cape Pacific as an example. 
552 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above. 
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The term “group of companies” as discussed here refers to a collection of 
companies through which control553 by way of shareholding554 can be exercised 
through one or more shareholders, not unlike the definition given in section 1 of the 
Companies Act. There is in principle no reason why a company in which another 
company holds less than 100% of the voting rights, or even less than 50%, should be 
more difficult to pierce for tax purposes than a wholly owned company.555 
For the purposes of this dissertation, piercing in the group context refers to those 
cases where piercing is applied between fellow subsidiaries of the same group, not 
where piercing is effected between company and shareholder. This is known as 
“horizontal piercing”. An example where this may be relevant for tax purposes can be 
found in the context of treaty shopping. For example, interest or royalty income flows 
through various companies in a group to benefit from beneficial reduced withholding 
tax rates in the applicable DTAs. 
Since the principles discussed in this dissertation thus far all involve vertical piercing 
which would similarly apply to the holding/subsidiary relationship, only horizontal 
piercing is considered here as a potentially more complex matter to be dealt with, in 









                                            
553 As explained in the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above, the existence of control in the context 
of considering whether abuse of the corporate veil can be perpetrated, is not dependent on a 
shareholder’s control of a company, but rather on control of a company’s shares. In other 
words, a shareholder as owner of a “portion” of the corporate veil (figuratively speaking) is as 
capable of applying the corporate veil for his or her own abusive purpose as a majority 
shareholder would be (provided the company is employed in a manner allowing the abuse, 
which may be the case even if the majority shareholder’s purpose is entirely legitimate). 
554 By way of the exercise of voting rights attached to shares. 
555 Contra Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1976) 3 All ER 462, and 
particularly the dictum by Lord Denning at 467 and Goff LJ at 68. 












     Figure 1: Horizontal piercing                 Figure 2: Conventional piercing 
 
 
Horizontal piercing requires the piercing principles to apply to two corporate veils. 
These veils include the corporate veil between Company A and the shareholder above 
and the aforementioned shareholder and Company B. The corporate veil exists only 
between a company and its shareholder(s). There is no corporate veil between 
subsidiaries.556 This principle means that piercing can only be applied in a context 
where a common shareholder exists if both veils have been abused to a degree 
disallowed by the law. In the context of income tax specifically, the shareholder’s 
purpose in using the corporate veil of both companies must have been primarily for 
tax purposes before a court would be willing to pierce in the group context.  
This may appear to be a rather stringent test. However, had tax reasons been the 
predominant purpose for the shareholder to have its companies enter into a 
transaction with a fellow group company, that purpose would probably also be the 
reason for the other company to agree to enter that transaction. 
                                            
556 A good example of horizontal piercing is to be found in ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v Botha 
[2010] ZAWCHC 563. See also Cilliers & Luiz (1996) THRHR 524 and 525 on Cape Pacific. 
Contra Metlika Trading Ltd v CSARS [2012] JOL29511 (GNP) 13. See the text to ch 2 part 3 
2 1 above: although this deals with the relationship between directors vis-à-vis their 
companies, the principle applies likewise to fellow subsidiaries. The corporate veil can only 
exist between a company and a shareholder. Also refer DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets (1976) 3 All ER 462 467 where it was held that piercing in a group 
context involves the two subsidiaries being deemed not to exist, and that the shareholder is 
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The problem with analysing piercing in the group context in South Africa is that very 
few judgments have dealt with the question.557 The findings of courts in other 
jurisdictions may however provide guidance, with good examples to be found in the 
English courts’ judgments.558 
The first authority dealing specifically with piercing within groups is DHN Food 
Distributors. The court allowed piercing in this case, since not doing so would have 
amounted to “a denial of justice”.559 The court preferred to view the structure as what 
it was in economic substance rather than what it was in legal form. It distanced itself 
from the “strict legalistic view” taken by the Lands Tribunal in that dispute. 
In response the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc (“Adams”) 
categorically stated that: 
 
“… save in cases which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is 
not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 merely 
because it considers that justice so requires. Our law, for better or for worse, recognizes 
the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their 
parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate 
legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to such separate 
legal entities.” 560 [own emphasis] 
 
Or as Goff LJ held in Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon: 
 
“Counsel suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between 
parent and subsidiary company in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But 
we are concerned not with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, in 
law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.” 561 [own emphasis] 
                                            
557 This is not to say that piercing has not been applied in a group scenario in South Africa. 
See the judgments in Gore and Cape Pacific for examples hereof. The AD also confirmed the 
principle that a “holding company is a separate legal entity from its subsidiary”: The Ritz Hotel 
Ltd v Charles of The Ritz Ltd 1988 3 SA 290 (A) at 43 of that judgment. 
558 The judgments which are discussed below have also been relied on by our own courts 
when considering piercing in the context of company groups: see the judgments referred to in 
n 557 above as examples.  
559 Shaw LJ in DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1976) 3 All 
ER 462 473. 
560 Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1019. 
561 [1986] 3 All ER 468 486 as quoted in Adams. 
 




It is submitted that DHN Food Distributors cannot serve as good authority and it has 
been subject to much criticism since. 562 The problem is that courts are obliged to take 
a legalistic view. To depart from this approach will inevitably lead to legal uncertainty. 
The law demands that the separate legal personality of a company, one that is 
couched in fiction and in form, be recognised. To deviate from a strict application of 
this rule, except in the most exceptional of circumstances,563 will lead to a curtailing of 
a rule which is a necessity for economic exchange as well as for the certainty of the 
persons in that environment that the form of their business will be recognised. 
In the light of the well-founded criticism thereof in the Adams case, DHN Food 
Distributors should in my view not be regarded as authority for holding that piercing 
within groups (or within a “single economic unit” as was put to the court in Adams) 
should be subjected to an approach different from ordinary piercing principles.564 
There is no special dispensation when piercing is considered in a group context, and 
the separate existence of a company forming part of a group should be recognised to 
the same extent as that of any other company.565 Although it was anticipated in 1982 
                                            
562 Refer to Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 above where the court also quoted 
with approval Lord Keith’s dictum in the House of Lords in Woolfson wherein that Court too 
distanced itself from the approach taken in DHN. DHN should also not be quoted out of 
context. As discussed in the text to ch 2 part 6 2 above, the case involved a situation where 
piercing was sought to be applied by the group for its own benefit, a rather unusual occurrence. 
It thus did not involve any abuse as such and which would by implication be present where 
piercing for tax purposes is concerned, which is what this dissertation is exclusively concerned 
with. 
563 Such as where a structure is set up with tax purposes primarily in mind. 
564 See specifically Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1026. Contra Deputy 
Sherriff Harare v Trinpac Investments (Private) Ltd [2012] JOL 28241 (ZH) where the DHN 
case is mentioned as the only authority for the extension of the exceptions to the general 
principle applicable to the piercing doctrine. Conspicuously, no mention is made of any of the 
English authorities criticising the DHN approach. I agree with Meskin et al Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act (at the discussion of s 19 of the Companies Act) that the conclusion 
reached in the Deputy Sherriff case cannot be supported. 
565 Refer to Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 53 et seq and the authority quoted 
there. This approach has also been tacitly endorsed by our courts: see for example the 
Metlika, Gore and Cape Pacific cases referred to above. Also see Williams “Companies: Part 
I” in LAWSA 91; Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act at the discussion of s 19 of 
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in the case of Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of The Ritz Ltd (“Ritz”)566 that the relaxed 
approach adopted in DHN Food Distributors may be followed in South Africa in future, 
nothing came of this.567 Rather, the approach set out in Adams568 should be adopted. 
This judgment was later than both Ritz and DHN Food Distributors and held that 
subsidiary companies are independent persons at law from one another and from their 
holding companies. 
 
5 2 2 Piercing “one-man companies” 
The question whether a different regime applies to so-called “one-man companies” is 
as old as the question whether a company is a distinct and separate legal persona.569 
The term “one-man company” as used here does not necessarily only refer to a 
company owned by a single natural person as shareholder, but rather to any company 
of which all the shares are owned by a single person, be it a natural or legal person. 
The submission is that the principles regarding the ownership of companies within 
a group context apply in exactly the same way to one-man companies. As expressed 
by Lord Herschel in Salomon: 
 
“I am unable to see how it can be lawful for three or four or six persons to form a company 
for the purpose of employing their capital in trading, with the benefit of limited liability, and 
not for one person to do so… It was said that in the present case the six shareholders other 
than the appellant were mere dummies, his nominees, and held their shares in trust for 
him. I will assume that this was so. In my opinion, it makes no difference.”570 
 
                                            
the Companies Act; Cassim et al The Law of Business Structures 70. Cf Stevens The External 
Relations of Company Groups in South African Law 72. 
566 1982 2 All SA 292 (A). Also refer Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 279.  
567 Significantly too, none of the 3 SCA cases on piercing discussed in the text to ch 3 part 3 
3 above even deals with the DHN case in the wake of Adams’ case. See also Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law 54 et seq and the authorities cited there. 
568 Approved by the AD in The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 1994 
2 All SA 11 (A) 25. Adams v Cape Industries plc 1991 1 All ER 929 1019 and quoted above. 
569 See Salomon where the matter was also considered. 
570 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 para 44 et seq. 
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And Lord Macnaghten: 
 
“It has become the fashion to call companies of this class ‘one man companies’. That is a 
taking nickname, but it does not help one much in the way of argument. If it is intended to 
convey the meaning that a company which is under the absolute control of one person is 
not a company legally incorporated, although the requirements of the Act of 1862 may have 
been complied with, it is inaccurate and misleading: if it merely means that there is a 
predominant partner possessing an overwhelming influence and entitled practically to the 
whole of the profits, there is nothing in that that I can see contrary to the true intention of 
the Act of 1862, or against public policy…”571 
 
The conclusion from the above is as applicable in modern company law as it was 
in 1896: the mere fact that a company is 100% held by a person should not even be a 
factor to take into account when considering whether piercing should be applied or 
not. The separate legal personality of a “one-man company” deserves as much 
recognition and is as open or closed to piercing as a company with many shareholders 
or one belonging to a group.572 
What distinguishes “one-man companies” from companies with more shareholders 
is that it is practically easier for the separate legal personality of such companies to be 
abused, given the absence of other shareholders to keep the one shareholder in 
check. The same applies in the group context.  
Whether a company is a “one-man company” is therefore not a factor when deciding 
whether piercing would be justified or not. Rather, a “one-man company” will be easier 
to pierce simply because it will be easier to demonstrate that the corporate veil of such 
                                            
571 Para 53. See also Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 95 and 96. 
572 See Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act on s 19. In RP Crees (Pvt) Ltd v 
Woodpecker Industries (Pvt) Ltd [1975] 2 All SA 665 (R) 668 it was said:  
“Thus, a company can be under complete control of and its activities entirely dictated by 
another person but that does not deprive it of its distinct legal personality. A person in 
captivity may be entirely subject to and his conduct completely dictated by his captor. 
Nevertheless he still retains an existence and is a separate entity from the person who has 
complete power over and direction of him.”  
The decision of the court in Gering v Gering [1974] 1 All SA 65 (W) 69 and 70 can therefore 
not be supported. The position is the same under English law (Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayif 
2008 EWHC 2380 (Fam) para 103), Canadian law (Clarkson Co v Zhelka [1967] 2 OR 565, 
64 DLR (2d)) and US law (see Cheng (2010) Mississippi Law Journal 509). 
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a company is being abused. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as justification for 
treating the corporate veil of “one-man companies” as of a lesser substance or 
“density”573 than that of other companies.574 
 
5 2 3 Burden of proof 
The corporate veil may be pierced where two questions of fact have been answered 
affirmatively. These questions are, firstly, whether the taxpayer was indeed in the 
position to use the corporate veil in question and, secondly, whether the taxpayer did 
so primarily for tax purposes. Whether this will constitute “improper conduct” in terms 
of prevailing policy considerations is a question of law, which is irrelevant in 
establishing who bears the onus. Questions of law are left to courts to answer once all 
the facts have been established in line with the burden of proof.575 
Ordinarily the burden of proof in respect of the two questions of fact on which the 
legal question will be based is on the party alleging misuse of the corporate veil (in 
other words on the SARS).576 The law of taxation, however, proves to be the exception 
to the rule and the statutory rule must trump the common law approach.577 Section 
102(1) of the Tax Administration Act provides: 
 
“A taxpayer bears the burden of proving— 
(a)  that an amount, transaction, event or item is exempt or otherwise not taxable; 
(b)  that an amount or item is deductible or may be setoff; 
(c)  the rate of tax applicable to a transaction, event, item or class of taxpayer; 
(d)  that an amount qualifies as a reduction of tax payable; 
                                            
573 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 162. 
574 Bark and another NNO v Boesch serves as example. Also see the discussion of the alter 
ego doctrine in the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above. 
575 DT Zeffertt & AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed (2009) 45 et seq; Mabaso 
v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A) 874: “[T]he onus of proof relates to factual and not legal issues.” 
576 This has been the consistent approach of the courts in all reported judgments considering 
the piercing doctrine. It is also consistent with the position in the South African law of evidence 
in general (Zeffertt & Paizes The South African Law of Evidence) and as enunciated by the 
AD in Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946, adopting the position of Voet being that he who asserts 
must prove. See also the application of this principle in CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust [1992] 2 All SA 245 (A) 255 et seq. 
577 Zeffertt & Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 46. 
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(e)  that a valuation is correct; or 
(f)   whether a ‘decision’ that is subject to objection and appeal under a tax Act, is   
      incorrect.” 
 
Typically, where piercing is to be applied tax will fall on a party other than the pierced 
company. In terms of the provisions of section 102(1)(a) the taxpayer will have to show 
that piercing should not be applied. It is difficult to conceive of a scenario where 
piercing is applied in the tax context that will not be subject to this provision. It covers 
the four examples identified in chapter 1 and the taxpayers there will in each instance 
have to bear the onus in terms of section 102(1). 
The question arises whether the statutorily assigned burden of proof in section 102 
also applies to common law remedies, or whether its application is limited to the anti-
avoidance rules contained in the various tax acts. There is no indication in the wording 
of section 102 itself that the application of this provision is limited to the remedies 
created by a tax act. This is confirmed by the attitude of the courts in the past when 
they were confronted with the question of onus in cases where common law doctrines 
were being applied against taxpayers. The judgment in CSARS v NWK Ltd (“NWK”), 
dealing with the common law simulation doctrine, is instructive in this regard: the court 
held that the onus of proof rests on the taxpayer to refute SARS’ assessment of the 
facts.578 It follows that this principle will also extend to cases where SARS applies 
other common law remedies. 
Section 102 above makes it clear that one is dealing here with the burden of proof 
in the ordinary sense, in other words with questions of fact.579 Therefore, once SARS 
has issued an assessment, the taxpayer will be called upon to show on a balance of 
probabilities which facts contradict the basis on which the assessment has been 
issued to the taxpayer. Where piercing is concerned, these would have to be either 
that the taxpayer did not use the corporate veil in question or alternatively that the veil 
was not used primarily with a tax motive in mind. 
                                            
578 CSARS v NWK Ltd [2010] 73 SATC 38 et seq dealing with the legislative predecessor of s 
102(1) contained in the now repealed s 82 of the Income Tax Act. Also see Erf 3183/1 
Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR [1996] 58 SATC 229 240. 
579 Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A). 
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On a practical level, it will in most cases be easy to establish whether the taxpayer 
was in fact able to use the company. It will mostly amount to whether the taxpayer was 
a shareholder of the company or not.580 The more difficult factual question will in 
practice be whether the taxpayer intended using the company primarily for tax 
purposes.581 
 
5 3 Application 
Example 1582 serves as an illustration of the application of the above principles: the 
individual that transfers the listed share portfolio to the wholly owned company through 
which the portfolio will be held going forward, effectively avoids the incidence of 
dividends tax.583 Although there is the added benefit of having the shares secured in 
a separate corporate vehicle, this is clearly an ancillary benefit to the individual 
investor on a subjective level. People have always had the opportunity of structuring 
the listed share investments in this manner and had in the past not cared to do so. The 
restructuring now584 is clearly because of the tax benefits only.585  
In the international tax context of Example 3,586 the individual would be able to 
reduce his tax liability permanently if the investment holding company referred to were 
to be incorporated and effectively managed in Mauritius by exploiting the reduced 
withholding tax rates in the South Africa/Mauritius DTA.587 Mauritius does not levy a 
domestic dividend withholding tax. 
                                            
580 Although this may be less simple to the extent that an in-substance shareholding 
relationship (see the text to n 340 above) is alleged. 
581 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 above. 
582 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
583 Companies tax resident in South Africa are exempt from dividends tax in terms of s 
64F(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. It should be noted that this is not a beneficial regime contrived 
by Parliament, but rather one to ensure that profits distributed through companies to the 
ultimate beneficial owner are not subject to double taxation. See the text to n 499 above. 
584 Which can be done without suffering any tax costs now in terms of s 42 of the Income Tax 
Act. 
585 Admittedly, in practice, evidentiary considerations may hamper proving the subjective 
element of the test. 
586 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
587 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government 
of the Republic of Mauritius for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion with respect to taxes on income (effective 28 May 2015). 
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It is evident that both the subjective and objective prerequisites of the common law 
piercing test are present: the individual is able to, and indeed does objectively, use the 
corporate personality of the company. He does so subjectively for tax purposes. The 
question therefore is firstly whether this is at the very least “improper” and secondly, 
whether the avoidance of tax when achieved as primary purpose can be considered 
“improper enough” to allow for piercing. 
It has already been explained in parts 3 3 2 1 and 5 1 1 of this chapter above why 
the use of corporate personality for tax purposes should at the very least be considered 
improper. Because the individual’s commercial or other considerations in the example 
above are of secondary importance to him and his main purpose was to commit the 
said impropriety, policy considerations warrant piercing of the corporate veil. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 has shown that piercing should be regarded as a separate remedy 
potentially available to SARS in the South African tax context. This chapter has 
concluded that where the main purpose to avoid tax through use of the corporate veil 
is present, the question of whether the remedy can only be used as a last resort 
becomes irrelevant. So too does the question whether other shareholders with no tax 
purpose are part of the structure: the veil is just as translucent for minority 
shareholders where impermissible tax avoidance is concerned as it is for majority 
shareholders. 
The availability of the remedy depends entirely on the remaining criteria set out in 
Cape Pacific. Firstly, whether the purposeful use of the corporate veil primarily for tax 
purposes can be described as “improper.” Secondly whether such impropriety would 
on a balancing of policy considerations be enough to warrant piercing. Recent UK 
precedent largely supports this approach by applying the “evasion principle” which 
South African courts too should in my view adopt in developing the common law. 
The conclusion drawn above is that piercing should be available as remedy against 
impermissible tax avoidance. Not only should the intentional avoidance of tax through 
the use of the corporate veil be treated as amounting to an evasion of otherwise legal 
obligations if done mainly for those reasons, but policy considerations favouring such 
an approach should be recognised even when weighed against considerations 
opposed to piercing. 
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That is not to say that tax avoidance is necessarily improper. However, where 
Parliament has created a fiction which is then used in a manner contrary to its intended 
purpose, indeed in such a way that it actively counters the efficacy of other statutes 
passed into law (for example the Income Tax Act), such misuse is clearly improper 
and policy considerations require such impropriety to not be allowed.  
It remains to be considered in chapter 4 how, if at all, this common law test interacts 
with section 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
 




CHAPTER 4: PIERCING IN TERMS OF THE COMPANIES ACT – SECTION 20(9) 
 
1 Introduction 
The Companies Act of 2008 brought with it a number of provisions not previously 
contained in the Repealed Companies Act. One of these provisions is section 20(9) 
which provides a legislative mechanism with which South African courts may apply the 
piercing doctrine. Section 20(9) states: 
 
“If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is 
involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or 
any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may- 
(a)  declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of 
any right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company 
or, in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another 
person specified in the declaration; and 
(b)  make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration 
contemplated in paragraph (a).” 
 
Much speculation and little clarity exist on how section 20(9) generally, and the 
phrase “unconscionable abuse” specifically, interact with the existing body of law. The 
foremost element of uncertainty arises from the fact that the corporate veil may already 
be pierced in terms of the common law.588 The question is: how should the common 
law and the new legislative remedy interact? Should the common law inform the 
content of section 20(9) or is section 20(9) incompatible with the common law position 
that it will then have supplanted? Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act and the 
judgments dealing with that provision are also indirectly relevant. Due to the obvious 
similarities between section 20(9) of the Companies Act and section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act, it is conceivable that the South African courts will follow the same 
approach in interpreting section 20(9) as they have with section 65.589 It remains to be 
                                            
588 Discussed in ch 3 above. 
589 Even though Ex Parte Gore suggests otherwise. See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 2 below. 
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considered whether the subtle differences in wording between the two statutory 
provisions may have been intentional. 
The South African courts have thus far considered section 20(9) only on two 
occasions, firstly in Ex Parte Gore and shortly thereafter only briefly in Van Zyl NO v 
Kaye NO (“Van Zyl v Kaye”).590+591 The latter judgment did no more than confirm the 
earlier judgment in Ex Parte Gore.592 Ex Parte Gore is therefore the appropriate point 
of departure to consider how section 20(9) should be approached, especially regarding 
the interaction between the common law doctrine and the remedy in section 20(9). 
Even though Ex Parte Gore set the basis for how the common law doctrine and 
section 20(9) should interact, that judgment did not carry out a detailed analysis of the 
content of the key phrase “unconscionable abuse”. An interpretative approach such 
as that prescribed by the SCA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality (“Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund”)593 is therefore carried out in this 
chapter after a critical analysis of Ex Parte Gore in order to ascertain what section 
20(9) says. The proposed content of section 20(9) is then compared to the common 
law piercing doctrine and applied in the context of the law of taxation. 
 
1 1 Ex Parte Gore 
In Ex Parte Gore the liquidators of a number of companies applied for the corporate 
veils of those companies to be pierced. The companies involved were all subsidiaries 
of a single holding company. The court was asked to pierce the corporate veils to allow 
the liquidators to treat the assets of these companies as being that of the holding 
company for satisfying the claims brought by various creditors. In granting the 
application in terms of section 20(9) Binns-Ward J declared that the separate juristic 
personalities of the companies concerned were unconscionably abused. The 
                                            
590 Van Zyl NO v Kaye NO 2014 4 SA 452 (WCC). 
591 The facts in Van Zyl v Kaye did not involve the piercing of the corporate veil in detail, but 
rather focused on an application to disregard the so-called “veneer” of a trust. The judgment 
was delivered by the same judge in the same court as that in Ex Parte Gore and is dated a 
little more than a year later than the earlier judgment. 
592 On whether s 20(9) should be considered as being supplemental to the common law rather 
than substitutive. Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 466 et seq. 
593 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 18 et seq. 
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companies were therefore to be regarded as a single entity for the purposes of 
satisfying the creditor claims in question.  
The significant finding in Ex Parte Gore was that section 20(9) should be considered 
as being supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive,594 since the 
Companies Act does not expressly provide that section 20(9) replaces the common 
law doctrine.595 This finding suggests that the essence of the common law piercing 
doctrine has been retained in section 20(9), but that piercing in terms of the statutory 
provision may be granted more readily compared to the common law doctrine. 
Ex Parte Gore offers two reasons why section 20(9) piercing should be approached 
with less circumspection than is the case under the common law. Significantly, one of 
these reasons is not that the court considered the common law remedy to be a remedy 
of last resort,596 whereas section 20(9) was not. Rather, Ex Parte Gore confirms that 
the common law remedy, like section 20(9), is potentially available even where an 
alternative remedy is also present.597 The first reason is doctrinal in nature and the 
second is based on a literal interpretation of section 20(9). 
 
1 1 1 Revisiting considerations opposed to piercing – the separation of powers 
doctrine 
It is instructive that the court uses the word “supplemental” to describe the relationship 
between section 20(9) and the common law.598 It suggests that the remedy in section 
20(9) does not restrict the application of the common law doctrine in any way. The less 
“drastic” or “exceptional” statutory provision can therefore only serve to increase the 
cases where piercing may be applied.599 It further shows that the common law remedy 
co-exists with section 20(9).600 
Considering the content of the common law doctrine, the only manner in which that 
doctrine in its current state can be applied in a less drastic manner is through a 
                                            
594 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 34. 
595 31. 
596 See the text to chapter 3 part 2 above. 
597 See n 38 to that judgment. 
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divergence of approach to either or both of the two questions of law which that doctrine 
involves. These two questions of law are (a) the meaning of improper conduct”601 and 
(b) whether a considerations-based approach602 would dictate that piercing be applied 
in a specific instance or not. Of the two only the latter can conceivably have been 
affected by the introduction of section 20(9).603 Nothing suggests that section 20(9) 
can be interpreted as introducing more grounds for impropriety604 than under the 
common law.605 Ex Parte Gore must therefore be understood to suggest either that 
section 20(9) introduced further policy considerations in favour of piercing, to have 
detracted from those considerations opposed to piercing, or a combination of the two 
In my view section 20(9) eliminated a key consideration that previously would have 
caused piercing to be applied with circumspection: the introduction of the statutory 
piercing remedy removed the risk of a court breaching the separation of powers 
doctrine.606  
The corporate veil of the company form is itself introduced by statute.607 The 
disregarding of a statutorily designed instrument by an application of the common law 
by its very nature amounts to a drastic intervention by the judiciary.608 Incorporating 
the doctrine into legislation was a significant yet natural development that should be 
understood in the context of the rule of law, the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the interplay between the common law and statutory law. Previously the common law 
piercing doctrine could be seen as the judiciary “overriding” statutory law in the form 
of the Companies Act. The courts were therefore reluctant to use the remedy for fear 
of trumping valid legislative directives of Parliament.609 In this sense, the common law 
remedy certainly required exceptional circumstances to justify its application to any 
                                            
601 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 above. 
602 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
603 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
604 See text to ch 4 parts 2 2 to 2 4 below. 
605 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 above. 
606 The effect of the separation of powers doctrine in acting as a disincentive to piercing in 
terms of the common law was identified as a consideration in the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 
above.  
607 See n 45 above. 
608 See n 278 above. 
609 See Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 UKSC 34 83. 
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given set of facts. In order to apply the doctrine, there had to be clear indications that 
the legislature did not intend that the corporate personality should be abused in such 
a manner. 
The position is different now, if only by virtue of the fact that the remedy has been 
legislated. Piercing no longer involves the judiciary revoking a privilege created by 
statute. Rather, the legislature itself now clearly grants authority to the judiciary to do 
so. The legislature has acted and has clearly set out the circumstances in which courts 
should act. 
Through the removal of this risk South African courts are now actively empowered 
to pierce the corporate veil whenever the facts of a particular case justify them to do 
so.610 
Ex Parte Gore is therefore correct when it regards section 20(9) as presenting a 
less drastic remedy compared to the common law piercing doctrine. While the policy 
considerations in favour of piercing remain the same for section 20(9) as for the 
common law, the main consideration against piercing has now been removed.  
 
1 1 2 “Gross” versus “unconscionable” 
The second reason advanced in Ex Parte Gore in support of section 20(9) presenting 
a less “drastic” or “exceptional” remedy compared to the common law doctrine is one 
based on the literal interpretative view expressed by Binns-Ward J. Ex Parte Gore 
reaches its conclusion on the basis that section 20(9) refers to an “unconscionable 
abuse” rather than the “more extreme”611 phrase “gross abuse”.612 The implication is 
accordingly that section 65 of the Close Corporations Act involves more restrictive 
requirements than section 20(9). Ex Parte Gore mentions no authority for this 
conclusion and in my view it is not correct.613 It is both ironic and contradictory that Ex 
Parte Gore relies elsewhere on the judgment of Airport Cold Storage which involved 
                                            
610 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 34. 
611 34. 
612 Which phrase is used in the piercing provision in s 65 of the Close Corporations Act. 
613 For the reasons set out in the text to part 1 1 2 2 of this chapter below it is suggested that 
a contextual interpretative approach, which is considered more appropriate in the current 
instance, shows the opposite, namely that “gross abuse” in the Close Corporations Act and 
“unconscionable abuse” in the Companies Act should be given the same meaning. 
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section 65 of the Close Corporations Act,614 to illustrate when piercing in terms of 
section 20(9) would be justified and where the common law would have failed to 
present an adequate remedy. If Ex Parte Gore’s literal interpretation were to be 
accepted, piercing in terms of the common law, section 65 of the Close Corporations 
Act and section 20(9) of the Companies Act would each involve a different standard 
of proof for piercing.  
The literal meaning of “unconscionable” in section 20(9) is considered below, 
followed by an analysis whether “gross abuse” in section 65 of the Close Corporations 
Act carries a different meaning compared to that in section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act. 
 
1 1 2 1 The literal interpretative approach in Ex Parte Gore 
It is suggested that a literal interpretative approach to give content to “unconscionable 
abuse” is inappropriate, primarily due to the problematic phrasing involved. Where Ex 
Parte Gore favours a literal interpretation of “unconscionable abuse” solely by 
differentiating between “gross” and “unconscionable” abuse, such a conclusion seems 
insufficient.615 
“Unconscionable” apparently suggests that a limited form of abuse of the corporate 
veil, if such a notion exists, is condoned.616 Clearly the words “unconscionable abuse” 
                                            
614 At 33 Binns-Ward J refers to Airport Cold Storage where the “scant regard for the separate 
legal personalities of the individual corporate entities” would constitute both a “gross abuse” 
as contemplated in s 65 as well as an “unconscionable abuse”. 
615 I illustrate the limited assistance of a literal interpretation in the current context in part 2 2 
of this chapter below by conducting a more thorough literal analysis there compared to the 
cursory literal analysis which formed the basis of the conclusion reached in Ex Parte Gore. 
616 Williams “Companies: Part I” in LAWSA 93; Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 415 et 
seq. See also Domanski’s criticism of this “unduly restrictive” approach in Domanski (1986) 
SALJ 235. It must be presumed that “unconscionable” was added to the provision for good 
reason. On the presumption that statutes do not contain purposeless provisions: Du Plessis 
“Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 342; C Botha Statutory interpretation – An 
introduction for students (2012) 133; LC Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 5 ed (1981) 119 et seq; J 
Silke “The Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation – Canons of Construction, Recent Judicial 
Comments and New Approaches” (1995) Acta Juridica 153 et seq. It is arguable that the 
approach is comparable to the common law distinction between “negligence” and “gross 
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are intended to restrict the application of section 20(9) in some manner. It is obvious 
that the provision cannot be applied where juristic personality is used for legitimate 
purposes. However, where a shareholder departs from the legal or reasonable use of 
juristic personality,617 the question then arises when such abuse can be described as 
being “unconscionable”. 
“Unconscionable” can be defined as “not right or reasonable”,618 “unscrupulous”619 
or “exorbitant”.620 In comparison “gross” can be said to be “(especially of wrongdoing) 
very obvious and unacceptable”,621 “heinous” or “bad”622 or even “culpable”.623 While 
dictionary definitions are relevant when interpreting a particular statutory phrase,624 
the dictionary meaning of “unconscionable” unfortunately seems unhelpful in 
determining the scope of application of section 20(9).625 
It is unclear how the above can be said to suggest a less extreme connotation 
compared to “gross abuse” as used in the Close Corporations Act. 
 
1 1 2 2 The purpose and context of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 
Cassim et al626 are of the view that section 20(9) should be interpreted in the same 
manner as section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. The reason for this is obvious 
when comparing the almost identical wording of the two provisions. Section 65 reads: 
                                            
negligence” – see Schoeman (2012) De Rebus. Cf Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 
62 and Domanski (1986) SALJ 235. 
617 See definition of “abuse” in Garner Black’s Law Dictionary. 
618 Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
619 Garner Black’s Law Dictionary. 
620 G Davidson Roget’s Thesaurus (2004). 
621 Soanes & Stevenson Oxford Dictionary of English. 
622 Davidson Roget’s Thesaurus. 
623 D Greenberg Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (2012), referencing “gross 
negligence”. 
624 National Screenprint (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Finance 1978 3 SA 501 (C) at 507A-H. The 
SCA held in the cases cited above that the dictionary meaning of words should be used with 
caution as interpretative aid: it should rather be used as guidance or a framework within which 
the purpose and context of a phrase may be sought. 
625 S 40 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2009 (“CPA”) contains a list of factual 
circumstances when conduct would amount to “unconscionable conduct”. Given the different 
context in which “unconscionable” is used in that Act, it is doubtful whether any meaningful 
help for the purposes of s 20(9) may be gleaned from the CPA’s wording. 
626 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 57. 




“Whenever a Court on application by an interested person, or in any proceedings in which 
a corporation is involved, finds that the incorporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or 
any use of, that corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the 
corporation as a separate entity, the Court may declare that the corporation is to be deemed 
not to be a juristic person in respect of such rights, obligations or liabilities of the 
corporation, or of such member or members thereof, or of such other person or persons, 
as are specified in the declaration, and the Court may give such further order or orders as 
it may deem fit in order to give effect to such declaration.” 
 
The main difference between section 65 and section 20(9) is that the corporate veil 
of a company may be pierced where there has been an “unconscionable abuse” of 
its corporate personality. In comparison the Close Corporations Act’s piercing 
provision applies where a “gross abuse” of the corporate personality of a close 
corporation is present, which according to Ex Parte Gore carries a more extreme 
connotation. 
At the outset the vagueness of both the terms “unconscionable” and “gross” is 
notable. Apart from indicating that more than mere “abuse” is necessary in both 
legislative provisions,627 there is no other clear difference between “gross” and 
“unconscionable”. Both provisions are aimed at achieving the same purpose, albeit for 
different types of juristic persona. The context and purpose of section 65 is therefore 
the same as that of section 20(9). An interpretation that the two words have distinctly 
different meaning therefore relies solely on a literal approach, which, as shown above, 
must be considered inconclusive.628 
Reliance on such a literal interpretive approach629 has diminished in recent years. 
“[R]ather than attempting to draw inferences as to the drafter’s intention from an 
uncertain premise…”,630 an interpretation which gives certainty and clarity must be 
                                            
627 See also the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 1 above and part 2 2 below. 
628 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 1 above. 
629 See the text to ch 4 part 2 1 below. 
630 Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise 2005 2 SA 
166 (SCA) 25. 
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preferred.631 A literal interpretation in the current instance presents such an uncertain 
premise. A contextual and purposive interpretation on the other hand suggests that 
sections 65 and 20(9) share a similar meaning of the phrases “unconscionable abuse” 
and “gross abuse”.632 
In the present instance the presumption that the same (or substantially the same)633 
words used in the same statute have the same meaning is obviously not applicable. 
However, there is some authority that substantially the same wording used in different 
statutes dealing with the same topic may carry some interpretative weight.634 Context 
is vital when applying this “presumption”.635 A similar context is obviously present in 
sections 20(9) and 65: the purpose of both remedies is to guard against an abuse of 
corporate personality. The context therefore strongly supports application of the 
presumption in this case. Even if this is not done, practical considerations dictate that 
the two provisions be given a similar meaning. A contrary view would give rise to 
illogical results: the corporate personality of a close corporation would be more or less 
penetrable than the corporate personality of a company. There is no legal authority for 
this notion.636  
                                            
631 In the absence of evidence of a deliberate change of expression the presumption that a 
change in language shows to a different meaning cannot be applied: EA Kellaway Principles 
of legal interpretation – Statutes, Contracts & Wills (1995) 365 et seq. 
632 Also see J Roodt “The consequences of the "unconscionable abuse of the company's 
juristic personality" (undated) bbrief.co.za <http://www.bbrief.co.za/resources/articles/new-
companies-act-2008> (accessed 11-09-2012).  
633 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 347. 
634 Kellaway Principles of legal interpretation 364, referring to Zimmerman v Grossman [1971] 
1 All ER 363 369.  
635 Silke (1995) Acta Juridica 138 et seq; Kellaway Principles of legal interpretation 364; Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 18 et seq. 
636 Cassim “Piercing the veil under s 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: A new direction” 
(2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 307 318. See also Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 420 and Cassim 
et al Contemporary Company Law 57. The preamble to the Companies Act also clearly 
expresses the intention of the Companies Act to harmonise the treatment of companies and 
close corporations. It is further significant that the approach in both Airport Cold Storage and 
Die Dros was to use the common law approach as applied to companies in the interpretation 
of s 65, in other words to apply the approach to piercing for companies also to close 
corporations. See also Meskin PM, Galgut B & Kunst JA Henochsberg on the Close 
Corporations Act (2010) n 65.1 where the view is expressed that a court’s jurisdiction to pierce 
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Final authority for the argument that section 20(9) should be interpreted to have the 
same threshold requirement as section 65 (which in turn is interpreted as being the 
legislative equivalent of the historic common law test)637 is the SCA’s comparative 
approach in Ebrahim when comparing section 64 of the Close Corporations Act to 
section 424 of the Repealed Companies Act. Here the Court held that “[t]he case law 
on one provision … illuminates the other.” 638 For section 64 to apply, the “business of 
a corporation … [must be] … carried on recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent 
to defraud …”. In comparison, the Repealed Companies Act in section 424 requires 
the business of a company to be carried on “recklessly or with intent to defraud …”. 
Here the SCA read nothing into the fact that the Close Corporations Act, introduced 
some years after the Repealed Companies Act, had a differently worded section 64 
compared to section 424 of the Repealed Companies Act. Despite the different 
wording the two were considered the same in substance and to apply with the same 
threshold requirement, albeit in different contexts.639 There is no reason why there 
should be a different approach in approaching the application of section 20(9) vis-à-
vis section 65.640  
 
1 1 3 Conclusion on Ex Parte Gore 
While the conclusion in Ex Parte Gore that section 20(9) is supplemental to the 
common law must be agreed with, it is suggested that only the first reason advanced 
for the remedy in section 20(9) being less drastic than the common law remedy is 
valid. Section 20(9) removed a key obstacle to piercing, viz the separation of powers 
                                            
in terms of s 65 is equivalent to that under the common law and further that s 65 has subsumed 
the common law piercing doctrine where close corporations are concerned. 
637 See n 268 above. 
638 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 13. 
639 Also see L & P Plant Hire BK v Bosch 2002 2 SA 662 (SCA) 39. 
640 Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 420. A possible explanation why the term 
“unconscionable” was preferred over “gross” in s 20(9) is that the term “unconscionable” was 
already known in the context of piercing as applied for companies. It is worth noting that 
“unconscionable” is not a new term in the context of piercing. The term has its origin in Botha 
where Flemming J referred to an “onduldbare onreg”, which was subsequently translated by 
Nel J in the Cape Pacific a quo judgment to “unconscionable injustice”. See n 733 below. See 
also the text to ch 4 part 2 4 2 2 below. 
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doctrine. The literal comparison between section 20(9) and section 65 also offered in 
Ex Parte Gore as a second reason for reaching this conclusion does not seem tenable. 
 
2 “Unconscionable abuse” – a statutory interpretive exercise 
2 1 Introduction 
It remains to be considered in what other respect, if any, section 20(9) creates a 
remedy different from that offered by the common law. Once this has been 
established, the possible application of section 20(9) in a tax context will be 
considered. 
Section 19 breathes life into the company and provides it with juristic personality. 
Without it companies would not have existed.641 Yet, “… their separate existence 
remains a figment of law, liable to be curtailed or withdrawn when the objects of their 
creation are abused or thwarted.”642 Until the adoption of the present Companies Act 
such curtailing or withdrawal of the legal existence of companies had no equal in 
legislation compared to the remedy that existed in respect of close corporations.643 
The interpretation of the phrase “unconscionable abuse” is central to the application 
of section 20(9). It provides the key to the future application of the piercing doctrine in 
South Africa since it is also bound to affect the common law approach. The phrase 
has connections to some older cases forming part of the common law644 as well as 
cases involving the Close Corporations Act.645 
Cassim et al rightly identify the vagueness and uncertainty of the meaning of the 
phrase as the “most troublesome aspect of section 20(9)”.646 The enquiry into the 
content of section 20(9) requires a detailed exercise in statutory interpretation, 
something that Ex Parte Gore did not engage in. 
                                            
641 Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 15:  
“Although juristic persons are recognised by the Bill of Rights – they may be bound by its 
provisions and may even receive its benefits – it is an apposite truism that close 
corporations and companies are imbued with identity only by virtue of statute.” 
642 Ebrahim above at para 15. 
643 S 65 of the Close Corporations Act. 
644 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 below. 
645 See the text to ch 4 parts 1 1 2 2 above and 2 3 4 below. 
646 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 60. 
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While the point of departure for statutory interpretation remains the words of the 
particular provision,647 the position in South African law is no longer a question of 
simply attaching the ordinary or literal meaning of words to a specific provision.648 
Nevertheless, it is also not possible to disregard the clear, ordinary meaning of words 
used in a statute and only to have regard to the context and purpose of the provision. 
Rather, the meaning of the words used must be analysed by considering the purpose 
and context in equal measure. One cannot ascertain a meaning by way of a literal 
approach and then merely test this against the purpose and context within which the 
words are used. Context and purpose together are paramount.  
However, interpreting a provision can never be separated from the wording of a 
statute itself. Content must be given to the words used to the extent that the definition 
of the words used permits it, but drawn from the context and purpose within which they 
are used, rather than with reference to a dictionary meaning. 
CSARS v Bosch649 summed up this unitary approach of considering context and 
purpose in the first instance (and not only in instances of ambiguity),650 as follows:  
“The words of the section provide the starting point and are considered in the light of their 
context, the apparent purpose of the provision and any relevant background material.”651 
 
This approach is followed below to ascribe a meaning to the phrase 
“unconscionable abuse”. It has already been shown that a literal interpretation of the 
phrase provides little assistance.652  
                                            
647 Confirmed in City of Tshwane v Marius Blom & GC Germishuizen Inc 2014 1 SA 341 (SCA) 
para 15 and Bothma Batho Transport v S Bothma & Seun Transport 2014 2 SA 494 (SCA) 
para 12. 
648 The so-called “golden rule” of statutory interpretation, as discussed by DV Cowen “The 
interpretation of statutes and the concept of ‘the intention of the legislature’” (1980) 43 THRHR 
374. See also Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 
(SCA) para18 et seq. 
649 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Bosch 2015 2 SA 174 (SCA). 
650 CA Emslie “Income Tax – Deduction of Research and Development Expenditure in terms 
of Section 11D of the Income Tax Act” (2015) 64 The Taxpayer 93. 
651 At para 9. 
652 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 above. 
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The context of the phrase in section 20(9) presents a wide range of factors to 
consider: the provision’s appearance in the Companies Act; the Constitutional context; 
the context within the existing common law framework and the context within the body 
of law concerning piercing in terms of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. 
The interpretive value to be placed on “background material” must, however, also 
be used with circumspection. This material will therefore be considered last to 
determine whether or not it confirms the interpretation offered in this part.653 
 
2 2 Purposive and literal interpretative approach 
It is clear from the wording of section 20(9) that its purpose is to provide a sanction 
against the misuse of corporate personality. The extent of the abuse that must be 
present before invoking the section 20(9) sanction is, however, unclear. While the 
purpose of the provision is obvious, the difficult questions are when such abuse arises 
and when an abuse can be said to be “unconscionable”.  
Section 7(a) of the Companies Act may be appropriately regarded as prescribing a 
purposive approach for the interpretation of the Companies Act as a whole, including 
section 20(9).654 However, all that section 7(a) does is to bring the purposive 
interpretation of section 20(9) within the context of a constitutionally-based 
interpretation, which is dealt with in a contextual interpretive approach.655 Whilst the 
purpose of section 20(9) is clear, its scope of application needs to be determined by 
way of a contextual enquiry. 
A critical analysis of the cursory literal interpretative analysis by Binns-Ward J in Ex 
Parte Gore was done above.656 That analysis showed that a literal interpretation of the 
meaning of “unconscionable” is of limited value when only comparing it to the phrase 
used in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. 
It must be accepted that the only logical manner in which to interpret 
“unconscionable abuse” would be to accept that the separate existence of a company 
                                            
653 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 374. 
654 See J Katzew “Crossing the divide between the business of the corporation and the 
imperatives of human rights – the impact of section 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2011) 
128 SALJ 689.  
655 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 3 below. 
656 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 1 above. 
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may be used for various purposes. This variety of purpose may even extend to 
circumstances not foreseen or intended by the Companies Act, but which may still be 
permissible.657 If this is not the case, the adjective “unconscionable” in section 20(9) 
would be unnecessary. The logical conclusion is that the corporate veil may not be 
used for purposes unforeseen by the Companies Act or to the detriment of others. It 
is therefore possible to use corporate personality for purposes that would have been 
disallowed, had it not been that those purposes would in those circumstances achieve 
an ancillary goal. In instances of limited abuse the use of corporate personality is 
condoned where it achieves an entirely legitimate primary purpose. Using the separate 
corporate personality of a company for such unforeseen purposes may rightly be 
described as a misuse or abuse, since it entails the use of the corporate veil for 
purposes for which the Companies Act did not intend it. Seen in this light 
“unconscionable” denotes more than the use of the corporate veil for an unintended 
purpose. It envisages the abuse of the corporate veil primarily for unintended purposes 
which will simultaneously disadvantage another.658 In this sense the misuse can be 
described as “exorbitant”, “unreasonable” and “unscrupulous”.659 This accords with the 
common law approach which states that the corporate veil cannot simply be pierced 
when it is considered just to do so.660 Disadvantage on its own is insufficient. What 
“unconscionable abuse” in the literal sense does suggest, and which accords with the 
common law approach, is that the corporate veil may be pierced when used primarily 
for purposes unintended by the Companies Act which are also prejudicial to third 
parties. 
                                            
657 See Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 16 where one of 
the uses of a close corporation was described, in the context of piercing, as being “contrived 
but permissible”. 
658 Similar to the common law approach in Hülse-Reutter where the court was only willing to 
pierce in the presence of a person being “unfairly prejudiced” (being but one of the 
requirements listed) as a result of the corporate veil being used by someone else. See text to 
ch 3 part 2 above. Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 34: “The provision 
brings about that a remedy can be provided whenever the illegitimate use of the concept of 
juristic personality adversely affects a third party …” Cf Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law 60. 
659 See the text to n 618 to 620 above. 
660 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552. 
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Separate corporate personality can serve more than one purpose.661 At various 
times the value of the various benefits to a shareholder of separate corporate 
personality could differ. It is therefore seems that the insertion of the word 
“unconscionable” was necessary to ensure that the corporate veil is not pierced in 
circumstances where it is used partly for purposes other than it was intended for,662 
but which are nonetheless acceptable in the context of a legitimate primary purpose.663 
This strongly suggests that an “unconscionable abuse” can only be present if the 
primary purpose of the use amounts to an abuse. 
If it is accepted that the corporate veil was not intended to provide tax benefits,664 
the mere fact that such benefits had been obtained would per definition amount to an 
abuse of corporate personality. To automatically consider such abuse as 
unconscionable though, would be absurd. Where the corporate veil is used for 
legitimate purposes, and a tax benefit arises as a secondary benefit, the ensuing tax 
benefit is a legal consequence of a legitimate transaction, rather than the motive for 
the transaction itself. In such instances using the corporate veil objectively to achieve 
a secondary purpose that the corporate personality doctrine was not designed for 
cannot be said to be “unconscionable”. 
“Unconscionable” therefore involves a subjective test of the purpose or intention 
with which the shareholder in question uses the corporate veil. However, as is clear 
from both the literal definition of the word as well as the comparable phrase found in 
the Afrikaans version of the Companies Act,665 the phrase also has traits of an 
objective test. It is therefore necessary to compare the actions of the shareholder with 
society’s likely view of those actions. This means a value determination of what society 
would regard as being “unreasonable”, “excessive”, or “gewetenloos”.666 The 
                                            
661 See the text to ch 2 parts 2 2 and 2 3 above. 
662 For example, if an otherwise unintended purpose is but a secondary advantage envisaged 
by the shareholders. 
663 This accords with the judgment in CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd [1993] 55 SATC 198 by 
the AD that the firm rule is that every word in a statutory provision must be considered and 
ascribed some meaning; there is a strong presumption against the notion that the legislature 
would have included words in a statute per incuriam. 
664 Which is the conclusion in ch 4 part 4 below. 
665 “gewetenlose misbruik”. 
666 See the text to n 659 and 665 above. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 158 
 
approach is similar to, for example, the test to determine “gross negligence” through 
the application of the “reasonable person” criterion.667 That being said, although it is 
an objective determination whether or not an action would be considered 
“unconscionable”, the test ultimately applied is a subjective one: was what is seen as 
objectively “unconscionable” actually intended?668 This is shown by the various cases 
dealing with the common law piercing doctrine:669 did the shareholder intend to abuse? 
This necessarily includes an enquiry into whether the abuse of the corporate 
personality is so severe that the reasonable person will be unable to reconcile him- or 
herself with the shareholder’s subjective purpose for abusing the corporate form. 
Whether such abuse was severe enough is thus subject to objective considerations.  
Although a literal interpretive approach is not without value,670 the above 
conclusions are by no means final and confirm that the use of a literal interpretation 
only by the court in Ex Parte Gore was inappropriate. As is evident from the discussion 
above the very nature of the word “unconscionable” leads to potentially divergent 
meanings.  
 
                                            
667 Malan discussed by Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 415 in the context of close 
corporations. As concluded in the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 2 above, the approaches under the 
Companies Act and the Close Corporations Act should be aligned. 
668 As was argued in ch 3 above (see especially part 3 3 2 1 thereof) the subjective intention 
for using the corporate veil is of significant importance in the tax avoidance context: the 
doctrine, whether in terms of the common law or s 20(9), can by implication only apply where 
the tax purpose was at least the primary purpose with which the veil is used by the taxpayer 
in question. 
669 This dissertation concludes that s 20(9) is essentially an embodiment of the common law 
piercing doctrine: see the text to ch 4 part 2 5 below. 
670 It is interesting to note the divergent views taken on the literal meaning of the term, further 
confirming that a literal enquiry is of limited use here. Where Ewing and Kleitman for example 
consider the phrase on a literal analysis to introduce a narrower piercing test compared to the 
common law (C Ewing & Y Kleitman “Piercing the corporate veil” (2011) Without prejudice 8-
9). Ex Parte Gore regards the legislative provision as providing for a wider basis on which 
courts would be entitled to pierce.  
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2 3 Contextual approach 
2 3 1 Introduction 
As mentioned above, a contextual interpretive approach to section 20(9), specifically 
the phrase “unconscionable abuse”, holds the key to the meaning of this provision. 
This context includes the common law position on the piercing doctrine as developed 
thus far, the similarly worded section 65 of the Close Corporations Act and section 
20(9)’s context in the Companies Act. All of this must be seen in the broader 
constitutional context. This follows from the judgment of Schreiner JA in Jaga v 
Dönges, NO and another; Bhana v Dönges, NO and another,671 which the SCA 
recently referred to with approval: 
“Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and expressions 
used in a statute must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement 
that they must be interpreted in the light of their context... ‘[T]he context’, as here used, is 
not limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary 
kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its 
apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background.”672 
 
In the various contexts within which section 20(9) is to be interpreted, various 
presumptions of statutory interpretation find potential application. These 
presumptions, although not sufficient on their own to give a definitive meaning to 
section 20(9), provide great assistance, particularly in a contextual approach.  
They are briefly discussed below before applying them in the various contexts 
identified earlier. 
 
2 3 2 The role of presumptions in statutory interpretation 
The presumptions of statutory interpretation that could be used as interpretive tools in 
giving meaning to section 20(9) include the presumption that statute law does not alter 
existing law more than necessary (but also that statutes do not contain purposeless 
or nugatory provisions) that words used by the legislature in more than one statute 
should bear the same meaning and that statute law promotes public interest.  
                                            
671 1950 4 SA 653 (A). 
672 See Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 
421. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 160 
 
Regarding section 20(9) the following issues are pertinent: 
 
 to what extent does the presumption relating to public interest affect the 
contents of section 20(9) when considering the provision in the context of the 
present constitutional dispensation?673 
 does the presumption that similar wording has the same meaning if used in 
a similar statutory context have any influence on the comparison of section 
65 of the Close Corporations Act with section 20(9) of the Companies Act?674 
and 
 is the presumption dealing with the alteration of law applicable when 
considering section 20(9) in the context of the common law, keeping in mind 
that statutes are also presumed not to contain nugatory provisions?675 
 
In this regard the presumptions do seem to have some role to play in a contextual 
interpretative exercise.676 
The role that these presumptions play in our modern constitutionalist era has 
admittedly been questioned.677 However, in the recent Constitutional Court judgment 
in South African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth (“Shuttleworth”)678 the relevance of 
presumptions in the constitutional era received explicit acknowledgment.679 
Although there is a consensus that the presumptions can at most only assist in a 
limited fashion, the dominant view is that they do provide a guide where uncertainty 
                                            
673 See the text to part 2 3 3 of this chapter below. 
674 See the text to ch 4 parts 1 1 2 2 above and 2 3 4 below. 
675 See ch 4 part 2 3 5 below. 
676 See too the view of Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 333 that a 
literalist-cum-intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation would ordinarily seek to 
discount the operation of the presumptions entirely. Here one is dealing with something 
different, viz a contextual approach only. Also see Cowen (1980) THRHR 391 et seq who 
argues for a much more prominent role for the presumptions in our law. 
677 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 333.  
678 2015 5 SA 146 (CC). 
679 116 et seq where Froneman J based an argument solely on the presumption against sub-
delegation. See also the judgment of Ngcobo J in Veldman v Director of Public Prosecutions 
2007 3 SA 210 (CC) para 67, dealing with the presumption against retrospectivity. 
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exists. It is evident from the analysis which follows680 that this remains the case for 
section 20(9), irrespective of whether the relevant canons of statutory interpretation 
have all been applied.681  
The presumptions identified above have a clear role to play in a contextual 
approach to interpretation.  
 
2 3 3 Context within the Companies Act and the constitutional framework 
In considering “unconscionable abuse” “[t]he phrase must ‘take its colour, like a 
chameleon, from its settings and surrounds in the Act’”.682 It is therefore necessary to 
look at the remainder of section 20683 to determine whether anything useful may be 
gleaned therefrom on the contents of section 20(9) or any of the other provisions 
contained in the same part, chapter, or the remainder of the Companies Act.  
When conducting such an analysis, the uncomfortable setting within which the 
subsection finds itself is striking. It does not neatly fit into the theme of section 20, 
which deals with the validity of company actions, as opposed to the dealings of 
shareholders using a company. The same uncomfortable setting was present for 
section 163(4) of the Companies Act. That section previously contained an almost 
identical version of the section 20(9) piercing provision before the Companies 
Amendment Act 3 of 2011684 moved it to section 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
Section 20 addresses the “Validity of company actions”, while section 163 provides 
for the “Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate juristic 
personality of company”. The subsequent moving of the piercing provision under the 
                                            
680 See the text to parts 2 3 3 to 2 3 5 below. 
681 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) para 44; Du Plessis “Statute law and 
interpretation” in LAWSA 333; GE Devenish “African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral 
Commission: The new methodology and theory of statutory interpretation in South Africa” 
(2006) 123 SALJ 399-408 402; A Singh “A re-evaluation of the common law presumptions of 
interpretation in the light of the Constitution” (2012) 75 THRHR 99 et seq. See also Cowen 
(1980) THRHR 391; HS Celliers “Die betekenis van vermoedens by wetsuitleg” (1962) 79 
SALJ 195. 
682 Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise 2005 2 SA 
166 (SCA) para 25, quoting with approval from the dictum in De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for SARS 2002 3 All SA 181 (A).  
683 With the heading “Validity of company actions”. 
684 Effective on 1 May 2011, the same date that the Companies Act became effective. 
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Companies Act appears to have done nothing to alter the content of section 20(9) and 
was merely brought about to facilitate an easier flow to the reading of the Act. The 
uniqueness of the remedy granted by section 20(9) is such that it may have been 
better placed as a separate section in the Companies Act altogether, as is the case 
for its legislated comparative in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. While this 
does not detract from the force of the provision, it also does not shed any light on its 
potential content. 
The obvious conclusion is that very little can be deducted from the physical space 
that the provision occupies in the Companies Act. It is necessary to consider the Act 
holistically and to consider section 20(9) within the context and ambit of what the 
Companies Act seeks to achieve. In this regard, section 5(1) of the Companies Act 
determines that the Act:  
 
“(1) … must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set 
out in section 7.”685 
 
Section 7 prescribes that the Companies Act has as its purpose the promotion of 
compliance with the Bill of Rights in the application of company law.686 This echoes 
the sentiments of section 8(1) of the Constitution that the Bill of Rights applies to all 
law. It also purports to provide a predictable environment for the efficient regulation of 
companies.687 Where piercing in the common law context is concerned, the need for 
legal certainty and the piercing doctrine itself are potentially in conflict with one 
another. As a result of section 7 this conflict also exists in the context of the Companies 
Act: the value-based considerations of the Bill of Rights on the one hand compared to 
the need for legal certainty on the other, the latter being especially relevant in a 
commercial context. The similarity to the common law position is further extended as 
section 7 calls for a balancing approach where the rights and obligations of 
shareholders are concerned, as is the case in the common law context.688 Notably 
                                            
685 See also Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) para 32 which subscribes 
to an approach whereby ss 5 and 7 are consulted to assist in interpreting s 20(9). 
686 S 7(a) of the Companies Act.  
687 S 7(l). 
688 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
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though, section 7 does not imply that potential tax benefits afforded to companies are 
a purpose at which the incorporation of companies under the Companies Act is aimed.  
The Bill of Rights does not address the corporate veil nor the state’s ability to tax 
directly. In this regard one should therefore be careful not to push the constitutional 
argument too far where it is but of limited and indirect application.689 However, as was 
argued in part 3 3 1 2 the Bill of Rights must necessarily play a role in interpreting 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act, in particular the meaning of “unconscionable 
abuse”. Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires this.690 The judgment in Paulsen691 
shows that even in the absence of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights having direct 
application, the Bill of Rights still has an important role to play in the interpretation of 
statutes or the common law.692 
This is especially relevant where matters of policy come into play. The very 
substance of the corporate veil is greatly dependent on the policy considerations 
surrounding its application.693 
In this context, as has been argued is the case at common law,694 the values and 
spirit of the Constitution cannot be said to support the use of a company for tax 
purposes. The Bill of Rights has clear transformational aspirations695 with a focus on 
and clear theme of social justice.696 The Shuttleworth judgment makes it clear that the 
levying of tax is an expression of democratic will.697 The levying of tax therefore 
becomes a constitutional matter and one subject to democratic values. This does not 
                                            
689 See the text to n 521 above and the comments in Zuma above. 
690 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 327. 
691 Paulsen v Slipknot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) 117. 
692 See also Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 474 CC para 28, 484F-485A.  
693 A teleological interpretation is therefore warranted: see Botha Statutory interpretation 143 
et seq; Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 365 et seq. 
694 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
695 South African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth 2015 5 SA 146 (CC) 87. 
696 See specifically ss 25(2) and (4)(b) of the Constitution. 
697 2015 5 SA 146 (CC) para 42:  
“[T]he power to tax residents is an incident of, and subservient to, representative 
democracy. The manner and the extent to which national taxes are raised … must yield to 
the democratic will as expressed in law. It is the people, through their duly elected 
representatives, who decide on the taxes that residents must bear.” 
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conflict with the principle enunciated in Conhage:  
 
“Within the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the relevant legislation, a taxpayer 
may minimise his tax liability by arranging his affairs in a suitable manner. If e g the same 
commercial result can be achieved in different ways, he may enter into the type of 
transaction which does not attract tax or attracts less tax.”698  
 
A taxpayer’s ability to minimise his tax liability must also be exercised within the 
bounds of accepted constitutional norms in the Bill of Rights. Like other legislative 
instruments tax statutes embody the democratic will of the voting public. If the 
arranging of a taxpayer’s affairs involves using a company in a transaction only to 
frustrate the effect of a tax statute such abuse should tip the balance of 
considerations699 in favour of piercing, irrespective of other considerations. 
Taxation is one of the methods with which to promote social cohesion by distributing 
wealth. It is a tool through which Government can exercise legislative power to achieve 
some desirable social objective. It must be recognised that taxation is more than an 
instrument through which the state procures income to enable it to govern. Taxation 
is often used to achieve a secondary allocative, distributive or stabilising purpose 
through which to achieve certain social and economic objectives, objectives often 
mandated by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights itself.700  
Although by no means conclusive, a constitutional approach to the intentional 
avoidance of tax through using the corporate veil must weigh heavily when compared 
to considerations opposed to piercing. The presumption that statute law promotes the 
public interest, linked to section 39 of the Constitution, underscores this.701 
Section 158 of the Companies Act supports the constitutional approach discussed 
here. It encourages courts to adopt a wider rather than a narrow interpretive approach 
when interpreting the Act.702 The courts are mandated to develop the common law 
and to promote, inter alia, the purposes of the Act. In this context section 7(b)(iii), (d) 
                                            
698 [1999] 61 SATC 391 1. 
699 1. As referred to by Domanski. 
700 J Murphy “The Constitutional Review of Taxation” (1995) Acta Juridica 89-122. 
701 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 336; Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 124 
et seq. 
702 Devenish (2006) SALJ 401. 
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and (e) are relevant indicators of the social purpose that the company should seek to 
achieve. It is this purpose and the social contract between society and the company, 
in terms of which companies both directly and indirectly are meant to benefit society,703 
which shareholders abuse if the separate existence of the company is used primarily 
for tax purposes. 
Section 20(9) would therefore deem it more than a mere “ordinary” abuse of legal 
personality of a company if that separate personality is used for tax purposes. This 
conclusion is based on a consideration of section 7(a) of the Companies Act 
specifically, together with policy considerations and the values which section 39 of the 
Constitution aims to promote. Admittedly, it is by no means clear from either the 
constitutional approach or the Companies Act alone that any identified instance of 
abuse should be considered “unconscionable”. The constitutional approach only 
provides further context within which a court in exercising its discretion to pierce must 
consider public policy.704 It falls short though of giving an unambiguous meaning to the 
phrase “unconscionable abuse”. The meaning of this phrase becomes much clearer 
when one considers section 65 of the Close Corporations Act as well as the common 
law context. 
 
2 3 4 Context within the legal framework of section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 
Contrary to the suggestion in Ex Parte Gore,705 any interpretation of “unconscionable 
abuse” as used in the Companies Act should in my view keep the approach to the 
phrase “gross abuse” in the Close Corporations Act in mind.  
The view has been advanced throughout this dissertation that the common law 
piercing test necessarily contains a subjective requirement.706 In other words, the veil 
can only be pierced if the shareholder intentionally abused the separate corporate 
personality of the company.707 This is in line with the cases dealing with section 65 of 
                                            
703 Katzew (2011) SALJ 692 et seq. 
704 See the text to ch 4 part 3 2 below. 
705 See the text to part 1 1 2 2 of this chapter above. 
706 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 and ch 3 parts 3 3 2 1 and 3 3 2 4 above. 
707 Flemming J did not use the term “onduldbare onreg” above in the subjective sense. Now 
though, through the translation which the term has undergone before being legislated, both 
the English (“unconscionable abuse”) version of the Companies Act and the Afrikaans 
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the Close Corporations Act which strongly suggests that the common law remedy and 
section 65 are aligned in this respect. In TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du 
Plessis708 Hattingh R determined that the relevant member’s actions were done “met 
een doel voor oë”.709 In the a quo judgment in Airport Cold Storage Griesel J held that 
the members “chose” to ignore the separate corporate personality of the relevant close 
corporation when it suited them.710 In Mncube v District Seven Property Investments 
CC711 it was determined that abuse of the corporate veil would involve it being used 
for a “nefarious purpose”. Admittedly, in Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe712 the 
                                            
(“gewetenlose misbruik” translated back to Afrikaans from “unconscionable abuse”) translation 
suggest, on a literal interpretation at least, that a subjective approach should be followed, if 
only at least in part but a requirement nonetheless. With reference to the origins of the term, 
one may be tempted to suggest that, given the origin of the term in the judgment of Flemming 
J (and regarded as being “too rigid” in Cape Pacific), that the choice of the phrase 
“unconscionable abuse” in s 20(9) may be an expression by the legislature that the piercing 
test should be applied in this rigid sense. Such an argument will however be incorrect – see n 
36 of Ex Parte Gore. The phrase “unconscionable injustice” has been used in an entirely 
different context by the courts than is the case now for the phrase used in s 20(9): the former 
relates to the consequence of certain conduct, whereas s 20(9) would refer to the conduct 
giving rise to the remedy (as opposed to the consequence thereof). 
708 1998 1 SA 971 (O). 
709 985 and 986. 
710 2008 2 SA 303 (C) para 78. The facts of the case were briefly that a father and son were 
the respondents facing applications in terms of ss 63, 64 or 65 of the Close Corporations Act 
(all of these provisions effectively amounting to piercing in varying circumstances). In terms 
thereof an application was brought to have the two individuals held personally liable for the 
debts of a close corporation. The application was successful, based on s 65. On appeal to the 
SCA the appeal was rejected and the a quo judgment upheld, but based on s 64. The list of 
objective factors mentioned in the a quo judgment in support of the application for piercing in 
terms of s 65 may cast doubt on whether the subjective intention was decisive in arriving at 
the court’s conclusion that piercing was an appropriate remedy in that instance. Even though 
the judgment was upheld on appeal to the SCA in Ebrahim, it is then significant, that the order 
was maintained, though in terms of s 64 and no longer s 65. Since the order of the court a quo 
was left undisturbed by the SCA, the court may have felt disinclined to address whether the 
piercing remedy may have been more appropriate in terms of s 64. A similar example of the 
most appropriate piercing provision perhaps not being utilised, is to be found in Haygro 
Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 (C): see the text to n 713 below.  
711 [2006] JOL 17381 (D) 15. 
712 Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 (C). 
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court appears to have considered only objective factors in applying section 65. The 
reliance on objective factors in this judgment has, however, been questioned, 
particularly whether section 65 was the appropriate provision in terms of which to 
effectively pierce the corporate veil.713 Considering that both the section 65 remedy 
and the common law doctrine714 clearly involve a subjective test and further that the 
phrase used in section 20(9) has its roots in the common law and a clear connection 
with section 65, it is suggested that the same approach must be taken in respect of 
section 20(9). “Unconscionable” must therefore be determined with reference to the 
subjective intent with which the abuse is exercised. 
A further important observation from a study of the reported cases dealing with the 
piercing of close corporations is that section 65 appears to have, at least in practice, 
usurped the role of the common law.715 In none of these reported cases have the 
courts sought to apply the common law remedy as alternative to the remedy in section 
65 of the Close Corporations Act. Since the Close Corporations Act has a legislated 
piercing remedy in place which mirrors the common law doctrine’s content,716 it means 
that practically section 65 would be the preferred method to pierce the corporate veil 
of a close corporation. While the common law doctrine may continue to exist in theory 
in the close corporation context, it does so together with the remedy in section 65. 
A natural conclusion is that the same approach should be applied to the relationship 
of section 20(9) of the Companies Act and the common law remedy: the former is 
largely the legislated replica of the latter.717 As was the case for close corporations, 
                                            
713 Meskin et al Henochsberg on the Close Corporations Act n 65.4 where the view is 
expressed that the corporate veil should rather here have been pierced in terms of s 63(a) or 
alternatively 64, and that the application of s 65 here may have been inappropriate. See also 
Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 419. 
714 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 above. 
715 See also Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 417 (and 420) who agree with this approach 
where the interaction between s 65 and the common law was at stake, as well as Botha v Van 
Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 164 referred to there as authority for the view taken. 
716 See text to n 715 above. See also Airport Cold Storage at para 24. 
717 Other than potentially that the one remedy having wider or narrower application than the 
other (which it is maintained is not the case), no other divergent principles exist between the 
two remedies. It follows that, if s 20(9) would apply to broader set of facts, the common law 
remedy would be rendered powerless, as it can never remedy any situation where s 20(9) 
would not also apply. If it were argued that s 20(9) has narrowed the scope of piercing, 
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the enactment of a statutory piercing doctrine of general application should not be 
regarded as an indication of an intentional departure from the position that pre-existed 
under the common law.718 Section 20(9) was not intended to substitute the common 
law doctrine. It should rather be regarded as the legislated equivalent of that remedy, 
supplementing it yet without changing the substantive requirements thereof.719 For 
South African common law purposes though, even though the common law and 
section 20(9) piercing remedies will co-exist, the practical effect is bound to be that the 
common law remedy will practically no longer serve much of a purpose, simply since 
the two remedies are in substance the same.720 Ex Parte Gore illustrates this well: a 
piercing application was brought in terms of the common law, alternatively in terms of 
section 20(9). By granting relief in terms of section 20(9), and not in terms of the relief 
requested in first instance, the court effectively found the two remedies to be 
substantially the same. 
The wording of section 20(9) suggests that the piercing remedy in this provision will 
not be rigid, but will be developed in the same way, as the common law remedy.721 
The vagueness of the literal interpretation of the abstract phrase “unconscionable 
abuse” will enable the courts to develop the piercing doctrine continuously within the 
context of ever-changing policy considerations.722 Where it had previously been done 
in order to develop the common law, it will in future happen as part of a statutory 
interpretive process to contextualise this “open-ended concept”.723  
                                            
compelling arguments would exist that this was done purposefully and in line with the 
presumption that statutes do not contain purposeless or nugatory provisions – legislation 
trumps the common law (Botha Statutory interpretation 43). Also see Kellaway Principles of 
legal interpretation 360 et seq. 
718 See Airport Cold Storage where the court uses the common law principles developed thus 
far to inform the contents of “gross abuse”.  
719 See Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 34; Nel (2014) Obiter 575; 
Smith (2016) JJS 71. 
720 See the one exception noted in ch 4 part 3 4 below as well as those instances where s 
20(9) will be supplemental to the common law remedy (see the text to ch 4 part 3 5 2 below). 
721 See the text to ch 4 par 2 3 5 below. 
722 Ch 4 part 3 2 below. 
723 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 2008 2 SA 303 (C) para 24. 
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One has to conclude therefore that the two tests contained in section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act and section 65 of the Close Corporations Act have the same 
meaning.724 This means that section 20(9) involves a subjective enquiry into the 
intention with which the separate corporate personality of the company is being 
abused, as is the case in section 65. This is an important conclusion in a tax avoidance 
context.725 
It is interesting to note Larkin’s prophetic words in 1989 that section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act could very well act as the forerunner for a legislated equivalent in the 
Companies Act at some stage in the future.726 He was also clear in his correct analysis 
that section 65 replaced the common law piercing doctrine where close corporations 
are concerned. The time has indeed now arrived where the statutory provision in 
section 20(9) has practically usurped much of the common law piercing doctrine,727 
but without replacing it. Legislating the remedy may have its advantages, but as Larkin 
rightly pointed out, the risk is that it may bring along an element of rigidity.728 For a 
common law doctrine such as piercing, rigidity is bound to render the provision archaic 
over time if it is unable to adapt with the ever-changing nature of society’s commercial 
needs. This will be the challenge for our courts: to continue developing the doctrine 
even in its legislated form in order to maintain the doctrine’s relevance. The provision 
in its current form fortunately provides enough manoeuvring space for the courts to 
develop the doctrine.729 
Rigidity, according to Larkin, is bound to set in if section 20(9) is interpreted in an 
overly technical manner. This demands a pragmatic approach to the interpretation of 
section 20(9), requiring it to be interpreted as having the same meaning as section 65 
                                            
724 See also ch 4 part 2 4 2 2 below: the drafting history of s 20(9) betrays that the provision 
was meant to have the same effect as s 65 of the Close Corporations Act. Contra Ex Parte 
Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) para 34 where Binns-Ward J obiter comments 
that the test in the Close Corporations Act has a more “extreme connotation” to it compared 
to the test in s 20(9).  
725 See the text to ch 4 part 4 below. 
726 Larkin (1989) SA Merc LJ 280. 
727 See also the text to ch 4 part 2 5 below; Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 
(WCC) para 32. 
728 See also Cassim et al The Law of Business Structures 71. 
729 See the text to ch 4 part 3 2 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 170 
 
(in the context of companies as opposed to close corporations). As has been shown, 
section 20(9) is to be regarded as the equivalent of the pre-Companies Act common 
law doctrine.730 This does not signal the demise of the piercing doctrine.731 Rather, it 
continues to exist substantially unchanged,732 but its practical use is bound to be 
extremely limited in future.  
  
2 3 5 Context within the common law 
“Unconscionable”, as appearing in the Companies Act, seems to have been borrowed 
from the common law judgments on the piercing of companies. It is thus a familiar 
term in the piercing context,733 even though the contents thereof have developed over 
time. 
South African courts have thus far only considered section 20(9) in detail once, and 
that was in Ex Parte Gore.734 The conclusion reached in this dissertation regarding the 
interplay between the common law and section 20(9) is confirmed in that case.735 It 
was concluded there that the common law test was not replaced, but rather that 
section 20(9) applies concurrently with it and operates in a supplemental fashion. 
The fact that the relief granted in Ex Parte Gore was in terms of the alternative relief 
requested under section 20(9) gives context to Binns-Ward J’s dictum that section 
20(9) is “supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive”. This may seem 
to contradict the afore-mentioned dictum, but it shows that section 20(9) is not meant 
to vary the common law doctrine by replacing it with a new and different test. It keeps 
the common law remedy intact. Seen in this light, the question whether the common 
                                            
730 See also the conclusions at ch 4 part 2 4 2 2 below where this conclusion is supported by 
the drafting history of s 20(9). 
731 See the text to ch 4 part 2 4 below. It remains the only remedy in terms of which a court 
can pierce a foreign incorporated company. 
732 See the text to ch 4 parts 2 2 to 2 5 below. 
733 Refer the discussion in ch 4 parts 1 1 2 2 and 2 3 4 above on the translation by Nel J in 
Cape Pacific a quo of Flemming J’s “onduldbare onreg” in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 
157 (W) to “unconscionable injustice”. 
734 See the text to parts 4 1 1 and 4 1 2 above. 
735 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) paras 31, 32 and 34 and discussed 
in the text to ch 4 part 1 1 above. 
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law piercing doctrine still exists becomes largely academic if the requirements and 
outcome of both remedies are similar.736 
Although Ex Parte Gore is the only example of a direct consideration of section 
20(9), the SCA has also expressed itself obiter on the matter. In WT v KT the court 
compared the divergent approaches that may underlie “looking behind the veneer of 
a trust” and “piercing the corporate veil”. The court concluded: 
 
“By analogous reasoning, unconscionable abuse of the trust form through fraud, dishonesty 
or an improper purpose will justify looking behind the trust form.”737 [own emphasis] 
 
It is significant that the SCA used this specific wording.738 Applying it to a company, 
piercing of the corporate veil will be justified where an unconscionable abuse of it is 
perpetrated by means of fraud, dishonesty or with an improper purpose. 
It confirms that piercing can only be justified where an unconscionable abuse is 
present, that is abuse which has arisen through fraud, dishonesty or improper 
purpose.739 Although the discussion of the common law piercing doctrine in chapter 3 
has shown that there are many more considerations linked to the doctrine than merely 
determining when an act will qualify as “fraud, dishonesty or other improper 
conduct”,740 this statement clearly indicates that the SCA would regard section 20(9) 
                                            
736 Contra Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 58, published though before the 
judgment in Ex Parte Gore. See also Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases at 
“Interested Person” that s 20(9) has broadened the common law remedy. 
737 WT v KT 2015 3 SA 574 (SCA) para 31. 
738 Smith (2016) JJS 75. 
739 In the company law context this is an obvious reference to the test proposed by the same 
court in Cape Pacific. The approach is consistent with that proposed by Steyn Die Uitleg van 
Wette 100 where he explains the rule with reference to Donellus De Jure Civili 1 15 8 and 
Glück Pandecten, 1: 390:  
“Regsterme in ‘n wet gebruik, put hul inhoud uit die gemene reg waaruit hul afkomstig is, 
en indien ‘n woord of uitdrukking in ‘n wet ‘n onduidelike, maar in die gemene reg ‘n 
duidelike betekenis het, word die gemeenregtelike betekenis daaraan toegeskryf.” 
740 The role of policy considerations in determining whether the remedy is only available as a 
final one is discussed in part 3 3 2 2 of this chapter below. 
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as inextricably linked to the common law test enunciated in Cape Pacific.741 It confirms 
that the Cape Pacific test is still valid and currently the test to be applied in terms of 
section 20(9).  
The “unconscionable abuse” test in terms of section 20(9) is – as was the case with 
for the common law test742 – necessarily a subjective one. The SCA emphasised this 
in WT v KT, referring not to “improper conduct” as was done in Cape Pacific, but 
rather to an “improper purpose”. This is a clear endorsement that the subjective intent 
or purpose of a shareholder abusing the corporate veil is a necessary factor to enable 
a court to pierce in terms of section 20(9). It is unfortunate that Binns-Ward J in Ex 
Parte Gore appeared to be willing to pierce the veil only based on objective criteria.743 
The approach is not correct and the reference to Ebrahim’s case as justification is 
misplaced. In Ebrahim the SCA dealt exclusively with the provisions of section 64 of 
the Close Corporations Act and not section 65 as the a quo judgment had. The SCA’s 
judgment strongly suggests that the court purposefully preferred to apply section 64 
given the objective considerations at play, rather than section 65 on which the a quo 
judgment relied.744 It is submitted that any piercing according to section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act,745 section 20(9) of the Companies Act746 or the common law747 
necessarily involves a subjective enquiry. 
The conclusion is therefore that the threshold requirement for piercing in terms of 
the common law is also the test applied to piercing in terms of section 20(9). At 
common law, once fraud, dishonesty or an improper purpose is shown to be present, 
policy and other considerations come into play. This too is the case with section 20(9), 
                                            
741 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 above. Contra Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All 
SA 437 (WCC) para 33 which suggests that there are many more bases on which to pierce in 
terms of s 20(9) when compared to the traditional common law approach. 
742 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 above. 
743 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) para 33. The willingness to pierce 
on objective criteria alone is based on the principles of the alter ego doctrine cautioned against 
in the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above. It is suggested that objective criteria are not enough for 
piercing to be applied, subjective criteria also need to be involved. 
744 See the text to n 710 above. 
745 See the text to part 2 3 4 above. 
746 See the text to part 2 3 3 above. 
747 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 and ch 3 parts 3 3 2 1 and 3 3 2 4 above. 
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which provides that a court “may”748 pierce the veil in instances of unconscionable 
abuse.749  
It remains to refer briefly to the presumptions of statutory interpretation. Two 
presumptions are of particular relevance in this regard. They are the presumption that 
the legislature does not intend to vary existing law more than is necessary and that 
legislation does not contain nugatory or futile provisions. 
Applied to section 20(9) it appears at first sight as though these two presumptions 
may be in conflict with each other. On the one hand there is the presumption that 
section 20(9) is nothing but the legislated equivalent of the common law position. On 
the other hand the second presumption would have it that the introduction of section 
20(9) must have changed the scope of the common law doctrine. Nevertheless, it is 
possible for the two to be reconciled. 
Section 20(9) is essentially the statutory version of the common law doctrine, both 
in its current application as well as in its ability to evolve in line with changing policy 
considerations. The presumption that the legislature does not intend to vary the law 
more than is necessary750 fits in well with this view. A clear departure from the 
prevailing position is required to avoid the application of the presumption. No such 
clear departure is present in section 20(9) and the piercing remedy in section 20(9) 
must therefore be interpreted in line with the existing common law remedy.751  
However, honouring the presumption that a statutory provision does not impose 
more change than is necessary, does not mean that the provisions of section 20(9) 
can be regarded as nugatory. Particularly in view of the uncertainty in which the 
remedy is shrouded (and recent doubt in some jurisdictions even about its 
                                            
748 As opposed to “must”. 
749 See 4 3 2 below. 
750 Which exists to promote legal certainty and esteem for the common law. 
751 Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 97 et seq, quoting exhaustively from the old Dutch authorities. 
“Die bedoeling om die gemenereg te verbeter moet, soos P Voet sê, blyk uit ‘n uitdruklike 
bepaling, of ipso facto, dit wil sê uit dwingende veronderstellings uit die wet self afgelei word.” 
See also the various other authorities and case law discussed there as further authority. Also 
see Botha Statutory interpretation 78; Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 
340; Kellaway Principles of legal interpretation 335 and 357 et seq; Silke (1995) Acta Juridica 
134 et seq. 
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existence),752 it is to be welcomed that the South African legislature has expressed 
itself in favour of the remedy. Section 20(9)’s clarification of ancillary matters (such as 
whether the piercing remedy is a remedy of last resort)753 also counters the argument 
that interpreting section 20(9) in line with the existing common law renders it effectively 
purposeless. The presumption that statutory law is not purposeless or nugatory must 
be regarded as having been rebutted in this case.754 
It follows that the common law presumptions support the argument that 
“unconscionable abuse” in section 20(9) should be interpreted in line with the pre-
existing common law threshold requirement, viz the presence of fraud, dishonesty or 
an improper purpose. 
 
2 4 Background material 
It remains to consider whether the conclusion in the previous paragraph will also be 
justified if one has regard to the “relevant background material”.755 
Du Plessis considers background material to have a confirmatory function at most 
and that it should be used with circumspection.756 In the present context this is 
uncontentious since a contextual interpretative approach already points to the 
meaning that should be attached to “unconscionable abuse”.757 
The Constitutional Court758 decided in Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) 
                                            
752 See for example the UK Supreme Court judgment in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 2013 
UKSC 34. 
753 See the text to ch 3 part 2 below. 
754 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 342; Botha Statutory interpretation 
133; Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 119. 
755 See Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Bosch 2015 2 SA 174 (SCA) 
para 9; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 18 
and Jaga v Dönges, NO and another; Bhana v Dönges, NO and another 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 
421 (referred to with approval in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund). 
756 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 374. 
757 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 above. 
758 After leaving the question open in S v Makwanyane 1955 3 SA 391 (CC) para 19. It was 
decided there at para 18 that undisputed, clear and relevant background material (even if not 
a report of a judicial commission of enquiry) may be useful as interpretive aid in constitutional 
matters. 
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Ltd759 that background material may be used to inform the interpretation of non-
constitutional statutory provisions too.760 The SCA in Krok v CSARS761 applied this 
view. In Krok it was said that the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa is 
akin to that set out in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Article 32 makes it clear that the preliminary work in preparation of a treaty 
– which is in essence a statutory instrument – may be considered to confirm an 
interpretation through the application of the prescribed unitary interpretative 
method.762 This method is also used in this dissertation in relation to section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act.763 The question is whether the background material to the 
Companies Act, section 20(9) in particular, supports the conclusion that the common 
law piercing doctrine gives meaning to “unconscionable abuse”. 
 
2 4 1 Background to the adoption of the Companies Act: the context of section 20(9) 
The Companies Act of 2008 was not meant to radically change all aspects of South 
African company law. This is clear from the policy document on corporate law reform 
released by the Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”) in 2004.764 The Companies 
Act in its current form which in many places retained the principles contained in the 
Repealed Companies Act of 1973, supports this. Where a direct departure from the 
previous dispensation is not apparent, the common law remains. This also applies to 
the piercing doctrine. There is no evidence of any direct policy decision on whichever 
level to purposefully alter the pre-existing common law in this area. 
                                            
759 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) paras 200 and 201. 
760 See Mansingh v General Council of the Bar 2014 1 BCLR 85 (CC) paras 26 to 28 and the 
reference there to Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund; Kellaway Principles of legal 
interpretation 276. 
761 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA) para 27. See also the extensive background material relied upon by 
the court in Pienaar Bothers (Pty) Ltd v CSARS HC case no 87760/2014 of 29-05-2014 para 
33 to assist with a contextual statutory interpretative exercise. 
762 See the dictum in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 quoted in Bothma Batho 
Transport v S Bothma & Seun Transport 2014 2 SA 494 (SCA) para 12. 
763 Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 134 no longer reflects the current position in South African law. 
764 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform 
GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-2004 3.3 (27). 
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This is not true of indirect impacts. Olson765 points to the emergence of the 
stakeholder model as part of the present Companies Act and how this model is playing 
a bigger part in the interpretation of the Companies Act of 2008.766 
This should also inform the manner in which section 20(9) should be approached, 
especially in the context of tax avoidance. Whereas shareholders may in the past have 
been able to argue that – in keeping with the shareholder model – the company is a 
creature created for their use and profit maximisation only (which would be promoted 
by paying less tax), this is no longer the case. If it is accepted that the use of a company 
mainly for tax purposes amounts at a minimum to the abuse of legal personality,767 
such abuse in terms of the stakeholder model clearly leans more, rather than less, to 
being “unconscionable”. 
Seen in this context, section 20(9) provides a remedy of potentially wider application 
in the tax context compared to the common law developed when the Repealed 
Companies Act was still in effect.768 This is not to say that piercing should now be 
applied liberally. Such an approach will detract from the purpose that the company as 
legal person is meant to serve. Although the stakeholder model changes the 
understanding of the company form, the Companies Act as a whole in principle still 
subscribes to the shareholder primacy model. The influence of the stakeholder model 
                                            
765 Olson “South Africa moves to a global model of corporate governance but with important 
national variations” (2010) Acta Juridica 219 220 et seq. Olson was a member of the 
international team engaged as part of the company law reform process. 
766 Also see s 7 of the Companies Act which contains clear evidence hereof. S 20(9) itself, as 
well as ss 165(2)(c) and (d), further serve as examples. The requirement in s 72(4) for bigger 
companies to have a social and ethics committee is a further example of a nuanced inclination 
towards the stakeholder model as opposed to the strict shareholder model. Olson (2010) Acta 
Juridica 222 also refers to Elkington’s “triple bottom line” approach, adopted by the King II and 
III reports on corporate governance and expressly subscribed to by Government (South 
African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform GN 1183 in 
GG 26493 of 23-06-2004 3.2.3). It is clear from these Guidelines that a definitive policy shift 
towards the stakeholder model was intended. The King IV Report on Corporate Governance 
for South Africa 2016 23 et seq not only considers it necessary that a company’s tax strategy 
and policy should be in line with wider stakeholder considerations, but also that specifically 
tax strategy and policy should be the responsibility of the governing body and audit committee 
of a company. 
767 See the text to ch 4 part 2 2 above. 
768 Ch 3. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 177 
 
does shift policy considerations in a direction in which the intentional avoidance of tax 
can increasingly be regarded “unconscionable” and a justifiable ground on which a 
court may apply section 20(9).  
 
2 4 2 Background to the adoption of section 20(9): its purpose  
2 4 2 1  International influence 
When looking at the law reform process that culminated in the Companies Act of 2008, 
the role of international corporate law advisors is striking. This points to the possibility 
that the wording of section 20(9) too may have its origin in foreign company law. The 
international involvement comprised mainly legal experts from Canada, the UK and 
the USA.769 The significant American influence in the drafting of the Act is 
foreshadowed in the DTI policy document which contains extensive referencing to the 
USA experience.770 The significant foreign influence in the drafting process is also 
shown by the fact that the chief drafter of the Companies Act, Mr Phillip Knight, was 
from Canada.771 
It is therefore necessary to investigate whether company legislation from 
particularly the USA, Canada and the UK contain comparable provisions to our section 
20(9) and, if so, how these are applied in their country of origin. 
The USA does not have a federal corporate law system and laws governing 
companies fall under the jurisdiction of each state. Apart from the approach adopted 
by states generally, it is necessary also to consider the company law in the State of 
Delaware specifically, which does not use of the Model Business Corporation Act.772 
                                            
769 TH Mongalo “An overview of company law reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to 
the Companies Act 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica xiii reports that the initial round table 
discussions held on 11 July 2003, and which formally marked the launch of the company law 
reform process, included several participants from the USA and the UK. This group was to 
expand further in the coming years to include other international experts, notably from Canada. 
These individuals would make up the international reference team which, together with the 
local reference team, advised the drafting team. 
770 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform 
GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-2004. 
771 Mongalo (2010) Acta Juridica xv. 
772 (Revised 2010) (“Model Business Corporation Act”), which states generally apply.  
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Not only is the State of Delaware the most popular jurisdiction in the USA for 
incorporating companies, but it is also relevant due to its perceived status as a tax 
haven.773 
The general position regarding limited liability in the USA is set out in section 6.22(b) 
of the Model Business Corporation Act which provides that: 
 
“Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a 
corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that 
he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.” 
 
Although broad piercing provisions do exist in Delaware, none of them goes as far 
as section 20(9) and none can be applied to counter abuse for tax purposes.774  
For example, while section 325 of the State of Delaware’s General Corporation 
Law775 envisages piercing, it stops short of providing any grounds, notably tax related 
grounds, upon which the corporate veil may be pierced: 
 
“(a)  When the officers, directors or stockholders of any corporation shall be liable 
by the provisions of this chapter to pay the debts of the corporation, or any part 
thereof, any person to whom they are liable may have an action, at law or in 
equity, against any 1 or more of them, and the complaint shall state the claim 
against the corporation, and the ground on which the plaintiff expects to charge 
the defendants personally. 
 
 (b)  No suit shall be brought against any officer, director or stockholder for any debt 
of a corporation of which such person is an officer, director or stockholder, until 
judgment be obtained therefor against the corporation and execution thereon 
returned unsatisfied.” 
 
                                            
773 See JG Gravelle “Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion” (23-01-2013) 
Congressional Research Service <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf> (accessed 
12-06-2013). 
774 While some states also provide for so-called “pass-through entities” for tax purposes (S 
Corporations in North Carolina and Delaware being examples), these hybrid entities are not 
considered in this research: CCH State tax Guide – all states vol 1 (2010, updated 2013) 
(Loose leaf publication). 
775 (Revised 2013) Title 8, Ch 1, revised 2013. 
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In the context of a so-called “professional corporation” section 608 of the same 
Act776 limits the grounds for piercing to acts carried out in the exercise of the 
profession: 
 
“Any officer, employee, agent or shareholder of a professional corporation shall remain 
personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent, wrongful acts, or 
misconduct committed by such person, or by any person under such person's direct 
supervision and control, while rendering professional services on behalf of the 
professional corporation to the person for whom such professional services were being 
rendered.” 
 
In Canada, the Canadian Business Corporations Act of 1985777 contains a 
potentially wide-ranging provision aimed at providing relief for acts that are “oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial”:778  
 
“If, on an application under subsection (1), the court is satisfied that in respect of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates 
 
(a)  any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates effects a 
result, 
(b)  the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its affiliates are or 
have been carried on or conducted in a manner, or 
(c)  the powers of the directors of the corporation or any of its affiliates are 
or have been exercised in a manner 
 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of 
any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order to rectify 
the matters complained of.” 
 
It is unclear though whether this provision would allow for piercing as a relief as 
such, let alone piercing being applied to counter the intentional avoidance of tax as 
contemplated in this dissertation.779 It in any case seems to be related to our section 
163 rather than section 20(9). 
                                            
776 Title 8, Ch 6.  
777 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44. 
778 S 241(2) of the Canadian Business Corporations Act. 
779 No similar provision is contained in the Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-32. 
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A further relevant provision is article 317 of the Civil Code of Québec:  
 
“The juridical personality of a legal person may not be invoked against a person in 
good faith so as to dissemble fraud, abuse of right or contravention of a rule of public 
order.”780 
 
As is the case with section 241(2) of the Canadian Business Corporation Act, article 
317 of the Civil Code of Québec too is not as far-reaching as the provisions of our 
section 20(9). 
 A corresponding provision to section 20(9) could also not be found in the UK 
Companies Act of 2006.781 
Although the foreign legislation studied to a lesser or greater extent does contain 
focused piercing provisions, none of them is of such a potentially sweeping nature as 
section 20(9). And since the term “unconscionable abuse” could not be traced to any 
foreign statutes, the South African provision seems to be of local origin. Foreign 
company law therefore provides little assistance in the interpretation of section 20(9), 
save for the indirect role which it played in the development of the common law 
piercing doctrine782 that in turn shaped the approach to section 20(9).783 
 
2 4 2 2  History of the drafting of section 20(9) 
The domestic roots of section 20(9) and how it was introduced into the Companies Act 
of 2008 remain to be considered.  
Although it has been established that “background material” may be used as a help 
to statutory interpretation784 the use of extrinsic evidence of the drafting process in the 
form of parliamentary debates and reports is particularly controversial. It is suggested 
such evidence is to be applied with particular circumspection and with limited for 
referring thereto: not to ascribe a meaning to “unconscionable abuse” as such, but 
                                            
780 CQLR c C-1991. 
781 2006 C 46. 
782 S 5(2) of the Companies Act providing that “[t]o the extent appropriate, a court interpreting 
or applying [the Companies Act] may consider foreign company law”, does not have a direct 
bearing on the interpretation of s 20(9). 
783 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 above. 
784 See the text to ch 4 part 2 4 above. 
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rather to give context to this phrase. Put differently, the parliamentary drafting process 
is considered not in order to pin a specific part of such deliberations to a phrase. It 
rather informs the broader context of the provision to determine whether it supports or 
derogates from the conclusions reached thus far. 
Neither the memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill 2008785 nor the 
memorandum on the objects of the Companies Amendment Bill of 2010786 addresses 
the provision, first introduced as section 163(4) and later moved almost verbatim and 
renumbered as section 20(9).787  
Although by no means conclusive, the limited attention that the provision received 
throughout the drafting process suggests that the provision was not considered a 
deviation from the existing legal position at the time. If this had been the case, one 
would have expected an explanation in the supplementary material to the Companies 
Act and Companies Amendment Act. 
Section 163(4) further did not form part of the Draft Companies Bill 2007788 or of the 
Bill789 introduced to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on 25 
June 2008. As appears from the minutes of the Portfolio Committee’s final meeting on 
the Bill held on 28 August 2008,790+791 section 163(4) was only introduced there at that 
very late stage and as part of the proposed amendments by the DTI. 
The deliberations of that Portfolio Committee meeting were the only discussions 
forming part of the parliamentary process on what was then section 163(4). No 
minutes of meetings indicate that the provision was discussed at any other Portfolio 
                                            
785 B61-D 2008. 
786 B40-B 2010. 
787 See the Companies Amendment Act. S 20 addresses the “Validity of company actions” 
whilst s 163 provides for the “Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of 
separate juristic personality of company”. The subsequent moving of the piercing provision 
does not in any way detract from that provision’s validity or potential application and appears 
to have been merely brought about as an attempt at a more logical grouping of the provisions 
of the Companies Act. 
788 Presented on 10 May 2007 during a workshop by the Department of Trade and Industry to 
the Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee. 
789 Certified as at 18 June 2008 without being introduced. 
790 Companies Bill [B61-2008]. 
791 Which Bill was finalised without any further changes or debates on s 163(4), passed by 
Parliament subsequently and signed into law on 8 April 2009. 
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Committee meeting or that it was the subject of debate in either the National Assembly 
or the National Council of Provinces. It is therefore important to take note of the only 
limited discussion and rather crude analysis of the provision at the deliberations at that 
final Committee meeting held on 28 August 2008 as recorded in its minutes: 
 
“Clause 63 
Mr Sibanda792 read out the proposed amendment to the clause. He explained that this 
provision would ensure that no person could use the company as a shield. 
 
In response to questions, chiefly from Mr Labuschagne,793 Mr Dwinger794 gave as examples 
of what was intended, companies not paying their creditors and their directors relying on 
the limited liability provision to escape paying the creditors personally. 
 
Mr Netshitenzhe795 explained that this was in line with a recent court decision regarding a 
close corporation where the members of the defaulting close corporation had been held 
personally liable for the debts of the close corporation.”796 [own emphasis] 
 
The above can certainly not be considered a technical analysis of what is now 
section 20(9). It further betrays very little of the reasoning behind the introduction of 
the legislative piercing provision. The reference to “a recent court decision” is, 
however, insightful. 
The court decision referred to can only be that in Airport Cold Storage. This should 
not be used as a means to interpret section 20(9) though. Airport Cold Storage which 
correctly interpreted section 65 as being in line with the common law approach, was 
mentioned only as an example of the potential effect of a general piercing provision. 
The minutes show that the judgment was not referred to as guidance on how section 
20(9) should be approached.797 
                                            
792 DTI Chief Director: Policy and Regulations, Consumer and Corporate Regulation Division. 
793 Democratic Alliance member. 
794 Manager: Legal Services: CIPRO. 
795 DTI Director: Compliance Law and Policy, Consumer & Corporate Regulation Division. 
796 Parliamentary Monitoring Group <https://pmg.org.za/print/report/20080828-companies-bill-
adoption> (accessed 26-09-2014).  
797 The judgment was subsequently upheld on appeal, albeit for very different reasons. See 
the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 and ch 4 parts 1 1 2 2 and 2 3 5 above. 
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Perhaps more pertinent, the reference to Airport Cold Storage is possibly the best 
indication yet that the provision was meant to operate in the same manner as its 
legislative counterpart, section 65 of the Close Corporations Act. This supports the 
conclusion reached above,798 viz that no distinction should be made between the tests 
of “gross abuse” and “unconscionable abuse” as prescribed in the Close Corporations 
Act and the Companies Act respectively. And since section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act is to be interpreted in line with the common law piercing test, the 
same approach should be applied to section 20(9). This again supports the earlier 
conclusion that the common law test and that to be applied for the purposes of section 
20(9) are the same.799 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
Having applied the holistic approach of statutory interpretation to section 20(9), in 
particular to the phrase “unconscionable abuse” as used in that provision, it is 
concluded that no particular inference can be drawn from a literal and purposive 
approach other than that the provision is aimed at preventing the abuse of corporate 
personality.  
It has already been stated800 that using the corporate personality of a company to 
achieve a tax benefit can be described as an abuse.801 Whether such an abuse goes 
far enough to become unconscionable, can only be established by considering the 
contexts of the provision. These contexts include the common law802 as well as the 
largely similar provision to be found in section 65 of the Close Corporations Act803 
(especially when considered in conjunction with the process involved in creating the 
statutory remedy),804 together with the presumptions of statutory interpretation.805 
                                            
798 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 2 above. 
799 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 2 2 above. 
800 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 above. 
801 See also part 2 of this chapter below in relation to what would constitute an abuse of 
corporate personality in the context of s 20(9) specifically.  
802 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 above, and particularly the SCA judgment in WT v KT 2015 
3 SA 574 (SCA) linking the common law to s 20(9). 
803 See the text to part ch 4 2 3 4 above.  
804 See the text to ch 4 part 2 4 2 above. 
805 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 2 above. 
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These all support the conclusion that section 20(9) aims to provide a statutory 
equivalent to the common law doctrine as it existed before, with the same ability to 
evolve and develop. It follows that “unconscionable abuse” in section 20(9) should be 
understood in the same light as Cape Pacific’s common law test of “fraud, dishonesty 
or other improper conduct”.  
The previous criteria entitling a court to pierce therefore remain relevant. These 
criteria are now no longer applicable only to the common law piercing doctrine, but 
also to piercing in terms of section 20(9).806 Section 20(9) embodies the common law 
doctrine: it does not provide for a wider or stricter approach,807 although the 
constitutional framework considered together with the Companies Act as a whole808 
suggests that policy considerations in favour of piercing, especially where tax 
considerations are involved, may weigh heavier going forward.809 
It remains to consider how section 20(9) interacts with the pre-existing common law 
position. 
 
                                            
806 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 above; Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 
(WCC) 32, Cf Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 157 (W) 157:  
“Sulke bepalings, langs wisselende lyne, dui nie aan wat die bestek van die 
gemeenregtelike benadering tot assimilasie tussen aandeelhouer en maatskappy moet 
wees nie, behalwe dat dit meermale sal blyk dat wetgewende maatstawwe omtrent die 
persoonlike aanspreeklikheid wat in 'n bepaalde situasie ontstaan 'n voldoende aanduiding 
gee dat 'n Hof nie daarnaas uit hoofde van gemeenregtelike oorwegings vir dieselfde 
situasie tog ook aanspreeklikheid kan erken volgens ander maatstawwe nie.” [own 
emphasis] 
807 Other therefore that the remedy is no longer only available as a last resort (see ch 4 part 3 
3 below); compare with the common law position set out in ch 3 part 2 above. If there was 
uncertainty previously, this was removed through the introduction of s 20(9) which makes no 
mention of the existence of alternative remedies as a consideration when applying s 20(9). 
808 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 3 above. 
809 See the text to ch 4 part 3 2 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 185 
 
3 Relationship between the broader section 20(9) and the common law 
piercing doctrine 
3 1 Introduction 
The effect of the common law piercing doctrine on section 20(9)’s interpretation cannot 
be ignored. The conclusion above was that the content of the word “unconscionable” 
in section 20(9) is the same as that of the “fraud, dishonesty or other improper 
purpose” test applied for common law purposes.810 There is no reason why “abuse” 
as used in the common law context,811 such as in Cape Pacific, should carry any 
different meaning from where it is used in a legislative provision such as the 
Companies Act. 
 
3 2 Policy considerations in favour of and considerations opposed to piercing 
 “Unconscionable abuse” does not comprise the entire piercing provision in section 
20(9), although it is a key component thereof. A key element of the common law 
doctrine is the role played by policy considerations.812  
Yet section 20(9) appears to ignore policy considerations altogether. Does this 
mean that they have become irrelevant for the purposes of section 20(9)? If this is the 
case, a court would be entitled to pierce the corporate veil even where only a limited 
form of abuse is present. 
In the absence of a clear indication to this effect, policy as a determining factor of 
when abuse is serious enough to warrant piercing should not be discarded. Judicial 
discretion has always been a key component813 of the piercing doctrine. It is still true 
that our courts do not have a general discretion to pierce814 but there can be no doubt 
that some discretion may be exercised.815  
                                            
810 WT v KT 2015 3 SA 574 (SCA) para 31. 
811 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 5 2 above. 
812 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
813 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
814 See the text to n 417 above. 
815 See the text to n 819 below. See also ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v Botha [2010] ZAWCHC 563 
para 18 as authority therefor that courts are entitled to adopt a flexible approach to piercing. 
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The fact that section 65 of the Close Corporations Act has been interpreted as akin 
to the common law piercing doctrine, effectively reading policy considerations into that 
legislative provision, supports this conclusion.816 
It is further important that section 20(9) provides that a court “may” (as opposed to 
a clear directive that a court “must”) apply piercing.817 This leaves room for a court to 
consider other factors such as policy considerations818 and then to exercise its 
discretion819 whether it would be appropriate to pierce or not to remedy the particular 
instance of abuse. 
To apply piercing under section 20(9) without the discretion to take policy 
considerations into account would amount to a drastic departure from the common law 
doctrine which was not the intention with the introduction of the Companies Act.820 A 
departure of this nature would have such a great effect on legal certainty and the 
manner in which corporate personality is understood that it would require clear 
legislative intent to this effect. “Abuse” is a wide concept. If policy considerations were 
not taken into account, any instance where a company is used to achieve a purpose 
other than that for which corporate personality was intended would be open to 
piercing.821 A different approach under section 20(9) whereby policy considerations 
are ignored would not only erode legal certainty in relation to corporate legal 
personality, but would disallow many of the accepted uses of the company form. Policy 
considerations must therefore continue to enjoy recognition in the application of 
section 20(9) in the same manner as at common law.  
 
                                            
816 See the text to parts 1 1 2 2 and 2 3 5 above. 
817 Cf s 65 of the Close Corporations Act. 
818 See ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 and part 2 3 3 above. 
819 Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 (C) 1070; Ebrahim v Airport Cold 
Storage (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 585 (SCA) para 26; Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 552 and Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 1336 
(SCA) 20; Schoeman (2012) De Rebus. 
820 See the text to ch 4 part 2 4 1 above. 
821 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 above. 
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3 3 Not a remedy of last resort 
The conclusion earlier in this dissertation was that piercing in terms of the common 
law is not a remedy of last resort as has been claimed.822 Piercing will be appropriate 
if it has been determined that no effective remedy exists against the company, even 
though other remedies against the company’s shareholders may be available.823 
Section 20(9) now removes any doubt that piercing need not only be applied as a 
remedy of last instance.824 
There appears to be little justification for the legislated remedy in section 20(9) not 
to be applied if alternative remedies may exist.825 If the Companies Act does not 
require it, then such a requirement, even if it did exist in common law,826 has become 
redundant.827 The common law cannot limit the application of a remedy created by 
statute where that statute does not provide for such a limitation.  
When one considers the equivalent piercing provision in section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act, there are no cases where the courts sought to limit the application 
of section 65 to a remedy of last resort. 
 
3 4 Application to foreign companies 
Particularly relevant in the context of profit shifting as an example of impermissible tax 
avoidance is the question whether section 20(9) can also be used to pierce the 
corporate veil of companies not incorporated under South African law. 
Section 20(9) applies to any “company”, which definition in section 1 does not 
include foreign companies.828 Therefore section 20(9) cannot be available as remedy 
                                            
822 See the text to ch 3 part 2 above. 
823 Which is unlikely to ever apply as a restriction in the tax context. 
824 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 29; D Subramanien 
“Unconscionable abuse” - section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, Ex Parte Gore NNO 
2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC)” (2014) 35 Obiter 150 159. 
825 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) 34. 
826 The conclusion in ch 3 part 2 above was that no such bar ever existed. 
827 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 58; Cassim (2014) SA Merc LJ 320. 
828 See the text to n 834 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 188 
 
in the case of a company not incorporated in South Africa.829 Foreign companies will 
be the one area where common law piercing can remain relevant.  
This gives rise to two questions, namely whether it was previously possible to pierce 
foreign companies in terms of South African common law and whether it was the 
intention of the Companies Act to ensure that foreign companies cannot be pierced 
under its section 20(9). 
Piercing of foreign companies appears to have been possible at common law.830 
Such an approach appears logical: although the legal personality of the foreign 
company was created in terms of South African law, it is still recognised by South 
African law.831 Likewise, it would be unthinkable in the modern-day commercial 
environment for the South African legal system not to recognise the legal personality 
of foreign companies. It follows that foreign companies too could, if their legal 
personality was used to perpetrate fraud, dishonesty or some other improper purpose, 
be pierced by a South African court. Just as legal personality (irrespective of 
nationality) is a principle accepted by South African common law, so too is the piercing 
doctrine, and for the common law in general it does not matter where that corporate 
                                            
829 S 20(9) may apply to “domesticated companies” (which are included in the definition of a 
“company”), but this will not always be applicable to companies involved in cross-border 
avoidance structures. 
830 One would have expected a contrary comment to this extent in any of the judgments in 
Banco de Mozambique, Hülse-Reutter or The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd had this not 
been the case. In all three cases the court considered whether applying piercing would be 
appropriate, which it would have been unable to do had it not been satisfied that it had the 
jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil of the foreign companies involved. Specifically, 
paragraph 24 of the latter judgement is significant where the court went as far as to state that 
a South African court will apply South African law when called upon to pierce the corporate 
veil of a foreign incorporated company. See also VTB where the UK Supreme Court was 
willing to pierce the veil of Russian companies. Though doubt was expressed there (at 131) 
about the correct forum in which to do so, the court did apply piercing there. The conclusion 
there was that there may be no single choice of law rule to govern piercing matters. Where 
matters relating to tax are concerned though, I would consider it appropriate that the matter 
be considered in the country whose tax is allegedly being escaped. 
831 See definition of “juristic person” in s 1. Also see text to n 836 below. 
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personality was created. The only question that is relevant is whether a court would 
have jurisdiction to hear a matter,832 which is an entirely different question.833 
There are two possible explanations why section 20(9) does not apply to foreign 
companies. It may be an intentional lacuna to ensure that foreign incorporated 
companies can no longer be pierced by South African courts (which amounts to a 
drastic deviation from the pre-Companies Act era). Alternatively, it should be accepted 
that the Companies Act is meant to regulate South African companies only and thus 
cannot authorise the piercing of a company that it has no authority over.834 
The latter approach must be accepted. An overhaul of company law involving that 
foreign companies can no longer be pierced would have necessitated an express 
statement to that effect.835 The legal personality of the foreign company was previously 
and still is recognised in South Africa by our common law and not by the Companies 
Act.836 The foreign company thus operates within the bounds of the common law and 
within that legal context, which includes the piercing doctrine. 
The piercing doctrine aims to address abuse of the corporate legal personality. Just 
as piercing may be applied irrespective of the original reason for a company’s 
incorporation, so it should be irrelevant where that corporate legal person has been 
incorporated in considering whether piercing should be applied or not. The South 
                                            
832 Banco de Mozambique; The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation 
1994 2 All SA 11 (A). 
833 In the tax context ss 107 and 117 of the Tax Administration Act suggest that a South African 
forum will have jurisdiction to consider piercing cases. 
834 S 20(9) applies to a “company”. That word is defined in s 1 of the Companies Act to exclude 
a “foreign company” from its ambit. In support of this interpretation it is significant that s 95 
deems it necessary to include a “foreign company” in the definition of “company” for the 
purposes of chapter 4 of the Companies Act. 
835 An interpretation that would suggest that the effect of s 20(9) is that foreign companies can 
no longer be pierced would be contrary to the presumption that statutory law does not intend 
to change the existing legal position more than is necessary (see the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 
above). 
836 Even though the Companies Act classifies a foreign company as a “juristic person”, this in 
itself does not endow it with legal personality: a “trust” is also defined as a “juristic person” for 
the purposes of the Companies Act, even though it is settled in South African law that it does 
not have legal personality (E Cameron, MJ de Waal, B Wunsh, P Solomon & E Kahn Honoré’s 
South African Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 67 et seq). 
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African common law recognises the corporate legal personality of a foreign company. 
The place of incorporation of a company should not exempt a legal person from 
scrutiny and regulation. 
This is the one instance where the common law piercing doctrine has not been 
rendered practically redundant and will continue to play a role to counter the abuse of 
legal personality of foreign origin. Other than confirming that the piercing of foreign 
companies will happen in terms of the common law doctrine and not section 20(9), 
nothing substantial turns on this. If anything, it reinforces the conclusion that the 
piercing remedies in section 20(9) and the common law must be seen as equal and 
existing concurrently. If this is not done, the absurd result will be that the corporate 
legal personality of foreign companies and of South African companies will be 
approached differently without any justification.  
The conclusion is therefore that piercing in terms of the common law doctrine still 
presents the appropriate remedy to counter the intentional avoidance of tax in the facts 
set out in Example 3 above,837 whereas section 20(9) will not be available to address 
the use of the Mauritian company in that example. 
 
3 5 Ancillary matters 
There are further ancillary matters which are dealt with briefly below. 
 
3 5 1 Where the common law remedy correlates with section 20(9) 
 Section 20(9) confirms the common law principle that a company need not have been 
founded in deceit for piercing to be applied.838 Rather, it needs to be considered what 
the company is used for and not why it was created. Section 20(9) is quite clear that 
either “any use of the company”, or alternatively “the incorporation of the company”, 
may present an instance of unconscionable abuse. 
                                            
837 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
838 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 All SA 543 (A) 553; 
Cassim (SA Merc LJ) 310. 
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As is the position in common law, section 20(9) provides for the piercing of 
companies in relation to shareholders in substance,839 that is persons substantially 
acting in shareholder capacity, as opposed to mere shareholders in form.840 
Also unchanged from the common law position is that foreign law can still play an 
important role in interpreting and developing the piercing doctrine under the 
Companies Act.841 
Section 20(9) is also written in general terms which do not specifically address the 
position of one-man companies or company groups. There appears to be no room to 
argue that the common law approach to these entities has been altered in any material 
way.842 
Finally, the legislated remedy, as was the case with the common law remedy,843 
operates in a limited fashion only. Piercing only disregards the corporate veil to the 
extent necessary to counter the identified instance of abuse thereof. All other rights 
and obligations created by the corporate veil remain unaffected and unaltered. This is 
clear from both section 20(9) and section 218(1) of the Companies Act. Section 20(9) 
is specific in its application in this regard. It provides that a company may be 
disregarded as a separate juristic person as relates only to “any right, obligation or 
liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company” as opposed to all such 
rights, obligations or liabilities. In a similar vein section 218(1) directs that all 
agreements (and by implication existing rights and obligations) remain intact unless 
specifically affected by an order of court. It is made clear that a declaration by a court 
in terms of section 20(9) only reaches as far as the order itself, without tainting the 
remainder of the rights and obligations of the company unrelated to the piercing order.  
 
                                            
839 Persons able to exert effective shareholder control over a company, even though in form 
that person does not actually hold any shares in the company under consideration. 
840 See n 340 above. 
841 S 5(2); see the text to ch 3 part 4 above. 
842 See the text to ch 3 parts 5 2 1 and 5 2 2 above. 
843 Ch 2 part 6 1 above. 
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3 5 2 Ancillary matters where section 20(9) is supplemental to the common law 
doctrine 
Earlier in this dissertation844 examples of reverse piercing, or where piercing was 
applied for the benefit of the shareholder, were given. Although it is doubtful whether 
the judgments mentioned were decided correctly,845 the possibility to apply the 
piercing doctrine in such a manner appears to have been effectively removed by 
section 20(9). It is difficult to imagine any example whereby a court, in terms of the 
discretion afforded to it, would grant relief to a shareholder who had proven also that 
he or she had abused the corporate veil him- or herself.846 The doctrine of estoppel 
would also militate against such relief being granted.  
In the strict sense this may not be a departure from the common law doctrine as 
such, but to the extent that examples of reverse piercing appear to exist, section 20(9) 
clarifies that this is no longer possible. 
What is of greater importance and a clear divergence from the common law remedy 
is that piercing in terms of section 20(9) is no longer a drastic or exceptional remedy,847 
notwithstanding the fact that the remedy has been left largely unchanged in its 
legislated form.848 There is no further reason why the remedy should be approached 
with deference and judicial restraint, even if such a reason may have existed at 
common law. 
As a result our courts are empowered to apply piercing. The Companies Act now 
foresees that piercing may be applied where the requirements are met, which include 
situations where the corporate veil is abused with an improper purpose in mind and 
                                            
844 Ch 2 part 6 2 above. 
845 It is difficult to consider how reverse piercing could strictly meet the requirements of the 
common law piercing doctrine, since it is inconceivable that an applicant-shareholder could 
successfully prove that it had itself perpetrated an abuse whereby it should benefit itself. 
846 An apparent exception would be where minority shareholders seek to have the corporate 
veil pierced due to the abuse thereof by a majority shareholder. This would, however, not 
constitute reverse piercing, but piercing in the ordinary sense. 
847 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 above; Knoop NO and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) 
Ltd FSHC case no 7095/2008 of 4 June 2009 para 23; Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 4 SA 
1336 (SCA) 23; Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 2 SA 558 (C) para 23. 
848 The provision itself gives no indication that judicial restraint should be exercised in applying 
the remedy. See also Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) para 34. 
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policy considerations in favour of piercing outweighs those considerations opposed 
thereto. Once this test has been passed, there is no reason why the courts should not 
apply the remedy available in section 20(9). This will be the case where the corporate 
veil is used mainly for a tax purpose. 
 
4 Application of section 20(9) for purposes of the law of taxation 
4 1 Overview 
Any interested person may bring an application in terms of section 20(9). Therefore, 
where the merits warrant it, the SARS Commissioner may also bring such an 
application.849 
Section 20(9) has the potential to be successfully applied as a remedy by SARS to 
counter the use of the corporate veil primarily for tax purposes.850 Section 5(4) of the 
Companies Act directs that the provisions of that Act and the Income Tax Act should 
be applied concurrently, with the Companies Act’s provisions, including section 20(9), 
prevailing in the case of inconsistencies.  
From the various targeted interventions in the Income Tax Act851 it is clear that the 
corporate veil is capable of being abused in such a manner. Using the corporate veil 
mainly for tax purposes constitutes an improper purpose in terms of the common law 
piercing test. Improper purpose means that an abuse of the corporate veil by 
shareholders has occurred if they used corporate personality to that end.852  
On the basis that the common law threshold test is the same in the now legislated 
piercing remedy,853 using the corporate veil for tax purposes can therefore be 
described as unconscionable abuse.  
However, the matter does not end there and policy considerations such as when 
the court “may” pierce the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9), then come into 
                                            
849 See also s 218(2) of the Companies Act. 
850 PwC “Piercing the corporate veil: section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008” (2013) PwC 
South Africa Synopsis Tax Today; Lewis & Malcolm “Notion of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ 
extended” (31-03-2013) TaxManSA.co.za. 
851 See n 244 above. Also see confirmation to this effect in Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 4 All SA 
157 (W) 164. 
852 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 1, 3 3 2 3 and 5 1 1 above. 
853 See the text to ch 4 parts 2 5, 3 1 and 3 2 above. 
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play.854 Certainly, the same policy considerations in favour of piercing for tax purposes 
already identified855 remain as relevant for the purposes of section 20(9) as was the 
case in common law. The policy considerations favouring piercing for tax purposes 
appear, if anything, to have increased in recent years.856 
When balancing the considerations against piercing with the increasing 
considerations in favour thereof, the conclusion that the legislated remedy should 
embolden courts to apply the remedy857 becomes even stronger, especially in the tax 
context.  
The policy considerations in favour of piercing were extensively dealt with earlier858 
and were also considered as part of the discussion of the Companies Act’s drafting 
process.859 As mentioned in Ex Parte Gore these policy considerations should now 
also include the moral and economic effect that piercing would have.860 This is relevant 
in the tax context in the form of questions surrounding tax morality and the ability of 
the state to fund its operations for the public benefit. 
Considering the conclusion regarding the separation of powers,861 the question may 
be asked what further considerations opposed to piercing exist?  
The effect that piercing may have on other shareholders has already been identified 
as irrelevant in the tax context, given the remedy’s limited and focussed effect.862 In a 
similar vein, the creditors of the company will be left unaffected as the tax 
consequences would fall on the shareholder if the company is pierced, and not on the 
company. In the normal course of business it should be a risk which creditors have to 
accept regarding debtors since the latter may incur tax liabilities affecting the credit 
risk linked to the debtor involved. Since piercing is also possible through application 
                                            
854 See the text to part 3 2 of this chapter above. 
855 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
856 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
857 See the text to ch 4 part 3 5 2 above. 
858 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
859 See the text to ch 4 part 2 4 1 above. See also the DTI policy paper, South African Company 
Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-
06-2004. S 7 of the Companies Act now embodies these principles. 
860 Ex Parte Gore NO and Others 2013 2 All SA 437 (WCC) para 29. 
861 See the text to ch 4 part 1 1 1 above. 
862 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 3 above and the example there. 
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of the Income Tax Act, the possibility of detriment being caused to creditors of 
shareholders in a tax context appears to be acceptable from a policy perspective. 
The only other potential objection to piercing in the tax context would be legal 
uncertainty. However, the limited effect of the piercing remedy and the fact that 
piercing for tax purposes will not affect either the shareholders or creditors of the 
company involved largely negate this consideration. The question is also: legal 
certainty for whom? The only other party that may wish to depend on the need for legal 
certainty as a consideration opposed to piercing would be the offending shareholder 
him- or herself. Where the legal certainty of the taxpayer is impacted by such 
shareholder’s intent which has already been classified as unconscionable, the latter 
should prevail. The tax avoider’s uncertainty about the success or not of his avoidance 
scheme cannot be a consideration against piercing. Legal certainty for the shareholder 
in such a case must therefore be a secondary consideration.  
Barring any other considerations opposed to piercing in the tax context, the 
conclusion is that significant policy considerations exist in favour of piercing for tax 
purposes, whereas considerations opposed thereto are few. In an era where legal 
personality is so much more accessible,863 it is to be expected that instances of abuse 
thereof will be more prevalent. The same applies in the tax context and instances 
where corporate personality is used for tax purposes are bound to increase too. It is 
therefore necessary to approach the remedies contained in the Companies Act (such 
as section 20(9)) more liberally. 
Such an approach would also accord with the presumption that a remedial statute 
must be construed generously.864 This is apposite in an era where a purposive 
interpretation of statutes is increasingly required, especially in the tax context.865 
Section 20(9) should not be regarded in a different light. When applied in a tax 
context, it becomes an anti-avoidance provision and should be construed accordingly. 
Regard should then not only be had to the purpose of the remedy in section 20(9), but 
also to the purpose of section 19(1) which provides for the corporate veil. In the tax 
context this provision too should be regarded from a purposive point of view. When 
                                            
863 See the text to ch 2 part 3 1 above. 
864 Du Plessis “Statute law and interpretation” in LAWSA 345. 
865 See the text to ch 3 parts 5 1 2 and part 2 1 above. 
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the conclusion is reached that the purpose of the separate legal personality of a 
company is not to create a tax advantage,866 the use of the corporate veil primarily for 
this purpose must surely fail the test set in section 20(9). 
Piercing of the corporate veil is intended to serve as remedy where separate 
corporate personality is used to sidestep an anticipated contractual or other legal 
obligation.867 Where that obligation arises because of a taxation statute the remedy is 
no less applicable.868 
 
4 2 Burden of proof 
Section 20(9) applies irrespective of whether an interested person brings an 
application in terms of that provision for the section to apply or not. Section 20(9) 
enables a court to apply this section merely because a company is involved in the 
proceedings before it. 
Section 20(9) is silent on the burden of proof.869 As is the case with the common 
law piercing remedy, one is left with no alternative but to allocate the burden of proof 
to the taxpayer in terms of section 102(1) of the Tax Administration Act. For the 
purposes of section 20(9) the taxpayer will be required to disprove the questions of 
fact by showing either that the taxpayer was not capable of using the corporate veil or 
that the corporate veil was not used primarily for tax purposes.870 
 
5 Conclusion 
Through a careful analysis of legal interpretation one can conclude that the common 
law piercing remedy is largely similar to the remedy now contained in section 20(9). 
This conclusion is reached by considering the limited assistance of the literal and 
purposive interpretative approach. Of more value is the contextual approach, 
supported by the relevant background material on section 20(9) and the Companies 
Act as a whole.  
                                            
866 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
867 Strydom & Du Plessis (1997) TSAR 403. 
868 See n 496 above. 
869 S 221 of the Companies Act is equally unhelpful in this regard. 
870 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 3 above and the discussion there on the application of s 
102(1)(a) of the Tax Administration Act where common law remedies are involved. 
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The analysis of the common law position, the Close Corporations Act and the 
parliamentary drafting process revealed the clear link between the common law and 
section 20(9), especially regarding the threshold requirements of fraud, dishonesty or 
improper conduct now embodied in the phrase “unconscionable abuse”. The 
Constitution, the Companies Act and the drafting process behind the latter create a 
context for wider application of the piercing remedy than had previously existed, 
especially through the influence of policy considerations in favour of piercing, 
introduced through the word “may” in section 20(9).  
While stopping short of replacing the common law piercing doctrine, section 20(9) 
has usurped the role of the common law piercing doctrine in most practical situations, 
save where foreign companies are concerned. Since piercing of the corporate veil of 
a company can now also be achieved through legislated means, one can expect to 
see our courts henceforth apply the remedy with less deference. By implication one of 
the major considerations opposed to piercing has fallen away: the common law is now 
no longer used to override legislation, but legislation itself now limits the use of 
corporate personality.871 This should embolden the judiciary to apply the remedy with 
less circumspection should an unconscionable abuse be present, having regard to the 
relevant policy considerations. 
Admittedly, an argument may be made, if the aforementioned were true, that many 
more cases of close corporations being pierced in terms of section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act should have occurred. No reported judgments could however be 
found where South African courts have refused to pierce the corporate veil of a close 
corporation other than for reasons linked to failure to discharge the burden of proof. 
                                            
871 Section 19 of the Companies Act creates the companies separate legal personality (see ch 
2 part 2 3 above). While there is no direct equivalent of section 19 of the Companies Act in 
the Repealed Companies Act, the latter also made provision for perpetual existence (section 
65(1)) and dealt with limited liability (sections 66 and 85(3)). It can therefore be said that the 
consequences legal personality of a company was also previously created ex lege. There is 
also support for the notion that South African courts considered legal personality of companies 
to have been created by statute (as opposed to merely being regulated thereby). This is 
evident from the comment in Hülse-Reutter that justice considerations alone are not enough 
to warrant piercing. That judgment adds that judicial judgment must be used when considering 
piercing, but also a policy judgment. When considering whose policy should be judged, the 
answer must that of Parliament. It is clear further that Parliament too regarded the company 
as a “person”, as appears from that definition in the Interpretation Act, 33 of 1957. 
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Neither could empirical evidence be found to suggest that companies and close 
corporations have been pierced a comparative number of times since introduction of 
the Close Corporations Act. The absence of piercing cases in the close corporation 
context may therefore rather be due thereto that such potentially qualifying matters 
are not brought to court due to a lack of awareness on the part of legal practitioners of 
the existence of the potential remedy. 
Where the corporate veil is used primarily for tax purposes the conclusion is that 
this can be considered an unconscionable abuse as contemplated in section 20(9) as 
the corporate veil is used to avoid what would otherwise have been a legitimate 
statutory obligation to pay tax. It was also argued that very few considerations, if any, 
would exist against piercing being applied in such an instance. In addition there are 
the very clear policy considerations in favour of piercing which are as relevant for 
section 20(9) as they were at common law. 
Weighing up these considerations, the conclusion in this dissertation is that piercing 
would be justified in instances where the corporate veil is used primarily for the 
subjective purpose of avoiding the incidence of tax. 




CHAPTER 5: THE EFFICACY OF THE INCOME TAX ACT’S GENERAL ANTI-
AVOIDANCE RULES TO ADDRESS THE USE OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 
FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES 
 
1 Piercing provisions of the Income Tax Act 
As stated earlier, the corporate veil can be used to achieve tax benefits.872 To 
address this problem, certain focused piercing provisions were included in the 
Income Tax Act,873 often taking the form of specific anti-avoidance rules. The fact 
that these specific anti-avoidance provisions exist, indicates a general 
disapproval, at a policy level, of the corporate veil’s use in this manner.  
The introduction of the so-called “passive holding company” regime in 2008874 
serves as an example of how these specific anti-avoidance provisions counter 
the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes. With the introduction of dividends 
tax in 2012, National Treasury identified the risk that individuals could delay the 
liability for dividends tax by holding passive share investments through a 
company.875 Section 9E, which was introduced to tax dividends received by 
“passive holding companies”, was repealed with effect from 21 October 2008.876 
Thus, the structure achieving an avoidance of dividends tax was never 
addressed.  
                                            
872 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
873 See n 244 above for examples hereof. 
874 Introduced by s 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2008. 
875 See Example 1 in ch 1 part 3 above. In terms of s 64F of the Income Tax Act, South 
African companies to which dividends are declared are exempt from the dividends tax. 
Example 1 (ch 1 part 3 above) illustrates this exact risk practically. 
876 S 15 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012. The Explanatory Memorandum 
on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 at 52 somewhat unsatisfactorily claims that 
the risk has been mostly addressed by the increased dividends tax rate. No mention is 
made in the Explanatory Memorandum, or any other document released by National 
Treasury or SARS, of the continued potential for delay in levying dividends tax, which 
tax benefit as a result remains available to South African taxpayers. 
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The fact that the identified instance of abuse has not been attended to does 
not mean that the risk no longer exists. It remains one of the clearest examples 
of how taxpayers can use the corporate veil to mitigate or delay tax 
consequences. 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act has therefore been identified in this 
dissertation as a potential remedy that SARS could apply to address instances of 
abuse such as the above.877 This chapter considers whether the GAARs 
contained in the Income Tax Act878 can be applied with comparable efficacy.879 
 
2 Overview of general anti-avoidance rules 
South African courts have, to date, not pronounced on the GAARs in their current 
form.880 Nor have their provisions been amended in any material manner since 
coming into effect on 2 November 2006. In the absence of any judicial guidance 
on how these provisions should be approached, the content of the GAARs 
remains unsettled.881 
In terms of the now repealed section 103(1) the Commissioner could 
previously only apply the GAAR in that section’s sanctions if four requirements 
were all present, namely: 
 
                                            
877 See ch 4 above. 
878 Ss 80A to 80L of the Income Tax Act.  
879 ITC 1501 [1989] 53 SATC 314 326 provides an example of when the GAARs could 
be applied in a manner that would amount to piercing. See also Glaser Piercing the 
corporate veil 39. 
880 The “new” GAARs in ss 80A to 80L replaced its legislative predecessor, s 103(1) of 
the Income Tax Act, with effect from 2 November 2006. 
881 In this chapter, the Canadian GAARs will mostly be referred to for comparative 
purposes, since the South African GAARs were, at least in part, based on its Canadian 
counterpart. Furthermore, the Canadian courts have pronounced on the provisions of the 
relevant GAARs and these cases may provide guidance to South Africa. Australia’s 
GAARs do not contain an abnormality requirement and therefore differs substantially 
from the South African one. The USA does not have any federal GAARs and the position 
in the UK has not been the subject of any case law yet. 
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1. a transaction, operation or scheme (“scheme”) must have been entered 
into; 
2. the scheme must give rise to a tax benefit; 
3. the tax benefit must have been the sole or main purpose of the scheme; 
and 
4. the scheme must have been entered into or carried out by means of, or in 
a manner which would not normally be employed, or must have created 
rights and obligations which would not have been created between persons 
dealing at arm’s length.882 
 
These four essential requirements (for the GAAR in section 103(1) to apply) 
still reflect in the “new” GAARs contained in the Income Tax Act.883  
Since this dissertation considers when piercing can be applied to address the 
deliberate use of a company for tax related reasons, one can accept that in such 
instances the first three of the four requirements of the GAARs listed above, all 
of which involve questions of fact, would always be met. In such circumstances 
an arrangement884 would have been entered into involving a company, resulting 
                                            
882 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert [1971] 33 SATC 113 
116 and 117; see also Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1980] 42 SATC 55 
66; SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 5. 
883 S 80A of the Income Tax Act.  
884 S 80A refers specifically to an “arrangement”. The term is so widely defined that it 
encompasses virtually all commercial activity: “… any transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding (whether enforceable or not), including all steps therein or 
parts thereof, and includes any of the foregoing involving the alienation of property”. See 
also EB Broomberg “Then and now – II: The first three prerequisites” (2007) 21 Tax 
Planning. 
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in a tax benefit with the sole or main purpose885 of achieving that tax benefit.886 
Consequently the only requirement that still requires consideration, is the 
fourth requirement, “normality”. In other words, can the use of a company for tax 
purposes be considered abnormal as contemplated in the GAARs? 
 
3 Normality requirement 
3 1 Identifying the “arrangement” to which the abnormality requirement must 
apply 
It is important to identify the arrangement to which the GAARs is applied. Piercing 
in terms of the corporate law doctrine may present the fiscus with a remedy at 
the moment that the company is incorporated. It is argued in this chapter that no 
such remedy will exist in terms of the GAARs at that stage. This is because 
companies achieve a tax benefit for their shareholders by way of a two-stepped 
process: firstly, by a transfer of assets to the company, and secondly, by the 
company utilising those assets to generate income. This latter step will result in 
income tax consequences that are more beneficial than would have been the 
case, had the income been derived by the shareholders directly. It is argued in 
                                            
885 Although it is not yet settled whether the “sole or main purpose” requirement in s 80A 
involves a subjective or an objective test, strong arguments exist that the former is 
accurate (P Dachs “Anti Tax-Avoidance Provision – Is the purpose test subjective or 
objective?” (2013) 62 The Taxpayer 183-185; L van Schalkwyk & B Geldenhuys “The 
nature of the purpose requirement of an impermissible tax avoidance arrangement” 
(2010) 35 JJS 71-92; ITC 1888 [2016] 79 SATC 23 72). Contra De Koker & Williams 
Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.35 and SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to 
the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 20 et seq. This dissertation considers scenarios where 
the corporate veil is used with the subjective intent to achieve a tax benefit. Considering 
the arguments in favour of a subjective approach to be followed, together with the 
presumption of purpose against the taxpayer provided for in s 80G, the analysis 
continues on the basis that the “sole or main purpose” requirement will have been met 
where a company is used to achieve a tax benefit.  
886 See the specific anti-avoidance provisions referred to in the text to part 1 of this 
chapter above as examples of how a tax benefit could conceivably be created by use of 
the corporate veil. 
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this chapter that the GAARs can usually only be invoked in respect of the first 
step, namely on transfer of an asset to a company. Generally speaking, this is 
the only one of the two steps driven by a tax motive. Moreover, when income is 
later generated for the company by using the transferred asset, it is unlikely that 
the company’s utilisation of the asset will be driven by tax reasons.  
It is submitted that the “tax benefit” requirement887 is met for both steps. 
However, after obtaining the assets, the company would generally hold and utilise 
its newly acquired assets for a commercial, non-tax purpose and will utilise these 
in order to generate commercial benefits for itself. It follows that the act of 
transferring an asset to the company (step one) should be scrutinised to detect 
elements that may potentially be abnormal in terms of the GAARs. The 
transactions subsequently giving rise to income through utilisation of the asset 
(step two) should not be examined because they lack a tax purpose. However, 
where the two steps form part of a “unitary scheme”, both steps will have to be 
investigated. 
Although most recently applied in ITC 1862,888 the “unitary steps doctrine” was 
developed in the judgment of CIR v Meyerowitz (“Meyerowitz”)889 and further 
explored in Louw.890 All these cases rely in essence on the English case of 
Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins (“Crossland”).891 The legal principles 
enunciated in these cases are that an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” 
may be wider than any one transaction892 and that the eventual arrangement 
                                            
887 S 1 of the Income Tax Act presents a wide definition of a “tax benefit” which would 
include the postponement or the reduction of tax for the shareholder by virtue of 
transferring an asset to a company, even if the tax benefit for the shareholder will only 
materialise at a much later stage. Also see Smith (2016) JJS 89 which requires a wide 
meaning to be ascribed to the defined term. 
888 ITC 1862 [2012] 75 SATC 34 para 50. 
889 CIR v Meyerowitz 1963 3 SA 863 (AD) para 867. 
890 CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 paras 135 and 136. 
891 Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 and as referred to in 
Meyerowitz. 
892 CIR v Meyerowitz 1963 3 SA 863 (AD) referring to the a quo judgment. 
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need not be contemplated at the outset,893 although Louw strongly suggests that 
the ultimate step must at least have been foreseen as a possibility from the 
start.894 Crossland is clear though that a unitary scheme consists of all steps 
aimed at achieving an identified ultimate object. 
These judgments indicate that transactions are bound together in a single 
“unitary scheme” if they are entered into with a common tax motivated purpose. 
In other words, those steps necessary to achieve the desired tax benefit must be 
entered into purposefully to achieve that tax benefit. In the absence of a unitary 
scheme, different transactions are not steps in a larger arrangement.895 
Crossland, a case not dealing with GAARs as such, held that the steps of a 
larger arrangement would constitute a single arrangement or scheme, if the steps 
were all aimed at that same “ultimate object”, in that case the avoidance of 
surtax.896 The same approach was adopted in Meyerowitz897 and ITC 1862, 
although not with express reference to Crossland in the latter. 
In Louw, the AD had to consider whether the GAARs could be applied to an 
alleged scheme of transactions where an existing engineering practice was 
transferred to a company. Profits were subsequently extracted from the company 
in the form of interest-free loans.898 Although the terms of the loans were found 
                                            
893 Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 para 817 and ITC 1862 
[2012] 75 SATC 34 para 50. 
894 CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 para 135. 
895 Although the definition of “arrangement” in s 80L includes all steps to “any transaction, 
operation, scheme, agreement or understanding”, whether these separate arrangements 
or steps can be said to form part of a single, larger arrangement to which s 80A will apply, 
is dependent on whether the steps would form part of a unitary scheme. This principle 
does not detract from the fact that the provisions of s 80A may be applied to any step 
considered in isolation. See s 80H. What the “unitary steps doctrine” does seek to 
achieve, is to ensure that only steps with a sufficient degree of unity may be considered 
together as an arrangement to determine whether that arrangement would also be an 
“impermissible avoidance arrangement”. 
896 Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 para 817. 
897 CIR v Meyerowitz 1963 3 SA 863 (AD) para 873. 
898 The incorporation of a business (in other words the transfer of the underlying assets 
to a company) constitutes an “arrangement” (CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 136; 
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to have the effect of avoiding tax, the incorporation of the business and the 
extraction of profits by way of subsequent loan accounts, were held not to 
constitute a unitary scheme.  
There are three reasons for this finding that are important for purposes of the 
current analysis. Firstly, the granting of the loans was not a necessary step to 
bring about the tax benefits already achieved through incorporation of the 
business.899 Secondly, and in keeping with Crossland, incorporation of the 
business and the subsequent granting of loans did not share the same ultimate 
objective.900 Thirdly, a period of approximately five years lapsed between the 
incorporation transaction and the granting of the loans. This time period indicated 
to the court that the loan transaction was an independent transaction. The 
relatively short period within which the transactions in Crossland were entered 
into, seems to have influenced the court in finding that the transactions were 
linked.  
In both Meyerowitz and Crossland, the taxpayers were unsuccessful. In both 
these cases, the relevant schemes were found to include the first step, where the 
                                            
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert [1971] 33 SATC 113 118). 
If it were argued that the setting up of the company itself was effected with a tax benefit 
in mind, it would be important to illustrate that the applicable tax benefit achieved 
subsequently and through use of the corporate veil was already foreseen at 
incorporation; in other words it would be required to illustrate that the tax benefit was a 
part of the incorporation scheme implemented (see CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 134 
and 135; ITC 1862 [2012] 75 SATC 34 para 50 et seq). See the text to part 3 3 2 of this 
chapter below. An already incorporated business however also uses the separate legal 
personality of a company to achieve a tax benefit for its shareholders, even if only 
devised after incorporation and by virtue of agreements entered into by the company 
subsequently. (The directors’ loans in question in Louw being a case in point.) In these 
instances the same principle would apply for the GAARs as was the case for the common 
law (see the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 and 4 1 above) and s 20(9) of the Companies Act 
(the text to ch 4 part 3 5 1 above), being that the anti-avoidance provision can apply even 
if the abuse was not foreseen at incorporation, yet on condition that the benefit achieved 
is causally linked to the use of the separate legal personality of the company. 
899 CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 para 135. 
900 Para 135. 
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relevant assets were transferred from the taxpayer to a separate corporate 
structure, as well as the second step, namely the subsequent earning of income 
by the companies through the use of those resources. In both these cases, the 
evidence before the court indicated that the parties were aware of all the steps 
forming part of the arrangement and actively participated in certain vital parts 
thereof to achieve its purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.901  
However, in Louw the AD did not regard the incorporation of the business (step 
one), and the subsequent trading activities of the company (step two) as part of 
the same arrangement.  
Based on the facts in Louw, the court concluded that the transactions involved 
were not “part and parcel of a single scheme”.902 It is submitted that the facts in 
Louw objectively indicate the lack of a common purpose to avoid tax on the part 
of the company, whereas the courts in Crossland and Meyerowitz came to the 
opposite conclusion. 
The inference from these cases is that the necessary unity will exist only where 
the steps have all been entered into with a common purpose to avoid tax. The 
facts of each case will play a crucial role to determine whether the transactions 
were entered into with the same purpose. It is submitted that it may be difficult, in 
practice, to prove that two or more transactions form part of a unitary scheme, 
that is a single “arrangement” for purposes of the GAARs. 
Turning to Examples 1 to 4, the question whether steps one and two in those 
examples form a unitary scheme depends on the facts of the case. For example, 
if the transferor in Example 1 was aware of the second step, the company was 
incorporated with the expectation that it would distribute its profits to the transferor 
(now shareholder), such a distribution took place within a reasonably short time 
period and it is proven on the evidence that the company’s purpose was to aid in 
the avoidance of tax, a unitary scheme will exit. If, on the other hand, an 
independent board of directors are appointed after the company’s incorporation, 
the shares in its share portfolio are changed and a relatively long period of time 
                                            
901 Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 819; CIR v Meyerowitz 
1963 3 SA 863 (AD) para 872-873. 
902 CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 para 135. 
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passes before the profits are extracted, it may well be that no unitary scheme 
exists. 
The basis for the argument that no unitary scheme exists for Examples 1 to 4 
is that one cannot think the separate personality of the company away when 
applying the GAARs to determine whether a common purpose to avoid tax exists. 
The transferor is not a “party” in the strict sense to the subsequent transactions 
entered into by the company in step two. Furthermore, in step two, the purpose 
of the company in entering into these transactions would ordinarily be to advance 
its own commercial interests. The transferor (now shareholder) need not even 
give instructions to the company to enter into the subsequent transactions: the 
company does so because the transactions are in its own interests. Thus, the 
company does not have the same purpose as the transferor and, in consequence, 
the necessary joint ultimate objective is missing.903 
As a result, if no unitary scheme exists, only step one in Examples 1 to 4 may 
potentially be susceptible to the GAARs. Whether those arrangements may be 
considered “abnormal” is considered below. 
 
3 2 Normality in terms of the previous section 103(1) 
Under the previous version of the GAAR, an enquiry into the presence or absence 
of the “normality” requirement in section 103(1)(b) was conducted by: 
 
“… having, regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or 
scheme was entered into or carried out 
(i) was entered into or carried out -  
(aa) in the case of a transaction, operation or scheme in the context of 
business, in a manner which would not normally be employed for bona 
fide business purposes, other than the obtaining of a tax benefit; and 
(bb)  in the case of any other transaction, operation or scheme, being a 
transaction, operation or scheme not falling within the provisions of item 
(aa) by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in 
                                            
903 Although s 80F may be applicable in the current instance, it cannot apply to give rise 
to a different result to create a unitary scheme. Its operation is limited to establishing 
whether a tax benefit is present, which is uncontentious, and to determine whether an 
arrangement has commercial substance (see ch 5 part 3 3 3 below). 
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the entering into or carrying out of a transaction operation or scheme of 
the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question …” 
 
Therefore, a transaction, operation or scheme could only be considered 
abnormal if either of the following two indicators was present: 
 
1. the means or manner would not normally have been applied in the 
specific context (being business or otherwise); or  
2. the transaction, operation or scheme in question has given rise to rights 
or obligations that would not normally be created between persons 
dealing at arm’s length. 
 
In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue (“Hicklin”),904 the SCA summarised 
the test for abnormality as follows: 
 
“For ‘dealing at arm's length’ is a useful and often easily determinable premise from 
which to start the inquiry. It connotes that each party is independent of the other and, 
in so dealing, will strive to get the utmost possible advantage out of the transaction 
for himself. Indeed, in the Afrikaans text the corresponding phrase is ‘die uiterste 
voorwaardes beding’. Hence, in an at arm's length agreement the rights and 
obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the 
sense envisaged by [section 103(1)(b)](ii). And the means or manner employed in 
entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the 
sense envisaged by para (i).”905 
 
In terms of Hicklin, the enquiry for normality in terms of section 103(1) starts 
with the arm’s length test. Only once it has been established that a transaction is 
entered into on an arm’s length basis, should it be considered whether the 
transaction gave rise to normal rights and obligations and was entered into within 
normal means or in a normal manner. Two tests, namely whether normal rights 
                                            
904 [1979] 41 SATC 179. 
905 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195. 
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and obligations are created by an arrangement on the one hand, and whether 
these were created by way of normal means or in a normal manner on the other, 
remain important in terms of the current GAARs. Transactions creating normal 
rights and obligations may potentially be carried out by abnormal means or in an 
abnormal manner and vice versa. In other words, a transaction must give rise to 
normal rights and obligations and be carried out by normal means and in a normal 
manner, for it to be “normal” in terms of the previous GAAR in section 103(1). 
From a taxpayer’s perspective, it is not enough for an arrangement to be “normal” 
in terms of any one of the indicators listed in the GAARs, but rather that it is 
normal, measured against all of the potential indicators for abnormality. 
Broomberg906 considers it unlikely that the courts’ general approach to the 
current GAARs will differ significantly from its approach to section 103(1). The 
basis for Broomberg’s conclusion stems from a comparison of the wording of 
section 103(1) to that of section 80A, specifically in respect of the normality test. 
The normality test in section 80A shows many similarities when compared to its 
predecessor in section 103(1). However, the indicators for normality in section 
80A have been increased from two to four. Two of these four bear several striking 
similarities and contain only a slightly redrafted version of the earlier two potential 
indicators for abnormality.907  
In the absence of any case law dealing with sections 80A to 80L of the Income 
Tax Act, it is necessary to start with an analysis of the case law decided in terms 
of section 103(1) and to determine whether the case law relating to the 
abnormality requirement still apply to the current GAARs.908 The abnormality 
requirement of the current GAARs may potentially find application where the 
corporate veil is used for tax purposes. Such an application is considered 
below.909 
 
                                            
906 Broomberg (2007) Tax Planning. 
907 The two new indicators are discussed in the text to parts 3 3 3 and 3 3 4 of this chapter 
below. 
908 De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.4. 
909 See the text to parts 3 3 1 and 3 3 2 of this chapter below. 
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3 3 Normality in terms of section 80A 
In terms of section 80A, an arrangement would be considered abnormal if: 
 
“(a) in the context of business— 
(i)  it was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not 
normally be employed for bona fide business purposes, other than 
obtaining a tax benefit; or 
(ii)  it lacks commercial substance, in whole or in part, taking into account the 
provisions of section 80C; 
(b) in a context other than business, it was entered into or carried out by means or in 
a manner which would not normally be employed for a bona fide purpose, other 
than obtaining a tax benefit; or 
(c) in any context— 
(i)  it has created rights or obligations that would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm’s length; or 
(ii)  it would result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions 
of this Act (including the provisions of this Part).” 
 
The fact that the main purpose of an arrangement is to achieve a tax benefit 
bears no relevance to the normality of the arrangement in question.910 Similarly, 
the remedies available to the Commissioner in terms of section 80B may not be 
used to illustrate any alleged abnormality through combining steps to have them 
form part of a unitary scheme.911 This is relevant specifically where the use of the 
corporate veil is concerned: until all four elements of the GAARs have been 
shown to be present, the separate legal personality of the company, for tax 
purposes, remains unaffected by the GAARs’ remedies.912 The fact that the 
company is used purposefully to achieve a tax benefit is not enough for the 
GAARs to apply. It must also be shown that its use may be considered abnormal 
                                            
910 See text to n 941 below. 
911 De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.41. 
912 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 194, approved in CIR v 
Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 143. 
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in terms of section 80A.913 In addition, involving a company for tax reasons in a 
transaction does not amount to the implicated transaction being simulated.914 
Section 103(1) previously required normality to be determined by considering 
the circumstances under which the transaction, operation, or scheme was 
entered into or carried out.915 Notably this no longer forms part of the test for 
normality under section 80A. Broomberg916 argues that this change adversely 
affects taxpayers and cites a number of cases in support of his argument.917 
These cases indicate that the circumstances under which an arrangement takes 
place could only potentially justify a transaction, that would otherwise have 
appeared to be abnormal, as being “normal”. Broomberg’s view therefore 
appears to be correct. 
If section 80A is distilled, abnormality may now exist in terms of any of the four 
indicators, being “abnormal means and manner” as well as the “arm’s length 
rights and obligations” tests. These tests have been retained from section 
103(1).918  
Section 80A also introduces two new indicators, namely the “misuse or abuse” 
                                            
913 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 194, also applicable to 
the current GAARs (SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule 5). 
914 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 194. 
915 See Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195. The amendment 
to s 103(1) by s 29 of the Income Tax Act, 36 of 1996, in similar vein removed the 
requirement for the Commissioner to have regard to the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme involved. 
916 EB Broomberg “Then and now – III: The tainted element” (2008) 22 Tax Planning. 
917 De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.39 disagree with this 
conclusion and argue that a consideration of the relevant circumstances is still implicit to 
the test for abnormality. 
918 See SARS Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: Revised 
proposals (September 2006) 5 et seq which confirms that the new GAARs in ss 80A to 
80L were meant to retain the two pre-existing normality tests. It is reasonable to conclude 
that the judgments which previously considered the normality requirement in s 103(1) 
appear equally applicable in applying ss 80A to 80L to the extent that the wording and 
context of the provisions allow therefor. See Ex Parte Minister of Justice In Re Rex v 
Bolon 1941 AD 345. 
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and the “commercial substance” tests.919 Because the indicators for abnormality 
have increased from two to four, it is arguably more difficult to illustrate that 
transactions meet the requisite standards of “normality”. 
Companies may be used in various ways to reduce the tax cost that would 
otherwise have been borne by the shareholders of the company, had the 
company been absent. Such tax benefits may be achieved by using a company 
to own the assets (previously those of the shareholder) even though the 
interposition of a company does little to vary the real economic substance of the 
shareholders (see Example 1). The mere interposition of a company through 
which to indirectly conduct business or hold investments does not drastically vary 
the prevailing economic realities of the shareholder. However, it may give rise to 
profoundly different tax consequences.920 Examples of using the company to alter 
the tax consequences that would otherwise have resulted, include using a 
company to conduct business through in order to benefit from more beneficial 
corporate tax rates (see Example 2), or to become eligible to qualify for beneficial 
income tax regimes. These tax regimes would otherwise have been unavailable 
had the business been carried on directly by an individual or trust. Similarly, the 
interposition of companies in an established group may be used to avoid or 
significantly reduce withholding taxes charged in various countries (an exercise 
generally referred to as “treaty shopping”, as per Example 3) or to avoid or 
postpone dividends tax locally in South Africa (see Example 1).921 Thus far it was 
unnecessary to distinguish between these “types” of transactions. However, as 
will become clear from the following analyses, a differentiation is now necessary, 
as the normality test will have a different result depending on what “type” of 
transaction is considered.  
The applicability of the GAARs will depend on the specific facts at hand, yet 
                                            
919 Cf SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 23. 
920 In UK law the difference between tax mitigation and tax avoidance has been 
suggested to rest largely on the economic consequences of taxpayers’ actions. See G 
Loutzenhiser Tiley’s Revenue Law 8 ed (2016) 100 and the discussion at n 941 below. 
921 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
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generally two categories of avoiding tax by using a company may be identified. 
The first occurs where the company is used to manipulate the tax consequences 
of certain pre-identified and anticipated arrangements (for example, to ensure 
reduced withholding tax rates or delaying the levying of dividends tax – referred 
to below as “targeted avoidance”). Examples include those transactions 
contemplated in Examples 1 and 3 above.922 The second category relates to 
instances where the company form is used to achieve a more beneficial tax 
regime generally and to access more beneficial corporate tax rates to which the 
company form as opposed to non-corporate persons may have exclusive access 
(referred to below as “general avoidance”).923 Examples hereof may be found in 
                                            
922 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. By way of illustration, although these instances are 
already addressed by existing specific anti-avoidance legislative provisions, further 
examples of targeted avoidance would include making use of companies to receive 
salaries in an individual’s stead, as well as non-residents attempting to avoid capital 
gains tax on disposal of immovable property by owning these investments through 
companies indirectly and disposing of the shares in the company rather than the property 
directly. One could also contemplate how companies may be used as part of a 
restructure solely to facilitate relief in terms of the so-called “group relief” provisions 
contained in Part III of Chapter II of the Income Tax Act to facilitate the transfer of value 
between non-corporate taxpayers which would otherwise not have been possible to 
achieve without giving rise to the attendant tax consequences. 
923 The “controlled foreign company” legislation is aimed at targeting such instances of 
avoidance of tax. What is referred to here as “general avoidance” may very well in certain 
instances amount to tax mitigation or permissible tax avoidance as opposed to 
impermissible tax avoidance. The former is a reference to actions by taxpayers which 
will not be susceptible to the GAARs, whereas the latter will be. See the SARS 
Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act 
No. 58 of 1962) (November 2005) 2 et seq; BT Kujinga A comparative analysis of the 
efficacy of the general anti-avoidance rule as a measure against impermissible income 
tax avoidance in South Africa LLD thesis, University of Pretoria (2013) 16. When 
distinguishing though between permissible and impermissible “the line is far from bright” 
(Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co v R 2005 SCC 54). Kujinga (2014) CILSA 439 notes that 
the fact that South Africa, Canada and Australia all identify impermissible avoidance 
arrangement differently shows how difficult the distinction is. Of specific note is the 
reference at 5 to the incorporation of a new business as an example of legitimate tax 
planning. It is noted though that the reference there is to a new business specifically, 
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the cases of Secretary for Inland Revenue v Louw (“Louw”)924 and SIR v Geustyn, 
Forsyth and Joubert (“Geustyn”).925 
These two categories, being “targeted” and “general avoidance”, are 
considered below for each of the four normality indicators. 
 
3 3 1 Arm’s length rights and obligations test 
Hicklin’s case considered the arm’s length test to be the appropriate starting point 
for the enquiry into the normality of a transaction.926 That case determined that, 
in terms of section 103(1)(b)(ii), where parties to a transaction were engaging on 
an arm’s length basis with one another, the rights and obligations created in terms 
of a transaction, would more likely be regarded as being normal. However, 
abnormality would exist for purposes of section 103(1)(b)(ii) if an arrangement:  
 
“… has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arm’s length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question …”  
 
                                            
which appears to suggest that the transfer of an existing business to a company for tax 
driven reasons only or primarily may potentially amount to more than mere tax mitigation. 
In UK law, Loutzenhiser Tiley’s Revenue Law 100 suggests that tax mitigation occurs 
where taxpayers acquire tax benefits envisaged by the legislature through those 
taxpayers suffering the relevant anticipated economic consequences necessary for them 
to qualify for the tax benefits provided for. In contrast, tax avoidance would involve 
taxpayers acquiring those tax benefits through unanticipated means, in other words 
without bearing the necessary economic consequences that the legislature had 
intended. Where general avoidance is therefore achieved without meaningful economic 
consequences, such structuring could well be said to cross the divide between legitimate 
tax planning and impermissible tax avoidance. See also BT Kujinga “Analysis of misuse 
and abuse in terms of the South African general anti-avoidance rule: lessons from 
Canada” (2012) 45 CILSA 42 56 for the role that economic substance played in Mathew 
v R 2005 SCC 55.  
924 [1983] 45 SATC 113. 
925 [1971] 33 SATC 113. See also Examples 2 and 4 in the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
926 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195. 
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Hicklin then appears to go further and concludes that where the parties are at 
arm’s length with one another, the means or manner in which they will enter into 
an agreement is also more likely to be normal rather than abnormal,927 even 
though the “means or manner” test in section 103(1)(b)(i) makes no reference to 
arm’s length terms of an agreement or the relationship between the parties. The 
reference to “arm’s length” was only present in subsection (ii) dealing with rights 
and obligations. Hicklin’s case decided that “arm’s length” means “that each party 
is independent of the other and, in so dealing, will strive to get the utmost possible 
advantage out of the transaction for himself.”928  
It is possible that the court in Hicklin considered the arm’s length test relevant 
to interpret section 103(1)(b)(i) (“means or manner”) too due to the fact that 
section 103(1) required abnormality to be considered by “having regard to the 
circumstances under which a transaction, operation or scheme was entered into” 
as well as the “nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question”.929 The 
requirement to have regard to the circumstances surrounding a transaction and 
the type of transaction being entered into, was not retained in the current GAARs. 
The omission was likely deliberate and causes a substantial effect.930 As a result, 
it is arguable that whether parties are in an arm’s length relationship in relation to 
one another, is now irrelevant when considering whether the other indicators for 
abnormality, especially the “means or manner test”,931 may be present. The 
relationship between the relevant parties may even have become an irrelevant 
consideration in adjudicating the arm’s length test itself, since it amounts to 
context drawn from the circumstances of the transaction. As a result, it is arguable 
                                            
927 195. 
928 195. 
929 S 103(1)(b). 
930 EB Broomberg “Then and now – III: The tainted element” (2008) 22 Tax Planning. 
SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 24. De Koker & 
Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.39. 
931 The “means or manner” test (see the text to part 3 3 2 of this chapter below) was the 
only other alternative indicator for abnormality that existed in s 103(1) and which Hicklin 
considered. 
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that the “arm’s length test” under the current GAARs simply means that the terms 
of the relevant transaction should be compared with the terms of a transaction 
that would have been entered into between unconnected or -related parties, to 
determine whether the terms actually agreed upon are at arm’s length.932 In other 
words, the “arm’s length” test in section 80A(c)(i)933 now only considers the terms 
of an arrangement and not the relationship between the parties entering into it. 
As was the case for section 103(1), the “arm’s length rights or obligations test” 
under the new GAARs applies irrespective of whether a transaction is considered 
in the context of business or otherwise. The express reference to “any context” in 
section 80A(c)(i) links the test to the provisions of section 80A(i)(a) and (b) which 
deal with mutually exclusive contexts, being the context of business and 
otherwise. Consequently, a transaction would be abnormal, irrespective of 
whether in a business context or not, if its terms do not create arm’s length rights 
and obligations and irrespective of the means or manner that it employed. In the 
context other than business, in which transactions based on arm’s length terms 
would be less prevalent than in the context of business, such a conclusion is 
noteworthy. Although the wording of section 103(1)(b) was less explicit than 
section 80A, the latter cannot be seen as a departure from the previous position 
and in this sense,934 the two tests appear to be identical. One would therefore 
                                            
932 BT Kujinga A comparative analysis of the efficacy of the general anti-avoidance rule 
as a measure against impermissible income tax avoidance in South Africa LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria (2013) 80, 81 and 116 where it is argued that the test in Hicklin 
may have been inappropriate to apply to s 103(1)(b)(i) where the parties involved where 
not in an arm’s length relationship. Kujinga’s views appear to be supported by CIR v 
Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 118, which considers the arm’s length test to be a reference 
to the terms of the agreement, rather than the relationship between the parties involved. 
See also L Olivier 1197 (1997) 30 THRHR 725 738 as referred to with approval in ITC 
1699 [1999] 63 SATC 175 182; SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule 36 and 37. 
933 S 80A(c)(i) determines that a transaction would be abnormal if “… it has created rights 
or obligations that would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm’s 
length”. 
934 Other than for the comments above regading the test in Hicklin and that the test in s 
80A(c)(i) now only tests whether the terms of an arrangement is akin to that one would 
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expect that the case law dealing with the test in terms of section 103(1) should 
equally apply to the test now contained in section 80A(c)(i). One important 
exception should be noted, namely the omission of the phrase “under a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question …” from the test in section 80A(c)(i). This phrase formed the 
cornerstone of the judgment in Louw.935 The court found that the act of 
incorporation was not at arm’s length if it were to be considered in isolation, yet it 
was still considered normal “under a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question” (emphasis by Corbett 
JA). The change that section 80A(c)(i) brought about is therefore significant, as it 
effectively renders the Louw judgment irrelevant where the incorporation of a 
business creates rights and obligations that are not at arm’s length.936 The 
                                            
expect to find between two unrelated parties, as opposed the view that s 103(1) may 
have previously considered the relationship between the parties as the relevant point of 
reference. See text to n 932 above. 
935 CIR v Louw [1983] 45 SATC 113 paras 137 and 138. The act of incorporation would 
not have been considered abnormal in terms of s 103(1)(b)(i), in other words 
incorporation would amount to normal manner or means being employed. 
936 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 24. Cf B 
Croome, A Oguttu, E Muller, T Legwaila, M Kolitz, RC Williams & C Louw Tax Law, An 
Introduction (2013) 498. Contra De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax 
ch 19.39 which argues that considering the nature of a transaction is an implicit 
requirement to the arm’s length test and therefore, irrespective thereof whether the 
wording referred to is present in s 80A(c)(i) or not, the test in Louw remains relevant. 
Broomberg (2008) Tax Planning 9 et seq presents the alternative argument to De Koker 
et al and with which I agree (and which correlates with the argument regarding the 
omission from s 80A that the circumstances of an arrangement must be taken into 
account when considering whether it is abnormal or not (see the text to part 3 3 of this 
chapter above), also addressed by De Koker et al (n 917 above)). A consideration of the 
nature of a transaction may in most circumstances present a justification for the terms of 
any arrangement to have been entered into on an arm’s length basis. In absence of a 
specific requirement in s 80A(c)(i) for the nature of an arrangement to be considered, 
one is simply left with the arm’s length test as set out by the AD in Hicklin v Secretary for 
Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195 that needs to be applied. The test in s 80A(c)(i) 
should therefore simply be whether the terms of the arrangement is such that it is 
comparable to one where “each party is independent of the other and, in so dealing, … 
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change strongly suggests that the legislature has purposefully intervened to 
ensure that facts such as those in Louw will not be considered normal again. 
This statutory intervention does not cause the incorporation of a business to 
be abnormal automatically, even if it is done with a tax purpose in mind.937 The 
effect is merely that when the incorporation of a business is not carried out on 
arm’s length terms, it will be considered abnormal, irrespective of the “nature of 
the transaction, operation or scheme in question”. 
Where a business is incorporated, it amounts to an agreement of sale in which 
the business transferred to the company represents the merx and the amount 
paid for it, the pretium. When the “arm’s length rights and obligations test” is 
applied in the context of a business being incorporated, the question becomes 
whether the business is transferred for equal counter-performance and at terms 
and conditions that one would expect to find in a sale of business agreement 
concluded between independent persons. If not, the transaction is abnormal, 
notwithstanding the earlier judgment of Louw dealing with the provisions of 
section 103. It is therefore clear that where the company is used for “general 
avoidance” purposes, transfer of assets to a company may still be carried out on 
arm’s length terms (whether at incorporation of the company or subsequently) 
and will be considered “normal” in terms of section 80A(c)(i). It is then possible to 
use a company for “general avoidance” purposes without making use of non-
arm’s length transactions when the income-producing assets are transferred to 
the company. 
The same would apply to “targeted avoidance” transactions, such as the 
taxation of dividends or the manipulation of withholding tax rates. Again, targeted 
avoidance may be achieved without necessarily entering into non-arm’s length 
transactions when transferring the asset in question, such as a share portfolio, to 
                                            
strive[s] to get the utmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself …”, 
irrespective of the nature of the transaction being considered. In other words, the terms 
of an arrangement must be considered as if concluded between independent persons, 
irrespective of the circumstances, the nature of the relationship, or the nature of the 
arrangement involved. 
937 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 194. 
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a company. Subsequent income flows, such as dividend declarations or fees 
charged, will, however, now render a different tax result,938 merely because of the 
involvement of the interposed company in the transaction. These tax benefits are 
achieved even if the initial transactions are carried out on arm’s length terms. 
However, the tax consequences of subsequent transactions following such an 
arm’s length transfer of assets to a company may differ, depending on whether 
the counter-party of the later transactions is a natural person or a company.  
The arm’s length test in section 80A(c)(i) therefore fails to address “general” 
and “targeted avoidance”, both of which are perfectly capable of being achieved 
by way of transactions concluded on arm’s length terms, whether it is at 
incorporation or using the characteristic of the company form for tax purposes at 
a later stage. The conclusion is therefore that both “general” and “targeted 
avoidance” may be achieved by using a company without it being considered 
abnormal under the “arm’s length rights and obligations test”. 
However, a contrary view was expressed in ITC 1606:  
 
“In die huidige geval, waar H [BK] in die prentjie gebring is bloot om die vermindering 
van belastingpligtigheid ten doel te hê, kan die transaksie, onses insiens, in sy geheel 
gesien, nie as normaal of een, (sic) uiterste voorwaardes beding (one at arm's length) 
beskou word nie.”939 
 
In other words, the court considered any transaction to amount to a non-arm’s 
length one, if a company was involved only for tax purposes. That judgment, 
however, provides no support or reason for the remark. Although the dictum is 
clearly based on the specific facts of that case only, I submit that it loses sight of 
the principle in Hicklin. A company’s assets and profits are those of the company 
alone and may only be disregarded if all four elements of the GAARs are shown 
to be present. In the above case, it would appear as though the tax purpose was 
considered to have tainted the court’s consideration of normality; something, 
which the often-quoted judgment in Hicklin is clear, should not be taken into 
                                            
938 Notably withholding taxes. 
939 ITC 1606 [1995] 58 SATC 328 338. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 220 
 
account when a court considers the normality of a transaction.940 If a transaction 
is considered on its own and found to have been concluded on arm’s length 
terms, the fact that the transaction was entered into for tax purposes is of no 
consequence in considering whether the transaction has taken place at arm’s 
length or not.941 
The conclusion in ITC 1714942 was that, although the trust may be a recognised 
business form through which to conduct business, using the trust for business 
does not render all transactions it executed normal: it depends on the terms of 
each of the transactions entered into by the trust. The conclusion holds true for 
the company form too. A company, even though a normal business form, is also 
capable of concluding abnormal, specifically non-arm’s length, transactions. The 
question of normality therefore requires a transaction-by-transaction approach, 
irrespective of the nature of the entity involved.  
 
3 3 2 Means or manner not normally employed 
The second test for abnormality involves an enquiry into whether a transaction 
“was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not 
normally be employed for bona fide [business] purposes, other than obtaining a 
tax benefit”.943 The test differs, depending on the context in which the transaction 
concerned was entered into. If in the context of business, the means or manner 
employed in the arrangement under scrutiny are measured against the means or 
manner employed for bona fide business purposes other than for obtaining a tax 
benefit. If not in the context of business, the test is whether the means or manner 
would be used for any other bona fide purposes (excluding for the purpose of 
obtaining a tax benefit). 
                                            
940 Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195. 
941 ITC 1699 [1999] 63 SATC 175 183 sets out the correct approach:  
“It is correct that a distinction must be drawn between purpose and abnormality such 
that it is indeed possible that, notwithstanding a tax saving purpose, a transaction may 
nonetheless be normal.” 
942 [1996] 63 SATC 507 515. 
943 S 80A(a)(i) and (b) of the Income Tax Act.  
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Section 103(1) similarly distinguished between transactions taking place in- 
and outside the context of business. The distinction was only introduced with 
effect from 3 July 1996.944 No case law exists to provide guidance on when a 
transaction will be considered to have been entered into in the context of business 
and when not. The distinction is accordingly not entirely clear.945 In the context of 
business,946 it has been argued that the test amounts to considering “[h]ow would 
businessmen generally, not motivated by any tax considerations but rather by 
‘bona fide business purposes’, have structured that transaction?”947 
It is not essential for purposes of this dissertation to conclude when an 
arrangement will fall within a business context and when it will fall in any other 
context. Suffice it to say that the context within which an arrangement has taken 
place must first be determined and classified. Thereafter it must be considered 
whether the means or manner in which that arrangement was entered into in that 
specific context would normally have been employed. Very little therefore 
appears to depend on the distinction of the context within which an arrangement 
is to be considered for purposes of applying the “normal means or manner” test, 
save for offering a benchmark against which to consider the actual means or 
manner employed in the arrangement under consideration. 
Hicklin’s case states that if a transaction was entered into at arm’s length,948 
the means or manner employed would more likely be normal than abnormal. 
Should a court however find that a transaction was not entered into on an arm’s 
length basis contemplated in section 80A(c)(i), the other indicators for 
abnormality need not even be considered. This obviates the need to apply the 
                                            
944 S 29(1) of the Income Tax Act 36 of 1996, which introduced the above subsections 
(aa) and (bb) of s 103(1)(b)(i). 
945 See also SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 24. 
946 S 103(1)(b)(i)(aa) of the Income Tax Act 36 of 1996. 
947 ITC 1712 [2000] 63 SATC 499 at 501. The court here was prepared to accept for 
present purposes that this test reflects the law but declined to decide the point 
definitively. 
948 Whether between arm’s length parties or at arm’s length terms (see text to part 3 3 1 
of this chapter and n 932 above). 
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“means or manner” test.949 If it is therefore accepted that the “arm’s length rights 
and obligations test” is the appropriate point of departure when applying the test 
for abnormality,950 an enquiry into the means or manner in which a transaction 
was entered into can therefore only depart from an acceptance that the relevant 
transaction has been entered into at arm’s length. Failing this, the transaction will 
be considered abnormal ab initio by virtue of section 80A(c)(i), and the application 
of the “means or manner” test becomes of academic importance only. This would 
be the case irrespective of whether the transaction in question has been entered 
into in the context of business or otherwise. 
It is further significant that the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit is considered 
not to be a bona fide purpose in terms of this test, irrespective of whether this is 
in the context of business or otherwise. In this regard, section 80A(a)(i) and (b) 
expressly refers to a bona fide purpose, “other than obtaining a tax benefit”. 
Regardless of whether arguments may exist to support an assertion that entering 
into a transaction to obtain a tax benefit may be a bona fide purpose in- or outside 
the context of business, when applying the test in section 80A(a)(i) and (b) one 
must regard the obtaining of a tax benefit as not being a bona fide purpose.951 
The test requires an objective test to be applied:952 irrespective of the potential 
tax benefits of an arrangement, how would other parties have structured the same 
arrangement? The test would largely depend on a fact-specific enquiry. 
                                            
949 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 37 confirms 
that this test is conceptually the same as its predecessor. Precedent relevant to the test 
as contained s 103(1) therefore remains relevant. 
950 As is suggested by Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue [1979] 41 SATC 179 195. 
951 Both the Margo and Katz Commissions recommended that the GAARs provide 
expressly that a tax purpose is not considered a bona fide purpose. The risk identified 
was that in the absence of such express provision, particular transactions widely 
engaged in for tax purposes may be considered to become “normal” over time as a result 
of its common and general occurrence. (See SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance 
and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) 39 et seq.) 
952 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 24; see also 
Kujinga (2012) CILSA 52 for a similar conclusion on the position for the Canadian 
GAARs. 
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Objectively considered, one would typically expect any non-tax driven transaction 
to be structured in the most cost-effective and least complex manner possible, 
with as few steps as possible being entered into to bring about the desired 
commercial result.953 Simplicity is therefore key in evaluating whether the means 
or manner in which an arrangement was entered into would have been normally 
employed. If a more complex structure is therefore preferred, the reasons for it 
must be demonstrable. For example, added complexity would result in reduced 
commercial risk or increased bargaining power. It bears reminding at this stage 
that the test is not simply whether the relevant arrangement exhibits unusual 
means or is entered into in an abnormal manner, but rather whether the 
arrangement’s features present elements which one would not normally expect 
to encounter for parties seeking to achieve a bona fide purpose.954 
The effectiveness of the means or manner test in curbing the intentional 
avoidance of tax by using corporate personality is limited by the fact that the 
“bona fide purpose” requirement is objective. Generally speaking, can it ever be 
objectively considered abnormal to incorporate a business, for example, given 
the many non-tax benefits associated with incorporation? Quite likely no, not even 
if subjectively done for tax purposes. One cannot ignore the non-tax 
consequences that using the corporate veil brings with it, such as protection of 
shareholders, which, objectively, is commercially attractive and which 
consequence would result due to the operation of law, whether in the context of 
business or otherwise.955 Therefore, even if an arrangement would fall foul of a 
                                            
953 On the assumption that no other non-tax related reasons may require the transaction 
to be structured in a more complex manner or through more complex means. It may be 
that a more complex structure may achieve the same economic result, yet with fewer 
commercial risks arising as a result. 
954 ITC 1699 [1999] 63 SATC 175 183. 
955 In Louw it was concluded that the mere incorporation of a business cannot be 
considered abnormal. That case relied heavily though on the requirement that the means 
or manner test be applied by having regard to the nature of the transaction as well as 
the prevailing circumstances in which it is concluded. Both these requirements were 
subsequently removed from the GAARs and Louw can thus no longer serve as 
justification that the incorporation of a business presents a normal means or manner. 
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subjective purpose test, the objective bona fide purpose test would still be passed 
simply because the company as legal entity brings with it consequences which, 
objectively, will be commercially attractive.956 
This poses a significant obstacle in applying the means or manner test in 
instances of “general” as well as “targeted avoidance”. 
In relation to “general avoidance”, Geustyn makes clear that the incorporation 
of an existing business would generally not be considered abnormal.957 It is 
therefore authority for the proposition that the incorporation of an existing 
business may pass the “means or manner” test. Although the rule laid down in 
Geustyn is by no means absolute and depends on the relevant facts,958 it is 
                                            
This however does not derogate from the fact that a business or assets may still be 
transferred to a company by virtue of normal means or in a normal manner on the basis 
that objective reasons exist (other than a tax benefit) for the business or assets to be so 
transferred to a company. 
956 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert [1971] 33 SATC 113 
119:  
“there is nothing abnormal in transferring an existing partnership business to a 
company: indeed, such a transaction may, I think, fairly be regarded as relatively 
commonplace in the commercial world.”  
See also EB Broomberg “Then and now – VIII: Some conclusions” (2008) 22 Tax 
Planning where the author argues that the interposition of an entity is likely to fail the 
normality test if the entity has no objectively plausible interest in the subject matter of the 
interest. ITC 1606 [1995] 58 SATC 328 338 presents an ostensibly contrary view where 
Tebbutt J held the view that  
“… waar H in die prentjie gebring is bloot om die vermindering van belastingpligtigheid 
ten doel te hê, kan die transaksie, onses insiens, in sy geheel gesien, nie as normaal 
… beskou word nie.”  
It is considered that this dictum cannot be considered to have laid down a rule other than 
to confirm that where objectively (and not subjectively) the company has been interposed 
in a structure for a tax purpose it will then be considered abnormal in terms of the means 
or manner test. It is important here that the subjective purpose test in the introductory 
part of s 80A is not confused with the objective bona fide purpose test contained in the 
means or manner test as part of the normality requirement (ITC 1699 [1999] 63 SATC 
175 183). 
957 [1971] 33 SATC 113. 
958 [1971] 33 SATC 113 119. 
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unclear if the incorporation of a business can ever be considered abnormal in 
terms of the means or manner test, especially considering that it is an objective 
test which applies to this indicator. The same would generally be true for any 
transfer of assets to an existing company. The transfer of assets to a company 
for “general avoidance” purposes, whether transferred as part of an existing 
business or not, creates objective legal rights and obligations which would 
amount to a normal means or manner of dealing with one’s assets. These 
benefits would be relevant in a non-business context too. The means or manner 
of incorporation would be “normal” in the objective sense, even if subjectively 
these legal consequences are of secondary importance to the transferor. For 
“general avoidance” purposes, using the “means or manner” test to counter the 
use of corporate personality to manipulate the ultimate tax consequences of the 
shareholder is accordingly ineffective. 
As regards “targeted avoidance”, the means or manner test presents varying 
results and its efficacy can therefore be called into question. Consider Example 
1 above959 where an individual chooses to hold share investments through a 
wholly owned company merely to delay dividends tax being levied. In such an 
example, as was the case for “general avoidance”, the means or manner 
employed may arguably be normal.960 It may be argued that the same rights and 
obligations would be created, in the simplest way possible, by way of the same 
means or manner as in the case of any investor that would prefer to hold 
investments in a separate vehicle. Consequently, there is nothing objectionable 
to such a structure from a commercial perspective and this too would be the case 
for any other investor, irrespective of the subjective motive with which these 
shares are purchased in or transferred to the wholly owned company. 
Conversely, instances of treaty shopping (Example 3) prove to be more 
complicated. Complex structures that duplicate costs would more likely be 
considered abnormal if layers of companies are used and located in various 
                                            
959 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
960 It is submitted that it is not abnormal for an individual to hold listed shares through a 
holding company. Thus the means used by the individual, namely the use of the holding 
company, is not abnormal. 
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jurisdictions to act as extended conduits through which profits are repatriated to 
a holding company. The subjective purpose is irrelevant in considering whether 
such a structure would be abnormal in terms of the means or manner test. 
However, objectively, one must consider why various companies are used to 
repatriate dividends where the absence of any intermediary companies would 
have achieved the same commercial results. This could possibly be an example 
of where the means or manner in which a group structure is set up may amount 
to it being considered abnormal within the context of the means or manner test, 
although this is by no means definitive. Every single transfer of an asset or 
interposition of a company, considered on its own, may very well be implemented 
by way of normal means or in a normal manner. However, where an intricate 
string of companies is designed through which an investment is indirectly held, 
the question becomes more complicated. It is conceivable that a court will find 
that interposing a single company is in itself inadequate to exhibit a sufficient 
degree of abnormality to satisfy the “abnormal means or manner” test. In the 
absence of direct precedent on the matter, it is my view that a court may likely 
consider the transfer of an asset to a string of companies ultimately owned by the 
transferor as being abnormal for purposes of the means or manner test.  
Interestingly, the incorporation and interposition of the companies in the 
various jurisdictions do not give rise to a tax benefit. The tax benefit from this 
intricate company group structure only manifests once dividends are declared 
from one company to the next. In other words, the tax benefit is not linked to the 
interposition of the conduit, but to the subsequent proverbial opening of the 
commercial tap. It is highly unlikely that the declaration of dividends alone would 
be considered abnormal. However, to the extent that one could show that the 
avoidance of withholding taxes in any applicable jurisdiction through treaty 
shopping was the ultimate objective of setting up the various companies, the 
incorporation of the various companies and the declaration of dividends could be 
considered a unitary scheme.961 In such a case, the avoidance of withholding 
                                            
961 See the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above for reasons why subsequent dividend 
declarations are unlikely to form part of a unitary scheme. 
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taxes on dividend declarations may be considered abnormal by virtue of the initial 
group structure created.962 Suffice it to say that the means or manner test 
presents varying degrees of efficiency in addressing the use of the corporate veil 
for tax reasons. 
 
3 3 3 Lacks commercial substance 
The first of the two newly introduced indicators contained in sections 80A to L of 
the Income Tax Act applies to an arrangement if it “lacks commercial 
substance”.963 The indicator is only applicable in the context of business. This 
could present a limitation on its application to prevent the abuse of the corporate 
veil for mainly tax purposes, as the test cannot apply as indicator in a context 
other than business. This is a unique limitation to the first of the four potential 
indicators of abnormality. 
To establish whether an arrangement lacks commercial substance, the 
provisions of section 80C must be taken into account. In turn, section 80C is 
prescriptive as to when an arrangement would lack commercial substance. It is 
not clear whether it is possible for an arrangement to lack commercial substance 
in terms of section 80A(a)(ii) even if such an arrangement would fall outside the 
scope of section 80C. However, the context surrounding subsections 80C(1) and 
(2), and the broad and general test set out in section 80C(1), which was clearly 
not meant to apply to specific preconceived scenarios, indicates that section 80C 
is meant to serve as an exhaustive provision. In other words, an arrangement 
                                            
962 Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 as referred to in Louw 
and Meyerowitz. Cf ITC 1862 [2012] 75 SATC 34 para 50 et seq. See also the text to 
part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
963 S 80A(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
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cannot lack commercial substance in terms of section 80A(a)(ii) if it does not meet 
the criteria in section 80C.964+965  
Although the contents of subsections 80C(1) and (2) are analysed below,966 
the relationship between these two subsections is confusing and it is not clear 
whether the provisions are meant to be read together, or whether they are meant 
to serve as separate tests.967 This dissertation does not offer a view on how this 
question should be approached. For the present analysis it will do to regard an 
arrangement as being abnormal on the basis of it lacking commercial substance 
if it qualifies as a transaction in terms of either section 80C(1) or 80C(2) as there 
appears at least a reasonable prospect that an arrangement falling within either 
of these provisions may be considered to lack commercial substance.968 It is 
                                            
964 See also SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 27 
which agrees with this approach. EB Broomberg “Then and now – V: The commercial 
substance test” (2008) 22 Tax Planning 51 also suggests that the “lack of commercial 
substance” test is effectively defined in s 80C(1). 
965 If anything, the open-ended wording of s 80A(a)(ii) emphasises that which s 80C(2) 
makes clear, being that the indicators listed there present examples rather than a 
definitive list of instances when commercial substance would be lacking from an 
arrangement. An unrestrictive approach to “commercial substance” is therefore provided 
for in s 80C(2) already. The wide interpretation afforded by s 80C(2) therefore further 
supports the argument that s 80C should be relied upon as the defining provision of 
“commercial substance” as envisaged in s 80A(a)(ii). S 80C does not encroach upon or 
restrict an interpretation of what “commercial substance” would entail by setting 
predefined limitations through the predefined scenarios specifically addressed in s 
80C(1) and (2). 
966 See the text to parts 3 3 3 1 and 3 3 3 2 of this chapter below. 
967 Broomberg (2008) 22 Tax Planning 51; EB Broomberg “Then and now – VII: Two 
more indicators” (2008) 22 Tax Planning 103 advances the view that the two tests should 
be treated as separate. The contrary view of De Koker & Williams Silke on South African 
Income Tax ch 19.39 is that s 80C(2) offers examples of arrangements which would lack 
commercial substance as envisaged in s 80C(1). 
968 Broomberg VII (2008) Tax Planning 103; SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the 
General Anti-Avoidance Rule 29 argues that an arrangement falling into one of the 
preconceived categories of s 80C(2) should be subjected to the presumptive test 
contained in s 80C(1). As argued persuasively by Broomberg VII (2008) Tax Planning, it 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 229 
 
therefore suggested that section 80A(a)(ii) may apply if an arrangement falls 
either within the provisions of section 80C(1) or exhibits any one of the traits 
specifically mentioned in section 80C(2) or exhibits some similar characteristic. 
 
3 3 3 1 Section 80C(1): The arrangement’s effect upon business risks and 
cash flow 
Section 80C(1) provides that: 
 
“… an avoidance arrangement lacks commercial substance if it would result in a 
significant tax benefit for a party … but does not have a significant effect upon either 
the business risks or net cash flows of that party apart from any effect attributable to 
the tax benefit that would be obtained …” 
 
Earlier it was assumed that a tax benefit exists for the arrangements being 
considered.969 Whether a “significant” tax benefit is achieved by using the 
corporate veil remains to be considered. Furthermore, whether either the 
business risks or net cash flows of the shareholder have been significantly 
affected as a result, must also be examined. 
It is uncertain what a “significant” tax benefit would entail and how it would 
differ from an “ordinary” tax benefit. The test to determine what would be regarded 
as significant970 is also uncertain. Would it involve a mere quantitative exercise,971 
or does it require a more involved approach by having regard to the relevant facts 
and circumstances of each case?972 It is equally unclear whether a tax benefit 
which creates a mere postponement of liability for tax could also amount to a 
“significant” tax benefit being achieved. Since the possibility that a “significant” 
tax benefit may be created by using the corporate veil for tax purposes exists, 
                                            
would accordingly have been unnecessary to include the non-exhaustive list in s 80C(2) 
to start off with, should this interpretation be correct. 
969 See text to ch 5 part 2 above. 
970 As relates to a “tax benefit”, “business risks” or “net cash flows”. 
971 Broomberg V (2008) Tax Planning 50. 
972 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 18 et seq. 
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this dissertation assumes that the tax benefit created as a result will also be a 
“significant” tax benefit. 
Incorporating either an operating business or a passive investment would not 
immediately alter the economic value of the investment in the hands of the owner. 
However, that is not the test that should be applied. The question is not whether 
there has been an increase in value as a result of the transfer. Rather, the 
question to be asked is to what extent the business risks and net cash flows of 
the relevant parties have been affected. It has been argued that the test is two-
pronged, namely:973 
 
(a) Were there any significant changes to the business risks or net cash flows 
of each party involved in the arrangement? 
(b) If “no” for any party in (a) above, has there been a significant tax benefit 
created for that party as a result of the arrangement? 
 
If “yes” in (b), the arrangement in question would lack commercial substance.974 
From an anti-avoidance perspective, the weakness of the “business risks or net 
cash flows” test lies therein that the test requires the position of “a party” to the 
arrangement to be considered. The corporate veil creates that additional party to 
an arrangement. For the company, its business risks and potential cash flows 
(where applicable) will change when the assets are transferred to it. Irrespective 
of whether the transferee company obtained a significant tax benefit or not,975 the 
assets transferred to it will necessarily have a significant effect on the business 
                                            
973 BT Kujinga “The economic substance doctrine against abusive tax shelters in the 
United States: lessons for South Africa” (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 218 244. 
974 Naturally if the answer in (a) is “yes”, the inquiry stops there and there is no lack of 
commercial substance. 
975 It is arguable whether the transferee company will actually be better off from a tax 
perspective. It will not be paying less tax than before acquisition of the assets transferred 
to it. By involving the company in the corporate structure of the transferor, the tax benefit 
arising is not that of the company, but ultimately that of the transferor which will be in a 
net better tax position on an economic consolidated basis. 
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risks and net cash flows for all parties to that arrangement, thereby ensuring that 
the provisions of section 80C(1) cannot be applied to it as part of the asset 
transfer.976 
The business risks that are inherently attached to an asset, are transferred to 
the company, when it takes transfer of the assets. For example, the risk of the 
assets being lost, destroyed, or decreasing in value, is assumed by the company 
on transfer. This has a significant effect on the business risks of both the 
transferor and transferee, which puts the arrangement beyond the scope of 
section 80C(1) for both parties.977 
Since the business risks978 linked to an asset transferred to a company will 
necessarily have a significant effect on the business risks of the parties involved, 
it becomes irrelevant in terms of the commercial substance test whether such a 
transfer will also affect any person’s cash flows. For even if cash flows are 
unaffected, section 80C(1) applies only where neither business risks nor cash 
flows are affected by the arrangement. If business risks are affected, then 
commercial substance is still present. For purposes of the current enquiry the 
question whether cash flows are altered appears to be irrelevant since the tax 
benefits achieved through use of the corporate veil could very well be achieved 
with or without altering cash flows. 
Consequently, section 80C(1) on its own would be ineffective in combatting 
impermissible tax avoidance resulting from using the corporate veil to achieve a 
tax benefit, whether in the context of “targeted” or “general avoidance”.979 
 
                                            
976 Broomberg V (2008) Tax Planning 50. 
977 The wording of s 80C(1) suggests that that provision will be inapplicable even if the 
tax benefit is more significant than the effect on net cash flows or business risks, as long 
as these too are significant. 
978 “Business risks” is an undefined term, but could include a variety of risks attendant to 
conducting business, such as market risk, credit risk, operational risk, and foreign 
exchange risk (De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.39). 
979 When applying the provisions of s 80F(a) in conjunction with s 80C(1) though, a 
different result appears to emerge. See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 3 below. 
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3 3 3 2 Section 80C(2): Indicators for lacking commercial substance 
Section 80C(2) expressly does not intend to present an exhaustive list of criteria 
indicative of whether an arrangement would lack commercial substance or not.980  
The introductory part of that provision is clear that the indicators of a lack of 
commercial substance “are not limited to” those indicators listed in section 
80C(2)(a) and (b).981 It is not entirely clear what other characteristics would also 
be indicative of an arrangement lacking commercial substance.982 This will 
ultimately depend on the facts. However, if the ejusdem generis rule of statutory 
interpretation is applied, the other tests already specifically listed in section 
80C(2)(a) and (b) will be important.983 These potential other characteristics will 
be considered after first considering what those factors already listed in section 
80C(2)(a) and (b) comprise. 
Section 80C(2)(a) requires the legal substance or legal effect of an 
arrangement which achieves a tax benefit to accord with its legal form: 
 
“(2) For purposes of this Part, characteristics of an avoidance arrangement that are 
indicative of a lack of commercial substance include but are not limited to – 
 
(a)  the legal substance or effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole is 
inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the legal form of its 
individual steps …” 
 
Due to the legal fiction of separate legal personality, this test is wholly 
inapplicable where the corporate veil is used to achieve a tax benefit. Although 
legal personality involves a legal fiction and may be considered an exception to 
the substance over form doctrine,984 it is nonetheless a statutorily created legal 
                                            
980 SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 26. 
981 See also the National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Bill (2006) 63. 
982 National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 
(2006) 64 provides only one further example. This example is irrelevant to this 
dissertation. 
983 Cf De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 46.22. 
984 See the text to ch 2 part 4 2 1 above. 
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rule.985 At the transfer of any asset to a company to achieve a tax benefit, the 
legal substance and effect and legal form will be consistent, insofar as the 
corporate veil is concerned, due to the operation of law.986 The corporate veil’s 
existence is a manifestation of legal substance. Upon a valid transfer of an asset 
to a company, the company will be the owner of that asset. Therefore, both in 
substance and form the company will be the owner of the assets and not the 
transferor. Consequently, for both “targeted” and “general avoidance”, section 
80C(2)(a) could not apply to pierce the corporate veil. Income generating assets 
transferred to a company will not lack commercial substance as contemplated in 
section 80C(2)(a). 
Section 80(2)(b) provides as follows: 
 
“(2) For purposes of this Part, characteristics of an avoidance arrangement that are 
indicative of a lack of commercial substance include but are not limited to – 
(a) … 
(b)  the inclusion or presence of - 
(i)  round trip financing as described in section 80D; or 
(ii) an accommodating or tax indifferent party as described in section 
80E; or 
(iii)  elements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each 
other.” 
 
As argued earlier, where the corporate veil is used for tax purposes and the 
arrangement is not a unitary scheme, the GAARs can only apply to the transfer 
                                            
985 See the text to ch 2 part 1 above. 
986 Kujinga (2015) SA Merc LJ 228 et seq compares how the economic substance 
doctrine in the USA may be applied to assist with an interpretation of the “commercial 
substance” test in s 80C(1) of the Income Tax Act (at 221). While the conclusions and 
recommendations there would potentially be helpful in approaching s 80C in future, care 
should be taken not to confuse “substance” or “commercial substance” with “legal 
substance” (which is the test prescribed by s 80C(2)(a)). While Kujinga’s conclusions 
and recommendations may certainly be applied in most cases where s 80C(1) generally 
(as well as potentially subsection (2)(a) specifically) is concerned (in other words, where 
“substance”, “economic substance” and “legal substance” may amount to the same 
notion), this is not the case where the “legal substance” of separate corporate personality 
is concerned. “Legal substance”, where corporate personality is involved, differs 
fundamentally from “substance” or “economic substance”. 
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of the assets to the company (step one) and not to the subsequent arrangements, 
when those assets are utilised to generate income (step two).987 
Section 80C(2)(b)(i), dealing with round trip financing, will not apply when an 
asset is transferred to a company, as such a transfer of ownership will not involve 
round trip financing.988 
Section 80C(2)(b)(ii) deals with “accommodating or tax-indifferent parties” and 
is equally inapplicable. Section 80E, which defines this concept, sets one of two 
potential preconditions for a person to be considered an “accommodating or tax-
indifferent party”.989  
The first potential basis to be considered as such is that that person or any 
amount received by that person must not be “subject to normal tax”.990 Most 
South African resident companies are subject to South African income tax and 
thus “normal tax”.991 Given the generally strict tax regulatory framework within 
which accommodating or tax-indifferent parties are required to operate,992 it is 
difficult to see how the involvement of such a party in an arrangement as 
transferee would still meet the commercial requirements of the shareholder.993 In 
                                            
987 See the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
988 As contemplated in s 80D of the Income Tax Act and which is referred to by s 
80C(2)(b)(i) of that Act. 
989 S 80E(1)(a)(i) and (ii). 
990 S 80E(1)(a)(i). Normal tax is levied in terms of s 5 of the Income Tax Act and is the 
income tax – refer definition of “income tax” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. See also the 
example in SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 31. 
991 Various limited exceptions exist, and which companies are specifically mentioned in 
s 10(1) of the Income Tax Act as being exempt from income tax. These companies 
include either non-profit companies (the position of which is not considered in this 
dissertation (see the text to ch 1 part 2 2 above)) or involve instances so exceptional that 
it is also not considered here in any further detail. 
992 Such as public benefit organisations and those other entities specifically dealt with in 
s 10 of the Income Tax Act. 
993 In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR [1996] 58 SATC 229, a pension fund was 
used as part of a tax motivated scheme. Although the case was not decided in terms of 
the then operative GAARs, the role of the pension fund in the relevant scheme might be 
described as that of a tax indifferent party.  
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the unlikely cases where the use of an accommodating or tax-indifferent party 
could still be used to achieve a tax benefit, section 80C(2)(b)(ii) may very well 
present a potential basis for piercing in terms of the GAARs.  
From the position of the transferor, due to the South African residence basis 
of taxation applied by the Income Tax Act, all non-resident companies will be 
subject to South African income tax on South African source income.994 In a 
transaction aimed at achieving an income tax benefit,995 the transferor of an asset 
will not be a tax accommodating or tax-indifferent party, as such party would 
otherwise not have needed to transfer the asset, since it was already not subject 
to South African income tax.996 The same logic extends to amounts that may be 
received exempt from income tax by the transferee entity (such as local 
dividends).997 Considering that the GAARs are intended to act as remedial 
provision only, it is unlikely that the provisions of section 80E(1)(a)(i) could be 
invoked where the amounts in question would have been exempt from income 
tax in the hands of the transferor. 
The second basis upon which persons may qualify as accommodating or tax-
indifferent parties in terms of section 80C(2)(b)(ii) relates to the offsetting of 
amounts as described in section 80E(1)(a)(ii). That provision is inapplicable for 
the same reasons that section 80C(2)(b)(iii), also dealing with offsetting, is 
inapplicable. It is therefore appropriate to discuss section 80E(1)(a)(ii) read with 
                                            
994 See the definition of “gross income” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
995 S 80E(1)(a)(i) does not extend to taxes other than the income (or normal) tax. 
996 It is possible that a person not subject to normal tax may be subject to other taxes on 
income (such as any of the withholding taxes) and that it transfers the assets in an 
attempt to avoid these. However, these persons (typically not subject to income tax by 
virtue of their tax residence) would become subject to the income tax based on the 
source of the income received. It is therefore difficult to contemplate a scenario where a 
person will not be subject to income tax, yet subject to other source-based taxes (such 
as any of the South African withholding taxes) which it seeks to avoid. It is considered 
unlikely that examples exist where the transferor would qualify as a tax-indifferent or 
accommodating party yet consider it necessary to transfer assets to achieve a relief from 
South African taxes. 
997 S 10(1)(k)(i) of the Income Tax Act.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 236 
 
section 80C(2)(b)(ii), together with section 80C(2)(b)(iii) to illustrate why neither 
will apply in the piercing context.  
Section 80C(2)(b)(iii) contemplates arrangements whereby elements of the 
arrangement will “have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other”. For 
purposes of this dissertation, the applicability of this test is only considered where 
a transfer of assets to a company takes place on arm’s length terms. If the transfer 
of asset did not take place on arm’s length terms, the arrangement would already 
be considered abnormal.998 I submit that an arm’s length transfer of assets to a 
company cannot be considered as “offsetting or cancelling each other” and 
therefore by implication lacking commercial substance. When a business is 
incorporated, or assets sold to a company on arm’s length terms, a sales 
transaction is entered into. Therefore, counter-performance in the form of either 
cash, debt, the assumption of the transferor’s debt or the issuance of shares is 
required. None of these resemble the characteristics envisaged in either sections 
80E(1)(a)(ii) or 80C(2)(b)(iii). 
To conclude an analysis of the specific provisions in terms of which an 
arrangement may lack commercial substance: none of these will apply in a 
situation where the veil is pierced for tax purposes. To consider which other 
transactions, not specifically addressed by section 80C(2)(a) or (b), may 
nonetheless potentially fall within the ambit of section 80C(2),999 it is necessary 
to consider what trait subsections (2)(a) to (2)(b)(iii) have in common and then to 
consider whether this may be applied to abuse of corporate personality for tax 
purposes. 
Broomberg suggests that the theme of section 80C(2) involves the 
interposition of a party in a transaction, in which such party has no economic 
interest, so as to secure a tax benefit for the “real parties”.1000 This appears to be 
an appropriate summary and encapsulates the essence of section 80C: an 
                                            
998 See text to ch 5 part 3 3 1 above. 
999 Which provision has been drafted in an open-ended fashion. 
1000 Broomberg VII (2008) Tax Planning 103; see also the further examples listed in the 
SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 35 et seq, 
although notably the Draft Guide fails to identify a general consistent principle which s 
80C(2) seeks to achieve. 
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arrangement would be considered to lack commercial substance if a party is left 
commercially in substantially the same position before and after a transaction, 
except for the tax benefit achieved. However, the suggested approach does carry 
the risk of being applied too liberally. In my view, the test cannot simply be an 
examination of whether a party to an arrangement has been enriched as a result 
of the arrangement. If the test was applied too liberally, many arm’s length 
negotiated transactions could be regarded as lacking commercial substance, 
leading to absurd results. I therefore submit that the question should rather be 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that a party involved in an arrangement 
may reasonably be considered to benefit commercially from the arrangement 
either immediately or in future, through commercial benefits created as a result 
of the arrangement. The substance-based enquiry for section 80C(2) proposed 
here is therefore a potentially much wider test than the “business risks” and “net 
cash flow” analysis required by section 80C(1). Whereas the test in section 
80C(1) takes what can be described as an immediate or short-term view of the 
results of a transaction, section 80C(2) requires a longer term and potentially 
more permanent effect before an arrangement will be regarded as indeed having 
commercial substance. 
At a more general level, the problem when using the commercial substance 
test in section 80C to address the abuse of corporate personality for tax purposes 
is two-fold.  
In the first instance, a company has legal substance. This is significant since 
the legal substance afforded to a company cannot be entirely separated from the 
question of commercial substance in the corporate personality context. Barring 
the application of section 20(9) of the Companies Act, the company, as separate 
legal person, is able to act as a party to an arrangement. Therefore, it is able to 
benefit commercially itself, even if it is with the ultimate goal of creating a tax 
benefit for its shareholder(s). The commercial realities thus draw on the legal 
substance created by the fiction of legal personality. The company can create 
commercial benefits (in other words commercial substance) for itself by virtue of 
its ability to own assets. 
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This is relevant for the use of the company in instances of “general avoidance”, 
where the company would generate wealth for its own account by employing the 
assets transferred to it. To a more limited extent, the barrier would also be present 
in instances of “targeted avoidance”, which would typically entail the company 
being used as a conduit: receiving profits and passing it on in due course, typically 
by way of dividends payments. Especially where the distribution of profits to 
shareholders is not immediate, those profits would also belong to the company, 
both legally and commercially, thus creating commercial substance for it. 
The second barrier to employing the commercial substance test as a means 
of combatting impermissible tax avoidance using corporate personality, is that the 
test is objective, a point relevant for “targeted avoidance”. The question, at the 
stage when an asset is transferred to a company,1001 is whether that company is 
objectively able to use that asset for its own commercial benefit. It is irrelevant 
whether it in fact intends to use it for its own commercial benefit. The objective 
test would have to be applied by having regard to the rights and obligations linked 
to such a transfer. For example, if a company acquires the use of an asset as a 
lessee but is obligated to sublease this asset to another party on exactly the same 
terms, it could be argued that the main lease agreement is without any 
commercial substance. The same argument applies where a company is 
employed to hold investments yet is obliged in terms of a contract and the terms 
of a specific class of shares to distribute any distributions received to its 
shareholders upon receipt thereof. In such an instance too, any share 
investments held by the company could quite reasonably be considered to lack 
commercial substance, as there is no reasonable, objective prospect that the 
company will hold the shares for its own commercial benefit. The problem with 
the objective test however, is that a company may very well not be obliged to 
pass on distributions to shareholders. Yet that may be the exact intent with which 
the investments in question were transferred to it, namely to ensure the timeous 
distribution thereof to its shareholder who ultimately controls it. In terms of the 
objective commercial substance test, such a subjective intention would be 
irrelevant. Objectively, the company can utilise its investment for its own 
                                            
1001 See the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
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commercial benefit. Whether it actually intends utilising it for that purpose is 
another question altogether and cannot change the fact that the acquisition of an 
investment (or the right of use of a property through a lease agreement) is 
commercially substantive. 
It follows that whether an arrangement lacks commercial substance or not 
appears to present a limited remedy in combatting the intentional avoidance of 
tax through use of the corporate veil. This is primarily because the legal 
substance granted to the company by virtue of incorporation in terms of the 
Companies Act enables a company to also have commercial substance. 
 
3 3 3 3 The effect of section 80F(a) 
Section 80C should not be considered in isolation. Section 80F(a) has a direct 
bearing on the application of section 80C and provides that: 
 
“[f]or the purposes of applying section 80C or determining whether or not a tax benefit 
exists for purposes of this Part, the Commissioner may treat parties who are 
connected persons in relation to each other as one and the same person …” 
 
This provision presents another example of a piercing provision contained in 
the Income Tax Act.1002 Section 80F(a) allows for piercing of the corporate veil of 
a company in relation to a connected person1003 to determine whether an 
arrangement, such as the transfer of an asset, lacks commercial substance. For 
purposes of that enquiry, the company and the connected person (such as 
potentially a shareholder) are treated as the same person. An exercise of this 
nature would conceivably involve considering the economic unit holistically to 
                                            
1002 The piercing provision in s 80F(a) is a piercing provision of general application, as 
opposed to those piercing provisions identified elsewhere in the Income Tax Act aimed 
at curbing specific instances of tax avoidance – see the text to part 1 of this chapter 
above. 
1003 The term “connected person” is widely defined in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. Although 
the term is to be applied within the confines of the definition, it would almost always 
include a significant shareholder of a company. 
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determine whether the transaction has brought about any significant commercial 
benefits to that unit. 
As discussed earlier, neither section 80A(a)(ii), nor section 80C provides a 
clear definition of what “commercial substance” entails. What is clear from an 
analysis of section 80C,1004 is that for a transaction to have commercial 
substance, it must have some sort of “effect”. Therefore, where an asset is 
transferred between a company and a connected person, the application of the 
piercing provision in section 80F(a) would result in that transaction having no net 
effect, other than for the tax benefit created. 
Through section 80F(a), the GAARs may be applied as remedy against both 
“targeted” and “general avoidance” where the corporate veil is used. Consider the 
“targeted avoidance” example of treaty shopping in Example 3.1005 Where 
numerous companies are interposed in various jurisdictions to ensure that the 
repatriation of profits result in as little withholding tax as possible, the structure 
will most likely fail at the commercial substance hurdle, when considered in light 
of section 80F(a). Whether various companies are interposed or not, the 
commercial substance of the economic unit as a whole remains unchanged, 
indicating a lack of commercial substance through the interposition of the 
companies involved. The same would apply for “general avoidance” where a 
company is employed to house a business or a share investment: the commercial 
substance of the economic unit comprising the shareholder and company will be 
the same, irrespective of whether a company would have existed as a means to 
house the assets or not. In the context of section 80C(1) specifically, the business 
risks and cash flows of the economic unit would remain unaltered if considered 
on a net consolidated basis, yet it would achieve a significant tax benefit as a 
result. 
An exception will be where real economic benefits can objectively be created 
in the hands of the company, which would otherwise have been impossible if 
ownership of the asset remained with the shareholder. Such a result may very 
well occur, for example where assets which will create economic synergies are 
                                            
1004 See the text to part 3 3 3 2 of this chapter above. 
1005 See the text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
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transferred to a company, or where more than one shareholder pool assets 
together in a single company. Where the company however serves no objective 
purpose, other than to act as the puppet of the shareholder, one may very well 
find that such a transfer holds no economic or commercial substance when 
viewed holistically, as enabled by section 80F(a). 
Although section 80C would appear to apply in instances of abuse of the 
corporate veil for tax purposes, two reasons exist why it may nevertheless be an 
ineffective remedy for SARS. 
In the first instance, it should be borne in mind that section 80C only operates 
in the context of business and what would have been an effective remedy against 
the abuse of legal personality for tax purposes, cannot be applied in a context 
other than business. Therefore, section 80F(a) as applied to section 80C can 
likewise only apply in a business context. This may present an obstacle where an 
individual chooses to hold share investments through a company to avoid the 
immediate instance of dividends tax (Example 1), although it remains unclear 
whether such a scenario would be in the context of business or not. 
Secondly, and of broader application, section 80B presents inherent limitations 
for the GAARs to apply in instances of abuse of the corporate veil, even where 
an impermissible avoidance arrangement can be said to exist. These limitations 
are discussed in more detail below.1006 
 
3 3 4 Misuse or abuse of the Income Tax Act 
The final of the four potential indicators of abnormality involves the question if in 
any context the arrangement would “result directly or indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of provisions of” the Income Tax Act.1007 
3 3 4 1 “Misuse or abuse” in the general anti-avoidance rules 
Whereas the “commercial substance” test discussed above1008 contains specific 
statutory guidelines relating to its implementation, such guidelines are not 
                                            
1006 See the text to part 3 4 of this chapter below. 
1007 S 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act.  
1008 See the text to part 3 3 3 of this chapter above. 
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provided for the “misuse or abuse” test in the GAARs. Furthermore, in the 
absence of any reported judgments on the application of section 80A(c)(ii) to 
date, the potential scope of the test remains uncertain. 
The wording of the provision itself provides no clear direction on how the 
provision should be approached. Yet, as is the case in interpreting section 20(9) 
of the Companies Act,1009 the essence of the test lies in the meaning of the phrase 
“misuse or abuse”. 
There appears to be consensus that the provision calls for the adoption of a 
purposive statutory approach to the interpretation of the Income Tax Act and for 
the interpreter to conclude on this basis whether a statutory provision has been 
misused or abused.1010 South African courts already apply a purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation as part of a three-pronged approach.1011 The function 
of the “misuse or abuse” test is therefore called into question.1012 It is difficult to 
conceive of a situation where a court would interpret and apply a provision in the 
Income Tax Act in line with a purposive approach, yet simultaneously consider it 
to have been “misused or abused”. The test therefore contains a contradiction, 
                                            
1009 See the text to ch 4 part 2 above. 
1010 D Clegg “Use it or abuse it” (2007) 21 Tax Planning 36 and the sources cited there. 
See also n 1012 below.  
1011 See the text to ch 4 part 2 1 above. 
1012 The so-called “modern” approach to statutory interpretation (as described in SARS 
Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: Revised proposals) was 
only specifically embraced in South Africa after the GAARs in their current form had been 
enacted. It is clear from the Revised proposals that the motivation behind introducing the 
Canadian “misuse or abuse” test was to reinforce this approach to statutory interpretation 
and as set out in the Canadian judgment of Canada TrustCo, a judgment dealing with 
the Canadian “misuse or abuse” equivalent provision. That judgment also endorsed the 
now prevailing position in South Africa, being that statutes should be applied in line with 
the three-pronged literal, purposive and contextual approach. Now that that approach 
has been explicitly adopted in South Africa, it is questionable whether the “misuse or 
abuse” provision has any further function to serve. Cf EB Broomberg “Then and now IV” 
(2008) 22 Tax Planning; Y van der Westhuizen “Abusing the Income Tax Act by misusing 
the letter of the Act” (2008) 71 THRHR 613; Kujinga (2012) CILSA 46 et seq; De Koker 
& Brincker Silke on International Tax 46.20 and 19.39; SARS Draft Comprehensive 
Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 40 (compare with 44). 
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because if a provision has already been interpreted purposefully, and the 
arrangement falls within or outside it, the provision cannot have been misused or 
abused.1013 It may therefore be that section 80A(c)(ii) previously had a role to fulfil 
under a dispensation where fiscal statutes were subject to a strict literal 
interpretation only.1014 However, as this is no longer the case for South African 
fiscal statutes, it appears unclear what further role the provision can play.1015 
Authority1016 suggests that the phrase has its origins in the Canadian 
GAARs.1017 It appears likely that the Canadian roots of the provision are the 
                                            
1013 Clegg (2007) Tax Planning 36 and the sources cited there. See also n 1012 above. 
1014 The so-called “modern” approach to statutory interpretation (as described in SARS 
Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: Revised proposals) was 
only specifically embraced in South Africa after the current GAARs were introduced. 
1015 Kujinga (2012) CILSA 47. See the text to ch 4 part 2 1 above. Prior to the “modern 
approach” to statutory interpretation being explicitly adopted by the SCA in South Africa 
(see the text to ch 4 part 2 1 above), Van Schalkwyk & Geldenhuys (2010) JJS 183 in 
2009 considered s 80A(c)(ii) to act as a “reinforcement” to the modern approach to 
statutory interpretation, to the limited extent to which it was already followed in South 
Africa at that stage. Given the recent changes to the approach to the interpretation of 
statutes in 2014 (see the text to ch 4 part 2 1 above), their view supports a conclusion 
today that s 80A(c)(ii) does little more than what is now already required when 
interpreting legislation.  
1016 National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill 
(2006) 63. Clegg (2007) Tax Planning; Broomberg IV (2008) Tax Planning; C Cilliers 
“Thou shalt not peep at thy neighbour’s wife: s 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act and the 
abuse of rights” (2008) 57 The Taxpayer 85; De Koker & Williams Silke on South African 
Income Tax ch 19.39; SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule 39; Van Schalkwyk & Geldenhuys (2010) JJS 172. Kujinga (2012) CILSA 48 points 
out that the misuse or abuse test is in part also derived from the abuse of rights doctrine 
applied in many European jurisdictions. He adds though that this doctrine is not applied 
in Canada and that it is likely that South African courts would opt to apply a purposive 
interpretative approach to tax legislation (as is the case in Canada), rather than 
incorporate elements of the abuse of rights doctrine (which is also not applied in South 
Africa) when giving content to the misuse or abuse test. Cf Cassidy (2012) Stell LR 339. 
1017 S 245(4) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 1 (5th Supp). That test 
involves a two-part inquiry, being firstly a legislative interpretative exercise regarding the 
content of the allegedly abused provision followed by an application of the facts in 
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primary cause for the provision not fitting neatly within the South African 
context.1018 The “misuse or abuse” test’s seemingly uncomfortable existence in 
the South African GAARs may be attributed to a number of factors. It could be as 
a result of the strong civil law links that the Canadian legal system has compared 
to our own common law system,1019 the different approach adopted in that 
jurisdiction concerning statutory interpretation,1020 or due to the dissimilar context 
within which the provision operates in the Canadian GAARs compared to its 
South African counterpart.1021 It is finally notable that the “misuse or abuse” test 
in the Canadian GAARs fulfils a much more prominent role compared to its South 
African equivalent. In terms of the Canadian GAARs, the “misuse or abuse” test 
is a required element before a transaction can be subjected to the GAARs,1022 
whereas in South Africa it is but one of four potential indicators for abnormality.1023 
                                            
considering whether the object, spirit or purpose of the relevant provision was defeated 
or frustrated (Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co v R 2005 SCC 54 para 50).  
1018 De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 46.20; SARS Draft Comprehensive 
Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 39. 
1019 Cilliers (2008) 57 The Taxpayer. 
1020 Cilliers (2008) 57 The Taxpayer; see n 1010 above. 
1021 Van der Westhuizen (2008) THRHR 620; Broomberg IV (2008) Tax Planning; 
Kujinga (2012) CILSA 49, 50 and 51 notes that the South African GAARs, unlike their 
Canadian counterpart, were introduced to address the perceived failure of earlier 
versions of the GAARs. This dissertation is not concerned with a detailed interpretation 
of the general application of specific provisions of s 80A. It considers only whether s 80A 
may potentially be applied to address the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes. A 
detailed consideration of the Canadian authorities on s 80A, and specifically the cases 
of Canada TrustCo and Mathew considering the Canadian “misuse or abuse” provision, 
would amount to an unwarranted deviation of focus of this dissertation. Suffice it to say 
that the test is accurately summed up in Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co v R 2005 SCC 
54 para 6:  
“Abusive tax avoidance may be found where the relationships and transactions as 
expressed in the relevant documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object, 
spirit or purpose of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax benefit, or where 
they are wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions that are contemplated 
by the provisions.” 
1022 Kujinga (2012) CILSA 43; S 245(4) of the Canadian Income Tax Act. 
1023 See the text to part 3 3 of this chapter above. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 245 
 
Despite the lack of clarity that surrounds section 80A(c)(ii),1024 its provisions 
cannot be ignored. It is quite possible that courts may, for policy considerations, 
wish to have recourse to a more flexible provision. Such a provision may be found 
in section 80A(c)(ii) and may be capable of providing the remedy that courts seek. 
In light of the less than satisfactory results achieved in the application of the other 
three indicators for abnormality in cases of abuse of corporate personality, a more 
flexible provision may be desired.1025 It is further clear that section 80A(c)(ii) 
should be afforded a wide interpretation, as it aims to address actions that would 
“result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of …” the 
Income Tax Act. 
In applying section 80A(c)(ii) in the piercing context, two questions should be 
answered upfront: who is perpetrating the alleged abuse, and which provision of 
the Income Tax Act is being abused? 
As far as the former is concerned, the company cannot abuse itself, even 
though its use causes a tax benefit. Rather, the shareholder exercising ownership 
control over the company and the ultimate beneficiary of the tax benefit, would 
perpetrate the abuse. The shareholder interposes a company to abuse the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act. The company can therefore not be said to have 
abused the provisions of the Income Tax Act when it is party to a transaction 
                                            
1024 See Broomberg IV (2008) Tax Planning specifically. The author argues further that 
the lack of clarity will lead to courts adopting a severely conservative approach and be 
willing to apply the provision in but the most limited of circumstances. See also Kujinga 
(2012) CILSA n 24; Kujinga (2014) CILSA and referring to the approach in King; B 
Geldenhuys An analysis of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act no. 58 of 1962 as 
amended MAcc thesis, University of Stellenbosch (2009) 5. In Canada TrustCo Mortgage 
Company v The Queen [2003] 4 CTC 2009 at paragraph 91 the court warns that the 
application of the GAARs would reach dangerous levels where it is used to replace legal 
provisions with policy. For a similar approach in South Africa, see Cassidy (2012) Stell 
LR 336. Kujinga (2014) CILSA 446 accurately identifies the source of uncertainty in the 
context of s 80A(c)(ii), being that the misuse or abuse test presupposes that a single 
purpose can be identified for each provision in the Income Tax Act, where the reality 
rather is that development of the provisions of that Act is much more complex. 
1025 See the text to parts 3 3 1 to 3 3 3 of this chapter above. 
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giving rise to the tax benefit for the shareholder.1026 The only transaction that the 
shareholder will be a party to is the transfer of assets to the company. The 
company will enter into all subsequent transactions giving rise to a tax benefit. As 
was the case with section 80A(a)(ii),1027 section 80B likewise presents a 
disconnection from section 80A(c)(ii) which is potentially fatal to the application 
of the “misuse or abuse” provision as anti-avoidance remedy where the corporate 
veil is used for tax purposes. This point will be addressed below.1028 
The “misuse or abuse” test is inefficient for another reason. The test requires 
the identification of the relevant provision of the Income Tax Act that is being 
abused. The Income Tax Act recognises a company as a separate taxpayer, 
which is entitled, in its own right, to the appropriate relief afforded by the Income 
Tax Act. Consequently, any alleged abuse does not arise from the provisions of 
the Income Tax Act, but rather by virtue of an abuse of the Companies Act, 
specifically section 19(1) thereof. The tax consequences associated with legal 
personality follow by operation of law, because of the fiction of legal personality 
created by the Companies Act and are no different from the tax treatment that 
other companies are entitled to.1029  
The question therefore arises whether an abuse of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act takes place if its provisions are applied for the purposes that they 
                                            
1026 See the text to ch 5 part 3 1 above. 
1027 The “commercial substance” test in s 80C(2) considered in the text to part 3 3 3 2 of 
this chapter above. 
1028 See the text to part 3 4 below. 
1029 As an example, s 5(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act (the so-called “charging provision”) 
determines that “there shall be paid annually for the benefit of the National Revenue 
Fund, an income tax … in respect of the taxable income received by or accrued to or in 
favour of … any company during every financial year of such company”. [own emphasis] 
The definition of a “company” in s 1 in turn includes in paragraph (a) any company 
incorporated in term of the Companies Act. The charging provision therefore derives 
content from the Companies Act. The primary provision therefore potentially the subject 
of misuse or abuse to achieve a tax benefit must therefore be the relevant provisions of 
the Companies Act. The operation of the Income Tax Act naturally follows on the 
interpretation provided in terms of the Companies Act as a consequence of law.  
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were designed for. It is difficult to foresee a situation where the tax consequences, 
which will arise for a company in terms of the Income Tax Act, can be said to 
amount to a misuse or abuse of a relevant provision of that Act.1030 Its provisions 
are applied, or “used”, as intended because of the legal effect that the Companies 
Act brings about. 
Nonetheless, the words “indirect” misuse or abuse may suggest that a wider 
interpretation should be followed for this test. Thus interpreted, the test goes 
further than the other three indicators for abnormality which are applied on a “per 
arrangement” basis. As mentioned earlier, the abuse of the corporate veil is 
achieved by way of a two-stepped process, namely the transfer of assets to a 
company, and thereafter through generating income in that company through the 
use of the assets. The second step creates the tax saving. However, as argued 
above, the GAARs are not very effective against these two steps. On the other 
hand, if the “misuse or abuse” test is interpreted widely the second step may also 
be taken into account in evaluating the tax consequences under the GAARs of 
the first step. Such an approach would be unique to the misuse or abuse test 
when compared to the other three abnormality indicators. The reason why section 
20(9) of the Companies Act is effective, is because it is not applied on a “per 
arrangement” basis, but on a “per corporate structure” basis. It therefore 
evaluates the effect that a corporate structure has on income tax. Arguably, a 
“per corporate structure-based” approach as opposed to a “per arrangement-
based” one is what is required to address the tax use of the corporate veil. The 
misuse or abuse test appears to allow for such an approach. 
The argument nevertheless remains that the GAARs only provide a remedy to 
alter those tax consequences that arise from an “impermissible avoidance 
arrangement”. The GAARs do not allow the Commissioner to determine the tax 
consequences of subsequent transactions not part of the “impermissible 
avoidance arrangement”. It is these transactions that give rise to the actual tax 
benefit but the shareholder is not a party to them and the company does not enter 
into these transactions for tax purposes. 
                                            
1030 De Koker & Williams Silke on South African Income Tax ch 19.39. 
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To conclude, the indicator for abnormality contained in section 80A(c)(ii) has 
failed to provide clear protection against instances of abuse of the corporate veil 
for tax purposes. 
 
3 3 4 2 Comparing “abuse” in section 80A(c)(ii) with section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 
The words “misuse or abuse” are used in section 80A(c)(ii). If this section is 
applied to pierce the corporate veil, these words may be contrasted to the 
“unconscionable abuse” test, used in section 20(9) of the Companies Act.1031 
Can the “unconscionable abuse” test in section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
be used to inform the “misuse or abuse” test in section 80A(c)(ii), or vice versa? 
It could even be argued that where section 80A(c)(ii) is applied to achieve 
piercing, its meaning may be informed by section 20(9). 
Courts have often used the phrase “misuse or abuse”, contained in section 
80A(c)(ii), to describe shareholders’ approach to companies’ separate corporate 
personality.1032 “Abuse” has similarly been used in the corporate, statutory law 
piercing provisions.1033 
Clearly though, the two phrases used in the Income Tax Act and the 
Companies Act have distinctly different historical origins.1034 The phrase 
                                            
1031 Kujinga (2012) CILSA 54 cites Canada TrustCo (SCC) as potential authority for the 
view that the use of “misuse or abuse” in the Canadian GAARs is tautologous and that 
“abuse” is a broad enough term to include instances of “misuse”. The South African 
position may likely be similar, which creates a greater prospect for “abuse” in the GAARs’ 
and s 20(9) contexts to be used to inform one another’s content.  
1032 Cape Pacific, Hülse-Reutter and Lategan being but some of the South African 
examples.  
1033 S 20(9) of the Companies Act and s 65 of the Close Corporations Act. See also text 
to n 634 above. 
1034 The phrase as used in the Income Tax Act has been borrowed from the Canadian 
and certain European jurisdictions’ GAARs (see the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Bill of 2006 63), whilst the word “abuse” as used in the 
Companies Act clearly has its origins in the Close Corporations Act (see the text to ch 4 
part 1 1 2 2 above). 
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contained in section 80A of the Income Tax Act is moreover used in a very 
different context compared to section 20(9) of the Companies Act or section 65 
of the Close Corporations Act.1035 Although these provisions are all used as anti-
avoidance mechanisms to prevent circumvention of the respective provisions, the 
potential instances of abuse, which the relevant provisions aim to address, are 
vastly different. The different contexts in which the phrases appear, make it 
practically impossible to ascribe any meaning to “misuse or abuse” that could 
apply in both the corporate law context as well as the anti-avoidance context of 
the law of taxation.  
It is conceivable that the instances of abuse may overlap to a certain extent in 
certain scenarios. For example, where the corporate veil is abused in a company 
law context, the provisions of the Income Tax Act may also be “misused or 
abused”. The examples considered in this dissertation illustrate situations where 
the legal form is abused to achieve a tax benefit, which may potentially also 
qualify as a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. However, 
the principle remains that the test in section 20(9) of the Companies Act is meant 
to counter abuse of the corporate veil, whereas section 80A(c)(ii) of the Income 
Tax Act addresses abuse of the provisions of this Act. As such, the requirements 
and approaches to the two statutory tests are different. Moreover, it would be 
inappropriate to attribute a meaning to the phrase in the Income Tax Act similar 
to that in the Companies Act only when section 80A is applied in a piercing 
context. Such an approach would imply that the meaning ascribed to section 
80A(c)(ii) would be different depending on whether it is applied in a piercing or a 
non-piercing context. Furthermore the word “abuse” as used in the Income Tax 
Act is without the adverb “unconscionable” or “gross” as is the case in the 
Companies Act and Close Corporations Act respectively. 
It would accordingly be inappropriate to attempt to attribute any meaning to the 
phrase “misuse or abuse” as used in the Income Tax Act that is informed by an 
interpretation linked to either section 20(9) of the Companies Act or section 65 of 
the Close Corporations Act.  
 
                                            
1035 See text to n 635 above. 
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3 4 Applying section 80B to address the abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes 
Section 80B contains an exhaustive list of remedies available to the 
Commissioner when an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” is present: 
 
“The Commissioner may determine the tax consequences under this Act of any 
impermissible avoidance arrangement for any party by— 
(a)  disregarding, combining, or re-characterising any steps in or parts of the 
impermissible avoidance arrangement; 
(b)  disregarding any accommodating or tax-indifferent party or treating any 
accommodating or tax-indifferent party and any other party as one and the 
same person; 
(c)  deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be 
one and the same person for purposes of determining the tax treatment of 
any amount; 
(d)  reallocating any gross income, receipt or accrual of a capital nature, 
expenditure or rebate amongst the parties; 
(e)  re-characterising any gross income, receipt or accrual of a capital nature or 
expenditure; or 
(f) treating the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been 
entered into or carried out, or in such other manner as in the circumstances 
of the case the Commissioner deems appropriate for the prevention or 
diminution of the relevant tax benefit.” [own emphasis] 
 
It is apparent that sections 80B(a) to (f) provide remedies to the Commissioner 
to apply in instances of abuse of the corporate veil.1036 Primary among these 
remedies would be section 80B(c). However, the provision may only be applied 
to determine the tax consequences of the “impermissible avoidance 
arrangement” itself. In other words, an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” 
must already exist before the remedy applies. 
It is important to distinguish between a “tax benefit”, a requirement of an 
“impermissible avoidance arrangement”, and the “tax consequences” thereof, 
which section 80B aims to address. A “tax benefit” must exist for the 
                                            
1036 Provided that an impermissible avoidance arrangement can be shown to be present 
first and without having recourse to s 80B. De Koker & Williams Silke on South African 
Income Tax ch 19.41. 
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Commissioner to be able to access the remedies in section 80B. The 
Commissioner’s remedy is to determine the “tax consequences” of the 
impermissible avoidance arrangement in a variety of ways listed in subsections 
(a) to (f). Arguably, “tax consequences” can only be addressed to the extent that 
they have materialised. If tax consequences are yet to materialise, there would 
be nothing for the Commissioner to determine through the application of section 
80B. Where a “tax benefit” might be present (which includes a future tax 
benefit),1037 but no tax consequences have arisen yet, section 80B cannot apply. 
In other words, it is possible that a “tax benefit”, and therefore an “impermissible 
avoidance arrangement”, may exist, but that the “tax consequences” linked 
thereto have not yet arisen.1038 In such a situation, section 80B cannot be applied 
yet. 
It is useful to refer here to an argument advanced above, namely that an 
arrangement, which is not a unitary scheme, consists of two steps, namely the 
incorporation of the company and the subsequent flow of income. It was further 
argued that an arrangement which is not a unitary scheme, is limited to the first 
step. The second step does not form part of the arrangement.1039 
Section 80B can therefore only be applied to the first step of an arrangement 
that is not a unitary scheme. However, there are no tax consequences that can 
be determined differently in terms of section 80B, because no direct tax 
consequences arise from step one. This remains true, even though a “tax benefit” 
as defined may exist, and even if the transfer of the asset to the company is 
abnormal.1040 Section 80A therefore brings those transactions within the purview 
of an “impermissible avoidance arrangement”, yet section 80B cannot be applied 
                                            
1037 See the definition of “tax benefit” in s 1 of the Income Tax Act, which definition is 
wide enough to also include future tax benefits to be achieved. Also see the three 
judgments in Hicklin; Smith and King. 
1038 Contra SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 4 
which states that s 80B may be applied to address any “tax benefit”. This assertion is not 
borne out by the wording of s 80B. 
1039 See the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
1040 See Hicklin which illustrates the point that it would be important to identify the specific 
transaction which gives rise to the relevant tax benefit in order to determine to which the 
transaction the remedies in the GAARs may be applied. 
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given the absence of any “tax consequences” arising at that stage. Where the 
corporate veil is abused, the beneficial tax consequences for the shareholder will 
only arise from the subsequent commercial transactions that the company enters 
into (step two). The question is therefore whether the tax consequences of the 
subsequent transactions (step two) can also be regarded as consequences of the 
“impermissible avoidance arrangement” (which comprises only of step 1) and 
therefore be susceptible to section 80B’s remedies. The answer to this question 
seems to be “no”, since none of the parties to the subsequent transactions 
receives a tax benefit or has any tax related purpose in mind for entering into 
these transactions. Applying section 80B will likely also negatively affect the tax 
consequences for the company, which has not achieved any tax benefit for itself. 
Furthermore, these subsequent transactions will be considered normal. The 
remedies provided by section 80B only contemplate transactions which by 
themselves give rise tax consequences that arise immediately. It does not apply 
to “tax benefits” which will only arise as a result of future transactions which 
themselves will not amount to “impermissible avoidance arrangements” and to 
which different persons will be party to. 
Arguably there is a lacuna in section 80B when it comes to addressing tax 
benefits which will only arise through future transactions, entered into as a result 
of earlier “impermissible avoidance arrangements”.1041  
The GAARs’ remedies in section 80B are intended only to prevent the 
avoidance of “the tax consequences under [the Income Tax] Act of any 
impermissible avoidance arrangement for any party”. Section 80B is not meant 
to serve as a taxing1042 or a penal1043 provision where an “impermissible 
                                            
1041 On the assumption that the “avoidance arrangement” can be said to be abnormal, 
which may prove to be difficult to argue. See tax to parts 3 3 1 to 3 3 4 of this chapter 
above. 
1042 Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 4 SA 
715 (A) 727 et seq. 
1043 See the discussion in ITC 963 [1961] 24 SATC 707 (T) of Watermeyer CJ and 
Schreiner JA’s judgments in King. It confirms that the GAARs are not intended to be 
applied as penal provisions. Rather, the GAARs are intended to apply as remedial 
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avoidance arrangement” has been entered into. The GAARs call upon the 
Commissioner to identify the specific tax benefit that was the result and purpose 
of the arrangement entered into. The creation of any other tax benefits as a 
consequence of an arrangement being entered into, and for which ancillary tax 
benefits were not the sole or main purpose of entering into that arrangement, 
become irrelevant.1044 It becomes difficult to apply section 80B where the tax 
benefit of step one is the tax consequence of step two. 
A tax benefit will be created for the shareholder from subsequent transactions 
entered into by the company, whether as part of “targeted” or as “general 
avoidance”. However, these are entered into by the company to further the 
legitimate commercial purposes of the company, whether it is to receive dividends 
from an investing company or to conduct business generally at beneficial tax 
rates. It is submitted that section 80B cannot be applied to these subsequent 
transactions, nor to the company entering into them, since these arrangements 
                                            
provisions (see for example s 80B(2)). In other words, the GAARs should not be applied 
to widen the net beyond the general scope of the Income Tax Act (ITC 1636 [1997] 60 
SATC 267), nor be applied without reference to the scheme of that Act. Applied to the 
current instance, the GAARs may only be applied to address the tax benefit purposefully 
sought to be achieved. Anything more would amount to the GAARs being applied either 
as penal or taxing provisions outside of the general scope or scheme of the Income Tax 
Act. 
1044 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Gallagher [1978] 40 SATC 39; De Koker & Williams 
Silke on South African Income Tax chs 19.35 and 19.39. Consider Example 4 (in the text 
to ch 1 part 3 above): where the trust transfers the asset in question to the company by 
virtue of the corporate roll-over relief contained in s 42 of the Income Tax Act, two tax 
benefits arise: one being the roll-over relief provided for capital gains tax purposes on 
the transfer of the asset itself, and secondly the future tax benefit to be achieved in the 
form of lower tax rates to apply when the asset is subsequently disposed of by the 
company. Even though both tax benefits will have been achieved by the same 
arrangement, the former cannot be denied by the Commissioner in terms of s 80B, as s 
80B will then be applied as a penal provision. The tax benefit afforded in terms of s 42 is 
not the purpose of the transfer, but rather the tax benefit that will only arise subsequently 
through lower tax rates achieved, and s 80B should only be applied as remedy against 
that tax benefit (provided the other elements of an “impermissible avoidance 
arrangement” can also be said to be present).  
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will be normal and will not create (nor intend to create) a tax benefit for the 
company. 
The apparent disconnect between sections 80B and 80A appears to be 
detrimental to the effective application of section 80B to avoidance arrangements 
perpetrated by way of employing the corporate veil. For these reasons, none of 
the remedies in section 80B will address the tax benefit created.  
The identified deficiency is seemingly absent in Canada. The Canadian 
Income Tax Act provides for the GAARs’ remedies to apply more flexibly to “deny 
a tax benefit that would … result, directly or indirectly, from an avoidance 
transaction” [own emphasis].1045 Based on the wording of the remedial provisions, 
the Canadian GAARs may potentially be applied even when a unitary scheme is 
absent and where a tax benefit is created “indirectly” through an “avoidance 
transaction”.1046 
To conclude, section 80B provides for the attribution of different tax 
consequences to the specific impermissible avoidance arrangement identified. 
The tax consequences of subsequent transactions1047 that no longer form part of 
the impermissible avoidance arrangement cannot be altered. It is submitted that 
the tax consequences of any transaction are primarily that of the transaction itself. 
This is as much true for transactions forming part of an “impermissible avoidance 
arrangement” as it is for transactions entered into, subsequent to an 
                                            
1045 S 245(5) of the Canadian Income Tax Act.  
1046 The positions in the UK and Australia are less clear. In the UK, an indirect approach 
appears similarly to be justified. The UK Finance Act explicitly provides that 
arrangements forming part of the specifically identified “tax arrangements” should also 
be subjected to scrutiny (S 207(3) of the Finance Act, 2013 (c 29)). The Australian 
Income Tax Assessment Act 27 of 1936 provides that the Commissioner may apply the 
remedies contained in s 177F where the GAARs apply “to a scheme in connection with 
which a tax benefit has been obtained”. Cassidy identifies shortcomings in that 
jurisdiction in defining how wide an arrangement may be considered to be and which 
steps may be said to be included in that arrangement or scheme. Cassidy (2009) SALJ 
746 et seq. Once the arrangement or scheme has been identified, it is necessary to 
consider whether the tax benefit has been achieved from that arrangement (Cassidy 756 
et seq). This makes the Australian GAARs susceptible to the same deficiency that the 
South African GAARs exhibit in this regard. 
1047 Not forming part of a unitary scheme (see the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above). 
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“impermissible avoidance arrangement”. The tax consequences of an 
arrangement cannot primarily be the consequence of an earlier transaction. It 
must be that of the transaction itself. To illustrate, in Example 1, the 
consequences of the company receiving a dividend arise because the underlying 
investments generated a dividend. However, there is also a link, albeit indirect, 
to the earlier transfer of the share investments to the company (even if the 
dividend declaration was not expected at that stage). The fact that in Example 1 
no dividends tax arises is causally linked to the interposition of the company. 
However, the actual tax saving consequence arose only once the dividend itself 
was declared. At the point when section 80B is applied to the transfer of the 
shares to the company, the dividend has not yet been declared. The tax 
consequence to be remedied by section 80B, namely the absence of dividends 
tax, has not occurred yet. 
When considered in isolation, the dividend declaration cannot be seen as an 
impermissible avoidance arrangement, since the declaration will not be 
abnormal, carries no tax benefit more than would have been the case otherwise 
for the parties involved and is in no way driven by tax motives on the part of the 
company or its underlying investments. It can moreover not be said to form part 
of a “unitary scheme” as it is not aimed at achieving the tax benefit that the 
interposition of the company itself was aimed at achieving.1048 
Even where a unitary scheme may be said to exist, and that scheme has been 
entered into abnormally, section 80B can only be applied if the Commissioner 
delays taking action until after the actual tax consequence has occurred, for 
example at the declaration of the dividend in Example 1. Whether prescription will 
allow for section 80B to still be applied at that stage is a further question that will 
need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.1049  
It remains to be seen how South African courts will approach the question of 
section 80B’s application. It is quite possible that an empowering and wide 
                                            
1048 See text to part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
1049 S 99(1) of the Tax Administration Act. This issue falls outside the scope of this 
dissertation and will not be examined in detail. 
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constructive approach will be applied when considering the application of these 
rules;1050 one which requires the provision to be construed as operative rather 
than restrictive. This may result in an interpretation of section 80B that allows it 
to apply to any “impermissible avoidance arrangement”, even if its tax 
consequences only arise subsequently through unrelated transactions. It is 
submitted that such an interpretation would be too wide and too far removed from 
the wording of section 80B itself. It is suggested that neither the wording nor the 
purpose of section 80B stretches far enough to allow the Commissioner to apply 
the GAARs to alter the tax consequences of transactions which do not form part 
of an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The potential application of section 
80B, even in those limited circumstances identified above where the use of the 
company can potentially amount to an “impermissible avoidance arrangement”, 
is therefore questionable at best. 
 
4 The general anti-avoidance rules and burden of proof 
Which party bears the onus of proof in relation to three1051 of the four elements 
contained in section 80A, is not settled. 
Section 102 of the Tax Administration Act makes it clear that a taxpayer bears 
the burden of proof in virtually all disputes with the Commissioner. It is somewhat 
contentious whether section 102 applies to the GAARs. Its predecessor in section 
82 of the Income Tax Act was considered not to have applied to section 103 of 
that Act.1052 The latter was regarded as a specific provision containing its own 
particular provisions relating to onus,1053 as opposed to section 82, a general 
provision. 
                                            
1050 Cf Glen Anil Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 
1975 4 SA 715 (A) 716; CIR v Nemojim [1983] 2 All SA 485 (A) 505. 
1051 The “arrangement”, “normality” and “tax benefit” requirements. 
1052 ITC 1636 [1997] 60 SATC 267 318 to 324, and 323 in particular. 
1053 See discussion of ss 103(4) and 80G(1) in the text to part 4 1 of this chapter below.  
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Whether the previous position in relation to the onus is still relevant to the new 
regime introduced by section 102 of the Tax Administration Act read with sections 
80A to 80L of the Income Tax Act, is considered below. 
 
4 1 “Purpose” requirement 
Similar to section 103(4),1054 section 80G(1) of the Income Tax Act places the 
onus relating to the purpose of an arrangement on the taxpayer:  
 
“An avoidance arrangement is presumed to have been entered into or carried out for 
the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit unless and until the party obtaining 
a tax benefit proves that, reasonably considered in light of the relevant facts and 
circumstances, obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the 
avoidance arrangement.” 
 
Section 80G(1) creates a rebuttable presumption that a taxpayer has entered 
into an avoidance arrangement with a tax purpose. The burden of proof is 
therefore on the taxpayer to show differently. It is therefore uncontentious that the 
taxpayer bears the burden of proof relating to the sole or main purpose of entering 
into an arrangement.1055 
 
4 2 Abnormality requirement 
The existence of specific presumptions in section 103 clearly weighed heavily 
with the court in ITC 1636, which is considered the leading judgment as far as 
the onus of proof in relation to section 103 is concerned. From this judgment it is 
clear that the presumption in section 103(4), dealing with the taxpayer’s purpose 
for entering into a transaction, was to be given a constructive and empowering 
meaning.1056 The court was of the view that the onus was usually on the 
                                            
1054 De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 46.9. 
1055 De Koker & Brincker Silke on International Tax 46.9; SARS Draft Comprehensive 
Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 29; Broomberg II (2007) Tax Planning. 
1056 The same applied to the now repealed s 103(3), which introduced a rebuttable 
deeming provision as related to the arm’s length nature of specific transactions, and thus 
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Commissioner in section 103, but that the presumption created an exception to 
this. If such an interpretation was not adopted, section 103(4)’s content would 
have been superfluous, considering the onus created generally against taxpayers 
in terms of the former section 82. To afford section 103(4) a constructive 
interpretation would therefore imply that the onus of proof would otherwise have 
been on the Commissioner to show the presence of the “purpose” requirement. 
Therefore, so the reasoning went, there is no reason why the remaining three 
requirements of the GAARs should be approached differently. In other words, the 
onus of proof will be on the Commissioner in the absence of a deeming provision 
such as that contained in section 103(4) and which relates to the purpose 
requirement only.1057+1058 
Whether the onus rests on the Commissioner in respect of the abnormality (as 
well as the two further remaining requirements of the GAARs), hinges to a 
                                            
had a potential bearing on one of the two indicators in the previous GAAR as related to 
the requirement of “abnormality”. Unlike the “purpose” presumption still present in the 
current version of the GAARs (s 80G(1)), no equivalent provision to s 103(3) is contained 
in the current GAARs. The absence of a provision similar to the repealed s 103(3) in the 
current GAARs is considered insignificant though in creating statutory interpretative 
context, since the judgment in ITC 1636 suggests that the presence of any one 
presumption would have sufficed as indication that the presumption is intended to create 
an exception to where the onus of proof would ordinarily have laid in its absence. 
1057 SARS Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: An Interim 
Response (2006) 15. 
1058 In relation to where the onus of proof would lie to show abnormality, both 1TC 1862 
[2012] 75 SATC 34 and ITC 1699 [1999] 63 SATC 175 considered the onus to rest upon 
the Commissioner, both with reference to the judgment in Conhage. It is considered that 
that judgment endorsed the conclusions of its a quo judgment in ITC 1636 (see also ITC 
1862 [2012] 75 SATC 34 para 9). ITC 1712 also concludes that the onus to show 
abnormality rests on the Commissioner (at 501 et seq), though without giving reasons 
why this was considered to be the case. Considering that this judgment was subsequent 
to that of the reasoned judgment in ITC 1636, it can probably be safely assumed that the 
conclusion in ITC 1712 was based on the reasoning applied in ITC 1636 which at that 
point in time represented good persuasive authority. In relation to the elements of “tax 
benefit” and an “arrangement” being present, ITC 1636 likewise endorses the position 
that the onus falls on the Commissioner to prove the presence of these two elements 
too. 
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significant extent on the rebuttable presumption created by section 103(4) (and 
section 103(3) to a limited extent).1059 The question relating to the current GAARs 
is thus whether the same approach is still appropriate. The matter therefore 
becomes worth revisiting given the absence of a comparable provision to the 
erstwhile section 103(3). 
Unlike section 103(4), section 80G(1) is capable of being interpreted in a 
constructive fashion and without affecting how the burden of proof in relation to 
the remaining three elements of the GAARs should be dealt with.  
Section 103(4) contained a presumption which only applied once the relevant 
assessment was disputed. Section 103(4) therefore only became relevant once 
the Tax Court heard the matter, in other words when such a matter was litigated. 
Before the dispute was heard in the Tax Court, the presumption in section 103(4) 
would have had no effect. 
In terms of the new GAARs, this is no longer the case. Section 80J of the 
Income Tax Act, which did not have an equivalent provision in section 103, 
requires the Commissioner to invite the taxpayer to make representations as to 
why the provisions of section 80A should not apply. This invitation may only be 
extended after the Commissioner has been satisfied that all four requisite 
elements of an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” are present.1060 Nothing 
stops the Commissioner from relying on the presumption created against the 
taxpayer at that stage. In other words, the Commissioner may invite the taxpayer 
to make representations regarding the applicability of section 80A, even when 
only three of the four requirements are present. The purpose of the presumption 
can therefore no longer be seen as establishing the onus of proof in the Tax 
Court, but rather as lowering the barrier for the Commissioner for invoking the 
provisions of the GAARs. If this is the case, and if section 80G(1) already 
                                            
1059 The court in ITC 1636 [1997] 60 SATC 267 323 goes as far as mentioning several 
considerations which would, barring the presence of s 103(3) and (4), have led it to 
conclude that the onus to prove the absence of any of the four requirements of the 
GAARs to be on the taxpayer. Had s 103(3) and 103(4) not provided context to s 103, 
Kroon J appears willing to accept that the onus would have been on the taxpayer in terms 
of s 82 to illustrate the absence of any of the four requirements present in s 103(1). 
1060 S 80J(1) of the Income Tax Act.  
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becomes operative prior to dispute proceedings, the provision is arguably no 
longer intended to inform dispute proceedings. Therefore, in the absence of a 
deeming onus provision, there remains little reason why disputes involving the 
GAARs should be treated any differently from other disputes and inconsistent 
with section 102 of the Tax Administration Act. As a result, it would appear that 
the onus for proving the absence of any of the four requirements the 
Commissioner alleges to be present in the section 80J notice issued, will now 
rest on the taxpayer. 
Considered in light of the above, it is quite possible that the other 
considerations the court identified in ITC 16361061 may now compel a court to 
conclude that the question of onus should be approached differently in sections 
80A to 80L than it was in section 103.1062 Such conclusion enjoys support 
considering that section 103(4) clearly related to dispute proceedings, whereas 
section 80G(1)’s operation is no longer limited to dispute proceedings only.1063 
 
4 3  Arrangement and tax benefit requirements 
The onus to prove the existence of an “arrangement” and a “tax benefit” was on 
the Commissioner in terms of section 103(1).1064 For the same reasons above, in 
relation to the “abnormality” requirement, this position too appears to have 
changed.1065  
 
                                            
1061 See n 1059 above. 
1062 See the contradictory views in SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule 24 and 44 compared to 48. Broomberg II (2007) Tax Planning gives 
further potential motivation for a shift in the onus as relates to the various elements of 
the GAARs. Cf SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
48 for two views contradicting one another as to where the onus lies. See also the text 
to part 4 3 of this chapter below. 
1063 Broomberg II (2007) Tax Planning notes that the phrase in s 103(4) “whenever in 
proceedings relating thereto it is proved” is notably absent from s 80G(1). See also SARS 
Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 48. 
1064 See ITC 1636 and the authority mentioned there. 
1065 See the contradictory views in SARS Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule 18 compared to 48. 
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4 4 Conclusion 
Statute prescribes onus in relation to the GAARs. It is not a common law principle. 
Given the significant differences between the erstwhile section 103(1) and (4) 
and the current sections 80A to 80L, it is questionable whether the precedent on 
this specific question, specifically as established in ITC 1636, remain relevant. 
It follows that the Commissioner may now no longer bear the onus to show 
that any of the four elements in section 80A is satisfied when investigating an 
arrangement. Rather, it appears that the taxpayer may now very well be required 
to show that any one of the four elements necessary for the GAARs to apply is 
lacking. Such an approach would be in line with the manner in which all other 
assessments are approached by virtue of the application of section 102 of the 
Tax Administration Act, and no reason remains why the new GAARs should be 
approached any differently.1066 
 
5 Conclusion 
The GAARs’ biggest weakness in addressing the use of the corporate veil to 
create a tax benefit, lies in the abnormality requirement.1067 An analysis of the 
GAARs’ requirements show at best limited possibilities for SARS to address this 
form of abuse through the GAARs. The efficacy of sections 80A to 80L varies 
depending on whether “targeted” or “general avoidance” is sought to be achieved 
and depending on which indicator of “normality” is relevant. 
The same is arguably true of the Canadian GAARs which also exhibits 
shortcomings in the fight against the abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes.1068  
                                            
1066 ITC 1636 [1997] 60 SATC 267 323. 
1067 SARS Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962: An Interim 
Response 15; see also the references in SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and 
Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) 39 et seq to extracts from 
the reports of the Margo and Katz Commissions. 
1068 IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2010 Rome Congress) Volume 95a. Tax 
treaties and tax avoidance: Application of anti-avoidance provisions 171. 
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The GAARs in their current form are generally further unable to apply at the 
moment that the corporate veil is used for tax purposes. That moment is not when 
income accrues to the company, but rather when the assets and resources 
necessary to generate that income is transferred to the company.1069 The GAARs 
will apply only to the earlier transaction. The tax purpose required for the GAARs 
to apply will only exist for the shareholder, and the transfer of the assets will be 
the only transaction to which the shareholder will be a party. Moreover, when the 
company subsequently uses the assets, it will be utilised to generate income on 
which a tax benefit is achieved for the shareholder. Yet another party, the 
company, will enter into the income producing transactions for commercial 
reasons on a normal basis and not for tax purposes. 
When the arrangement, whereby assets are transferred to a company, is 
considered in terms of the four potential indicators for abnormality, varied results 
are achieved. The two new indicators,1070 not previously present in the now 
repealed section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act, show a potential increase in 
effectiveness when addressing the use of corporate personality for tax purposes, 
compared to the “arm’s length rights and obligations”1071 and “normal means or 
manner”1072 tests. It would also appear that the onus is now on the taxpayer to 
show that an arrangement should not be considered “abnormal” in terms of any 
of the four indicators, which differs from the position under the repealed section 
103(1). 
However, even the “commercial substance”1073 and “misuse or abuse”1074 tests 
prove to have their limitations in addressing the use of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes, for the reasons discussed above and linked to the inherent two-
stepped nature of using the corporate veil for tax reasons.1075 
                                            
1069 See the text to part 3 1 of this chapter above. 
1070 See the text to parts 3 3 3 and 3 3 4 of this chapter above. 
1071 See the text to part 3 3 1 of this chapter above. 
1072 See the text to part 3 3 2 of this chapter above. 
1073 See the text to part 3 3 3 of this chapter above. 
1074 See the text to part 3 3 4 of this chapter above. 
1075 See the text to part 3 4 of this chapter above. 
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Even if the onus of proof regarding the application of the GAARs has shifted 
to the taxpayer, the effectiveness of the GAARs are overall limited in addressing 
the use of corporate personality for tax purposes. 
  




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
1 Introduction 
The legal fiction of separate legal personality is a fundamental part of the modern 
commercial legal framework. Although legal personality is not limited to 
companies, the company form has been the focus of this dissertation.  
The limited liability of the company was developed to satisfy a particular 
commercial need.1076 Limited liability serves as an obvious incentive to economic 
growth, promoting economic activity whereby individuals can, through a 
company, undertake economic ventures with the assurance that potential losses 
that may result are limited. This is the purpose that separate legal personality 
serves in an economic context.1077 
Nowadays legal personality usually flows from statute,1078 even though legal 
personality has strong common law roots.1079 As a separate legal person the 
company is able to own assets and to earn its own income by using those 
assets.1080 Due to its separate legal personality the law of taxation also treats a 
company as a taxpayer in its own right, capable of being subject to tax on the 
income generated by the deployment of its assets.1081  
For income tax purposes in particular it may be of benefit for individuals to 
involve companies or layered company structures in transactions due to the 
beneficial regimes that the Income Tax Act affords companies. Involving a 
company in commercial activities may be beneficial for a non-corporate entity 
from an income tax perspective, even though commercially very little else is 
                                            
1076 See the text to ch 2 part 2 3 above. 
1077 See the text to ch 2 part 2 2 above. 
1078 In South Africa through s 19(1) and (2) of the Companies Act. 
1079 See the text to ch 2 part 2 1 above. 
1080 See the text to ch 2 part 2 3 above. 
1081 ITC 1618 [1996] 59 SATC 290 and ITC 1670 [1998] 62 SATC 34. 
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achieved.1082 As already said, I consider the use of the company solely for tax 
purposes to amount to an abuse of the doctrine of separate legal personality.1083 
The four examples listed in chapter 1 part 3 above present instances where 
the company form may be used only to serve the tax saving purposes of the 
individuals who are shareholders of the companies discussed there. 
Example 1 illustrates how an individual can avoid the imposition of dividends 
tax by transferring his share investment portfolio to a company wholly owned by 
him. 
Similarly in Example 2 a businessperson transfers a business owned in his 
own name to a company. The economic unit comprised of the individual and the 
company may now benefit from so-called tax arbitrage due to the more beneficial 
corporate tax rates applying to the business now operated in the company, 
compared to what would have been the case had the business remained in the 
individual’s hands. 
Example 3 involves an instance of treaty shopping, achieved through the 
incorporation of an intricate web of companies situated in different countries. 
These companies would each in turn receive and pass on profits in order to 
benefit from reduced withholding tax rates under a double tax treaty, repatriating 
profits to their ultimate shareholder in an as tax effective manner as possible. 
Finally, Example 4 involves a trust transferring capital assets to a company in 
which it owns shares in anticipation of the sale of those assets to third parties. In 
doing so the trust and company considered holistically will benefit from the more 
beneficial tax rates applying to the company upon the subsequent disposal of the 
assets than would have been the case had the trust disposed thereof itself. 
This dissertation considered whether the application of the doctrine of piercing 
of the corporate veil can address such abuse of legal personality, be it in terms 
of the common law, section 20(9) of the Companies Act or the GAARs in the 
                                            
1082 See the text to ch 5 part 1 and n 244 above. 
1083 See the text to ch 2 part 2 2, ch 3 part 3 3 2 3 and ch 4 part 2 2 above. 
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Income Tax Act.1084 In what follows, each of these three potential piercing 
mechanisms is applied to the four examples.1085 
 
2 Piercing the corporate veil 
As said above, piercing of the corporate veil involves disregarding the legal 
personality of a company for limited purposes.1086 Through the application of the 
piercing doctrine the shareholder and company are considered the same person 
in law: the company is therefore no longer considered a separate legal entity.1087 
Other legal doctrines may in certain circumstances have the same practical effect 
as piercing.1088 However, the unique legal requirements for the piercing doctrine 
to apply clearly distinguish piercing from other legal constructs and confirm its 
existence in law as a separate, self-standing doctrine.1089 
This dissertation considered the possibility of applying the piercing doctrine in 
any one of three forms as a remedy to address shareholders’ abuse of the 
company form for income tax purposes.1090 These three forms are: in terms of 
the common law,1091 through application of section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act1092 or through application of the GAARs in the Income Tax Act.1093 Should the 
doctrine in any of these forms find application, piercing would be an effective 
remedy to address the intentional avoidance of tax since piercing have the effect 
that income legally accruing to a company will be deemed to have accrued 
                                            
1084 Ss 80A to 80L of the Income Tax Act.  
1085 See the text to parts 2 1 to 2 3 of this chapter below. 
1086 See the text to ch 2 parts 3 1 and 6 1 above. 
1087 See the text to ch 2 parts 3 1 and 6 1 above. 
1088 See the text to ch 2 parts 4 2 1 to 4 2 8 above. 
1089 See n 136 above. 
1090 As already said, piercing as considered in this dissertation is limited to a 
consideration of the remedy’s potential application as remedy against impermissible tax 
avoidance (ch 2 part 5 2 above) vis-à-vis taxpayers avoiding payment of pre-existing tax 
obligations (ch 2 part 5 1 above).  
1091 Ch 2. 
1092 Ch 3. 
1093 Ch 4. 
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directly to the shareholder.1094 The potential unique tax advantages that the 
company form may have otherwise secured under these circumstances would 
then be unavailable to the shareholder.1095 
 
2 1  Common law piercing doctrine and abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes 
The content of the common law piercing doctrine in South Africa is best set out 
in Cape Pacific.1096 It involves using the separate identity of the company to 
perpetrate fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct; policy considerations are 
then relevant to determine whether such use is serious enough to warrant a 
disregarding of the corporate veil. 
The potential application of the doctrine for tax purposes involves two 
questions of fact and two questions of law. The questions of fact are whether the 
alleged abuser was in a position to exercise control over its share of the corporate 
veil,1097 and further whether it did so for tax related reasons.1098 The questions of 
law are whether the use of the corporate veil for tax purposes amounts to 
improper conduct,1099 and then whether policy considerations deem such 
improper conduct serious enough to warrant withdrawing the protection afforded 
by the corporate veil to shareholders.1100 
Improper conduct would be present where a person attempts intentionally to 
evade1101 a legal obligation from arising for him or her. Although applied in Cape 
Pacific in the context of the evasion of contractual obligations, there is no reason 
                                            
1094 See the text to ch 2 part 6 1 above. 
1095 See the text to ch 2 part 5 2 above. 
1096 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 above. 
1097 In other words, whether the person was able to exert shareholder control. 
1098 Be it in the capacity as de facto shareholder or in-substance shareholder (see the 
text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 5 2 above). 
1099 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 above. 
1100 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
1101 See the text to ch 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 4 1 above which confirms that a subjective 
approach is required. 
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why the piercing doctrine should not also apply to the evasion of obligations 
imposed by statute.1102 The evasion of an otherwise legal tax obligation from 
arising amounts to impermissible tax avoidance.1103 When persons with 
shareholder control over a company use it mainly for tax purposes, it would by 
implication amount to improper conduct. 
In my view a definitive societal shift has taken place in the area of tax 
avoidance, which is in line with Benade’s “doelmatigheidsreël”. Public policy is 
especially relevant in the current South African context where Government which 
levies tax is regarded as the mechanism through which a more equitable 
distribution of wealth and economic opportunities should be effected.1104 Public 
policy considerations should therefore play a significant role in developing the 
common law. Even if the intentional avoidance of tax on its own was previously 
not considered serious enough to warrant piercing,1105 strong arguments exist for 
the piercing doctrine to be so applied now.1106 The effect of piercing of the 
corporate veil is limited1107 and the other rights and obligations of the company 
remain unaffected. Consequently, many of the objections usually raised against 
the piercing of the corporate veil fall away when it is used to fight impermissible 
tax avoidance.1108 
South African courts are yet to consider the two questions of law referred to 
above where a shareholder intentionally uses a company to mitigate the 
shareholder’s own ultimate tax cost. As far as the questions of fact are concerned, 
the burden of proof rests on the taxpayer to show that he or she as shareholder 
did not use his or her control over the company to create a tax benefit.1109 
                                            
1102 See also the generality of the rule laid down by Lord Sumption in Prest (see the text 
to ch 3 part 4 1 above). 
1103 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 1 above. 
1104 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
1105 Even though no authority could be found to suggest that this was the case. 
1106 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
1107 See the text to ch 2 part 6 1 above. 
1108 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 and ch 4 part 4 above. 
1109 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 3 above. 
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In each of the four examples1110 it was assumed that the taxpayer in question 
mainly used a company for tax purposes. Applying the piercing doctrine on this 
basis, common law piercing would present an adequate remedy against a 
shareholder’s tax use of the company.  
If piercing was applied in Examples 1 and 3 withholding tax consequences 
would arise for the shareholders as if they had directly held the interests in the 
underlying investments. In Examples 2 and 4 piercing would have the effect of 
the individual and the trust respectively being taxed themselves at their relevant 
tax rates and on the profits realised by the company. 
 
2 2  Section 20(9) of the Companies Act and abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act embodies the common law piercing doctrine 
in legislated form.1111 While there may have been doubt previously as to whether 
the piercing doctrine is still relevant,1112 section 20(9)’s introduction removed such 
doubt. Section 20(9) also clarifies that the piercing doctrine is also no longer a 
remedy of last resort.1113  
I anticipate that South African courts will now apply the piercing doctrine with 
less circumspection than in the past, and not only because the doctrine was 
previously only applied as a remedy of last resort. The principle of separation of 
powers played an important role in this regard.1114 Where the judiciary had in the 
past been willing to pierce the corporate veil in terms of the common law, it only 
did so in in those clear cases where it was satisfied that it was not overstepping 
in terms of the separation of powers doctrine by disregarding legal personality 
created by the legislature. In the absence of statutory guidance to the contrary, 
                                            
1110 See the text to ch 1 part 3 and part 1 above. 
1111 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 above. 
1112 See n 136 above. 
1113 Although this perhaps never was the case in South African common law (see the text 
to ch 3 part 2 above). See also the text to ch 4 part 3 3 above. 
1114 See the text to ch 3 part 1 and ch 4 part 3 2 above. 
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the courts would only have been entitled to disregard statutorily created legal 
personality where it was clear that the use of separate legal personality in a 
particular instance was beyond what the legislature intended it to be used for.1115 
A good example would be where a company is used to commit fraudulent acts.1116 
Section 20(9) now removes this fundamental barrier. The legislature now 
expressly empowers courts to pierce the corporate veil. They may now do so 
within the boundaries of the Companies Act and without applying an overly 
conservative approach through fear of overstepping. The courts are now 
expressly authorised by the legislature in section 20(9) to pierce the veil where it 
is being unconscionably abused. 
This research has come to the conclusion that where a shareholder 
subjectively uses the separate legal personality of a company mainly for tax 
purposes that use would amount to an unconscionable abuse as contemplated 
in section 20(9).1117 As is the case with the application of the common law remedy 
considered in part 6 2 1 above, section 20(9) could find application in Examples 
1, 2 and 4. In all three examples the shareholders used the company form 
primarily for tax reasons. Avoiding a statutorily created legitimate tax obligation 
and avoiding a contractually established obligation1118 should be treated in the 
same manner. Both instances amount to an unconscionable abuse of the 
corporate veil. 
Example 3 which deals with a scenario involving treaty shopping, will in all 
likelihood involve the interposition of foreign incorporated companies not 
governed by the provisions of the Companies Act.1119 Although arguably exempt 
from the application of section 20(9), it is conceivable that the South African 
courts will seek to develop the common law piercing doctrine in line with section 
20(9)’s provisions. Foreign companies could ultimately become subject to the 
                                            
1115 Not dissimilar to what a purposive approach to the Companies Act may have 
required. 
1116 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 1 above. 
1117 See the text to ch 4 part 4 above. 
1118 WT v KT in ch 4 part 2 3 5 above. 
1119 See the text to ch 4 part 3 4 above. 
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same standards in terms of the South African common law as South African 
companies are in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
 
2 3 The Income Tax Act’s general anti-avoidance rules and abuse of the 
corporate veil for tax purposes 
If a company is used for tax purposes, one would in the context of the Income 
Tax Act expect to find that three of the four requirements for the GAARs would 
already be present. The only factor that normally would remain to be considered 
would be whether the use of the corporate veil in such an instance would also 
amount to “abnormality” in terms of any one of the four indicators in section 80A. 
In this regard there are strong arguments that the onus of proving the absence of 
all the indicators for abnormality rests on the taxpayer.1120 
The “arm’s length rights and obligations test” appears to be wholly ineffective 
to curb the tax use of the corporate veil.1121 Using the company primarily to 
achieve an avoidance of tax involves exploiting the company’s ability to own 
assets rather than participating in non-arm’s length-based transactions. A 
company achieves a tax saving benefit for its shareholders merely by virtue of 
holding and utilising its assets and resources. In transferring the ownership of 
assets to a company, which assets the company can acquire by entering into 
transactions on perfectly legitimate arm’s length terms, the company attracts the 
more beneficial tax consequences illustrated in Examples 1 to 4. This is 
especially the case where a company acquires assets in exchange for the 
issuance of shares.1122 
The second “means or manner test” proves to be almost equally ineffective for 
largely the same reasons as the arm’s length test above.1123 Where a tax benefit 
would arise by virtue of ownership of assets being placed in a company vis-à-vis 
ownership being retained by its shareholder, the ownership of the assets may be 
                                            
1120 See the text to ch 5 part 4 above. 
1121 S 80A(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act.  
1122 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 1 above; see also Example 4. 
1123 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 2 above. 
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transferred to the company by normal means or in a normal manner, thus not 
falling foul of the provisions of section 80B(a)(i) or (b). 
It may be different in the treaty-shopping scenario illustrated in Example 3. A 
court would be likely to regard the repatriation of profits to an ultimate shareholder 
through an intricate web of companies to involve abnormal means or be an 
abnormal manner in which to structure commercial share ownership. The 
difficulty with such an argument would again be that the act of repatriating profits 
itself will not be done abnormally; it would merely flow in accordance with the 
earlier created legal structure. To show that a tax benefit arises through abnormal 
means or in an abnormal manner, it is necessary to show that the initial creation 
of the corporate structure was done by abnormal means or in an abnormal 
manner. 
The commercial substance test in section 80C(1) does not present a clear 
remedy against the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes if not applied in 
conjunction with section 80F(a).1124 The same would apply to the specific 
scenarios identified in section 80C(2).1125 The operation of section 80C(2) is 
nevertheless not limited to the specific pre-conceived scenarios identified in 
sections 80C(2)(a) and (b).1126 It is conceivable that the scope of section 80C(2) 
is wide enough to include instances where an entity is purposefully interposed in 
a corporate structure solely for tax related purposes.1127 This is particularly the 
case when section 80F(a) is applied in conjunction with section 80C.1128 Section 
80F(a) enables the Commissioner to treat two or more connected persons as one 
when considering whether commercial substance exists. This is significant: 
commercial substance for purposes of section 80C would ordinarily exist because 
a company has commercial substance through, for example, the ownership of 
assets. However, this legal reality may be ignored by application of section 
80F(a). In virtually all instances where shareholders use the corporate veil for tax 
                                            
1124 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 3 1 above. 
1125 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 3 1 above. 
1126 S 80C(2) of the Income Tax Act.  
1127 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 3 2 above. 
1128 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 3 3 above. 
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purposes, the shareholder and company will be connected persons as defined. It 
follows that for a taxpayer to pass the commercial substance test in section 80C 
it must be clear that commercial substance is created when including a company 
in a corporate structure. If one keeps in mind that the commercial content of the 
company and the shareholder separately would in most instances be the same 
as the commercial substance of the two considered as a single economic unit, 
insufficient commercial substance could exist, resulting in section 80C finding 
application. 
A significant limitation to the application of section 80C as an indicator for 
abnormality is that it only applies in the context of business.1129 Where the 
commercial substance test is applied to the examples above, all of which are 
arguably framed within the context of business,1130 the use of a company in 
Examples 1 to 4 would seem to lack commercial substance when section 80C(2) 
is applied in conjunction with section 80F(a). 
A further limitation on the application of the GAARs is the wording of section 
80B. This limitation is equally applicable when applying the “misuse or abuse” 
indicator for abnormality.1131+1132 
Section 80B’s ineffectiveness stems from the fact that its scope is limited to 
addressing the tax consequences of the particular impermissible avoidance 
arrangement.1133 In order for section 80B to apply, it is necessary to identify both 
the relevant impermissible avoidance arrangement as well as its tax 
consequences. This arrangement will involve the transfer of assets to a company 
as part of an effort to craft a more favourable tax result in future. In all four of the 
examples given in this dissertation, such a transfer of assets takes place.1134  
                                            
1129 S 80A(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act.  
1130 Although guidance on which transactions would be considered to take place in a 
business context and which not, remain unclear. See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 3 2 above.  
1131 See the text to ch 5 part 3 4 above. Considering the uncertainty linked to the content 
or purpose of s 80A(c)(ii), it is considered unlikely that this provision may be applied to 
even begin with. 
1132 S 80A(c)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
1133 See the text to ch 5 part 3 4 above. 
1134 See text to ch 1 part 3 above. 
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In all of these cases, tax is avoided by using a two-step transaction.  
The tax benefits of the structure created by the first step will only materialise 
when the second step takes place. The income-earning transactions forming part 
of the second step, are not entered into for tax purposes. The company enters 
into them for its own commercial non-tax purposes. These transactions do not 
amount to impermissible avoidance arrangements. It is also doubtful whether 
these transactions through which the company earns income, will display 
sufficient unity with the first step to be considered part of the same arrangement 
as the first step. Furthermore, it is improbable that the remedial provisions in 
section 80B can be applied to either step one or step two.1135 Since little or no tax 
consequences arise by virtue of the transfer of assets to the company, section 
80B presents no real remedy to the Commissioner to apply in such cases.  
Overall the GAARs present little prospect of being effective remedies against 
taxpayers using the corporate veil as a tax reducing mechanism. The inherent 
weakness of the GAARs in this respect is largely due to the Income Tax Act’s 
recognition of the separate legal personality of the company form. The Income 
Tax Act’s acceptance of this gives rise to the point of departure that a company 
should be treated as a thing of legal substance, even where the fiction is used 
contrary to the purpose and context of the Act as a whole. 
 
3 Comparison of effectiveness 
When comparing the common law piercing doctrine and section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act, I concluded that, save for companies incorporated outside South 
Africa,1136 the two remedies are the same.1137 The remedy in section 20(9) will 
mostly mirror the South African common law doctrine, but the corporate veil of a 
foreign company may still be pierced in terms of the common law as the ambit of 
the Companies Act does not extend to non-South African companies. 
                                            
1135 See the text to ch 5 part 3 1 above. 
1136 See the text to ch 4 part 3 4 above. 
1137 See the text to ch 4 part 2 3 5 above. 
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Remarkable similarities exist when comparing the potential remedy in section 
20(9) in a tax context with the GAARs in the Income Tax Act. Both require a tax 
purpose as main motivation for entering in an arrangement and ultimately for that 
tax benefit to be achieved. The onus of proof will also be on the taxpayer 
irrespective of whether SARS applies the GAARs or section 20(9) as remedy.1138 
The difference between the two remedies is that the GAARs in the Income Tax 
Act require “abnormality” to be present in a particular arrangement involving the 
company, whereas section 20(9) of the Companies Act requires the company’s 
use to amount to an “unconscionable abuse”. Abnormality is not a requirement to 
pierce, which is why this dissertation argues that piercing is a much more effective 
remedy in a tax context than the existing GAARs for which abnormality is a 
requirement. In all four Examples, the dissertation shows that the GAARs may in 
all likelihood be ineffective, where the primary objective is tax avoidance. The 
reason is that the GAARs require “abnormality”, but these transactions are 
entered into in a normal manner.1139 
This dissertation identified the abnormality requirement as the main reason for 
the limited potential application of the GAARs to address the intentional 
avoidance of tax through use of a company, in spite of the two additional potential 
indicators introduced in 2006.1140 The absence of any reported judgments on the 
application of the GAARs since their re-introduction as sections 80A to 80L of the 
Income Tax Act hints at the inadequacy for these rules to address the intentional 
avoidance of tax in South Africa. An analysis of each of the four potential 
indicators for abnormality in this context also shows that the GAARs are an 
ineffective remedy. Their potential application appears to be limited to a few 
specific examples.1141 
The remedy in section 20(9) of the Companies Act is a much more adaptable 
and effective one due to its inherent generality. Unlike the provisions in the 
                                            
1138 See the text to ch 3 part 5 2 3 above. 
1139 See the text to ch 5 part 3 1 above. 
1140 See the text to n 1067 above. 
1141 See the text to ch 5 parts 3 3 2 and 3 3 3 2 above. 
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Income Tax Act, this section’s effectiveness is bolstered by the explicit provision 
that legal personality is not absolute.  
The test in section 20(9) is whether the use of the corporate veil can be said 
to amount to an “unconscionable abuse” of the legal personality of the company. 
In other words, was the corporate personality of the company used to escape an 
otherwise legitimate legal obligation from arising1142 to the extent that policy 
considerations would require such separate legal personality to be disregarded? 
When the legal obligation being evaded involves the avoidance of a legitimate 
tax liability for a shareholder, the use of the corporate veil for this purpose will 
necessitate piercing in terms of policy considerations – a conclusion also reached 
in this dissertation.1143 
Section 20(9) creates the possibility that the corporate veil may be pierced in 
general. Save for the provisions of section 80C(2) read with section 80F(a), the 
GAARs in the Income Tax Act stop short thereof.1144 And even this piercing 
provision is also bound to be ineffective due to the remedial provision in section 
80B which maintains the principle that the company as separate taxpayer suffers 
its own tax consequences.1145 
 
4 Recommendation 
This dissertation identified the broad potential use of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes1146 and concluded that there exists a clear remedy against it in section 
20(9) of the Companies Act.1147 It is surprising that neither the previous common 
law piercing remedy nor the legislated remedy in section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act has been used to any significant degree in this context before.1148 This 
becomes even more surprising when one considers how clearly ineffective the 
Income Tax Act’s GAARs are in addressing such abuse. 
                                            
1142 See the text to ch 3 parts 5 1 1 and ch 5 part 3 3 4 2 above. 
1143 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 4 2 above. 
1144 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 2 above. 
1145 See the text to ch 5 part 3 4 above. 
1146 See the text to ch 2 part 5 2 above. 
1147 See the text to ch 4 part 4 above. 
1148 See n 248 above. 
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Two alternative solutions are available to address the South African Revenue 
Service’s persistence to try and apply the GAARs even though it has a much 
more appropriate remedy available in section 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
The first alternative is to create awareness of the potential application of 
section 20(9) as a remedy against impermissible tax avoidance. Taxpayers and 
SARS alike are well aware of the provisions of the GAARs, but this does not seem 
to be the case with section 20(9). I regard the lack of application of section 20(9) 
in a tax context to be due to a lack of awareness of the potential application of 
the remedy rather than the inappropriateness of piercing as a remedy against 
impermissible tax avoidance. Moreover, considering SARS’ increased appetite in 
recent years to use common law remedies1149 as tools against impermissible tax 
avoidance as well as its apparent misgivings regarding the efficacy of the GAARs, 
it is suggested that there should be an increased awareness of the piercing 
doctrine in SARS.  
The second recommendation would be to strengthen the GAARs in the Income 
Tax Act to address the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes, both in 
determining whether an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” is present as 
well as in applying the remedial provisions contained in section 80B of that Act. 
The presence of the piercing provision in section 80F(a) has the potential to be 
an effective remedy to counter the abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes.1150 I would therefore propose that the wording of section 80C, read 
with section 80F, be extended to include a context outside business in section 
80A. The GAARs would further benefit from an amendment of section 80B 
making its remedies also applicable to the tax consequences arising from 
transactions following on and enabled by an impermissible avoidance 
arrangement. This would follow the approach currently adopted in other 
jurisdictions.1151 
                                            
1149 Various reported judgments (Sasol Oil, Bosch and NWK are pertinent examples) 
illustrate a reliance in South Africa on the common law simulation doctrine and where it 
has been applied as a remedy against transactions aimed at avoiding tax. 
1150 See the text to ch 5 part 3 3 2 above. 
1151 See the text to ch 5 part 3 4 above. 
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Of the two recommendations above creating increased awareness of the 
potential ambit of the piercing remedy would involve a less dramatic intervention, 
yet achieve the same result as statutory amendments to the GAARs. Increased 
awareness can also be achieved without intervention on the part of the legislature 
and would keep the existing legal framework intact. Increased awareness should 
therefore, in my view, be the preferred option. In comparison, changes to the 
GAARs would require statutory intervention which would be superfluous given 
that sufficient remedies already exist in section 20(9) of the South African 
Companies Act to address the abuse of the corporate veil for tax purposes. 
It may be tempting to consider a third approach whereby specific anti-
avoidance remedies are introduced to address specific incidences of 
impermissible tax avoidance. However, given the wide-ranging potential for 
abuse, it would be difficult to anticipate and legislate against all possible instances 
of abuse in this manner. 
Experience with specific anti-avoidance remedies discussed in this 
dissertation1152 exposes the reality that specific anti-avoidance measures have 
the inherent problem that they require extremely careful drafting so as to not 
affect legitimate commercial transactions or structures being entered into. It is 
therefore my view that a remedy of general application is required to address a 
problem that requires a policy-based intervention. Such an intervention may take 
the form of either the legislature strengthening the GAARs in the Income Tax Act 
or the judiciary ensuring that section 20(9) is interpreted and applied in such a 
manner that it allows a policy and economic substance-based approach.1153  
 
5 Conclusion 
Separate legal personality is a legal fiction developed to satisfy the commercial 
requirements of society and to encourage economic activity.1154 When these 
                                            
1152 See the text to n 244 above. 
1153 Kujinga (2012) CILSA 42 argues that the spirit of tax laws can never be to allow 
taxpayers to avoid tax with no economic justification or commercial substance being 
obtained. I would argue that this principle extends beyond tax laws. 
1154 See the text to ch 2 part 2 2 above. 
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commercial objectives are attained, using the separate legal personality of a 
company is justified. However, where those consequences of separate legal 
personality are utilised for purposes other than what the doctrine of legal 
personality was developed for, it is questionable whether the recognition of legal 
personality should be persisted with, given that the doctrine of separate legal 
personality is being abused.  
Using the separate legal personality of a company mainly for tax purposes not 
only fails to achieve the commercial objectives that the doctrine was developed 
for, but also frustrates the otherwise legitimate imposition of taxes by the same 
legislative body that grants legal personality to the company form to begin 
with.1155 This dissertation concludes that such a use of the separate legal 
personality of the company constitutes an unconscionable abuse as 
contemplated in section 20(9) of the Companies Act.1156  
Through the introduction of section 20(9) the legislature has explicitly 
recognised that legal personality is not an absolute consequence of incorporation 
and that there are limits to the circumstances under which separate legal 
personality will be recognised. When legal personality is unconscionably abused, 
the separate legal personality of a company will not be recognised in spite of the 
policy considerations favouring the strict observance of that legal personality.1157 
In the tax context the only consideration identified which may militate against the 
application of piercing is that of legal certainty. Piercing could nevertheless be a 
reasonable consequence if that danger is addressed.1158 
This dissertation concludes that SARS may apply section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act as a remedy against impermissible tax avoidance when 
taxpayers enter into arrangements with the subjective purpose of achieving a tax 
benefit by using the corporate veil.1159 Section 20(9) is the legislative equivalent 
of the common law piercing doctrine of South African law. This remedy appears 
                                            
1155 See the text to ch 3 part 5 1 2 above. 
1156 See the text to ch 4 part 3 above. 
1157 See the text to ch 3 part 3 3 2 2 above. 
1158 See the text to ch 4 part 3 above. 
1159 See the text to ch 4 part 3 above. 
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to be much more effective in combatting abuse of the corporate veil for tax 
purposes than reliance by SARS on the GAARs contained in the Income Tax Act. 
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